

white "justice". We have nothing against an investigation of the Hungarian question; I would, however, energetically protest against handling this question as one of factional struggle, even in a disguised form. As comrade Landler has suggested, the matter must go either to the Executive or to the Congress. The Hungarian Party, and the Hungarian emigrants have contributed sufficient material for the Second and Two and a half Internationals; and that which comrade Landler has put before us to day is nothing more than digging up offal which had already been buried. I am absolutely opposed to having this matter considered from the point of view of factionalism. (Applause).

The President:

Comrades, we will now take a noon-day rest. But before, I would like to read to you some communications from the Presidium.

The Commission for the discussion of the resolution on the report of the Executive is requested to meet at six o'clock here, in the second hall.

The evening session begins at seven o'clock.

The following still has to be attended to:

The Delegation from Canada demands that they be allowed to appoint a representative in the French Commission. Comrade Spector; and one for the American Commission, Comrade McDonald.

Any objections?

None.

Some delegates from France have proposed that Comrade Scocci Maro, a delegate at the Congress in Paris, be appointed in the French Commission.

Any objections?

None.

Proposition carried

The meeting adjourned at 4.16 p. m.

BULLETIN

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No 7.

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16 November 1922.

Seventh Session.

Monday November 12th (Evening).

Chairmen: Comrade Markhlevsky, Comrade Meyer.

Contents:

Discussion on E. C Report (conclusion). Declarations by delegations: Italian Delegation, also Majority and Minority. French Left Wing, Centre and Young Communist Federation. Resolution on E. C. Report. Voting.

Speakers: Marschall, Sullivan, Friedlander, Vojovich, Malaka, Zinoviev, Scocumare, Graziadei, Souvarine, Darmoy, Pelouso, Meyer, Peri, Domski.

Markhlevsky presiding: Comrades, the various commissions, to which all the members of the Presidium belong, will still be occupied for twenty minutes or half an hour: the discussion must, therefore, be postponed till that time. However, if you desire, we shall proceed with the discussion (voices: "Let us continue"). Comrade Gruen, Austria, has the floor. (a voice: decline; Gruen: "I decline.")

Then Comrade Marshall has the floor. Marshall (America): Comrades: as representative of a group in the American Party which has been accused by Comrade Carr of having failed to harmonise its actions with the decision of the Executive of the Communist International, I would like to declare that this group agrees completely on every question with the policy of the Executive.

I should like to say a few words on Comrade Carr's speech. First of all, allow me to say that Comrade Carr has fallen into the very error which Comrade Bukharin recently criticised: he limited his speech to the internal problems of the Communist Party of America. He expects the delegates to the Congress to accept his words without preliminary knowledge of the concrete facts of the situation in the United States. He said that, considering the smallness of the American Party,

it should be modest. But it seems to me that the smallness of the American Party should not deceive us as to the importance of the problems of this country, for they are the greatest problems of the world revolution. The tasks of a revolutionary party must be most difficult in a country where the bourgeoisie stands at the height of its power, where the working-class movement is backward. Comrade Carr said that the Party had busied itself solely with the theses which Moscow accepted, and which had then bodily transplanted to America. After a while new theses were adopted, the order came to stop all strife, and the strife stopped. A very simple process. But the matter was really not so simple. Moscow is not a Prussian sergeant, and the American Party is not a raw recruit from the country, attentive to all orders; our Party had no reason to await orders from Moscow.

What conflicts have developed in the American Party within recent times? The International decided on the application of the United Front. The question before the American Party was a clear judgment of the situation, and an appropriate application of the policy. The judgment of the majority of the Executive of that time was opposed. The Executive declared

that the application of the United Front in America did not mean, politically, the union with other more or less revolutionary groups and parties, because such groups and parties did not exist. In America, the United Front meant that we should awaken the proletarian masses to political consciousness and then lead them into the struggle. The capitalists themselves helped us in such a solution of the problem. They began the offensive against the working class with all weapons at their disposal. The worker who went on strike to-day, found himself opposed to-morrow by the police, the militia, the State government and the national army. You have all read how a judge in Chicago settled the recent railroad strike simply by forbidding it. This use of political weapons against the working class awakened them to the consciousness of their common interests. Till then, such consciousness had not existed among the masses. They had lost their identity in the two great bourgeois parties, the Democratic and the Republican. But now resolutions are pouring in from the large workers' organisations, as the Brotherhood of Railway Workers, with a membership of half a million, the miners, whose Miners' Federation numbers half a million members, the machinists' organisation, with 200,000 members. In these resolutions, and at their congresses, the workers of the United States demand that an organisation be created which will represent them as a class in the political struggle. Such resolutions attest two things: first, in their origin, they point to the awakening political class-consciousness of the workers; second, the number of such resolutions shows the attempt of their leaders to destroy this spirit.

What is the duty of the Communists in this situation? It seems to me that three paths stand open to us; oppose this spirit which will finally result in the creation of an independent working class party, that is, to oppose the growing tendency of the working class for independent participation in the political struggle; remain passive in the face of such a spirit; or assume the leadership of it. The former majority of the Central Committee decided for the last, that is, it decided to direct this movement,

to take the initiative for the benefit of the masses. This was the fundamental conflict which developed in the American Party on the question of the United Front. Comrade Carr characterised this not as propaganda, but as treason to the Party. The development of the Communist Party is not, after all, a mere mechanical process. By its activity in a proletarian mass party, our Party will be able to draw to itself all those elements sympathetic to its ideals. At the same time, it will create a political mass movement of the elements among the American workers who are not yet ripe for our Party, and thereby considerably advance the proletarian revolution. Our work in the creation of such a Party would secure us an influential place within it. We must not wait until our sectarianism has turned the masses against us, but become an integral part of this movement capable of assuming the leadership of it. In this way, we could render a great service to the proletarian movement in America. These views, this appreciation of the situation, do not conflict in any way with any of the theses, resolutions, or orders of the International. If we have erred it is the duty of the Fourth Congress to point out our error.

In concluding, I would like to say a few words on the question of the support of Meyer London's candidature. Comrade Carr, as an honest man, dared to say that there was a group in the party which favoured the withdrawal of the Communist candidate out of friendship for Meyer London, so that the latter might be elected. What is the truth of the matter? Meyer London is the only candidate of the Socialist Party, who had begun to gain a footing among the Jewish working masses. However, we were not strong enough yet to compete with the Socialist Party which finds its strongest support in this element. If we had nominated a candidate in that district we would have alienated those working masses who still see their own representative in the candidate of the Socialist Party, who do not understand yet that it will make no difference to the workers, whether they elect Meyer London, or a Republican or Democrat candidate. We would have put into the hands of the Socialist Party a weapon to accuse us of

having helped to defeat a candidate of the workers. This we must avoid at all costs. What did we do then? We put up a candidate conducted our campaign as Communists against the Socialist Party, but at the last moment we withdrew our candidate with a declaration to the workers that we did not withdraw because we believe Meyer London a good representative of the workers, but because we had not yet been able to convince the workers of that district that Meyer London was not a good representative, and we wished to give his constituency the opportunity of seeing this with their own eyes. I believe that this was the only possible policy, the one that should have been carried out. Comrade Carr and his friends opposed this policy, but they were too modest to propose any other. However, this is no time for modesty; we have a problem before us to solve. Either we solve this problem, or we abdicate as Communists and as Marxians (Applause).

Sullivan. (America). Comrades, You have heard two representatives from America. Yesterday you heard the representative of the Centre, Comrade Carr. He at least has good intentions. I do not agree with them. He has some very pleasant illusions—the illusion, for instance, that in the American Party the Right Wing and the Centre can work together for Communism. I consider these illusions as harmful. But still he is honest. Just now, you heard another representative of the American Party, Comrade Marshall of the Right Wing. He is the representative of the Mensheviks. He is not honest. He wears a mask over his face. He comes here before you, revealing a little of his real face, saying that we must elect Meyer London, the social patriot to Congress, if not, then the Communist movement will vanish from America.

I happen to represent the Left element in the Party 4000 of whom were expelled and 1000 themselves left the party last January. We were expelled by the faction of Marshall that ruled the party up to September this year.

I have a criticism to make on the work of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. That the Executive Committee of the Comintern has supported the Right Wing of the American Communist Party

too much. And the result of it we see in America to-day—the Party is going down. If there is unity achieved now, it is only partial unity, and artificial unity. It will not last because the Right Wing, and Centre cannot work together and cannot stay for long in one organisation. I criticise the Executive Committee for having forgotten to apply the 21 points in America. Otherwise, we would not have heard the representative of the Right Wing here. To show you the kind of propaganda that was conducted by the Right Wing, I will give you some quotations. These quotations are from the official organ of the party—the official legal organ of the Party under control of the Party, under the control of Marshall and his Executive Committee. The first is on the Genoa Conference. The official organ of the party that was conducting Communist propaganda wrote as follows:

„Nevertheless the Genoa Conference is the first honest attempt of the European rulers to repair the damage of the war“.

In the name of Communism, Mr. Marshall praised the Genoa Conference of the imperialistic bandits.

Marshall: Did I write that?

Sullivan: You were on the Executive Committee and you were responsible. The organ was under your control. You did not contradict it. It was an official editorial of the Party. „The first honest attempt of the European rulers“. That was the kind of communist propaganda put out in the name of the Third International. There is another still better. I will ask the Presidium if it will be possible to put among the pictures where Caplan is shown shooting at Lenin, to put among the social revolutionary pictures one copy of the official organ of the American Party, that was published by Marshall—he is responsible for the policy. He says:

„Besides the political situation at the present time would make it more than fool-hardy to undertake to punish acts committed in the first revolutionary period too severely“.

