

BULLETIN

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Sixth Session.

November 12, 1922—Opened 12.30 p. m.

Chairman: Comrade Kolaroff, Comrade Markhlevsky.

Contents.

Discussion of report of E. C. (continued). Appointment of resolution commission.

Speakers: Kolaroff, Bordiga, Schuller, Rosmer, Radek, Peluso, Ravenstein, Landler, Acevedo, Sullivan, Domskey, Seidler, Bukharin, Katayama, Rakosi.

The chairman declared the session open at 12.30 p. m. He said that there were still twenty speakers on the list—and perhaps it would be as well to close it. This was agreed to without opposition.

The chairman: The Presidium suggests the appointment of a commission to draft a resolution upon the Executive's report. Here are the names of the comrades representing the various delegations selected to constitute the commission:

Bordiga.
Ruth Fischer.
Jean Renaud.
Roy.
Velti.
Greep.
Stern.
Penelon.
Acevedo.
Ravestein.
Michalkoffsky.
Wajowitch.

Bordiga: Will this commission deal with both parts of Zinoviev's report?

The chairman: No, it will only deal with the first part of the report.

Schuller: We propose the addition of a comrade representing the Young Communist Movement, Comrade Voniovitch.

The chairman: Any objection?..(agreed). The commission is asked to meet imme-

diately, during the course of the discussion, in order to draft its resolution. I call upon Comrade Rosmer.

Rosmer: I am far from wishing to dispute with a comrade of the French delegation concerning the Executive Committee's Report. There will be so much opportunity for disputes when the French question comes up for discussion, that it would be well if we could avoid disputes at this juncture.

Last night, however, at the close of his speech, Comrade Faure made a statement which I consider so important and so serious that I venture to examine it without delay.

At the end of his speech, Comrade Faure expressed a lively regret on account of the attacks which previous speakers had made on the French Party. This is a grave statement, inasmuch as it does not represent Comrade Faure's opinion alone, for we know quite well that it is widely diffused in France even among the comrades who are responsible for the management of the Party. We know that any intervention by members of the Communist Parties or by representatives of the CI are apt to be regarded as improper and intolerable intrusions into the life of the French Party.

Such a conception of the CI—at once false and dangerous—underlies all the

difficulties that have so frequently arisen during the last 15 months between the CI and the French Section.

We are all communists here. We are discussing the internal situation. The special problems confronting the French comrades are not of interest to these latter alone; they are of concern to the comrades of other countries, all the more, seeing that France has occupied a position of importance since the imperialist war. Everywhere the French army has been the tool of the counter-revolution. Our comrades in the other Parties are well advised in criticising here, in so far as they think it necessary, the actions of the French Communist Party.

For instance, Comrade Meyer has sound reason for saying that the attitude of the French Communist Party has greatly hampered the activities of the Communist Party of Germany. We know that this is true. Whatever we may say, we know that our German comrade is right. We know that the French Communist Party has not done its duty, has not acted as it should have done in order to help our German comrades in their daily struggle.

Comrade Meyer says that there was recently held in Cologne a meeting of representatives of the French Communist Party and the Communist Party of Germany. This meeting adopted certain resolutions, but it has been impossible to put the resolutions in force, owing to internal dissensions within the French Communist Party. Meyer adds that the German communists urgently desire the French question to be definitely settled here in Moscow.

I fully agree that this demand is legitimate. Were I asked to recall matters in connection with which our foreign comrades are entitled to criticise the doings of the French revolutionists, I might allude to a very serious incident—the general strike which representatives of French, Italian and British organisations agreed to call for July 21st 1919.

Renaud Jean: The French Communist Party did not then exist.

Rosmer: You know what happened. The general Confederation of Labour had entered into an agreement to call a general strike. At the last moment a new decision was taken. It was declared that,

owing to the difficulties with which the C. G. T. was faced at the moment, and owing to the threat of government action, it would be impossible to keep the pledge and to participate in the strike movement.

The consequences did not tarry. On the morrow of the failure of this strike movement, the French bourgeoisie felt its position sufficiently strengthened to engage in a savage onslaught against the Soviet Republic of Hungary to set the French armies in motion, and to destroy the Soviet regime in Hungary.

Comrade Renaud Jean reminds me that the French C. P. did not then exist. It is quite true that the debit account of the French C. P. is already so large that I ought not to add any items, but I am not thinking narrowly of the French C. P. I am looking at the French working class movement as a whole.

Let me stress my opinion that foreign comrades are perfectly within their rights when they meet us in such a Congress as this, in asking for explanations, in asking: Are you doing everything you ought in the way of preparations? Are you strengthening your organisation so that you may establish a Communist Party competent to fulfill the task that will be assigned to it in existing conditions?

Dormoy: That is precisely what we want:

Rosmer: The phrases used by comrade Faure last night were far from being such as would lead foreign comrades to believe that such was the unanimous opinion of the French delegation. Moreover, if I have alluded to Comrade Faure's declaration concerning this particular point, it is because in my view an utterly intolerable nationalist spirit exists in the French Communist Party, and because it is essential that this spirit should be exorcised. Comrade Dormoy knows that there are certain French comrades (some of them exercising great influence in the party) who consider that a foreign comrade has no right to consider or to criticise the policy of the party.

But whether a communist comes from Italy, Germany, or Russia, for us he should be a communist, not a foreigner. Comrade Dormoy knows, however, that for the members of the French Party this is not primarily a communist, but

primarily a foreigner, thrusting his nose into matters which do not concern him.

I will now proceed to consider the points touched upon in Comrade Zinoviev's report. I shall briefly discuss the question of the United Front, par. 9 of the rules, the crisis in the French Party and the attitude of the Executive of the Communist International in relation to this crisis.

Comrade Duret said yesterday, that when the tactics of the United Front came to be discussed in France there was an almost universal movement against, on the part of the French workers. He added that this was a healthy reaction against very dangerous tactics. I think that in this connection I shall do well to supplement Comrade Duret's exposition.

Why was there this almost unanimous antagonistic movement among the French workers?

The explanation is quite simple enough to recall how the tactics of the United Front were presented to the French workers. They were presented as implying the renunciation of communism, a return to reformism, the abandonment of the principles which had hitherto been the foundation of the CI; there was talk of the revolution being disarmed, and other things of like importance. It is not surprising that the French workers were uneasy, and that they said to themselves: "We absolutely refuse to accept tactics likely to lead us to reconciliation with the dissentients, and the abandonment of communism".

