

must state publicly that they desire to reenter the mass organisation. They should make a strong campaign for reentering. All the militants within the mass unions should carry on the same kind of struggle for readmission of these unions on the basis of unity of labour's forces. I feel confident that this aim can be attained if we only recognise the necessity for it. The thing that is to be done is for the leading spirits in the left wing movement and these independent revolutionary unions which in both instances are communists, to get together and consider all the practical measures to be taken in carrying out this policy.

In concluding I just want to point out that the role of the labour unions in the economic struggle against capitalism seems to be more appreciated by our enemies the capitalists, and reactionary labour leaders, than by ourselves. We have not yet fully recognised the necessity of communists and militants in general

working within the mass labour organisations. We have not yet to the fullest extent recognised that America. It seems as if we are afraid of becoming contaminated, and of losing our identity as communists, if we become "too much" involved in union activities.

In carrying out this policy which has been definitely laid down by the Comintern, of working within the unions by establishing our nuclei, we must realise that we are not doing so only for the purpose of making of them a recruiting ground for our party. We are doing that for the purpose of participating with the workers in their daily struggles, and develop these struggles for the economic needs of the masses into a general revolutionary struggle against capitalism, and transform the present trade unions into revolutionary instruments of the struggle for communism.

Session adjourned at 4 pm.

BULLETIN

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Chairman: Comrade Neurath.

Contents:

"The Tasks of Communists in the Trade Unions". — Concluded. — "Workers Relief".

Speakers: Lozovsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Radek, Bordiga, Münzenberg.

The Chairman, (comrade Neurath) Opened the Session at 12 o'clock noon, and called upon comrade Lovovsky to take the floor.

Lozovsky. Comrades, The discussion which took place yesterday following my report proves to us above all, that we agree in substance and principle. However, certain differences present themselves as regards form and method of practical work of the Communists in the trade unions. In this respect, it seems to me, that some of the comrades expressed themselves incorrectly, I shall begin with Comrade Heckert's objection.

I pointed out in my speech that in Germany certain incidents occurred when our comrades acted unwisely and the results of their actions had a detrimental effect upon the Communist movement. I will give two examples. The Union of Mental and Manual Workers and the Union of Agricultural Workers.

We fully agree with our comrades, the members of the German Communist Party, that all is not well in the Union. What is the Union of Mental and Manual Workers? It is an organisation embracing various Syndicalist, Communist, and non-Party elements: it contains also a great many backward workers who lack a clear and definite understanding of both the theoretical and practical side of Communism, but who are at the same

time, excellent fighting revolutionists. It is evident then, that our forms and methods of action as regards this organisation should differ from methods applied to an organisation directly connected with the Communist Party.

When we have muddle and confusion within the Communist Party we take very decisive Party measures against it, of a disciplinary and a political character. When we have confusion in a non-Party organisation then it becomes necessary for us to conduct an educational political, and organisational work so as to raise these non-Party masses to the Communist class consciousness.

Our difference with Comrade Heckert is not whether the work to raise the consciousness of the proletarian masses to the Communist level is necessary or not, but merely as to forms and methods of action. The criticism of our German communists directed against the Union is in the main correct—the Union in fact is a confused organisation, but the steps taken by our German comrades in connection with the Union were incorrect because they tended to drive away the best revolutionary elements from the Communist Party. A conference of the

Party and Trade Union workers which took place in Berlin is quite characteristic of this very fact.

In the Ruhr District during the conflict between the miners and the employers, the old Union proposed to warn the former of the coming strike two weeks ahead. Each individual worker had to hand in notice of the strike. This was a round-about way of acting, but it was possible to bring some pressure thereby upon the employers. Acting in this manner the Reformist Union calculated that the threat of the strike would have a quieting influence upon the employers, who were getting ready to advance upon the masses. But the Unionists declared that these tactics were unacceptable to them. Such tactics are opportunistic they declared, we recognise exclusively, revolutionary methods of struggle and refuse to send notices to the employers.

The Party declared itself against the tactics of the Unionists, stating that the Reformist are making a certain definite step, and advising them to do the same, at the same time making it clear to the workers that this step is insufficient; more radical and revolutionary measures of struggle against capital are necessary—at the same time, if you refuse to give notice as the Union of Mine Workers propose, the reformist workers will say that you are merely revolutionary phrase-mongers, and refuse to cooperate in the struggle. The Union was wrong in the given case, its action being governed by abstract and internal principles, and not by realities.

We held a conference in Berlin in which Comrade Kolnig, Secretary of the Rhine Westphalian Communist organisation, also participated. At this conference I asked Comrade Kolnig the following question: How many members of the Union are in the Rhine Westphalian Organisation, and received the answer: 70,000—and to the question as to the number of members in the Party the answer was 29,000. And in answer to my last question: How is it possible, having 29,000 members in the party you are unable to influence the Union, Comrade Kolnig frankly stated to me "Confusion reigns among the communists". My reply was: "If confusion was so great within the party, then it was necessary to clear your own ranks before

attempting to eradicate confusion among the non-party members of the Union."

Although in comparison with the general workers' movement of Germany the strength of the Union is not very great, counting 150,000 members only—however, 120,000 of these are mine-workers of the Ruhr Basin—a force not to be ignored but which should be reckoned with. The Profintern and the Comintern were successful in solving the conflict which has just arisen between the Communist Party of Germany and the Union. All the resolutions introduced by the Profintern were finally adopted by the Congress of the Union.