Was this a policy of Communism?

Marshall: Will you produce those papers.

Sullivan: I will produce them in the

American Commission. You do not think that I have them, but you know it is so.

Chairman: I ask that you will not interrupt the speech because the speaking time is limited.

Sullivan: If it gets under the skin of some people here I cannot help it, I am very glad of it. There is another editorial about the conference of the three Internationals in Berlin. What was given us in the name of Communist propaganda in the same organ? It was written by one of the fighting leaders Mr. XX and it was never contradicted by anybody in the official party press. XX has not forgotten the kiss he received from comrade Vandervelde, the most humble servant of his King, in winter of 1914-15. He is longing now for another such kiss:

"There is something about the call for a united front (Conference of the three Internationals in Berlin) It hypnotised us and the hope softly stirs within us that the time may come again when there will be only one Socialist Party and one International."

So, "It hypnotises us, and the hope softly stirs within us that the time may come again when there will be only one Socialist"—(not Communist) "Party, and one International".

That is the kind of communist propaganda conducted by the Right Wing in America. By the American Mensheviks that were supported by the Communist International, although not knowingly. In this is my criticism of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

So you would not wonder at the revolutionary elements leaving the party. I can give you many more instances of the Menshevik work. The Party was given into the hands of the Mensheviks who openly attacked the 21 points of the Communist International, defended Levi, defended Serrati, and attacked the control of the Communist Party over the legal party organisation. On the united front they propagated organic unity with mensheviks and elected Meyer London the social-patriot to Congress.

Marshall did not care to say that he and the Right Wingers in the Party insist that the illegal party must be liquidated. It conducted a campaign in order to liquidate the underground Communist

Party, and have just the legal organisation to remain with a program within the lines of bourgeois legality. Just as the old Russian liquidators of 1906 and after did. They were for the same big mass party. They promise a big mass party in America with 100,000 members and now it has come down to only 14,000 members according to their own figures, a centrist-menshevik party that is a small sect.

Well, I cannot say all I have to be- cause there is not time, but, so long as the Communist International will not say that the Right Wing Mensheviks must be expelled from the party, you will not see a healthy communist movement in America. You will ever see the real revolutionary elements the working class elements, leaving the party, and it will become nothing but a petty bourgeois movement, that considers its chief task to elect Meyer London, social patriot to congress, as was advocated here some minutes ago.

Markhlevsky: Comrades, the Swiss Austrian and Dutch Delegations have proposed the closure of the debate except for the Young Communist League and for the People of the East. Comrade Vujovich has been appointed for the Young Communist Leagues, and Comrade Malaka, of Java, for the Peoples of the East. Comrade Friendlander will speak on the motion for the closure of the debate.

Friendlander (Austria): Comrades, the discussion has been most exhaustive. All the tendencies have had their say, and I am sure that those present are beginning to feel tired. Moreover, Comrade Zinoviev will speak at some length in reply to the various points by the speakers. Therefore, a continuation of the discussion does not seem desirable. It would be desirable only to hear a representative of the nationalities who have not yet been heard, and also a representative of the Young Communists. I am sure that after a discussion which lasted nearly four days, all comrades will be in agreement with this motion.

Markhlevsky: Does anyone oppose this motion? No. The vote will now be taken. Those who are against the motion, please raise their hand. The motion is carried. I call on Comrade Vujovich.

Vujovich: Comrades, the Young Communist International has always approved and still approves the policy of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. It is of the opinion that during these fifteen month the Executive Committee has carried out the decisions of the Third Congress in the spirit and in the letter.

The Young Communist International has not only expressed in theory its solidarity with the policy adopted by the Executive Committee, but it has also made great efforts to apply the same tactics in the Young Communist Leagues.

We may say that the application of the United Front in the Young Communist League was crowned with complete success in all the countries where it was carried out. In Germany, France, (Czecho-Slovakia, and in other countries, the Young Communist Leagues basing themselves on the general instructions issued by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, have applied the United Front tactics, and we are justified in saying that it was proved in practice that we were right in adopting this line.

The Young Communist International is also in complete accord with the attitude of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the particular question of France, Italy, Norway, Czecho-Slovakia and of the other countries where the Executive Committee had to intervene in the course of the last fifteen months.

The Young Communist International is of the opinion that the desire of the Executive Committee to put into practice in the countries the decisions of the Third Congress, that is to say the desire to win over the majority of the working class, has not only been thoroughly understood by the Executive Committee but has been put into practice in all countries, specially in Czecho-Slovakia and Italy.

The Young Communist International on whose behalf I am addressing you, wishes to emphasise one particular point of Comrade Zinoviev's speech. I refer to the formation of communist nuclei in all the workshops and factories. It is of the opinion that the time has come to put into practice the thesis adopted on this particular point by the Third Congress.

The Young Communist International has already done its utmost to put these theses into practice. I could give you concrete examples of this, notably that of the Lyons region in France. The workshop organisations which we established there have been completely successful, and thus, by our action, communist nuclei came into being in the workshops and factories.

The Young Communist International is of the opinion that the Communist Parties must make a real effort in that direction in the near future.

Another point seems to us equally important, and that is the centralisation of the Communist International and discipline within the Communist International.

The Young Communist International has already shown by the activity of its organisations in the various countries that it believes in discipline and communist centralisation.

In France, and in other countries where the Executive Committee met with a certain amount of resistance on the part of the Communist Party, the Young Communist Leagues were always the first to give the necessary support to the attitude of the Executive Committee within the Communist Parties which had been their companions in the communist struggle.

The Young Communists severely condemn the various breaches of discipline which took place during the period covered by the report of the Executive Committee. We trust that such things will not happen in the future, and that all the communist parties will show that the theses and the resolutions, which formed the basis of the Communist International which was accepted everywhere in various resolutions in the course of several congresses, will be respected not only in words, but that every section will show in all future revolutionary struggles that communist discipline exists and is really applied. We also trust that owing to this, the Executive Committee of the Communist International will feel more sure than heretofore that all its decisions will be carried out. We trust that henceforth the watchwords of the Communist International, such as the United Front, will be adopted and applied in their entirety. The Young Communist International is of the opinion that the

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In this way, the Communist International and its Executive Committee will be able to conduct the revolutionary struggle which the situation demands with much more energy than heretofore (applause).

Malaka: (Dutch Indies). On behalf of the Communist Party of Java, I wish to speak on the importance of the question of the United Front for the oppressed masses of the East. I should like to put several questions to Comrade Zinoviev and Kadek. Perhaps Comrade Zinoviev did not mean that Java must have a different United Front. Perhaps our United Front is different from the others. However, the decision of the Second Congress of the Third International means that we must form a United Front with the revolutionary nationalists. Thus, our United Front is not a United Front with the social-democrats but with the revolutionary nationalists. We must recognise in our country that we also need a United Front. However, with us the tactics of the nationalists frequently assume various forms. Two of the most popular forms of nationalist tactics against imperialism are the boycott and the liberation struggle of the Moslems—of Pan-Islamism. It is on these two forms that I should like to put the following question: firstly, should we support the national liberation movement, secondly, should we support Pan-Islamism? If so, how far should we go?

I am ready to admit that a boycott is

not a communist method, but it is a method which under the political and military enslavement of the East is one of the most effective weapons, and we have seen that the 1919 boycott in Egypt against British imperialism, and the great Chinese boycott in 1919-1920 were crowned with success. The last boycott movement took place in British India. We may assume that this year or next year another form of boycott will be applied in the East. We know, of course, that the boycott is not our method but rather the method of the petty bourgeoisie and of the nationalist bourgeoisie. Moreover, we can say that the boycott is tantamount to supporting the native capitalists, but we also see that owing to the boycott movement in British India 18,000 leaders are kept in prison. The boycott in India has produced a very revolutionary atmosphere, and has compelled the British Government to ask Japan for military support in the event of the boycott movement being transformed into an open armed rising. We also know that the Mahomedan leaders in India, Dr. Kirchlef, Hasrat Mahoni and the brothers Ali are nationalists and that there was no rising when Ghandi was arrested. Everyone knows that local risings must end in defeat, because we have no arms and other war material at our disposal. Therefore, the boycott movement is important for us communists, now and in the future. We know in India and Java that many of our communists are inclined to proclaim the boycott movement in Java, perhaps because the communist mood created by the Russian Revolution has passed over, and perhaps also because in British India the atmosphere was not ripe for communist actions capable of competing with the other movement. In any case, we are confronted with the question: should we or should we not support these tactics? And how far shall we go? Pan-Islamism is a long story. First of all I will deal with our experiences in India where we collaborate with the Islamists. We have in Java a very large union comprising many very poor peasants, viz. Sarakat Islam. Between 1912 and 1916 this union had one million members, perhaps it had three or even four million. It was a very large proletarian

union which sprung up spontaneously, and was very revolutionary. Until 1920 we collaborated with this union. Our Party, consisting of 13,000 members, went to the National Assembly and carried on propaganda. In 1921 we succeeded in making Sarakat Islam adopt our program, and it went into the villages agitating for the control of production and for the watchword: "All power to the poor peasants and to the proletariat." Thus, we carried on the same propaganda as our Communist Party. Only sometimes under another name. However, a split occurred in 1921, owing to the tactless criticism of the leaders of the Sarokat Islam. The government, through its agents, made use of this split, and also of the decision of the Second Congress of the Communist International to fight against Pan-Islamism. The government agents said to the simple peasants that the Communists did not only want to create a split among them, but also that they wanted to destroy their religion. This was too much for a simple Moslem peasant. The peasant thought to himself that he had already lost everything in this world, and that he was not willing to lose heaven as well. Such was the mood of these simpleminded people, and the government propagandists and agents made good use of it. Thus we have a split.