How was it that so fantastic an interpretation of the United Front could so easily be diffused in France?

The reason was that in France there is so little knowledge of the matters which interest the world wide working class movement. The question of the United Front was not entirely new. People might have known something about it. It had first come to the Front in Germany. In France however, it was quite a new idea, and people believed that the proposed new tactics involved a complete rupture with the old.

I do not doubt the sincerity of the comrades who disseminate this dangerous phantasy concerning the United Front. It was owing to their ignorance that they were honestly stupefied by the new

proposals of the Executive Committee of the CI.

If we were to assemble all that was said in France, during this opening period, about the United Front, we might place over it the caption: What the United Front is Not.

The Communists who have so terribly distorted this tactic found supporters among the trade unionists, who were equally lacking in clear-sightedness, and were equally unable to understand the new tactic. It is true that at the moment that this proposal of the Executive came to France, a split was taking place in their Trade Union organisation. At the very time, when, thanks to the reformist leaders, the movement was being rent asunder, it was naturally difficult to put the tactics of the United Front into immediate operation. But the opposition to the United Front was not based upon objections to particular points of methods of application. The United Front was rejected as a whole, being considered a dangerous proposal emanating from the Communist International.

Thus the great majority of the French workers were marshalled against the United Front, and then the existence of this formidable opposition was made an excuse for telling the Communist International that it was impossible to apply the tactics in France. The assertion ran: "We shall have all the workers against us; the workers will not hear a word about the United Front".

In February the French Party sent a delegation to the Extended Executive. It will perhaps be useful to recall that this delegation comprised members representing all trends except the Left wing. Comrade Cachin represented the centre; Comrade Daniel Renoult represented his own trend; and another comrade represented the extreme left. All these comrades were in perfect agreement regarding the tactics of the United Front. They had not then discovered the explanation which was given here yesterday, after the event, by Comrade Duret—that the French Communist Party was too young, that it had no revolutionary past, that it could not run the risk of involving itself in a mass action. At the time, these comrades did not say all that. They said: "A United Front? With

where the dissentients. They no longer wish they are a tiny fraction, not worth anything. The C. G. T. of the rue Lafayette. It is breaking up; the ranks of its unions are depleted, and it would be absurd to seek for any auxiliary force.

Such were the considerations upon which these comrades based their opposition to the United Front. Let me repeat that the comrades represented all the trends except that of the left wing. They were unanimous. They formed an invulnerable alliance, determined to keep the front intact.

The French comrades—at least, those who were there—displayed an energy which would fain see transferred to another field, to the attempt to become genuine communists. Upon this matter of the United Front they exhibited commendable energy. There was some discussion. They perceived that no other section of the International shared their view. Nevertheless, they secured support from the Italian comrades, although these latter really held different views, especially concerning what a Communist Party ought to be. However, the Italians signed documents jointly with the French delegates, thus giving the latter a certain measure of support. The French delegation found therein a reason for maintaining its hostility to the United Front, and for persisting in the position it had taken up.

When the delegation returned to France, there was held a National Council, which reexamined the whole question. In the end a resolution of the most absurd character was voted. Not only did the French Communist Party show that it had completely failed to understand the tactics of the United Front, but it likewise declared that the Communist International and the Communist Parties that had adopted the tactics of the United Front were no longer revolutionary, but were leaning towards reformism, towards social democracy.

It was the French Communist Party which talked in such a fashion.

Comrade Ferdinand Faure complains because a German comrade has criticised the French Party, but he finds it easy to forget what the French Party was doing at this particular time. Left-wing communist is not an easy game to play. Cer-

tain Parties and groups may be justified in adopting such a position. But the French Communist Party is the last which ought to allow itself to play the game of left-wing communism.

Now that the French question has been so frequently discussed by the Communist International, so that all the comrades here present must be familiar with its smallest details, the opinion is universally held that the French Party is not merely not far enough to the left, but is much too far to the right, to be a genuine Communist Party.

Subsequently, this attitude of unmitigated hostility towards the United Front passed away. The French Party, none the less, wished to maintain its hostility, despite the fact that the United Front had been realised to some extent everywhere, not excepting France. Although it had been declared absolutely impossible in France, it was achieved first of all in the trade-union movement. The C. G. T. of the rue Lafayette had been regarded as a spent force, one which no longer need be taken into account. We gain no advantage by deceiving ourselves as to the real extent of our forces. When the comrades of the first delegation arrived here, we had just quitted Paris. Within the space of a few days, nothing had happened capable of modifying the situation. There is no occasion to exaggerate. There is still a force in the rue Lafayette. That is what we said to our comrades, who replied: "No, no; there is nothing left—nothing but dissension, decomposition."

The same tactics were still practised in France. Fallacious and absurd claims were put forward in comparison between the effectives of the C. G. T. U. and the C. G. T. Of course it was difficult to learn the precise figures, but everyone knew that (although it might not be possible to give definite percentages) in the case of certain unions there still remained forces of considerable magnitude faithful to the rue Lafayette. Certain trades and industries of great economic importance, the miners for instance, are still a notable power in their camp. It would be impossible to think of undertaking a general working-class movement without them.

The opposition to the United Front has been weakening, though by slow degrees. The

remarkable feature of the whole thing has been that at the very moment when the United Front was being realised, was being achieved by the organisations on their own initiative (inasmuch as they recognised that unity was imperatively demanded in existing circumstances), the French Comrades were saying: "This is an insignificant matter; we will size up the situation six months hence."

At first they said that the United Front could not possibly be realised; as soon as the United Front was realised, they said: "We'll see by and by."

What has been the result of these tactics? Not only have led the French Party into the condition of passivity. Comrade Duret, who is always on the watch for mass action—and who is right in desiring to involve the Party in mass action, in wishing to draw the Party out of the stagnation in which it has so long been languishing—rejects an opportunity for mass action when one presents itself! He told us that the united front was impossible; but he said that if factory and workshop councils were founded, it would become possible, for they would form the supports of the United Front. The first requisite was to found the factory and workshop councils; then the United Front could be formed, and mass action would follow.