Comrade Heckert puts the following question: How can we organise the workers who are leaving the trade unions? If we took up this work, this fact alone would have caused a split. I think that this question needs careful consideration. Take for example the Union of Agricultural Workers of Germany. This Union comprises perhaps more than 500,000 members. During the course of two years it lost from 200,000 to 300,000 members. The following alternative confronts us: Either we remain passive, or the Communist Party of Germany should take upon itself the task of organising the workers who have left the Union. Are we to be reproached for splitting the Trade Union movement upon the fact that we are organising those elements which are leaving the Trade Unions? Of course not. If we fail to organise these workers we cannot be called communists.

For we Marxists, organisation is not the end, but a means to achieve our end. We are fighting for unity in the trade union movement, but we cannot sacrifice the organisation of hundreds of thousands of workers for the sake of abstract principles.

I shall pass on to France now.—Some of the comrades will say that Comrade Lauridan's speech is a call to arms against syndicalism. I do not share this point of view. His speech is worthy of a communist. Comrade Lauridan related to us common ordinary things, but things that every communist should know. We agree with him that communists should remain communists, at all times, whether in trade unions, Co-operatives—and not separately as individuals, but should

guided by a united collected communist will. First of all, did the Communist Party of France have a Trade Union policy? It had resolutions upon the Trade Union questions, but it had no Trade Union policy whatsoever, for the reason that it lacked collective influence and will to carry out this Trade Union policy. Our desire is that our practical slogans, our ideas and conceptions, as well as our decisions as to methods of class struggle, be accepted by Communists.

And for this purpose there must be unanimity among them even if there are only three of them together. When I arrived at San Etienne I put the following question to our Communist comrades: How can the fact be explained that three or four thousand anarchists can exert a greater influence in the trade union movement than the Communist Party numbering 100,000 members. Does it signify that one anarchist is worth 50 communists? This is only possible when Communists refuse to carry on communist work and when each individual communist considers himself independent of his Party. If a Communist fails to be aggressive, then he is not a Communist. I do not mean aggression in words, but aggression in deeds, in actual struggle against the bourgeoisie. A Communist should always be in the vanguard. To be a Communist does not signify to merely have a party ticket—it signifies having a firm conviction in the correctness of the Communist programme and tactics.

Is it true, that in the organs of the Communist Party, anarcho-Syndicalists published articles directed against the Comintern, Profintern, and even against the Communist Party of France? You will admit that it was so. Is it true, that the anarcho-syndicalists conducted their propaganda through the organs of the French Communist Party? Yes, it is true. I could cite hundreds of examples. Is it true that a bloc existed between some of the anarcho-syndicalists and members of the Communist Party? (Lauridan: A secret agreement was signed) Yes, it is true. The Communists, together with the Anarcho-Syndicalists, signed a secret agreement. How did the Communists react to the publication of this agreement?

In what manner was this agreement

made public? The Central Executive Committee of the Party failed to take any measures to hold those Communists responsible who secretly concluded an agreement directed against Communism and the Communist Party.

Cachin. May I have the floor, please? A trade union Commission was appointed to conduct work among the trade unions Comrade Tomasi, "Left Wing", was the chairman of this Commission. He failed to give a report to the Central Executive Committee regarding these facts. It is necessary to establish the fact as to responsibility and to continually blame the same people.

Pakero. This accusation refers to another faction,

Lozovsky. You may be assured that at the present moment, I am not accusing anybody. I presume you will agree with me, that if the chairman of the Central Executive Committee, irrespective of the fact whether he belongs to the Left, Right, or Centre, fails to fulfill his obligations to the Communist Party, then he should be put out (Applause).

Lauridan. Excellent.

Lozovsky. Neither the Trade Union Commission nor the Central Committee took any measures against those members of the Party who had signed the anti-Communist agreement. I emphasize the fact that this is abnormal. It is immaterial whether Left or Right or any other comrades fail to fulfill their obligations—the responsibility falls upon all.

On can state the fact, at the present time, that the Party as a whole does not exert the influence in the Trade Union movement of France, corresponding to its strength. If unity of action existed in the Communist Party then its influence would have been ten times as great.

I wish to refer to another, perhaps a delicate question. Prior to the St. Etienne Congress I read an article written by Comrade Frossard, in which he wrote among other things, that "In the Trade Union Movement we follow the fine tradition of Jean Jaurès." We all deeply honour the memory of Jean Jaurès—but his traditions never the less, are not Communist traditions. One can say this without dishonouring his memory. Jaurès was one of the most prominent leaders of the Second International. He paid with

his life for his convictions. But our respect for him should not compel us to assert that all that he did was praiseworthy. No. The tactics of Jaurès are absolutely inapplicable to the Communists, to the Communist Party. If the Communist Parties were to be guided by traditions — then very little would have been accomplished. There are useful traditions which should be reckoned with and foolish traditions which should be cast aside.

The French Trade Union movement has various traditions. The traditions of the industrial proletariat of northern France are quite different from those of the small artisans of Paris. The strength of the industrial districts consists in the fact that the Trade Union movement is interconnected with the political movement. And if one is to consider traditions then I would give the preference to the traditions of northern France.