(Chair, Markhlevsky: your time is up).

I have come from India, it took me forty days to come here (Applause). The Sarakat Islamists believe in our propaganda. They are with us "with their stomachs" (to use a popular expression), but with their hearts they remain with the Sarakat Islam,—with their heaven, which we cannot give them. Therefore, they boycotted our meetings, and we could not carry on propaganda any longer. In the beginning of last year we made efforts again to get in contact with Sarakat Islam. We said at our Congress in December 1921 that the Moslems in the Caucasus and other countries which worked with the Soviets and struggle against International capitalism know their religion much better, and we also said that they are at liberty to carry on propaganda for their religion, but that this must not be done at meetings but in the Mosques.

We have been asked at public mee-

tings if we were Moslems or not, and if we believe in God. My answer to this has been that when I stand before God I am a Moslem, but when I stand before men I am not a Moslem (loud applause), because God said that there are many devils among men (loud applause). Thus we inflicted a defeat on their leaders with the Koran in our hands, and at our last year's Congress we compelled the leaders of the Sarakat Islam, through their own members, to collaborate. When a general strike broke out last year, they needed us, as the railwaymen were under our leadership. As the Sarakat-Islam leaders had expressed their willingness to work with us, they were obliged to help us. We went to them and said, Your God is all-powerful, but he has also said that on this earth the railwaymen are more powerful (loud applause). The railwaymen are God's Executive Committee in this world (laughter). However, this does not solve the question, and if we have another split, we may be sure that the government agents will be there again with their Pan-Islamism. Therefore, this question of Pan-Islamism is very important.

It is also very important to understand the meaning of Pan-Islamism. Once it had a historic meaning and meant that Islam must conquer the whole world with the sword, and that this must be achieved by a Holy War under the leadership of the Caliph who must be of Arabian descent. About forty years after the death of Mahomat the Mahomadens were split into three great States, and thus the Holy War lost its significance for the entire Mahomedan World, for it was no longer necessary to fight in the name of God for the Caliphate and the conquest of the world, because the Western secular Caliph of Spain said: I am the true Caliph, I must carry the banner. The Caliph of Egypt and Bagdad said the same. Thus, Pan-Islamism has lost its original meaning, and means now something quite different. At present Pan-Islamism is a nationalist liberation struggle, because Islam for the Moslems is everything: not only religion, but also the State, the economic system, the food, in fact everything. Thus Pan-Islamism now means the fraternity of all Mahomedan peoples and the liberation not only of the Arabian.

but also the Indian, Javanese and all other oppressed Mahomedan peoples. This fraternity is called the liberation struggle against the British, French, and Italian capitalists, consequently against world capitalism. Such is the meaning of Pan-Islamism in India among the oppressed colonial peoples for which secret propaganda is being carried on. This is our new task, and just as we are willing to support the national war, we shall also support the liberation struggle of the very active and energetic 250 million Mohamedans who are subject to the imperialist Powers. Therefore, I ask once more if we should support Pan-Islamism in this sense, and in how far we are to support it. This brings my speech to a close. (loud applause).

President:—The translations will now follow and then Zinoviev will have the final word. We propose, however, that we have a recess of ten minutes. I see no opposition to this. (Interruption: Why?) Because the comrades are tired.

The meeting adjourns.

On the resumption of the meeting the Chairman called upon Comrade Zinoviev. He said "Comrades, you will allow me to discuss in some detail the question of Workers' Government. It is not yet quite clear to me whether there are serious differences of opinion with regard to this question, whether this question has been completely ventilated, or whether a good deal of our differences were caused by variations in terminology. In the course of the Congress, and during the working out of the resolution on tactical questions, with which we shall deal after the question of the Russian Revolution, this will become clear. As far as I am concerned the question has nothing to do with the word „pseudonym" which has been quoted here. I am quite willing, under these circumstances, to give up the word. But the main thing is the significance. I think, comrades, that the question will be made clear if I express myself as follows: It is clear to us that every bourgeois government is a capitalist government. It is hard to imagine a bourgeois government—the mule of the bourgeois class—which is not at the same time a capitalist government. But I fear that one cannot reverse that saying. Every working class government is not a proletarian

government; not every workers' government is a socialist government.

This contrast is radical. It reveals the fact that the bourgeoisie have their, outposts within our class, but that workers have not their outposts within the capitalist class. It is impossible for us to have our outposts in the camp of the bourgeoisie.

Every bourgeois Government is a capitalist Government, and even many Workers' governments can be bourgeois Governments according to their social composition. I think that the main point is: there are Workers' Governments and Workers' Governments. I believe that one can imagine four kinds of Workers' Governments, and even then we will not have exhausted the possibilities. You can have a Workers' Government which, according to its composition, would be a Liberal Workers' Government, for example, the Australian Labour Government; and several of our Australian comrades say that the term Workers' Government is incorrect because in Australia we have had such Workers' Governments of a bourgeois nature. These were really Workers' Governments, but their composition was of a purely Liberal character. They were bourgeois Workers' Governments, if one may so term them.

Let us take this example; The general elections are taking place in England. It is not probable, but one may well accept in theory, as a possibility, that a Workers' Government will be elected, which will be similar to the Australian Labour Government, and will be of Liberal composition. This Liberal Workers' Government in England can, under certain circumstances, constitute the starting point of revolutionising the situation. That could well happen. But by itself, it is nothing more than a Liberal Workers' Government. We, the Communists, now vote in England for the Labour Party. That is the same as voting for a Liberal Workers' Government. The English communists are compelled, by the existing situation, to vote for a Liberal Workers' Government. These are absolutely the right tactics. Why? Because this objective would be a step forward; because a Liberal government in England would disturb the equilibrium, and would extend the bankruptcy of ca-

pitalism. We have seen in Russia during the Kerensky regime how the position of capitalism was smashed, despite the fact that the Liberals were the agents of capitalism. Plekhanov, in the period from February to October 1917, called the Mensheviks, semi-Bolsheviks. We said that this was an exaggeration; they are not semi-Bolsheviks, but just quarter-Bolsheviks. We said this because we were at war with them, and because we saw their treachery to the proletariat. Objectively, Plekhanov was right. Objectively, the menshevik government was best adapted to make a hash of capitalism, by making its position impossible. Our Party, which was then fighting the mensheviks, would not and could not see this. The parties stood arrayed for conflict. Under such conditions, we can only see that they are traitors to the working class. They are not opponents of the bourgeoisie, but when, for a period, they hold the weapons of the bourgeoisie in their hands, they make certain steps which are objectively against the bourgeois state. Therefore, in England, we support the Liberal Workers' Government and the Labour Party. The English bourgeoisie are right when they say that the workers' government will start with Clynes and finish in the hands of the Left Wing.

That is the first type of a possible Workers' Government.

The second type is that of a Socialist Government. One can imagine that the United SocialDemocratic Party, in Germany, forms a purely socialist government. That would also be a Workers' Government, a Socialist Government—with the word—Socialist—of course in inverted commas. One can easily imagine a situation where we would give such a government certain conditional credit, a certain conditional support. One can imagine a Socialist government as being a first step in the revolutionising of the situation.

A third type is the so-called Coalition government; that is, a government in which Social-Democrats, Trade Union leaders, and even perhaps Communists, take part. One can imagine such a possibility. Such a government is not yet the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it is perhaps a starting point for the dictatorship. When all goes right, we can kick

one social-democrat after another out of the government until the power is in the hands of the Communists. This is a historical possibility.

Fourthly we have a Workers' Government which is really workers' government—that is a Communist Workers' Government, which is the true Workers' Government. I believe that this fourth possibility is a pseudonym for dictatorship of the proletariat, that it is truly a Workers' Government in the true sense of the word. But this by no means exhausts the question. There can be a fifth or sixth type, and they can all be excellent starting points for a broader revolutionising of the situation.

I fear that in seeking for a strictly scientific definition, we overlook the political significance of the term. I do not care for hair splitting about a scientific definition, but I am concerned about not confusing the revolutionary definition. One has the feeling that before that—if we join the Social-democrats, we shall have a Workers Government. They forget that having joined we must then overthrow the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie will not give up their power voluntarily; they will resist with all their might. The question is to consider all eventualities within the perspective of the world revolution and civil war. One should never forget that, outside the Labour parties, there stands a bourgeoisie which for hundreds of years has been in power, and which will exert every effort to retain this power.

Therefore, in order to construct a Workers' Government in the revolutionary sense, one must overthrow the bourgeoisie; and that is the most important. We must not forget that we have here to distinguish between two things: (1) Our methods of agitation: how we can best speak to the simple workers, how we can enable them best to understand the position. For that purpose, I believe the slogan of "Workers' Government" is best adapted. (2) How will events develop historically, in what concrete forms will the revolution manifest itself? And all rambling discussions over slogans are worth nothing. We will now slightly raise the curtain of history.