After the second session of the Enlarged Executive, Comrade Frossard returned to France. I cannot say that he had been satisfied that the tactics of the United Front were opportune, and that he had decided to accept them. But he declared that we must no longer be under any illusion as to the opinion of the International on this subject. The French Party was utterly isolated in the matter, the continuance of this isolation was impossible, and it was no longer necessary to await the decision of the Fourth International Congress. (It had been contended, in fact, that the Executive Committee was not empowered to impose such a decision as a disciplinary matter, and that no authoritative ruling could be laid down before the Congress took place.

Frossard came back to France saying that we must no longer wait before accepting the tactics of the United Front. A great many of the Comrades followed

his lead, the result being that at the French Party Congress the tactics of the United Front were adopted by a large majority!

Thus there were interminable discussions with a view to action on a very small scale, when the United Front had already been realised in actual practice. It was realised in spite of the Communist Party, for the Communist Party had persistently been opposed to it.

Here, then, we have effective action. Not merely is the Party non-participant, but it seems to be opposed to the action, without having any alternative action to suggest. The best course for the opponents of the United Front would have been to suggest something better, but they never had anything at all to suggest.

What would have been the position of the French Party, on the other hand, if it had understood from the first its proper role as a section of the Communist International? If from the outset the French Communist Party had understood the tactics of the united front, it would not have been able to enforce them between one day and the next. A more or less considerable period would have been requisite, after which the united front (which is now being realised) would probably have been realised more quickly, and the Communist Party would have reaped the credit. Thus it would have retained the confidence of the working-class; and would have strengthened the still inadequate and feeble ties between itself and the working class.

Let us now consider the dangers of the United Front. Of course the tactics of the United Front, like any other tactics, are not free from numerous dangers which have to be guarded against. In France we have democratic traditions; this entails for the Party the danger of a union with the dissentients for the reconstitution of unity. But even if we were to refuse to adopt the tactics of the United Front, could we be sure of avoiding these dangers? We know them well enough, anyhow!

Comrade Ruth Fischer, whom the French opponents of the united front have attempted to annex, has shown us that her position is very different from theirs. She has pointed out some of the dangers

of these tactics in certain special forms they may assume. This was a useful warning. We must continually be criticising our own course of action, must ascertain in what way we have been mistaken, precisely where we have gone wrong, so that subsequently we may profit by our experience. But because this is necessary, it by no means follows that we are justified in completely rejecting the tactics.

In 1920 the Communist International saved the international working-class movement by forbidding revolutionists to leave the reformist unions. With the tactics of the United Front it has again saved the working-class movement, at a moment when the circumstances had completely changed and when the workers' forces had been scattered.

In 1920 there were still many comrades, good revolutionists, who believed that the period of trade-union organisation was closed, that there was nothing more to be done in the reformist unions to win them over—and yet, until they have been won over we have not proved that we are capable of making a revolution. To win over the unions is the first task of revolutionists, and it is a big one.

By introducing the tactics of the United Front, the Communist International has repeated the same service to the working class.

A split had taken place, and it was necessary to discover a means, none the less, of uniting for a common struggle the elements of the various organisations.

The matter had to be cleared up, for the very sake of working-class action. Such common action was indispensable to remedy the effects of the split which had already made great ravages, and to marshal the workers against capitalism.

I shall now proceed to examine paragraph 9. It is very remarkable that the French Party should have been the one to raise this question, and that it should be the French Party which shows so much interest in the rules of the Communist International. The rules and constitution of the Communist International have not been very widely read in France, nor are they well known there, paragraph 9 has been discovered because of the Fabre affair. Since it was difficult to put up a fight about the Fabre affair, paragraph 9 was chosen as the bone of con-

tention. The text is not perfectly clear. We read that the Communist International can expel a member of this branch. However, the French comrades have said: "The Communist International has no power to expel a member," and they add that paragraph 9 gives unique power to the Executive, and that this rule must be revised.

The very same comrades who have raised the question of paragraph 9, have also brought forward objections to the proposal that henceforward national congresses shall be summoned after the International Congresses. Seizing their chance they have said: "The Communist International claims that the affairs of the national sections can be discussed in the International Congress; in that case, the national sections will themselves have nothing to discuss". They will meet after the International Congress, and their sole function will be to enforce the latter's decisions. We are told that this is unacceptable, that the Communist International belongs to the masses, and that the masses must rule it themselves.

That is what was said in France. The French Communist Party is made up of various fragments of heterogeneous origin, representing different conceptions which have been imperfectly harmonised. Nothing but its tie with the Communist International could make the French Communist Party a going concern. Nevertheless the Communist International has been slandered, has been described as an intolerable creature reducing the national sections to a state of absolute passivity, the one function left to them being the elaboration of principles or the application of tactics transmitted from the centre.

The comrades who have held such views in France realise to-day that their activities have been very dangerous to French communism. Comrade Duret has changed much since he left Paris. We hardly recognise him. But Comrade Bukharin, who had never seen him before, has shown that he knows him very well, and has specified Duret's position in such a way that I think it would be superfluous for me to return to the matter now.

Duret: Why not?

Rosmer: Because the Chairman tells me that my time is up.

I should like to speak very briefly with

reference to a matter on which Comrade Zinoviev's report is not perfectly clear. I prefer to the factory and workshop councils. In the French translation of the report we read that it will be impossible to take the Communist Party seriously until it established factory and workshop councils. Comrade Murphy has done well to underline it by saying that it was not enough for a Communist Party to have the wish to establish such councils, for a number of other conditions were essential. I fully agree. He has shown how the turn of the matter took in Britain. It has taken the same turn in France, and there can be no doubt that the difficulty of establishing factory and workshop councils will be just as great in France as in Britain, though for different reasons. The few attempts that have been made in this direction have been isolated, so that we are not entitled to say that towards the realisation of this desideratum. It is impossible to form a sufficiently clear idea of the constitution of these factory and workshop councils to enable us to speak of them as a phenomenon interesting the party as a whole.

Several Voices: They will be founded.
Rosmer: Of course but it was necessary to stress the foregoing point. In a draft resolution which has been submitted to us, we read:

"The Fourth Congress of the Communist International approves the decision of the Executive Committee on the crisis of the French Communist Party".

I have no time left in which to touch, however briefly, upon the question of the French Party. This matter will come up for discussion later. We shall then show why the decisions of the Executive Committee of the Communist International have been incompetent to solve our crisis, and why the crisis which came to a head during the last Congress of the French Communist Party is of such fundamental importance. (Applause).