In conclusion, The Communist Party of France during the whole of its latter period, has not taken a definite stand of its own, but all the time appeared to be overborne by the syndicalists. But the French communists, while admitting the autonomy of the syndicalists, should keep in mind that they themselves are autonomous and independent, and should have the courage to express their own ideas without regard to the syndicalists.

I shall pass on to Italy—to the speech of Comrade Tasca. Comrade Tasca drew a very sad picture and referred even to Bernstein and his Reformism. What facts in my report served as material for the mournful picture as drawn by Comrade Tasca? What frightened him? Is it my expression that it is impossible to bend life to theses, but that one must write theses in conformity with life? This sounded like Bernstein to him; but there is nothing in common between my words and the principles of Bernstein.

The reformists state that it is possible to reach the goal without a revolution, we say however, that in the basis of the daily struggle we shall succeed in organising a fighting army which will gain victory over the bourgeoisie and will achieve our final aim: Communism. How can we achieve this ideal? This ideal will be achieved differently in the various countries, for the development of the working class is not the same in every

country, and we are guided by the various stages of development of each country in the tactics we adopt to reach our final goal. The special development of each country should be taken into account and corresponding tactics applied.

Putting the question thus, is not equivalent to Bernstein's refusal to attain the final aim. Therefore the fears of Comrade Tasca are unfounded. At the given moment we have strong reformist unions which are in need of great educational work in order to change the ideology of the working masses. Before we attain our goal we must overcome obstacles and historical difficulties.

These difficulties consist in the abnormal relations between some of the Communist Parties and the Trade unions arising on the basis of the traditions of Parliamentary Socialism etc.

What is the essence of the 20th paragraph of my theses? It is stated there that in the countries where the Party is not sufficiently strong and where internal struggle exists, it is essential to establish such relations between the trade unions and the Party which would correspond to the situation of the given moment.

In France, as is well known, a Syndicalist Party was formed within the Trade Unions. Our task is to unite the best elements of the present Communist Party and the Trade Unions.

On the basis of co-operation the best elements of both organisations will get into closer contact, and a real fighting unified Communist Party will arise which will be the actual undisputed vanguard of the French proletariat.

Both the Syndicalist and Communist Parties do not develop along parallel lines; their lines will intersect each other, and when that happens the Communist Party of France will be finally formed.

When we determine the principles of our work for one country or another, we must base ourselves on the existing relation of forces and on the existing relations between the trade union organisations and the party. For this reason we included in our theses clause 20. By inserting it we followed the advice of Lassalle: to state the real facts and speak the truth under all circumstances.

Comrade Tasca said in his speech that the Profintern is no more than a bureau

for propaganda and if it should desire to become a centre for the unification of the international revolutionary trade union movement, it will thereby precipitate a split in the world trade union movement. This is an untrue assertion. Of course, we are also a bureau of propaganda, but at the same time we are an organisation, and the distinctive feature of the Profintern consists in that it unites revolutionary organisations directly allied to it as well as revolutionary minorities remaining within the Amsterdam trade unions. The Profintern represents a real international organisation enjoying immense moral and political influence among the working masses. If we would have decided to separate the working masses which are sympathetic to us from the Amsterdam trade unions and attach them directly and exclusively to the Profintern, we would be working for a split. Not wishing to bring about a split, however, we said: Notwithstanding the greatest obstacles, we shall remain within the Amsterdam trade unions and work there in favour of the Profintern.

Comrade Tasca referred to the Factory Council. This question was discussed on the II Congress and to my mind there is no need to take up this question now. The Factory Council movement in Germany represents at present a tremendous mass movement. We shall not take up this question now, however, as it will be dealt with in the theses on the general tactics of the Comintern.

Further, when should the national organisations declare their affiliation with the Profintern? This is a question of tactics. When we find in some countries that the general Trade Union centre is on our side, we tell them: "You must now join the Profintern" I should like, for the sake of clarifying this question, to cite an example. We proposed to the Italian Confederation of Labour through its official representatives to join the Profintern. These representatives signed with us a formal agreement which they later renounced. But whether the official organisation is for us or against us, we are against a split. One thing is clear, we must carry on revolutionary work within the Trade Unions. We must arouse the reformist organisations to action. In every country forms and methods should be

devised for ideologically attracting to our side the broad working masses and thus preserve the unity of the Trade Union movement.

Some Trade Union organisations, however, put a wrong construction upon our cautious tactics in the question of affiliation with the Profintern. Thus, in Norway, 80% of the organised workers are sympathetic towards us. Twice the central organisation of the Norway Trade Unions adopted a resolution calling for affiliation with us, but it still hesitates to take actual steps towards affiliation on account of the 20% of the membership who cling to Amsterdam. Will there be a split, if a Trade Union organisation in whose ranks we find only 10% or 20% of reformistically inclined members will formally affiliate with us? Undoubtedly not. We declare: the minority should remain and submit to the majority and we apply this principle when we are in the minority, but the majority should by no means submit to the minority. When our adherents constitute a majority in a given Trade Union organisation, it is their duty to bring about a formal affiliation with the Profintern.