How will the revolution proceed? We will attempt all ways: through the wor-

kers' government, through a coalition government, and through a civil war. But all prophecies are out of place here. The revolution will probably come quite differently from the way we imagine it. We have already seen this in the Russian Revolution. Five years ago it was believed that the blockade, the famine etc., would force us to surrender. We foresaw all sorts of eventualities, except the eventualities of the new economic policy, except the victory of the revolution. The situation varies in each country. The revolution will probably come quite differently in Germany and in England. This does not mean that, as conscious revolutionists, we should not try to peep behind the curtain. We are thinking beings, the leaders of the working class. We must look at the question from all sides. It is nevertheless difficult to make any prediction. If we now look at the slogan of the workers' government from this new standpoint, as a concrete road to the realisation of the proletarian revolution, we may doubt whether the world revolution must necessarily pass through the stage of the workers' government. Our friend Radek said yesterday that the workers' government is a possible intermediary step to the dictatorship of the proletariat. I agree, it is a possibility, or more exactly an exceptional possibility. This does not mean that the slogan of the workers' government is not good. It is a good instrument of agitation where the relation of forces makes it possible. But if we put this question: is the workers' government a necessary step towards the revolution? I must answer that this is not a question that we can solve here. It is a way, but the least probable of all. In countries with a high developed bourgeois class, the proletariat can conquer power by force alone, through civil war. In such a case an intermediary step is not to be thought of. It might take place, but it is useless to argue here about it. All that is necessary is that we see clearly all the possible ways towards the revolution. The workers' government may be nothing more than a liberal labour government, as it might be in England and in Australia. Such a workers' government can also be useful to the working class. The agitation for a workers' government is wise, we

may gain many advantages therefrom. But in no case must we forget our revolutionary prospects. I have here a beautiful article by the Czecho-Slovak minister Benisch. I will read you a passage.

The "Tschas", organ of minister Benisch, writes, on September 18: "The Communist Party is building the United Front of the workers on a slogan of a fight against unemployment.

"We cannot deny that the communists are clever. They know how to present to the workers the same thing under different forms. For instance, some time ago, the communists began a campaign for the formation of Soviets. When they saw that this campaign was unsuccessful, they stopped their agitation, but resumed it a year and a half later under the mask of United Front committees. The United Front of the proletariat might become a tremendous force if based on progressive ideas, but the ideas of Moscow are not progressive."

This bourgeois is right, I believe. We communists who deal with the masses intellectually enslaved by the bourgeoisie, must make all efforts to enlighten our class. I have said that a workers' government might be in reality a bourgeois government; but they might appear a workers' government with real revolutionary tendencies. It is our duty to enlighten in all ways the more receptive sections of the working class. But the contents of our declaration must always remain the same.

Another thing, comrades, Soviet Government does not always mean dictatorship of the proletariat. Far from it. A soviet government existed for eight months in Russia parallel with the Kerensky government, but this was not a dictatorship of the proletariat. Nevertheless, we defended the slogan of the Soviet Government; and we only gave it up for a very short time.

This is why I believe that we can adopt the policy of the workers' government with a peaceful heart, under the only condition that we do not forget what it really amounts to. Woe to us if we ever allow the suggestion to creep up in our propaganda that the workers' government is a necessary step, to be achieved peacefully as a period of semi-organic construction which may take the place of the civil war, etc. If such views exist

among us, we must combat them ruthlessly; we must educate the working class by way of telling them: Yes, dear friends, to establish a workers' government the bourgeoisie must be first overthrown and defeated.

This is the most important part of the slogan. We will say to the workers: Do you want a workers' government, if so, well and good, we are ready to come to an agreement even with the social-democrats, though we warn you that they are going to betray you; we favour a workers' government, but under the one condition that you be ready to fight with us against the bourgeoisie. If this is your wish, then we will take up the fight against the bourgeoisie; and if the workers' government results from the struggle, it will stand on sound principles, and will be a real beginning to the dictatorship of the proletariat. There is no question here of the word pseudonym, I leave this word to Comrade Meyer; but we must draw a sharp line in this question. It is in no way a strategic move likely to replace civil war. The International must adopt the right tactics, but there are no tactics by means of which we could outwit the bourgeoisie and glide smoothly into the realm of a workers' government. The important thing is that we overthrow the bourgeoisie, after which various forms of the workers' government may be established.

In England in the given situation, a government may have revolutionary effects, and therefore we will support it even if it be of a limited, menshevik-liberal nature. But in doing so we by no means avoid civil war. As a matter of fact it would be civil war only in another form which may become even more cruel than any other. The existence of such a workers' government does not mean the avoidance of civil war. We know that just such a menshevik-liberal government may oppose us more cruelly than a bourgeois government; Noske and our own mensheviks have given sufficient proof of this. This is why I say that this slogan may be a good means of agitation when we understand well its revolutionary possibilities: for instance, take the slogan advanced by Blum and Frossard in France. The Executive is responsible for this. We had proposed this slogan in the

course of our discussions. But it was premature in France. Why? Because, on account of the traditions of the Party, the slogan was understood as a pure parliamentary combination. Some have said: Yes, Blum-Frossard's slogan was a good thing. Others have said: yes, but it is not easily achieved. The Executive was theoretically right when it said that the slogan of the workers' government must not be rejected. It was a possibility, it contained revolutionary prospects, but in France, under the circumstances, it was premature. If we had based our united action on the eight-hour day, we might have had better results. As it was, some comrades at once grew suspicious, and rumours were soon set afloat of the unification of the parties, etc. We must take the facts as they are. Some of our friends of the Left have perhaps been guilty of exaggeration. If I am not mistaken, it was Comrade Souvarine who said that here was a time in Russia when a Lenin-Martov Government was contemplated. This is not true. Such possibility never came up in Russia. We must not forget that with the fall of Czarism, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie was also half accomplished. The February Revolution, indeed, was a bourgeois revolution; but it was not wholly bourgeois, it was already then a great popular revolution which contained the seed of the October Revolution. Soldiers' Soviets had been organised from the very first day; soviets which were not to be disbanded after a few months as Noske had done in Germany, but such as began the fight against Kerensky from the very beginning.

At such a time when the mensheviks formed a kind of secondary government, the slogan of a workers' government was in place. As we know this led to no positive results. The civil war was not avoided. We did not form an alliance with Martov, but with the Left wing Social-Revolutionaries who represented the revolutionary peasantry. In this sense, the slogan was justified. But to attempt the same thing in France, and to say that this was the same as a Martov-Lenin government, was a wrong appreciation of the situation.

Even our best comrades have made mistakes in the application of this policy. I do not believe that this Congress, after

the work of the commissions has been accomplished will reject the slogan of the workers' government. This slogan is indisputably correct as a means to approach the masses. It is only a question of knowing how to apply it. It contains the same dangers as the United Front. When one speaks of government, one naturally thinks of Parliamentary combinations, with a distribution of cabinet seats, etc. We shall meet even greater difficulties here than in the application of the United Front. But this is no reason why we should reject it, as our French comrades have proposed. They say: "Our Party is too weak, we can do nothing with it". If your Party is too weak, you must strengthen it. If you cannot swim, jump into the water, and you will learn quickly enough. We point out the dangers of the policy so that we may be able to meet them. In this period of apathy through which we are passing the danger of opportunistic infection is great. Comrade Radek was right when he said that the danger now threatens from the Right; the six sessions which we have already held must have convinced you of this.

We must adopt a rigid line of conduct in this question. We must say to our comrades: "Yes, Workers' Governments are all well and good, but first of all we must overthrow the bourgeoisie"; for that purpose, we need weapons, we must be organised, we must have the majority of the working class. We must see clearly that we have a hard fight before us, that victory cannot be achieved without such a fight. With this I believe I may bring this part of my closing speech to an end.

I shall now dwell upon the most important parties, following the same order as in my first speech.

Accordingly, I shall begin with Germany. Comrade Fischer, who after all appeared much less terrible than some would have imagined (laughter) reproached us by saying that the Third Congress had not had a wholly good influence upon the German Party. This accusation she should have advanced against the Third, but not the Fourth, Congress. However, we are the successors of the Third Congress, and we stand ready to render account. I do not believe that the reproach was justified. We do not need

to exaggerate and say that we have saved the German Party. It is not we who have saved it, but the German proletariat itself. But what concerns the Third Congress, I believe that it acted correctly (quite true!). Some say that the Levi question was not correctly handled. Permit me to say that this is not so. Do not forget that during the Third Congress even the best militants were doubtful in this question.

This same doubt prevailed among our Russian delegates. Some of them thought that after all Levi was a clever fellow. Perhaps he can settle the question better than we can. It appeared however that this task and the duty of the Third Congress was to see that Levi be the only one to pass over to Noske, or at least that he go in very small company. Geyer and company are not of much importance. We let him have them willingly, and a few more with them. But the danger existed that he could take away with him part of our Party. In this matter the Third Congress has given a certain amount of assistance to our Parties and has enabled them to take up the right attitude and to save the best elements for the revolution. Thus, in this respect comrade Ruth Fischer was somewhat in the wrong.

As to the Rathenau affair, Comrade Radek already emphasised that we regard this part of her criticism as justified. At the time of the Rathenau assassination, we sent a confidential communication to the German Party when the action had already begun, expressing to our Central Organisation in Germany our opinion on this matter.

With your permission, I will put before you a few quotations from this letter. The letter is dated June 18th, and was therefore written when the fight was at its height:

"As to the attitude of the Party, we have followed as much as possible all that is going on in Germany. We have read our reports very carefully and are grateful to you for the details which it contains. The tactics of the first days, as described in the "Rote Fahne" are, in our opinion weak. One should not adopt as a slogan: the republic! the republic! in a situation such as this. One should on the contrary put evident proof before

the masses from the very first that the present Germany is a republic without republicans. One should show to the wide working masses, which are less concerned about the republic than about their economic interests that the bourgeois republic, far from being a guarantee for the class interest of the proletariat, is on the contrary the best weapon for the oppressed of the working masses in the present situation. We must not blow the horn together with the Social Democrats and the U. S. P. The Independence of our agitation work should never, never, never, be sacrificed to the United Front policy. This is for you a condition sine qua non. We are willing to negotiate with the S. P. D. and the U. S. P., but not as poor relations, but as an independent power, retaining its own character and putting before the masses the full program of the Party". I believe that this question is a sufficient proof that we warned our German Party in a good time against this weak point of the Rathenau campaign. We went even further than that, for, we asked if the German Party could not take up a more energetic attitude. Of course, it did not behave us to tell the German Party that it should at once begin an action, declare a strike etc. This kind of thing must be decided upon by the Party itself. We did however, raise the question of the possibility of an immediate, independent and energetic action by our Party. I am convinced, as far as I can judge the situation, that there was no possibility for such action: it would have resulted in nothing but bloodshed. The Central Committee did not commit such a mistake, and in spite of many shortcomings, it made the best of the situation.