Kolarov: The Dutch Delegation has moved to limit the time of each of the speakers on the list to 5 minutes. Twenty more speakers are on the list including representatives of Parties who have not yet been heard from, and others who have already spoken, but who represent opposition groups. We must adopt either this or some other motions of a similar

kind in order to limit the discussion. If we go on at the present rate, we shall require three whole days before we come to an end. As we have not much time at our disposal, we must arrive at some other arrangement.

I call upon comrade Radek to speak on this point.

Comrade Radek: I move that the speakers who have already spoken be struck off the list, unless they be representatives of minorities of their respective parties. This will enable us to allow 10 minutes to the remaining speakers. It is utterly impossible to say anything in 5 minutes; under such circumstances, it should be better to close the discussions altogether.

Kolarov: Is there any motion?

Peluso:—(Italy) We should like to know if an exception will be made in the case of declarations.

Kolarov: A written declaration may be read at any time.

Ravenstein (Holland): Comrades, the Dutch Delegation moves that the remaining speakers be limited to 5 minutes. We were also of the opinion that it is impossible to continue in this fashion, as comrade Kolarov said that under such circumstances two more days would be required. However, we proposed at the same time that the representatives of the Eastern peoples, who have as yet hardly spoken at all, should be given more time. We move that the representatives of the Eastern and colonial peoples (we have chosen this expression for want of a better one but the Congress will understand what we mean) be given the usual time. Comrades, if we carry on the discussions as proposed, it will be perhaps possible (although I do not know the sequence in which the comrades appear on this list) to give the same opportunity to the representatives of the Eastern peoples as was hitherto given to the representatives of the West European Delegations. Such is the Dutch motion, and I propose that at first the vote should be taken on the motion as it stands, and then on the amendments.

Landler (Hungary) — Comrades, comrade Zinoviev, in dealing with the Hungarian question, made an energetic attack on the Hungarian emigration. Just lately over two hundred comrades

were arrested in Hungary, and some of them will probably be condemned to death either to-day or to-morrow. Comrade Zinoviev said very little about the Hungarian movement, and yet he asked the Congress to deal very energetically with this matter. I am of the opinion that if this question is to be discussed, it will be utterly impossible to do it justice in five minutes. The Congress will not be able to come to any conclusion after a five minutes report. I beg the comrades to allow me 30 minutes for this question, the time which was allotted to the comrades from the other parties.

Acebedo (Spain) (Translated by Comrade Sullivan) expressed his regret at being unable to address the Congress in any other language but Spanish. Nevertheless he hopes that a sufficient number of delegates would remain in the Hall to listen to his speech.

He continued as follows: The Spanish Delegation is in complete accord with comrade Zinoviev's statement, except with the part dealing with the workers' Government. He was particularly pleased that the Executive had applied severe but just criticism to the question of the French, Italian, Norwegian and Czechoslovakian Parties. He said that this is the only way for the III International to maintain its tactics.

Although we were formerly against the tactics of the United Front, our representative in the Executive of the III International, together with the representatives for the Italian and French Parties signed an agreement to carry out the United Front tactics in their respective countries. In spite of this agreement the United Front tactics were systematically sabotaged in France, while in Spain, where the difficulties were much greater, especially owing to the syndicalists, the utmost was done to carry out these tactics in good faith. At the time of Comrade Humbert-Droz's visit to Spain, the Spanish Communist Party sent an open letter to the socialists, the reformist and the syndicalists anarchists, proposing common action in connection with a reduction of wages. The secretary of the Miners Federation thereupon proposed to the employers to add one hour to the working day in lieu of this reduction. This proposal would have jeopardised the

most valuable achievement of the working class—the 8 hour day. Thereupon the Spanish Communist Party took up the struggle along the lines of the United Front tactics, and a three months strike was carried out. This strike resulted in the workers returning to work with only a 5% reduction in wages. This is a clear proof that the United Front tactics can be successful, firstly, in stopping the capitalist offensive, and secondly in offering energetic opposition to reduction which made itself particularly felt in Spain during the last year.

I am sorry, my time is too short to tell you in greater detail in what way the United Front tactics can be used against the reactions in Spain.

We consider the question of the workers' government as a reformist illusion. The bell of the chairman reminds me that my time is up, and therefore I cannot deal more fully with this question. I will endeavour to bring up this matter on another occasion, but we are of the opinion that the workers' government will lead to reformism in many of the parts of the III International.

Whatever the resolutions of the Congress may be, the Spanish Party will ways remain faithful to the III International, and will observe International discipline.

Zinoviev: What did he say about Lenin's statement on the infantile sickness of the Party?

Sullivan: On this subject the speaker made the assertion that Lenin's ideas on the infantile sickness of the Communist Party must be considered in conjunction with the question of the workers' government. He did not say anything further on this matter, stating that time was too short to go into this in great detail.

Domsky (Poland): Dear Comrade! First of all I would like to say a word or two on the explanations made by my highly esteemed Comrade Mikhalkovsky. He asserted that there exists in the Polish Communist Party a faction of K. A. P. who, at the last Party Conference represented one fourth of the entire membership of the Conference. I am sure that Comrade Mikhalkovsky has no intention whatever to calumniate our Party, and yet, comrades, it was nothing but

funny to assert that the Party which had been characterised by Comrade Zinoviev as one of the best revolutionary parties in Europe has been tolerating for many years the membership of K. A. P., and that the leader of the K. A. P., Comrade Slussarsky, who is present here, has been regularly elected to the Party Executive during the last six years. It would really have been a shame for our Party if they were really K. A. P.-ment and we had not taken any steps to weed them out. But it is not true. These comrades are not of the K. A. P. They are Communists of the Left. Also Comrade Slussarsky, with whom I do not agree in his anti-parliamentary ideas, is in full opposition to the KAP on the questions of Putsch tactics, of activity in the trade unions, of centralism etc., and has demonstrated a thousand times in practice that he is not of the KAP but a Communist (Radek interposes: KAP is a term of abuse).

I have no definite mandate to speak for the opposition because our illegal conditions are fairly difficult. (Zinoviev: The only good thing about illegality). Yes, it is on account of this good side that I am speaking here formally in my own name only.