Now we shall consider the question of the International Federations. No-one will deny to the International Propaganda Committee the right to conduct propaganda on a National or International scale. Any Trade Union, joining a propaganda organisation still remains a member of a corresponding International Federation. It continues its work in the International Federation, endeavouring to alienate as large as possible a number of organisations from its ideological influence and to imbue them with our political views. We have no desire to split the International Federations. When the Russian and Bulgarian Trade Unions asked to be admitted to the International Federations, they were shown the door. They returned and were driven out once more. They returned for the sake of avoiding a split. However, when the Amsterdamers will represent only the Trade Union officialdom and the working masses will be solidly behind us, we shall not abstain from creating our own international organisations.

The last question we shall deal with is the question of Czecho-Slovakia. In

Czecho-Slovakia we have at the present time two types of Trade Union organisations. The split in Czecho-Slovakia occurred approximately in the same manner as in France. Here too, mass expulsions of revolutionary workers were used, and then the minority organised and convened a congress for the restoration of unity.

At the present time we are confronted with an accomplished fact. We have there two parallel organisations. I shall emphasize one characteristic feature of the activity of our comrades in Czecho-Slovakia. About 10 months ago the communists had the opportunity to elect a majority for the Congress of the central trade union organisations in Czecho-Slovakia. What happened? In Czecho-Slovakia, though less than in France, there is a considerable number of communists who want to be independent of the Party. There is in Czecho-Slovakia a large federation of agricultural workers; it is headed by comrade Bolin. Shortly before the Congress this federation suspended the payment of membership dues to the Amsterdam International, and continued so for six months, with the result that its representatives were not admitted to the Congress. What did the Party do? Nothing. It should be emphasised that comrade Bolin, head of the Federation of Agricultural Workers, is also a member of the Central Executive of the Communist Party. The Communists would have had as strong a delegation as the reformists, if 50 of our comrades would not have remained outside the Congress, as a result of the refusal to pay membership dues. But at the time the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia was afraid to obtain a majority at the Congress, for it would have been faced with many difficulties. What was the final result? The reformists expelled the revolutionary unions and brought about a split in the Trade Union movement under conditions much less favourable for our comrades than would have existed before.

On my way back from St. Etienne I had a consultation with the Comrades of Czecho-Slovakia and we worked out certain ways and means to forestall this split. We adopted a number of methods and clearly stated that we did not want a split.

There is still one question which I want to dwell upon. At their Congress, our Czecho-Slovakian comrades decided to create a united organisation i.e., to do away with separate federations (similar to what has been done in France in the department of Moselle; different industrial federations were to become sections of a united trade union organisation of the entire country). When the comrade set out this plan to us, we said to them: „Be careful, this is your future organisation, and not the present“. At the present time we still find among the communistically inclined workers many who are imbued with craft prejudices which are hard to overcome, and the attempt to create at once a completely unified organisation will undoubtedly arouse opposition within our own ranks.

We shall discuss this question at greater length at the Congress of the Profintern where the organisation questions and the questions of the inter-relationship between the local sections and the centre will be dealt with most exhaustively. We should state, however, that the Comintern and the Profintern warned the comrades to be careful, for they will encounter many difficulties, because resistance will be met even in their own ranks.

Lauriden: (from his seat) „The same difficulties occur also in the Moselle Federation“.

Lozovsky: My conclusion will be extraordinarily simple. International communism at the present time represents a very great force. It is the only revolutionary power in the world. We discuss questions pertaining to a single country in such detail, only because incorrect tactics in one country affect other countries. The vacillations of our ranks in one country weaken our united communist front and retard the movement of International communism. We want to have our work organised in all countries in such a manner as to assure the growth of our influence from day to day. We do not care to have a French communism, a Dutch or German communism, as was the case in the Second International, where socialism has a national character. We differ from the other Internationals in that the Comintern and the Profintern are real world organisations in which international interests supercede national interests.

By mutual criticism and by collective work and collective deliberation upon the lines of policy in each country we shall enable the Comintern to grow stronger and lead the struggle for the overthrow of capitalism forward to final victory. (Applause).

Chairman Neurath: We will now proceed to elect a commission charged with the final edition of the trade union thesis before they are put to the vote of the Congress. The Presidium proposes the following comrades for this commission:

Lozovsky—Russia.
Rosmer—France.
Heckert—Germany.
Lansing—America.
Tasca—Italy.
Pavlik—Czecho-Slovakia.
Kolarov—Bulgaria.

Does anyone wish to speak on this question?

Murphy (Gt. Britain): I propose that comrade Clark represent Gt. Britain on this Commission.

Chairman Neurath: It has been proposed that in addition to the other comrades, Comrade Clark be added to the Commission as the representative of Gt. Britain. Is anyone against this proposal? As this is not the case, and as there was no objection to the other names, the Commission stands elected.

Comrades, we shall now revert to the programme question, and I call on comrade Bucharin to address you on behalf of the Russian Delegation.

Bucharin: I have, on behalf of the Russian Delegation, to make the following statement:

„In view of the fact that the dispute about the programme created the wrong impression that the divergence of opinion was on a matter of principle, the Russian Delegation lays down unanimously that the inclusion of the transition demands into the programmes of the national sections, and their theoretical formulation in the general part of the programme cannot be considered as opportunism.“

Signed by the representatives of the Russian Delegation. Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bucharin.

Chairman Neurath: The Presidium has made a careful study of the subject

and has elaborated a proposal on which comrade Zinoviev will address you now.