In this quotation it is said that independence of agitation should never, never, be given up. We could not say otherwise, for it would have been tantamount to suicide for the Communist Party. (Exclamation: quite so!). We also wished that the British Communists should join the Labour Party, but on condition of complete independence of agitation. The Labour Party did not agree to that, but this did not make us change our attitude. Independence of agitation is one of the fundamental principles of the Communist Party. The tasks in connection

with the struggle are very important, but independence is the foremost of our tasks. We must always remain true to our character. We must not for a moment forget that this miserable bourgeois republic is nothing else but a noose around the neck of the working class. It is difficult to understand how the "Rote Fahne" could bring forward the slogan "republic" just at a time when we should have said to the workers' that this sham republic was ready to throttle them, and that their proletarian interests were the things to fight for. In the given circumstances we are willing to fight together with the social-democrats against the nationalists, but you should never forget what the republic really means. Just at that moment this was your foremost duty. As far as we could judge from the distance, it seemed to us that our Party had put itself a little bit too much into the hands of the aristocratic organisations. We in Germany are not poor relations, but an independent party to whom the victory ultimately belongs. As they were particularly anxious to have us at that time, we had all the less reason to play the role of poor relations. It is quite clear that the strategy of the Scheidemann clique at the beginning of the Rathenau campaign aimed to isolate us. It was our duty to bear this in mind and use every opportunity for negotiation with them, but at the same time we should here make it widely known through the press that they were followers of Noske, while explaining exactly what we are. I am of the opinion that all the parties can profit by this example.

A few more words about the Berlin organisation. I forgot to mention in my first report that we had during this period a little disagreement with the Berlin organisation, which a certain extent found some expression in the press. Comrades, I am sure that I am expressing the mind of the entire Executive by saying that this conflict was a very painful incident, and that we are anxious to avoid even the shadow of a conflict. The Executive is well aware of the weak points of some of our local organisations. The Berlin, the Paris, and even the Petrograd Moscow and many other organisations have their weak points. It cannot be said, that the Circus

Busch campaign was a brilliant feature of the activity of our Berlin organisation. However, we know that it is a proletarian organisation, and we did not want to have it interpreted as if there was cause for continuous friction. As far as we are able to judge this matter, no serious difference of opinion exists, and if there is any difference, it is very slight and likely to occur in any organisation. At the time we invited the Berlin comrades to come here, in order to settle this little matter as quickly as possible. We did not succeed in this. I cannot help emphasising this at the Congress, in order to get rid of this incident once and for all. We are convinced that the Berlin organisation will be generally of the greatest use to the Party.

I should like to say just a few more words in connection with Comrade Fischer's speech. Comrade Fischer, your speech (if you will allow me to say so) was conspicuous for having combined many correct statements with a number of incorrect ones. This is, of course, not very serious, and it can, so to speak, happen in the best families. You said for instance that the S.P.D. captured the U.S.R. through the United Front illusion. This is not so; you flatter the U.S.P. The latter was not captured, it rather wished to be captured. And this is precisely what we must tell the German workers. The fact that the U.S.P. wanted to be captured, is a matter of political importance. It looked for the right moment to be captured, in fact it threw itself into the embrace of the S.P.D. This fact is very important, and will assist us in bringing back the workers of the U.S.P. into the right fold. You were also guilty of exaggerations when you said that weeks were wasted in negotiations with the other leading organisations. It is true the negotiations were rather protracted, but they certainly did not last as long as that. If I am not mistaken, they only took up one week of our time. However, it is easy to make mistakes in such small matters, and not much harm was done.

The German comrades, particularly in private conversation, told me that I had painted the situation of the German Party in too roseate colours, whereas not everything there was really so bright. Now,

Comrades, since many other delegates have reproached me in the opposite sense, it reasonable to assume that it was not so bad if I depicted the situation of a Party in too favourable terms. It is nevertheless a fact that it takes other Parties many months' discussion to solve such problems as have already been solved by the German Party. After the air of the March days, after the Rathenau campaign, after the discussion which we have had in the German Party, it may be stated without exaggeration that the Party in Germany has triumphed over the greatest difficulties and is on the way to becoming a real and earnest Communist Party fully capable of manoeuvring, which will soon bring about decisive events in Germany, perhaps much sooner than many of us and of our German comrades themselves imagine. This I say not by way of compliment, but because I am fully convinced of it.

Now I turn to our French comrades. I regret to observe that not all shades of opinion in the Communist International have found full expression in the debate. Many remained silent, and this was not praiseworthy. Comrade Duret was perfectly right when he said that whenever the boys of the Left Wing have something on their minds, they promptly say it openly, and at times with excessive candour. This is a good trait of the Left; but the other comrades who sit a little further to the Right are persistently silent, and this is bad. On considering what has been said in this hall one cannot help seeing that a Centrist semi-democratic mood is present in the ranks of the Communist International, or at least in its close vicinity.

But we intend to speak not only about the things that have been said here openly, but also about the things that have been left unsaid, because it is only in this way that a real picture of the situation can be obtained. I regret that it is not possible for me to select a single speech made by a French comrade of the Centrist camp which could serve as a theme for discussion. It is to be hoped that this will be possible later on in the course of the Congress.

With regard to the speech of Comrade Duret, I believe that Com. Bukharin has taken him to task somewhat too severely.

Of course, it cannot be disputed that Comrade Duret and his group have committed big mistakes in this campaign. But if we consider that this group had 800 representatives at the Paris Conference including some very good workers, and if we consider further that some of the comrades, including Comrade Duret, have quite honestly admitted their mistakes and are willing to improve, then the whole thing should not be dismissed with a joke, on the assumption that tomorrow perhaps he will do the same thing all over again. Should he do the same thing tomorrow, he must excuse me if I say that he will find himself opposed by the entire International; but when he says: "We admit our mistakes," then we have no reason to mistrust him. On the contrary, I am convinced that the major part of the leaders of the Renoult faction are really true to the International and really desire to rectify their errors.

Nevertheless his arguments will have to be examined a little more closely. Some of them have already been disposed of. He said that the masses in Germany are organised and in France they are not, that the United Front is applicable to Germany, but not to France. Comrade Duret should be told that he entirely ignores the real significance of the idea of winning over the majority of the workers. It is certainly a loose mass, like the sand on the sea-shore. This is our handicap. We must combine this loose mass and mould it, and this is much easier to do in France, just because the movement there has no traditions. In Germany, the worker, in order to change his membership card, has to undergo quite a big internal struggle. That is not the case in France. At the very beginning of the Communist International we said that the social democracy is the greatest obstacle to the revolution. It can be argued that the stronger the social democracy, the more difficult it is to organise the United Front. You in France are lucky that social-democracy has not been so strong. It is for this very reason that you will succeed more readily, if you will but prosecute a truly revolutionary policy, if you will build up a truly Communist Party. It was further said, that in France the United Front was immediately interpreted as an electoral

combination for political purposes. Perhaps, that is so. But why did you not start in the sphere of trade unionism, why not in the economic field? In both of these fields there is no possibility of opposition in principle. The only opposition in principle comes from comrade Bordiga, but he is wrong. Why did you not take up the question of the eight-hour day? Now you come and tell us that your Party is too weak etc. You are too weak because you have misconstrued this question.

In this connection I would like to say a word or two in record to Comrade Rosmer, in order to conclude with the French question. This morning he quoted my words to the effect that a party that was not active in the trade unions was not to be taken seriously and that a party which did not understand the trade union movement as a revolutionary movement is also not to be taken seriously. Rosmer said he agreed with the first proposition but he did not agree with the second one. He thought we should take into consideration the objective difficulties which were quite insurmountable. Nevertheless I must insist that it is a very important question; the trade union movement is the present time movement. No doubt there are objective difficulties which should by no means be underestimated. For instance, the Shop Stewards Movement in England has in many places gone to sleep, which goes to show that a revolutionary mass movement had not yet arisen in that country. But we must see quite clearly that when there is a real revolutionary party it is bound to bring about such a movement in a short time. I am firmly convinced that when our Party in Germany will become sound it will within six months achieve the beginning of a serious trade union movement. Strikes take place; we have the strikes at Le Havre, which have lasted for three or four months. At Le Havre the masses were almost unorganised. The Party did nothing in the beginning. In the face of such strikes as these it is quite possible for a Party like ours, having a central organ with 200,000 subscribers, to initiate a trade union movement in a short space of time. I therefore think we should fight shy of such weak-kneed elements who always say:

Also, it is difficult, there are obstacles. Of course there are obstacles, but a great deal depends on ourselves. Therefore I think that I ought to insist on my second proposition.

There is yet another thing I would like to emphasize in the speech of Comrade Dombky. He said that after the split of the Executive there was a danger of some of them coming over to us and swamping us. In this he was right. It is because of this that we rejected them when they wanted to join us. But they joined among themselves and declared: We are forming our own International. That was the 2½ International. First there was a split, now there is a junction of the majority of these elements with the 2nd International, but a part of these gentlemen will knock at our door, and we will then have to be careful to keep the door shut tight and flourish the 21 conditions once more before their noses. We may even have to say then: These 21 conditions do not suffice for these fellows! We may have to present to them 42 conditions (hilarious approval). Otherwise all these fellows will sneak in, and tomorrow we shall have the same crisis over again.