On the problems raised in Comrade Zinoviev's speech I would like to say the following: The United Front has been much tried out in our country in the course of the last six months. We have already accumulated a good deal of experience, and I believe that this experience is not encouraging to the adherents of the tactics of the United Front as it has been applied of late. Of course, every time one says something against the United Front one gets the reply: But you do not understand that we must have the majority behind us! And in Moscow one hears at times even a sharper answer: It is only an ass who fails to understand, etc. Of course this is, rather a sharp argument. Such an argument would kill an elephant (laughter). But it is altogether irrelevant to the question. Of course, we ought to win a majority of the proletariat, but it has to be a majority for a Communist Party, not for a hotch-potch of hazy and nebulous idea.

This experience of the United Front we have been collecting everywhere, chiefly

in Germany, but also in Poland: Comrade Ruth Fischer has said here a few things about the United Front in Germany, pointing out the mistakes that have been committed in the application of it, characterising them quite properly. To this I have something to add: When the comrades of the German Executive are defending this tactic, they say: Behold the great victories we have won thereby; the chief among these victories being the strengthening of our Party in Germany. Comrades, when one has such a situation as the taxation compromise, depreciated currency, soaring prices etc, one has to be very careful in claiming that all successes of the Party were due exclusively to Party tactics. No, there were other circumstances behind this gratifying growth of the German Communist Party. And when all claims are now made for the tactics of the United Front we should examine whether the successes in Germany were promoted or hindered by these tactics.

Comrade Radek has claimed very good results for these tactics. He said that we have prevented the Social-Democracy from overwhelming us during the Rathenau action etc., thanks to our cunning tactics. They were unable to combine the reaction in crushing us as it happened during the Kapp upheaval. This was all due to our tactics. At least so I understood him to have said. I maintain, however, that our tactics were much more harmless during the Kapp Putsch than it was during the Rathenau action, and still it did not prevent the Social-Democrats from openly making good cause with the reaction. Why? Because our tactics during the Rathenau action was not at all revolutionary, and the situation was by far less revolutionary than it was during the Kapp Putsch. Should another revolutionary situation arise, and should we take revolutionary action, will militant tactics prevent the Social-Democrats from joining the reactionaries and assaulting us! (Radek: What is reaction?) Yes, if you do not know what it is (laughter).

Comrade Meyer has claimed yet another victory; the Independents have joined the majority Social-Democrats in Germany. Yes, a great victory indeed, but not ours. It was a victory for the Social-Democrats.

and we ought not to dispute it. They have scored yet another victory. The workers in the U. S. P. did not protest against this union. The major part of the independent workers have quite calmly transferred their membership to the Social-Democratic Party, and this because our tactics of the United Front has well paved the way for it, so that the independent workers could glide over quite imperceptibly and Ledebour was left in isolation (interruption). If this be your victory, then I wish you less of such victories—of victories that might lead to your undoing.

I am glad to observe that the Communist Party with the aid of the Executive has taken cognisance of this mistake. The tactics of the United Front is applied quite differently now. Every Communist will subscribe to the way in which the tactics are now applied (I refer to the Factory Councils' movement in Germany). These are the proper tactics.

We, in Poland, have also had some experience with the tactics of the United Front. Comrade Mikhalkovsky has already spoken about it. We have addressed ourselves to the various factions, inviting them to a joint demonstration. In Warsaw we have given up our own demonstrations. In Gracow fifteen of our comrades were brutally maltreated by the P. P. S. It was indeed gratifying tactics. It has its saving grace in the fact that the Party Executive was absent from the demonstrations. (Laughter). This tactic has also had its theoretical effects. During the cabinet crisis in Poland, when Pilsudsky was forming a government headed by Slivinsky the communists in Warsaw sensed the danger of war, but our party press evolved quite a different theory. I must quote the text verbatim so that no one could say that I was reading between the lines. Here is what the editor of our Central theoretical organ had to say:

"One would think that the first duty of the Social-Democratic Party was to demand the immediate political amnesty and the liberation of the revolutionary members of the working class.... It is upon this point that the Communist agitation towards the Slivinsky Government should be centred."

Thus, with the arrival of a new Pilsud-

sky Government we begin with the demand for a political amnesty. (Radek; it was not a war government). Oh yes, it was not a war government before the elections. Here I will quote again:

"A democratic government, very well. But in the Diet and in the methods hitherto applied by the Government, there has been, and there could be, no basis for democracy. This basis could be furnished only by the struggle of the wide masses for democracy, and if Slivinsky had the courage to rely upon the masses, if he had for this purpose started his administration with the amnesty and the proclamation of political liberty for the working class, the Communist Party would gain a good deal thereby. But it is no less certain that the democratic government would gain just as much by winning the support of the masses for a certain length of time, this having a broad and solid basis of popular support."

This reads strikingly like an offer of support to the government by our Party. (Ejaculation: Ah, he is also an interpreter of dreams). These were the experiences that we had in Poland. Fortunately they are comparatively few. (The Chairman rings the bell, announcing that the speaker's time has expired. Voices are heard proposing to extend the speaker's time). This was because in Poland we had no basis for these tactics of the United Front. In Germany we had that basis; in France the demand for the tactics of the United Front has only aggravated the crisis in the Party without bringing any advantage, at least so far, (interjections).

The Chairman: Your time is up.

(Renewed cries: Extend his time).

Meyer: (Germany): I move to extend the speaker's time for five minutes.

The Chairman: Any objection? The motion is carried.

Domb'sky: I must cut short my remarks and come directly to the question of partial demands and workers government, which has been the subject of discussion here. As regards the workers, government, I was in the same boat as my friend Duret, I could not understand the meaning of workers' government in our tactic. At last I have heard a clear definition of this government. Comrade Radek has solaced me in private conversation that such

government is not contemplated for Poland (Radek: I never said it). Oh, then Poland will also have to bear the punishment of this sort of government. It is thus an international problem. Comrade Radek says that the workers' government is not a necessity but a possibility, and it were folly to reject such possibilities. The question is whether we inscribe all the possibilities on our banner we try to accelerate the realisation of these possibilities, once we have inscribed them on our banner. I believe that it is quite possibly that at the eleventh hour a so-called workers' government should come which would not be a proletarian dictatorship. But I believe when such a government comes, it will be the resultant of various forces such as: Our struggle for the proletarian dictatorship, the struggle of the social-democrats against it and so forth. Is it proper to build our plans on such an assumption? I think not, because I believe that we should insist on our struggle for the proletarian dictatorship... If the workers' government is to come, it will come even if we agitate and fight for our full program. It may happen that the working masses would turn their backs on the national labour party and join the social-democrats, as has been the case in Upper Silesia. It would be a step forward, at all events. But it is not our duty to agitate for such a step. We must agitate for our own Communist Party.