Zinoviev: I will simply read to you this proposal, which as we were informed, has the support of a number of those delegations that had the opportunity of acquainting themselves with it, viz, the German, Russian, Czecho-Slovakian, Polish, Bulgarian, and a number of other delegations.

The proposal is as follows:

1. All programme proposals are to be handed in to the Executive of the Communist International or to a Commission appointed by the latter, for detailed study and elaboration. The Executive of the Communist International is to publish with the least possible delay all programme proposals submitted to it.

2. The Congress endorses the decision that all the national sections of the Communist International, which are as yet without a national programme, must at once take in hand the elaboration of such a programme which must be submitted to the Executive not later than three months before the V Congress for endorsement by the next Congress.

3. The necessity of the struggle for the transition demands must be emphasised in the programmes of the national sections, with the reservation that such demands are dependent on the concrete conditions of time and place.

4. The theoretic basis for all transition and partial demands must be definitely laid down in the general programme, the IV Congress strongly condemning all attempts to represent the inclusion of the transition demands into the programme as opportunism, and also all attempts to gloss over or to replace the basic revolutionary task by partial demands.

3. The basis historictypes of the transition demands of the national sections must be clearly embodied in the general programme, due account being taken of the basic differences in the economic and political structure of the various countries, as for instance, Great Britain on the one hand, India on the other.

Chair: The Presidium is of the opinion that this proposal can be accepted without discussion. Nevertheless, we are in favour of the Delegations (although most of them have already expressed agreement with the proposal) having another

opportunity to express themselves. I will therefore adjourn the Session for 20 minutes.

(Interval.)

Chairman Neurath: I wish to draw your attention to the fact that all the sections are in agreement with the principle of the proposal of the Presidium. The Italian delegation however has declared that although in agreement with us on the principle of the question, it wishes to make a statement. I have been informed that in the event of the Italian section making a statement, other sections may do the same. I therefore beg the Italian Section to desist from making a statement.

Bordiga: The Italian delegation consents to have its statement entered in the minutes without reading it. But it cannot drop the statement.

Radek (in that case let him better read it!)

Chairman Neurath: As the Italian section agrees to its statement not being made here, but only entered in the minutes...

Radek. This is a misunderstanding. The Italian delegation has not renounced its statement, but only wishes that it should be entered in the minutes. I must point out that anything entered in the minutes must also come up at the session.

Chairman Neurath: All right, we will put this statement before the session, in the event of the Italian delegation insisting on having it entered in the minutes.

Bordiga: There are precedents on matters of this kind. In any case, if Comrade Radek is of the opinion that one cannot enter a statement in the minutes without reading it at the session, the Italian delegation insists on having its statement read.

The Italian delegation, while voting for the resolution postponing the question of the programme, insists on having it entered in the minutes that it would have preferred to have the C. I. programme discussed and adopted at this Congress. It agrees with the structure of the programme proposed by Comrade Bukharin, and is of the opinion that the question of the type of the programme should have been more definitely laid

down at this Congress, even if the decision on its final edition is to be postponed.

Chairman Neurath:—Does any other delegation wish to make a statement? This is not the case. Is anyone against the proposal of the Presidium? This not being the case I declare the proposal of the Presidium unanimously accepted.

Before proceeding with the next item on the agenda, I call upon Comrade Zinoviev to address you.

Zinoviev:—I should like to say briefly why we proposed to have the resolution adopted without discussion. I trust that these remarks of mine will voice the opinion of those who are present here.

We were of the opinion that a crippled or an abridged discussion would be harmful under given conditions. Therefore we proposed, voicing I am sure the wish of most of you, to adopt a resolution without an abridged discussion, which could be only harmful on this very complicated question.

I trust that we have found the way out of this difficulty.

Chairman Neurath:—This matter being disposed of, we are coming now to the next item on the agenda: Workers' Relief, on which Comrade Munzenberg will address the Congress.

Comrade Munzenberg:—Comrade I have divided my report into two parts. I will devote a few minutes to our Famine Relief, and take up the rest of the time with the second part of my report, with the Economic Relief.

Naturally, I will not spend any time on the causes, the magnitude, and the course of the famine. These facts are only too well known to most of the delegates. Every organ of public opinion reported on last year's famine in Russia which Lenin characterised as the greatest hardship in the reconstruction of Soviet Russia. It suffices to say that 40 million people were directly affected by the famine and that about 3 million of them died of starvation.

It is very important to know that the famine was vanquished and finally overcome not so much by foreign relief, but by the bourgeois or workers' organisations, but by Soviet Russia. I had pre-

pared myself to quote no numbers, but I will give two figures in this matter because public opinion is absolutely uninformed of the actual work of relief done to overcome the hunger. All the foreign, governmental, Red Cross, A.R.A., Nansen, Quaker and Workers' Relief sent 33 million poods of grain to Russia until August 1922; during the same time Russia herself gathered 165 million poods of food and 31 million of sowing seeds; altogether 196 millions. All the foreign countries, all foreign relief did not accomplish one sixth of what famished Russia herself did to combat the famine. The famine on the Volga gave birth to a manifestation of labour solidarity such as we had never seen in the history of the Socialist movement before. The action began spontaneously, before any organisation, any Party, had made direct appeal to the workers. German, Austrian and Dutch workers responded to the first call for help with large collections. The campaign spread to all countries, to Japan as well as to India, to North and South America, to every European country; all responded to the call for relief.