I now come to the situation in Italy.

This in particular has been the painful side of the whole of our discussion. One feels convinced that the Party led by Bordiga is at bottom a sound workers' Party, a revolutionary workers' Party which has accomplished a great deal of good, and yet one is often constrained to combat them theoretically and politically. This is the painful side. But Party duty compels us to tackle this painful matter. Comrade Bordiga started by arguing against our thesis of winning the majority of the working class. He said that it was a vague formula, that one could not understand what is really meant by it, and he demanded that we strike out of the resolution all reference to winning a majority of the working class.

This was the subject of the first fight between Comrade Lenin and Comrade Terracini. I must confess to having felt a sort of pity for Terracini at the time, it seemed to me that Comrade Lenin had handled him somewhat too roughly. It seemed impossible that these people could really be in opposition to the majority. Meanwhile the Fascisti have

been victorious; the Italian Socialist Party is broken up, and a multitude of other events of world importance have taken place. Yet even now Comrade Bordiga gets up on the platform and says: the majority is a vague formula. I must now confess that Lenin was right. These people were apparently afraid of the majority. Bordiga quite seriously put the question: how shall the majority be counted? In our resolution it was stated that we should bring the majority of the working class under the influence of communists. How shall we know that we have won the majority? We will not call in a chartered accountant for the purpose. We will not even ask Comrade Bordiga to find for us a suitable Italian notary or a witness furnished by Mussolini to certify that Communism has the majority in Italy. I believe that the trade unions should be the first standard to go by; also other standards would be found to indicate to us when we have won the majority. This does not mean to say that we should postpone our fighting until we have organised the majority of the workers. This is considered by Bordiga as a sort of bargain-hunting. He labours under the impression, that today the Executive faces towards the Right, and tomorrow towards the Left. This I must say is an error which should be eradicated. If this is not done, the Party is simply lost. How can the Party start work without possessing the requisite energy, without being conscious of its principal aims? This is surely not a vague formula. Bordiga takes exception to my statement that some Parties have increased their influence, although remaining weak numerically. Nevertheless it is a fact. The whole thing lies in the question of influence. To organise the majority of the workers immediately is a matter of impossibility; it will be possible only after the conquest of power by the proletariat. Even in Russia, only now, in the fifth year of the revolution do we claim to have organised the majority. In other countries it cannot yet be thought of. But the Communist Party can secure influence over the majority now. Yes, there are parties which are backward numerically, although they have strengthened their influence. I will quote to

an instance of a distant country, New South Wales. There we had a Party which numbered 500 members. After we had accepted it into the Communist International, it increased its membership to somewhere between 900 and 1000. But this small Party has brought the trade unions of that country—a quarter of a million workers—completely into the Proletariat, with great discipline and with great enthusiasm. This is a good example. We will not say: please organise the majority. We know too well how to value the initiative of the minority. It is certainly a splendid group of 500 workers that has managed to influence 250,000 workers.

It all amounts to a real determination by communists to gain influence over the majority. Bordiga wanted to know, for what purpose we were to win the majority for the Communist programme, and this is not a hotch-potch. (Ejaculation: Nor is he in favour of a hotch-potch.)

(Zineviev continued.) We are also in favour of winning them over for the revolution. However, if Comrade Dombky thinks that all the 230,000 workers in South Wales have read Bukharin's program, and will read all the projects of Comrades Thalheimer and Kabachiev he is very much mistaken. The workers know very well what they want. They want to overcome the bourgeoisie, and that is enough for them for the present.

Just a few words more about the Italian trade unions. I read lately an article which was probably written by Comrade Terracini. He deals with the Fascist trade union movement. The Fascisti are establishing all over Italy their own trade unions,—a new and very important phenomenon. They want to become a mass organisation. As to the attitude of the workers, it can be illustrated by the following example. In one large factory the owner dismissed all the workers and declared that henceforth he will take none but Fascist workers. After a little consideration the workers obtained Fascisti cards and were taken on again. Soon after, an election of the factory committee took place in this factory, with the result that the Fascisti obtained one percent of the votes, while an overwhelming majority of those elected were communists.

This was a very clever move on the part of the working class, who had a very good idea of what really was at stake. They said to themselves, we will procure the cards in order to avoid brutal treatment, but we will nevertheless remain revolutionary. But we must consider what we must do while the Fascisti are capturing or organising trade unions. It goes without saying that we must penetrate into Fascist trade unions in order to win them over to our side. And yet what do we see? Our comrade publishes an article in which he explains the nature of Fascism, syndicalism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The article is full of very clever arguments, only one thing is missing: the soul, the live masses, the only things which we should say and bring into the trade unions in order to overcome the bourgeoisie. The only necessary idea was missing in this article, and therefore the watchword was still-born. I believe, this article was reprinted in the "International Correspondence". Read this article, and try to find in it a live watchword by which the man in the street will learn how to penetrate into the stronghold of the enemy. You will not find any such watchword in it. This is just an illustration of what is really wrong with our otherwise splendid and brave Italian Communist Party.

A few more words about Spain. I think that Comrade Acevado's speech was extremely interesting. His most important statement was—that Spain has been very successful with the United Front tactics. The Spanish comrades were against these tactics. At the Enlarged Session of the Executive one of the Spanish comrades voted against the United Front tactics together with Comrade Renault. Experience has shown that our comrades in Spain have also been very successful as far as the syndicalists and anarchists are concerned. This should be a good example for us and I advise our friends of the French Party to follow it.

I am coming now to Czechoslovakia. I am not going to castigate Comrade Vajtauer once more, for he has already been severely punished. All I wish to say is that as far as we are concerned, the matter cannot be considered as ended simply because Comrade Neurath has proved that the program of the opposition

is perfectly worthless. I am ready to admit that the opposition is helpless. It is very easy to realise this. Moreover, it is even very easy to prove scientifically that they are followers of Proudhon, although one cannot be sure that many of them have read Proudhon or have even heard his name. But this does not solve the question, which must be dealt with as a live question just as it stands.

As you know, our comrades in the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Party are complaining that it was wrong on our part to reinstate opposition, and some German comrades are supporting them in that complaint. It was said that by this action we have undermined the authority of the Czechoslovak Central Committee. I do not think that this is so. I trust that the authority of the Czechoslovak Central Committee and of the Czechoslovak Party is so firmly established that it cannot be undermined even by such an erroneous step. I am of the opinion that comrade Vajtauer's speech will increase the authority of the Central Committee, and will explain the whole matter to the workers. Comrades, should not come forward with a series of articles, as comrade Kreibich has done declaring that we are the clever and gifted ones and the others are ignoramuses. This is not the right way to enlighten the workers. I cannot tell what the issue of our discussions will be. I do not want to anticipate the decision of the Commission, for the unexpected might happen. However, there is no doubt whatever that if comrades do not submit to the decisions of the Executive, there is no other choice but to sever all connection with them. We must be prepared for all eventualities, even for an undesirable issue of this matter. Nevertheless, the Executive was right in inviting these comrades and in bringing the matter before the International Congress. If they are expelled, this will not have been done either by the International or by the leaders of the Party. It will not be possible to say either in Germany or elsewhere that comrades of the Left Wing are being expelled without having been heard. No, all of you, Italians, Germans, in fact all the comrades shall judge whether it is possible to retain such comrades in our midst. It

was an easy matter to expell Verfeuil, Fabre and others of the Right Wing, for we had papagraph nine to go by. But working people even though they be devotees of Proudhon without knowing it should not be expelled at once. We should on the contrary have patience with them and should endeavour to persuade them. Comrades from all the countries must take part in this. You must bear in mind that this was sprung on us a month before the World Congress, and took us entirely by surprise. Why should we therefore be too hasty over this matter? It was our duty to put the whole matter before the International. We had a notion that they had perhaps worse things than Proudhonism in store for us. I therefore, trust that workers with an International spirit will think this matter over twenty times after the Congress will have spoken before they sever connection with the Party.

It has often been said that a serious situation has also its painful side, thus, some of our German comrades say: "our Executive is beginning to be a little bit tinged with the K. A. P. D. mentality". It is inclined to take such elements under its wing. I believe that we acted correctly in the question of the K. A. P. D. We expelled it when it was already a helpless little group, after every kind of attempt had been made to retain it in our ranks. It was only when its best elements came to our United Communist Party that the International had its say. At present the K. A. P. D. is only a group of harmless people who have only a political interest. But what did Levi do? He was very hasty and severed connection with any workers who happened to disagree with him on any matter whatever. It was a great mistake of the Spartakus Bund to follow the policy of Levi in this matter. On this occasion Levi showed that he was nothing but a bourgeois aristocrat to whom the workers were only an object for his manipulations and who had never a kind word for them to enlighten them on their errors. Our Czech Central Committee was going to repeat Levi's mistake in connection with the K. A. P. At any rate it was a mistake of the same kind, and therefore we interfered and said: Comrades, wait until the IV Congress. We

trust that the best elements will come back to us. If they do not, it will mean a split. Matters have become more complicated than we expected. It is not a question of authority, but of something much more important. It is question of the interest of the Party as a whole, and of the interests of the International as a whole. It is not only a Czech question. I have been told that in Berlin some comrades added fuel to the flame with respect to this question. I shall let this be as it is, but one thing is sure—a certain uneasiness does exist. This is not only a Czech question, but an International question affecting our attitude to such groups of workers, and I am of the opinion that at this Congress we must endeavour to solve this question in such a way that these workers should remain with us in spite of all the errors which they may have committed. Nothing of course can be done with those who do attach more importance to the philosophy of a Vajtauer than to the International. I trust, however that the majority will take a different view in this question. They will remember at the decisive moment that we are not an International such as Vajtauer represented it, but that there is only one proletarian International which is of the greatest importance for every worker. I am convinced that it is precisely these left wing workers who will have such a conception as will bring them back to us.