But some comrades give a different interpretation to the slogan of Workers Government. We are really out for the Proletarian Dictatorship, but we dare not say it. The working masses are afraid of the Communist Dictatorship, and even when we declare that the Proletarian Dictatorship, is not the Communist Dictatorship, they do not believe us.

I therefore think, that when we meet with opposition to the Communist Dictatorship on the part of opponents whom this "Commissar" dictatorship paints in the blackest colours, it should be our policy to counter-act such a position, not by launching slogans that are pseudonyms, as comrade Zinoviev aptly remarked. Pseudonyms will not win the fight for us. We must state our revolutionary slogans quite clearly. This does not mean to say that we ought make any partial demands.

We should draw up partial demands and we have done so in every struggle, in as much as these were necessary for the struggle of the working masses for the improvement of their lot, and for their weaken the chains of bondage. These slogans we ought to formulate and to support. But we should not advance any slogans in which we do not believe ourselves, we should have no slogans intended to expose anybody or as a means for manoeuvring. We must have slogans either partial or ultimate in which we believe ourselves, and for which we are ready to fight.

In conclusion, I would like to say this: The working class is not so foolish and not so cowardly as some are inclined to think. The working class wants to fight for the revolution. He who speaks to the workers in their own language for any length of time is bound to be understood. It is sheer ignorance of the situation of the working struggle to suppose that the workers can be ordered about like an army now to the right, then to the left, without their own intelligent comprehension. This war can end in victory only when our slogans and our ideology are perfectly clear and well understood by every soldier. Only in this manner can the working class carry on the struggle consistently towards the ultimate goal.

Kolarov: I am going to address you on behalf of the Balkan Communist Federation.

Comrade Zinoviev said that our Federation has hardly functioned during the past year. Unfortunately this is true. Our efforts to make the Federation a political centre for the Balkan Parties have been only partially successful. The work is only just beginning, and it will require the continued united efforts of the Balkan Parties and the effective assistance of the Executive of the International to bring the work to a satisfactory conclusion. Now that the Rumanian Party has been put on its feet, and the Yougo-Slav Party is in course of reorganising itself by adapting itself to the conditions of illegality in which it finds itself, there is every reason to believe that the Communist Balkan Federation will soon become an important factor in the Balkan revolutionary movement.

des, and it is only against the Hungarian emigrés that he thundered. This is not usual of him. The nearest explanation for this is that comrade Zinoviev used this time honoured method because he knew that the Executive had been attacked on the question of the Hungarian movement. He has adopted offensive tactics, in order to compel us to adopt the defensive. However, I cannot even please comrade Zinoviev, whom I respect as a man and as the chairman of the International allow myself to be driven into a defensive position, because I was instructed by the Hungarian organisations to make a clear breast of it on this matter. I am not going to say a word about factions, for there are no factions. However, on behalf of the Hungarian factions I will put the whole truth and nothing but the truth before comrades. If I am to remain loyal, I must tell the Congress quite openly everything that is to be said on the Hungarian organisations, and must not speak as briefly and diplomatically as comrade Zinoviev.

The situation is as follows: A group of leaders of the Communist Party working at present in Hungary (according to authentic reports) will probably be put forward before a special court, and will be sentenced to death. The majority of this group of leaders are emigrés and belong to the faction to which I had the honour to belong at that time. These emigrés returned to Hungary some 12 months and other 9 and 7 months ago. At a time when our factional struggle was at its height, and our factional group had taken up an isolated position, they worked single handed against the social-democratic and the Horthy regime without saying a word about the factional struggle. They worked with heroic self-abnegation, with devotion to our cause and with great success. They published in Budapest a weekly illegal paper ten consecutive numbers of which appeared. Not a single social-democratic public meeting was allowed to pass without a demonstration for the Third International being made. On the question of political influence, I should like to refer to the fact that there was not a week, nay even a day on which the organ of the social-democratic Party did not protest against agitation. In spite of persecutions and social-

democratic denunciations the emigré leaders remained at their post and worked to the last minute. I say it once more that neither in the press, in the agitation, nor in the entire work was the factional struggle ever mentioned, although it raged within the ranks of the emigrés. They sent regularly reports to the Executive by a confidential official who also belonged to the former anti-Kun group. The Executive did not reply to any of these reports. (Hear, hear!)

(The Chairman vigorously rings the bell).

Comrades, I ask for 10 more minutes speaking time.

The Chairman: Comrade Landler asks for another 10 minutes.

The motion is carried by a large majority.

Under such circumstances I must protest energetically against the way in which the emigrés were treated here by Comrade Zinoviev. To bring up the question of the emigrés when since the Session of the Enlarged Executive, namely for 9 months, no factional struggle has taken place, is to say the least, out of place. I can prove it that the Hungarian emigrés have sacrificed themselves ever since the first days following the overthrow of the Soviet Government. Not a month nor a week passed without comrades going to Hungary and sacrificing themselves for the cause. Therefore, I cannot understand how Comrade Zinoviev can bring forward such accusations. I am only speaking for myself and on behalf of those comrades who are now in prison, but I must say that such an attitude towards the emigrés is unjust and does harm to the cause. It goes beyond me, how such accusations can be launched against communists at a World Congress without bringing forward a single proof. Zinoviev will probably refer to two so-called breaches of discipline. He can say that the Executive appointed a Central Committee, and that the latter did not go to Hungary. However, it can be proved that a leader of the Hungarian organisation came to Berlin and stated that we do not want comrades who cannot go into the workshops and factories. He said that the illegal work would be much

more perilous if, for instance, a comrade who was head of the police at the time of the Soviet Government, were to take part in conspiracy work. They sent a report on this matter to Moscow, they did not get a reply.