The campaign lasted undiminished for a year. It gave rise to a great many touching manifestations of solidarity towards the Russian working class. In England and especially in Holland a great number of working class women gave up their last jewels, even their marriage rings, for the starving Russians; children emptied their saving boxes, sold their pencils and their copy books; prisoners gave up their miserly pay for the relief of the starving Russians.

No action in the past decade has been so popular, or affected such large masses of the proletariat as the campaign for famine relief. I will not bore you with numbers; only allow me to read to you these few lines from the report from Bulgaria:

"Whenever any one celebrated a marriage, or child-birth, whenever anyone was buried, or whenever any other event happened, the starving Russians were remembered. Many cases have been recorded when women gave up religious observances and used the money thereby saved, for the Russian relief. Many gave up smoking for weeks, others did not shave, it even happened that comrades

sacrificed several meals a month to come to the help of their Russian brothers".

These are small individual manifestations. I quote them as a proof that this action affected the broadest, non-communist masses and awakened and increased the interest in and solidarity with Soviet Russia.

Comrade Zinoviev in his report said that this action was one of the most remarkable campaigns in the past years. It is indisputably true that almost all Communist Parties and groups with very few exceptions took part in this action and helped to make it a success. At the same time it must be stated in this connection that many comrades took quite a different attitude of the campaign. In Germany, there were groups who saw in this campaign but a philanthropic charitable action and acted accordingly. I believe that nothing could be more false than to see in the past campaign and the pending economic action, nothing but a charitable collection, an action of pure philanthropic character. Its primary importance is political not charitable.

The past relief campaign had a great political task to accomplish, which was only partly done because the Communists first began to carry on the campaign on the necessary scale only when they were forced to it by the masses. What were the immediate results when the famine broke out? The immediate results were that a great number of bourgeois governments attempted to increase their attacks against Soviet Russia. In September and October 1920 the world rang with the sword rattling of Polish and French militarism. And just as the English workers were able to prevent the English government from pursuing the Anglo-Polish-Russian war and put a stop to England's military support of the Russian interventionists, the famine campaign of the Comintern and the partial support of the Trade Union International and the large masses of unorganised workers created such a sentiment which forced France to give up some of her plans against Soviet Russia. As is well known, at the first news of the famine, France had prepared an extensive plan for armed intervention in Russia. The pressure of the masses and the change of public opinion in favour of the famished forced

even such reactionary governments as France to vote funds for the relief of the famine.

Our second political task in this campaign was brought about by our differences with the Second and Two and a Half Internationals and their affiliated unions. Forced by spontaneous mass manifestations, the official leaders of the Second and Two and Half Internationals, the adherent Trade Unions and the affiliated Parties declared themselves in favour of a large relief campaign for the benefit of the starving Russians. A few months later when the pressure from the masses became less urgent the leaders changed their course and attempted to use the famine catastrophe as propaganda against Soviet Russia. A savage campaign began in all Social Democratic newspapers whose dominant tone was: "Now you can see where Communism, where Bolshevism lead to! It is a return to barbarism! I only wish to recall the words of Wells at the last Congress of the Social Democracy. He declared; 'What is Bolshevism? It is the return to capitalism through cannibalism'. This was the propaganda of the Social Democratic papers for months. This made necessary a counter campaign on the part of the Communist Party to show the true causes of the famine. Those responsible for the catastrophe were not the Bolsheviks, but those who had prevented the lifting of the blockade and given their support to military interventions against Russia. Our press only partly came up to this task. (Quite true) The Social Democratic press conducted a much wider and more intensive campaign against Russia than the Communists for Russia.

Comrades, this was the great political significance of the famine relief campaign. To this campaign which awakened the interest of the large masses of the working classes in Soviet Russia by means of public discussion of the famine on the Volga we should have added a political propaganda explaining the course of the Russian Revolution and showing that the present famine was one link in the long chain of sufferings which the Russian proletariat had to undergo in the interest of its revolution. Everywhere where our committees and Parties have done this, we scored many political successes. I

only wish to recall the case of America and Japan, two very typical countries. The campaign for the famine relief enabled us for the first time to conduct Communist propaganda among the Trade Union workers of North America, and to unite these workers in a relief action under the control of the Communist Party. The same thing happened, in Japan. There large associations were created, consisting primarily of workers' organisations, Trade Unions, and even of a bourgeois Womens' League which acted together and were controlled secretly by the Communist Party. In this way we were able to bring for the first time before the masses the questions of Soviet Russia, proletarian revolution, etc.