I am coming now to the Poles and to the speech of our Comrade Dombisky. I cannot quite forgive Comrade Dombisky that he committed a grave political error already before the Third Congress. It was Dombisky who during the Russo-Polish war wrote an article which contained the following passage: To bring the Red Army and the bayonets of the Soviet Government to Poland is not a communist policy (interruption by Comrade Dombisky). Comrade Dombisky, I have known you for the last nine years and know that you find it difficult to keep quiet when you are being criticised. Nevertheless, I would ask you to remain calm. You adopted, at first in a letter and subsequently in the "Roter Fohne", an attitude which we termed at the time as the most genuine of nationalism. Every proletarian with any common sense will admit that in the event of the bourgeois

sie of one country holding down the proletariat with bayonets, the latter will be only too glad if a red army, be it a Hungarian, Italian or even French red army came to its assistance. This would be the opinion of every worker (applause). Of course Comrade Dombisky is not a nationalist. This was only a small remnant of the past which many a comrade of ours imbibed with his mother's milk, it is a remnant of the P. P. S. ideology. The Polish intellectuals as a whole are afflicted with nationalism, even some of our best comrades are tinged with it. Comrade Dombisky committed this error fifteen months ago. I am not saying this in order, so to speak, to demand his head. If he has something to teach us to-day, we are quite willing to learn, but nevertheless we will bear in mind that he has been guilty of the political error.

Now I am coming to the lesson which he taught us to-day. I have already discussed what Comrade Dombisky said about the majority. We are perfectly aware that we have not yet the majority in Poland. We cannot take the elections, recently conducted by Pilsudsky as a criterion. We know that Pilsudsky is an opponent and that the bourgeoisie has falsified the election. We are perfectly aware of all this, but we also know that we are not very far from a majority. We have not got it yet, but we shall probably have it in the very near future.

He also said that the United Front was alright in all the other countries, but not in Poland. This is the same kind of ideology of which we had an example to-day.

In all the other countries the Executive may assume the role of a dictator and may apply the United Front tactics, but in my country it is a different matter, the conditions are different, and so is the working class and the Party. To this I say that the United Front tactics are most suitable in a country like Poland. I notice in the Central Organ of the P.P.S. in Warsaw a daily column with the heading: "Long live the Workers and Peasants' Government". I can read it to you in Polish, in Craeow we learned some Polish from Comrade Dombisky. What does this mean? It means that the watchword of the workers' government finds an echo in all the sections of the masses. You said that we carry on this

democracy because this watchword promises to be successful with working masses. Comrade Dombosky says we must be against the workers' if these watchwords are already so popular with the masses that even the social traitors are having them continually on their lips, it is all the more reason for us to insist on the watchword of the United Front. We must keep the watchword continuously before the masses. We know that the Polish workers and peasants are not in favour of a bourgeois government, but that they are in favour of a workers' government. Therefore, although you are their representatives, we propose to work for a workers' government and a United Front. This shall be the slogan in the agitational campaign. The situation in Poland has certain features of its own, but it is precisely for this reason that we want to apply the United Front tactics there more than anywhere else.

The Polish comrades have also given me a speech by Comrade Slussarsky, a representative of the Polish opposition, who unfortunately has not spoken. Comrade Dombosky told me personally that I should not identify his attitude with that of Comrade Slussarsky. Well, comrades, this would be hardly possible. Comrade Slussarsky made the following statement in one of his speeches during the Party Conference; When Comrade Lenin says: "We are not going any further", I am ready to believe that he really meant what he says. However, such a thing is hardly possible, as the peasantry is the economic dictator of Russia.

The question is what is the attitude of the Third International to this policy. The Soviet Government is ready to use every means in support of its policy. In this respect the influence of the social compromisers and of the opportunists can be a decisive factor as far as the policy of the government is concerned. The tactics of the United Front, which establish contact with the opportunists, make it possible to exercise such influence."

These are the worst accusations against the Soviet Government (an interjection Levi). I do not think that Slussarsky has much in common with Levi. He has long ago got over this error, and if not, he will do so to-night (laughter). How-

ever, this is still an echo of Levi. Therefore, Comrade Slussarsky, you must be aware on what a slippery path you are.

One begins with criticisms from the left, and in the twinkling of an eye, one ends with Levi. This is a rather perilous path. This error must be rectified with the least possible delay.

Now a few words about Norway. I said that there were twelve papers in Norway that call themselves Social Democratic, and Comrade Haakon-Meyer told me quite maliciously that there were forty such papers. Probably they all bear the title "Socialdemokrat". Our Party in Norway is strong, and therefore much is expected of it. When we heard the short statement by the young academician, we said at once to ourselves that the Comrades were mistaken. One section of the Mot-Dae group is good, but the other is not under the control of the Party. It comprises young academicians of whom it may be said that up to 25 years, they are rabid revolutionaries, at 26 they begin to change, and at 30 they are well established barristers and opponents of the working class. We are afraid of these academicians. Those who have really learned something, should accept the Party discipline and should go to the workers in order to help them in their struggle for emancipation. It cannot be tolerated that after having been eighteen months in the movement, they declare the Communist International not to be sufficiently independent. We must insist on coming to a very definite conclusion on the Norwegian question, and I trust that we shall succeed in this.

Now a few more words about Comrade Varga's speech. He showed very conclusively that it is better to eat one's fill than to be hungry, that bread is better than hunger and that the legend about the hunger must be done away with. But this is not the question, for firstly it was not a legend. It was a severe famine, so we had to tell the working classes. Things are now somewhat improved; and naturally we shall tell the working masses that the Russian toilers are no longer starving. I am in agreement with Comrade Varga on this matter. We shall tell them that the position of the Russian worker

is improving daily. We shall not rejoice overmuch, until it has become a definite fact. We shall go to the workers with facts and figures. Step by step, we shall ameliorate the conditions of our workers; and then tell the workers of other lands of this. But this is not the matter under dispute, but something quite different. There is no longer famine in Russia. But we must admit that, in other countries, the dictatorship of the proletariat may cause a famine. Shall we refuse to tell the workers this bitter truth? We cannot avoid it. We must tell the workers just how the matter stands. In Russia we had five terrible years; in other countries the period might be shorter. The dictatorship does not necessarily imply famine; this depends upon various factors. But in many lands it would be probably accompanied by a famine. It would be opportunism and cowardice not to say this to the workers. We can't say to the workers, "To-morrow everything will be fine; you will have meat and a good home"; This would be laying ourselves open to attack by the reformists. The question is not whether I should tell the workers of other countries that there is no more famine in Russia; it is whether they will be visited by famine. They must be told this fearlessly. And the worker knows what life is, he knows the advance guard of the working class must tell him this quite frankly.

Now a few words more upon the speech of Comrade Landler. I wanted to spare the congress this sterile debate, but have not been able to do so. Comrade Landler has expressed himself as though I had shown myself to be against all political emigration. Comrades, you heard my speech; was that really the case? I said that our Italian friends would probably not be able to avoid organizing emigration centres. The Finns had it; and we, the Russians, also had it. I know well how to appreciate an emigrant organization which looks after its people. We should never dream of speaking of it in the same tone as that in which Herr Ebert has spoken of the political groups abroad. But, Comrade Landler, you have overshot your mark. There is also a type of emigration which harms the movement and poisons it; and we had such a case in a portion of the Vienna emigrés, whose representative

stands here today upon the platform in the person of Comrade Landler. Comrade Landler says I am a diplomat. In what does this diplomacy consist? I asked him this openly. As regards the comrades who are now in prison, we have of course the highest admiration for them. The first word of this Congress in Petrograd, at the opening celebration, was a special message to all comrades who are in prison, and by no means least to the Hungarian comrades. Naturally, I can support this part of Comrade Landler's speech with all my heart; I am in complete agreement that our brothers in jail be greeted, and that we mourn our fallen comrades. But the second part of his motion: to grant credentials to this Congress to two emigrés, and to form once more a Commission which shall go into the Vienna matter—this I cannot support. What is it all about? The memory of the comrades who fell for us in Hungary, will ever be sacred to us. But to speak in this way in the name of the dead, does not do at all. Such are the good old methods of the socialist revolutionaries. When people were shot dead by the Czar's troops, the socialist revolutionaries used to say, "We speak in the name of those who have been killed by Czarism". We say: the memory of all those who have fallen in the struggle is sacred to us. But one should not speak in the name of the dead; this advice I gave to Comrade Landler. Only the whole International can speak in the name of the dead, not individuals; and one should not connect the Vienna fracas with these things. They are quite different matters, which one should not join together.

There are 4,000 Communist in Hungary, says Comrade Landler. I hope there are more. However, I would very much like to know the opinion of these 4,000 comrades: whether they are with the Communist International Executive, or whether they are for the Vienna clique which has been so ably represented here by Comrade Landler. I hope they will be for us, and not for the Vienna clique.