I was in Moscow until August. The Hungarian question was treated in such a manner as to create the impression that the theory of the dying out of the State was being applied to the Hungarian question. For instance, Comrade Brandler, who functioned in Moscow as the commissary of the Hungarian question, boasted that he filed all the Hungarian reports without dealing with them. When Comrade Brandler left, a commissary for the Hungarian question was appointed who knew Bulgarian and Russian. As none of us knew these languages we could not speak with him. When we complained about it, those in power only shrugged their shoulders. How can we describe such an attitude of the Executive? Would you call this dealing objectively with the Hungarian question? Comrade Zinoviev can also say that a month ago we published a paper in Berlin against the decision of the Executive. However, we let the Executive know that the Hungarian Organisation demanded to have an organ. They wanted to have a four page weekly in order to keep informed about Soviet Russia and the International situation. In this paper there was not a word about the factional struggle. If this purely theoretical breach of discipline is such a crime that the emigrés must be branded for it, and that in a brief reference in a report as was done by Comrade Zinoviev, I must say that he is a born diplomat. Comrades, I hardly think that the World Congress will tolerate such a thing.

Under these circumstances, I have to ask the Congress to adopt the following resolution: 1) To admit the delegation of the Hungarian illegal organisation in addition to the delegation of the Hungarian Communist Party nominated by the Presidium.

The Hungarian organisation have at present only one representative from Hungary, but the emigrés have delegated two more delegates. The two representatives who belong to the emigrés were not allowed to come to the Congress because they belonged to our former

faction. I ask the Comrades to decide that they be admitted to the Congress.

2. "To include into the agenda of the Congress the Hungarian question, the question of the organisations established in Hungary, to appoint a commission for the discussion of this question, the composition of the commission to be the same as that for the other commissions."

3. "The Congress protests against the criminal atrocities attending the examination of the recently arrested Hungarian Communists, and against their being brought before a Star Chamber in order to be condemned to death. The Congress expressed its admiration of and sympathy with the courage with which the Hungarian Comrades work for the revolution, despite the tortures inflicted on them by the white terror."

Comrades, I beg of you to carry this resolution. It is not a question of a factional struggle, it is rather a question that cannot be settled by diplomacy. There is no danger whatever in investigating what is happening now in Hungary and the Hungarian question. One can only speak seriously of the final solution of the Hungarian question, if one makes the present Hungarian movement the point of issue instead of inventing some artificial diplomatic formula. It is not at all a question of who was People's Commissary in Hungary, and of who is the bearer (as Comrade Zinoviev said) of a historic name and can boast of great merits. What is important now to know is who is doing the necessary Communist everyday routine in Hungary, and this work is only done by those Comrades who work at home. Such a question cannot be solved behind the scenes and by diplomacy. The Congress itself can prepare the solution of this question, and if it does that, there will be no more Hungarian question to trouble our minds (Applause).

Katayama (Japan). The Japanese Communist Party has approved the report of comrade Zinoviev. I will not speak here only on the United Front as applying to Japan. The Japanese Communist Party is underground and is still young but we have been working openly through the Trade Unions and by other means. Our unions are fighting unions, having no traditional

difficulties. We have no Henderson, and we have no Gompers, so that our unions could, as soon as the Communist Party was organised, get into them and influence them. Comrades, in the past we have practised the United Front in many instances. When we started the propaganda movement against the Washington Conference all the trade unions cooperated to fight and make propaganda against this bourgeois, capitalistic, imperialistic conference at Washington. Then when the Government introduced a bill against all radical movements in Japan the trade unions of all shades, Anarchist, Syndicalist, Communist and Moderate came together to make effective propaganda so that the Government finally backed down.

We have started a movement under the name of "Hands off Russia", which was similar to that organised in England and now all trade unions and all radical associations are cooperating to fight against intervention and for the recognition of Soviet Russia. We could not do anything for the Russian famine, but with the change of government we started the Russian relief work and now not only trade unions, radical associations, but also even the petty-bourgeoisie cooperated to aid the Russian famine. This aid is all carried on under the control of the Communist Party, although it is deep underground.

Now I want to tell you my feelings during the last few days; we have difficulties with the United Front in the Communist Party. The United Front is not yet established in all countries, it is not established even in all the parties yet. But, comrades, we have a big enemy. We must fight this enemy at all cost. You forget, comrades of France, Italy and other countries; you forget that you must fight the enemy. On the contrary you are fighting each other. You ought to fight for the United Front against imperialism and capitalism. And again I tell you, we have not heard anything about a United Front internationally. What are you doing for other countries to unite them and make a united front against imperialism and capitalism? Nothing so far. I have not heard of anything so far of the international character of the United Front. We want a United Front with the strong Commun-

nist Parties of the world. Colonial countries need the United Front to fight capitalism. The Fourth Congress must impress all comrades going back from here with the necessity for a United Front, not only in their own countries but also in other countries so that we can reach our aim. Someone said that the United Front is a compromise. Yes, it is a compromise, but a compromise to gain our aims. It will not weaken our movement, but strengthen the movement. It is not a compromise with the petty-bourgeoisie, no, it is a compromise with labour leaders in order to reach the workers who are under the influence of these leaders. It will strengthen the Communist movement and enable us to gain our ends.

Marchlewski (presiding) Comrade Rakosi has the floor.

Comrade Rakosi: Comrades, I must confess to you that I do not very willingly limit myself in the discussion to the Hungarian question. The Hungarian question, like the Hungarian Party, is at this moment a very knotty problem; and as you will have noted from the words of Comrade Landler, every step which is not sufficiently considered, and every word which is not weighed, may cost the lives of good fighters. I cannot allow myself the luxury, as comrade Landler has done, to speak of the illegal situation which has in the past and will probably in the future cost the lives of some of our best comrades. I would rather light on the situation of the Hungarian emigrant movement and the Hungarian Party.

Comrades, what is the Hungarian emigration? It is that portion of the Hungarian Communist Party and the Hungarian working class movement, which has had to seek refuge abroad. What has been the nature of the Hungarian Communist Party? It had an energetic and swift period of fruition, which lasted only four months. In four months it seized power, which it retained four and a half months. These eight and a half months could, of course, not suffice to thrash out the various differences of opinion, on matters of and tactics, involved in the upbuilding and consolidating of a Communist Party. The Hungarian Communist Party went into emigration, where the many practical and theoretical differences of opinion could not be passed through the test of actual

practice in the daily struggle, neither could they be settled by activity, mass action or daily contact with the workers.

These differences continue to exist, and manifest themselves mainly in personal strife and abuse.