I will be brief, but I would like to mention another political fact of importance in this connection, and that is the question of the famine campaign in Russia herself. The bourgeois organisations attempted to use the catastrophe against Soviet Russia not only abroad but they also attempted to incite the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia against the Soviet government and plotted for its overthrow. Together with every plate of soup the A.R.A. distributed a leaflet which read; "We the American bourgeoisie are helping you after the Bolshevik regime has thrown you in this frightful situation." For several months the Trade Union International sent several delegates to the famine districts where they attempted to win the peasants and workers over to the Amsterdam International. This is why we gave over our distribution apparatus and especially our hospital stations in Samara, in Saratov, in Orenbourg, in the Ural, and in the Crimea, to the Soviet government in order to put a stop to this exploitation of Russia's misery against the Bolshevik regime, and we gave the piece of bread or meat which we could afford to bring to the suffering peasants and workers in the name of the Communist International. These Russian peasants and workers naturally do not stand on the same cultural plane, as for instance, the members of this Fourth World Congress of the Comintern. This thing took a very simple form in their mind. Till then they had heard of the Comintern only through the Congress reports in the form

of resolutions of the Western workers in favour of Soviet Russia. For the first time they felt the presence of the Comintern in flesh and blood. They saw practical action in their support. In this way the famine relief produced positive political results for the Comintern in Russia also. Comrades allow me a few more words on the relief work itself. This is also known to most of the delegates here through our constant reports. Under advice of the Executive, we attempted to form a United Front of the workers on the famine relief. We entered into negotiations with leaders of the Second and Two and a Half and Trade Union Internationals, we had two common conferences in Berlin, which had no positive results. Only in Italy and Czecho-Slovakia were we able to create a temporary committee of representatives from various parties, Trade Unions and cooperatives. However, a few months later the committee broke up when it came to the question of the disposal of the collected funds. The Czecho-Slovak Social Democrats wanted to give those funds over to Amsterdam.

Two great organisations took part in the workers' relief for the Russian famine; the Trade Union International and the Communist International. Allow me a word on the work of the Amsterdam International. The work of the Trade Union International found support in all the Social-Democratic parties and the still existing independent centrist parties. Under pressure of the spontaneous manifestation of the will of the masses to come to the help of Soviet Russia, the Amsterdam Bureau found very sharp and wise language.

Manifestoes were published in the papers saying "Workers, help Soviet Russia; if Soviet Russia falls misfortune will fall upon all Europe!" These manifestoes were ignored by the Centrist and other social democratic organs. As the agitation in the Press continued, the Amsterdam Trade Union International took the matter up; and now, after a year and a half, we can regard the work as established. The trade unions and the social democrats have contributed according to the audit of April 1922, altogether 1,400,000 Dutch guilden. With this sum 40,000 children have been fed for several months and

about 50,000 railway workers have received rations.

The aid of the International Co-operators has not been as great, as only the Czecho-Slovakian and Italian co-operatives have sent substantial shipments of clothing etc.

Now a few words with regard to the action of the Communist International. After the plan to form a powerful united front of working class unions and parties against the Russian Famine was wrecked, the Communist Party endeavoured to win support from as large a number as possible of the workers in the factories and the unions. This has been done in many countries with great success. For example, in Switzerland, in Holland, in Scandinavia, and also, to some extent in America. Large groups of sympathisers and considerable numbers of indifferent workers, were won over to the cause of famine relief through the activity of the Communist committees and parties.

The material results of this work were unexpectedly good. When we initiated the campaign, none of us would have thought it possible to amass such great sums as those which have been collected. You have heard, in the report of comrade Eberlein, how weak from an organisational point of view, the parties in the Western countries still are. To this we must add severe unemployment in America, England, Switzerland, and Norway, which materially hampered our activities, while in Austria and Germany, as a result of the continually rising cost of living, the position of the workers was thereby so impoverished that it was difficult even for the best of communists, to request further sacrifices of these comrades.

Altogether, the activity of the communist relief committees in goods, money, and valuables, realised over 2½ million dollars.

To illustrate the magnitude of this result, I would like to make a comparison. In Switzerland 250,000 trade unionists and social democrats, who organised a special campaign of their own, collected only 80,000 Swiss francs. On the other hand, the Swiss relief committee of the Communist Party, which had only a few thousand members, collected 540,000 Swiss francs (Applause). These are figures which tell us distinctly that the Com-

munist committees have been able to penetrate into many sections of the masses which were hitherto indifferent, and to obtain from them financial support.

I said just now that the Amsterdam International, with over twenty million members, collected 1,400,000 Dutch gulden. The Relief Committees of the little Communist Party of Holland, up till about a fortnight ago, collected half a million Dutch gulden. I believe that the Dutch Party has only four or five thousand members. And these have raised about half a million gulden, while the Amsterdam International with its 22 million members, up to the 15th March, had only raised 1,444,000 gulden. I believe that these figures show that it was possible to obtain good results when the Communist Parties conducted a skillful agitation. These figures also show the goodwill and self-sacrificing spirit of large sections of the working class.

With the 2½ million dollars, about 30,000 tons of foodstuffs and other relief material were sent to Russia. The relief work started in Russia in November. In December the first relief trains arrived in Kazan and other parts of the famine area. I will not detain you with figures especially as some of our comrades, working in the famine area, have not compiled exact statistics, as they forgot to include in their reports to whom relief was accorded. But it is better to forget to enter some one in one's statistical report, than to forget to aid him, as has been the case, I believe, by certain bourgeois organisations. During the famine months, we gave full relief to about from 200,000 to 220,000 people, and also supplied certain rations to railway workers and other workers in different necessary factories. At present the famine relief continues still in the form of aid to the children. We have taken over some Children's Homes in the different famine districts, in which at present 14,000 children are completely supported by us. We have also equipped a number of these homes.