Comrade Landler spoke in the name of those who are in prison in Hungary. Unfortunately, we cannot speak with these comrades. It might be possible to have them brought to Moscow. But we have here people who come to us from Hun-

garian prisons, and who were there sentenced to death or to life long imprisonment. We rescued them and brought them to Russia. What do these comrades say? Are they for Comrade Landler? No! They are against Comrade Landler, they are against the whole Viennese affair, and they are for the International. We did everything we possibly could to clear up the Vienna mess. It was a fine spectacle for the Two and a Half International. The German, French, English and other comrades will all remember how the papers handled this affair and how much it damaged us. That was a real treat for those people; it was a real Vienna schnitzel for Friedrich Adler (Laughter). And it was Comrade Landler who did this, and now he wants us to do it all over again. We are opposed to such a commission, we have had enough commissions. The International gives you its word that it will clean up the situation, but only on condition that there be no new emigration affairs of this kind; and the comrades must be told this, firmly and clearly. All honor to the emigrés who support the movement, but down with such emigrés as feed the Second and a Half Internationals with propaganda material; we have enough of that kind.

With this, comrades, I am practically at the end of my reply. I would just like to put one more question. Yesterday, Comrade Radek said that danger threatened us from the Right and not from the Left. I would like to emphasize these words, and express myself in full agreement with them. It is not a matter of the goodwill to the various comrades and groups, but it concerns the objective situation. We must see this clearly. Still worse times could come and so we shall strengthen the Communist International and maintain it as the advance guard of the proletariat, only in so far as we have a genuine international organization which will fight every trace of opportunism, not merely with words but with deeds. Today, I said in a commission:—sometimes we hear from our friends that in principle, they are in agreement with all that the Executive does.—That is how it always begins, so I quoted a few words from Bismark, who once said: "Whenever our old diplomats say we are for a thing

in principle, we are against it in reality. We do not need this sort of thing in the Communist International. Whoever is against the tactics of the Communist International should now say so clearly. Whoever is for them, should be so with all their heart and soul. Then we shall build up a real International, that will light up the obscurity of the world, such an International as will at the first opportunity lead the working class to battle and to victory. (Loud applause.)

Chairman: I wish to announce that after the translations the voting will take place; and that therefore this Session can by no means be considered as ended.

Scoccimaro: The majority of the Italian Delegation wishes to state that they will answer the arguments of Graziadei which dealt mostly with the Italian question in spite of his premises, at the special discussion of the Congress.

However, we cannot let two errors pass uncontradicted: 1. The thesis of the Congress of the Communist Party of Italy did not contain the affirmation that all splits were impossible in the Socialist Party of Italy; it only excluded the possibility that the constitution of our party might be modified to permit a fusion with the Left Wing of the Socialist Party.

It is not true that the majority in the Communist Party of Italy are abstentionists. The abstentionists are only a minority among the militants and in the central organs; they are, furthermore, completely disciplined to the policy of the International. There are only a few in our Delegation, and one of them belongs to the minority for which Graziadei has just spoken.

Graziadei: The minority of the Communist Party of Italy reserves itself the right to prove the truth of their assertions when the Italian question will be brought up for discussion in detail.

I wish to declare personally that when I spoke of the old anti-parliamentary faction to explain the point of view of certain comrades on the question of the workers government, I meant to say that this group has played, and is still playing an important role in the formation and organization of the Italian Communist Party.

Duret: Comrades, I am taking the floor to explain the vote of the group to which I belong.

As you know, our group was opposed to the United Front as expounded by the Executive Committee. You also know that till the last moment I have voted against the resolution of the Executive Committee because this resolution approved without reservations the policy of the United Front as expounded by the Executive Committee.

We have other reservations to formulate, especially with regard to the policy of the Executive Committee towards the various national sections. For instance, we believe that on the French question, the policy of the Executive Committee in supporting the Center and the Left was not the right position to take. We believe that the policy of the Comintern cannot be based, whether in France or any other country, upon elements who are still imbued with the social-democratic prejudices, such as the group of the Center in France. In spite of all reservations, however, we must face the situation.

Our group declared at the Paris Congress that it would accept all the decisions of the Third International. Furthermore, we have declared the same thing at the meetings of the French Commission. There are some elements who entertain the idea of a rupture with the Third International; we wish to demonstrate that the immense majority of the French Party is faithfully attached to the Third International; this is why in spite of all reservations, we will vote for the resolution of the Executive Committee.

Souvarine: The Left Wing of the French Party votes for the resolution of the Executive, but declares that the passage relating to the attitude of the Executive towards the crisis in the French Party, will not prejudice any special resolutions on the French questions which may be adopted by the Congress.

Dormoy — The Delegation from the Center of the French Communist Party, in accordance with the decisions of the Paris Congress, votes for the resolution on Zinoviev's report.

We reserve ourselves the right to explain our attitude to rectify certain unjust or inexact statements which have

come up in the course of the discussion on the report of the Executive.

Pelouso: The Italian Delegation accepts that part of the resolution, concerning the Communist International, paragraph 9 of the statutes of the International, and the thesis of the Second Congress.

But since we have some objections to make concerning some other point of the resolution, and especially in regard to the united front and the attitude of the International to the Italian question, objections which will be developed later in the course of the discussion, the Italian Delegation will not vote on the report of the Executive Committee.

Meyer—(Germany).—After we have heard the various declarations on the matter of the resolution, it might be well to read the resolution itself, it follows:—

"The Fourth World Congress of the Communist International wholly approves the political work of the Executive Committee of the Communist International which during the fifteen months of activity has carried out the resolutions of the Third World Congress, and have applied them correctly in accordance with the special political conditions in each country.

The Fourth Congress approves especially the policy of the United Front as it has been formulated by the Executive Committee in its thesis of December, 1921 and in other documents of the Executive Committee relating to this question.

The Fourth Congress of the Communist International approves the attitude of the Executive Committee on the crisis in the French Communist Party, on the working class movement of Italy, on the Communist Party of Norway, on the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. Questions of practical details will be dealt with by special commissions whose resolutions will later be put before the Congress. With regard to what has happened in certain parties, the Fourth Congress, reminds the National Sections that the Executive Committee of the Comintern is the court of appeal for the whole Communist movement during the time between world congresses and that its decisions are binding upon all affiliated parties. It follows therefrom that any infringement of these resolutions on the

ground in a later appeal to the next congress is an open breach of discipline. If the Comintern should allow such practice, all regular and unified activity of the Comintern will become impossible.

In answer to the doubts of the Communist Party of France as to the application of par. 9 of the statutes of the Comintern, the Fourth Congress answers that this par. 9 gives the Executive Committee of the Comintern the unquestionable right to expel from the Comintern, and therefore from the affiliated national section, any person or group which according to the view of the Executive Committee, are inimical to Communism.

The Executive Committee of the Comintern is forced to make use of par. 9 every time a national party does not show the necessary energy and consideration for the protection of the Party to expel non-Communist elements from its ranks.

The Fourth Congress of the Comintern reaffirms the 21 Conditions laid down by the Second Congress of the Comintern and demands of the future Executive Committee that it enforces these most strictly. The Executive Committee of the Comintern must become more than ever an international organization of the proletariat; it must ruthlessly combat all opportunism; it must become an organization based on the principle of the strictest democratic centralism.

Chairman - Meyer: Comrades, in the commission the discussion centered upon one question, namely, whether these paragraphs which express the approval of the Fourth Congress of the conduct of the Executive in the various countries should be now accepted or whether we should postpone our vote on this matter until the various language commissions have concluded their labours. The commissions declare that such a postponement is not necessary, as these commissions are occupied more with the future work of the Party, and less with the conduct of the Executive in the past... It also remains for us to consider whether we can approve of the general attitude of the Executive, while certain details still await the investigation of the commissions. Therefore, one delegation offers the following substitute for the original motion which I previously read:

"Purely practical questions of detail, concerning these parties, will be dealt with in the respective Commissions whose findings will be afterwards examined by the Congress."

At the final voting after this paragraph had been inserted all delegations, with the exception of two, agreed to the resolution. The Commission requests the Congress to vote for this resolution.

Peri: The French National Federation of Young Communists, which stands by the policy of the Left of the French Party in its struggle for the application of the decisions of the Communist International, accepts with reservations the resolution on the report of the Executive of the Communist International

Chairman: The following written explanation has been received. (Radek: Let us make an end of explanations, and vote!)

"With regard to the resolution of the Enlarged Executive, comrades Torp and Meyer of the Norwegian Delegation, state that they will vote for this resolution. They wish however to have it stated in the minutes that they do not agree with the standpoint of the Executive in the matter of the Norwegian Party".

After the various delegations, who have objections to individual points of the resolution or against the whole resolution, have presented their explanations, I think that we can vote generally, and not according to delegations.

If there is no opposition to this we shall now proceed to vote.

There appears to be no objection.

We shall now proceed to vote. Those delegates who are for the resolution, will kindly raise their hands... I thank you.

Those delegates who are against the resolutions, will please raise their hand.

Those delegates who abstain voting, will please raise their hand.

The resolution is passed by a great majority.

Comrade Bordiga has the floor for personal explanation. (Bordiga: I withdraw).

Comrade Domsky has the floor for personal explanation.

Domsky (Poland): "There were a few occasional slight misunderstandings in the course of Comrade Zinoviev's discourse on the question of my nationalism (Laughter). The incriminating article was not printed during the offensive on Warsaw, but long before that offensive, when no one knew it would take place. The article expressed no fundamental opposition to the inauguration of socialism at the points of the bayonets, but it merely

stated that, under the concrete conditions." (Laughter) Several comrades begin to sing the "International". All those present join in, and the speaker abandons further speech.

Chairman: Comrades the next Session will take place to-morrow at 11 o'clock. The order of the day is: The Dictatorship in Soviet Russia and the perspectives of the World Revolution.— Session closed at 1 15 a.m.