The Executive has occupied itself for ten months with this question and has taken great trouble in solving the fundamental doctrinal differences as soon as possible. Because these theoretical differences, were of too petty a nature, no adequate steps could be taken. This fact remains, however, that the political emigrants engaged in a quarrel during ten months: pamphlets were published which were a rare tit-bit for the social-democrats, who published long leaders in the "Vorwaerts" in which they threw mud upon our revolution, our Soviet Dictatorship, The Communist Party and the Communist International. The Executive had to take a position with regard to this matter, which occupied the first enlarged session of the Executive. In such a situation it was not only the right but the duty of the Executive to remove this cancer with a keen knife. For a hard and sharp plane is needed. After such a scandal, the Executive could do nothing else than extirpate this malignant growth, with all possible energy. These are the main outlines of this factional struggle.

President Marchlewski: I call Comrade Landler to order.

Comrade Rakosi (continuing): I would like to say something further with regard to the Hungarian Communist Party. Comrade Landler tried to decorate his faction with the wounds and suffering of the Hungarian Communist Party. I must energetically protest against this. The Hungarian Communist Party is not the product of any one faction; it is the product of the Hungarian proletariat, that proletariat which during our and a half months had the power of the State in its hands, and which now realises more painfully every day, what it had lost in the short lived Soviet Dictatorship.

The Hungarian Communist Party, as well as those comrades who are now in prison, have not been a party to this factional strife. To set the activity of the best Communists of Budapest on the

credit side of any one faction, is something against which I must energetically protest.

And another point; it would be most disadvantageous for the Hungarian proletariat and the future of the Hungarian Party if the World Congress received the impression that the Hungarian Party is being shattered by factional strifes. The Power of the Hungarian Communist Party is not to be measured by factional struggles. It suffices to glance at the activity of the Hungarian bourgeoisie which is still greatly in terror of the Communist Party and of its return to power.

The Hungarian counter revolution, which is trying to nip in the bud every Communist adherence by means of fire and sword, is compelled to look to the future and to organise itself in illegal groups to carry on a secret struggle with the Communist movement, which is sprouting abundantly in Hungary. And I hope that the Communist Party of Hungary and the Hungarian proletariat, which in 1919 demonstrated its ability to struggle for emancipation, and which is now carrying on the struggle under unexampled difficulties, will continue in the future to proceed along the path laid out for it by history, by its revolutionary past, despite emigrant factional strife and white terror.

Comrades, I would like to reiterate that it was certainly quite unpleasant for the Executive to clean out this Augean stable and restore order. It wrung the heart of every Hungarian comrade when the matter of our party came before the Executive; and it cut us to the quick when we saw that our labour and struggles had borne such fruit. I am incomplete accord with the last part of Comrade Landler's speech in which he proposes that the World Congress express its sympathy with martyrs protesting against their persecution. I also wish to say that the Communist International lost no opportunity of aiding the Hungarian proletariat whenever possible. You, comrades, know well that we have succeeded in releasing 100 Hungarian comrades from Horthy's dungeons; and I can also state that the Executive immediately took steps to free the present group of arrested comrades from the vengeance of

white "justice". We have nothing against an investigation of the Hungarian question; I would, however, energetically protest against handling this question as one of factional struggle, even in a disguised form. As comrade Landler has suggested, the matter must go either to the Executive or to the Congress. The Hungarian Party, and the Hungarian emigrants have contributed sufficient material for the Second and Two and a half Internationals; and that which comrade Landler has put before us to day is nothing more than digging up offal which had already been buried. I am absolutely opposed to having this matter considered from the point of view of factionalism. (Applause).

The President:

Comrades, we will now take a noon-day rest. But before, I would like to read to you some communications from the Presidium.

The Commission for the discussion of the resolution on the report of the Executive is requested to meet at six o'clock here, in the second hall.

The evening session begins at seven o'clock.

The following still has to be attended to:

The Delegation from Canada demands that they be allowed to appoint a representative in the French Commission. Comrade Spector; and one for the American Commission, Comrade McDonald.

Any objections?

None.

Some delegates from France have proposed that Comrade Scocci Maro, a delegate at the Congress in Paris, be appointed in the French Commission.

Any objections?

None.

Proposition carried

The meeting adjourned at 4.16 p. m.

BULLETIN

OF THE IV CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

No 7.

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Seventh Session.

Monday November 12th (Evening).

Chairmen: Comrade Markhlevsky, Comrade Meyer.

Contents:

Discussion on E. C Report (conclusion). Declarations by delegations: Italian Delegation, also Majority and Minority. French Left Wing, Centre and Young Communist Federation. Resolution on E. C. Report. Voting.

Speakers: Marschall, Sullivan, Friedlander, Vojovich, Malaka, Zinoviev, Scocumare, Graziadei, Souvarine, Darmoy, Pelouso, Meyer, Peri, Domski.

Markhlevsky presiding: Comrades, the various commissions, to which all the members of the Presidium belong, will still be occupied for twenty minutes or half an hour: the discussion must, therefore, be postponed till that time. However, if you desire, we shall proceed with the discussion (voices: "Let us continue"). Comrade Gruen, Austria, has the floor. (a voice: decline; Gruen: "I decline.")

Then Comrade Marshall has the floor. Marshall (America): Comrades: as representative of a group in the American Party which has been accused by Comrade Carr of having failed to harmonise its actions with the decision of the Executive of the Communist International, I would like to declare that this group agrees completely on every question with the policy of the Executive.

I should like to say a few words on Comrade Carr's speech. First of all, allow me to say that Comrade Carr has fallen into the very error which Comrade Bukharin recently criticised: he limited his speech to the internal problems of the Communist Party of America. He expects the delegates to the Congress to accept his words without preliminary knowledge of the concrete facts of the situation in the United States. He said that, considering the smallness of the American Party,

it should be modest. But it seems to me that the smallness of the American Party should not deceive us as to the importance of the problems of this country, for they are the greatest problems of the world revolution. The tasks of a revolutionary party must be most difficult in a country where the bourgeoisie stands at the height of its power, where the working-class movement is backward. Comrade Carr said that the Party had busied itself solely with the theses which Moscow accepted, and which had then bodily transplanted to America. After a while new theses were adopted, the order came to stop all strife, and the strife stopped. A very simple process. But the matter was really not so simple. Moscow is not a Prussian sergeant, and the American Party is not a raw recruit from the country, attentive to all orders; our Party had no reason to await orders from Moscow.

What conflicts have developed in the American Party within recent times? The International decided on the application of the United Front. The question before the American Party was a clear judgment of the situation, and an appropriate application of the policy. The judgment of the majority of the Executive of that time was opposed. The Executive declared