That which distinguishes the relief work of the C.I. from that of the bourgeois philanthropic societies, is that we have, from the beginning, united the famine relief—that is, the actual feeding of the hungry—with aid towards the

reconstruction of Russian agriculture and industry which were destroyed in the famine area.

I now come to the second part of my report: the economic help campaign. I must now take a brief glance at the past. The will of the West European and American workers to render to Russia, not only political aid through their Communist Parties, but also practical economic aid, has shown itself for several years. Already in the autumn of 1919, and still more markedly in the Spring of 1920, American, Swedish, Norwegian and German workers groups emigrated to Russia and there, with much idealism and little skill, endeavoured to restore Russian industry. Most of these experiments have ended in a complete fiasco. I am reminded now of the Kolomna affair, so well remembered in Germany. About a year ago, and mainly as a result of the famine relief campaign, an increased determination to extend economic aid to Russia has shown itself among the West European, and particularly among the American workers. In Germany a number of machines have been sent to Russia, besides tools and agricultural machinery. In Italy the co-operative societies played the most important part in economic aid. They intend to undertake the cultivation of 100,000 hectares of land. In England, in Switzerland, and Czecho-Slovakia groups are being formed, for example construction groups, who wish to emigrate to Russia with tools and a small capital. This tendency is also found in South Africa and is particularly strong in America. There are several large groups in that country adhering to the enterprise of the Dutch engineer Rutgers, who have established several thousand construction and other workers in the Cusnetz Basin, and has taken over mines and land sites for development.

In America there is the Friends of Soviet Russia, which is closely connected with the Communist International, and which has already supplied considerable economic help for instance, the 20 tractors which are now at work in the Perm district. In the United States there is also the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia which also sent several tractors to Russia; this organisation has several branches and several

thousand members. Then we have Comrade Hillman's plan which proposes to raise a loan of one million dollars for Russia and which has arranged with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers to found large-scale clothing factories in Russia.

In the last few days the Russian Government has established a special commission, under the control of Comrades Elduck and Tartens, which will bring over 8,000 American workers to Russia next Spring.

I believe it is the duty of the Communist International to define its position with regard to these matters. In America there are at least 20,000 people who are interested in these enterprises; in Europe perhaps an equal number. We must know how to deal with these things. Perhaps they are not good—then they must be changed into large-scale campaigns for economic help. Among most of the workers in Europe and America who are inclined to emigrate to Russia, the desire to aid Russia is mingled with the desire to aid themselves. They have the idea that within the next few years there will be great political crises in America or Europe. Russia, however, is at present in a state of improvement. Therefore, think they, let us shoulder our bundles and start for there. So far, the Communist International has refused to take up a position with regard to this; but they must now assume a very definite attitude. In the face of such a plan, the bringing of eight to ten thousand emigrants to Russia, we of the Communist International are in duty bound to tell our Russian comrades that we have given our best thought to this subject, not only to the work which these emigrants will do here, but to the consequent weakening of the revolutionary movement in the countries which they leave, through their withdrawal. There is no reason why we should mitigate the tremendous economic crises in France and Czecho-Slovakia by bringing a great mass of unemployed to Soviet Russia. I believe that we should unconditionally take up the attitude that, as a Communist Party, we are strictly opposed to any mass emigration of European and American workers to Russia. Such emigration implies no further support for Russia but only a

relieving of the crisis in the Western capitalist countries.

It is quite different, however, when for certain factories, certain skilled specialists are needed who cannot be found in Russia. In such cases the bringing over of European or American workers, under the control and with the consent of the Russian trade unions, might be advisable.

Comrades, whatever position we take with regard to this, it must at least be definite. Either the immigration of foreign workers is a good thing or it is a bad thing, and our attitude must be governed accordingly.

I am of the opinion that the question of economic help is a matter which deserves the support of the Communist International to the fullest extent. Only we must be absolutely clear as to the character of this help. We must finally break with such fantastic conceptions as that the economic help is a new campaign to solve the world problem, that it is the struggle of the classes to introduce new production as some comrades seem to think. Here a distinct division must be drawn.

There are a number of comrades who have great doubts with regard to economic help. They see in it the danger of the opportunistic petty bourgeoisie, they fear economic experiments which will have deteriorating effects on political propaganda. They remind us of Kolomna and other similar cases.

It is true that Famine Relief, and even more so economic help, is a very ticklish problem, especially when the Communist International supports it. It brings with it many great dangers. But there are no tactics which do not contain within themselves certain dangerous factors. We discussed the United Front for nearly a year, and the whole Congress was of the opinion that it implied dangers both from the Right and from the Left. Yet it was unanimously accepted. Because certain tactics may involve certain dangers is not an argument that they should not be introduced, if they be possible, useful, and productive of good results. One must take precautions, on a national and on international scale, to reduce this danger to a minimum.

Comrades, I believe that the problem of economic help is above all a problem

of expediency and practicability. The principal thing is that we should ask ourselves whether the expenditure of effort is justified by the results. There could be no doubt left in this Congress that the Communist International should agree that the first and best support of Russian economic reconstruction lies in the pressure exerted by the Communist and other working class parties upon the governments of their respective countries, so that they may recognise Soviet Russia and conclude advantageous trade agreements with them, and that, in these countries, the revolution be accomplished also. Therefore those comrades who are at present occupied with this work have no doubt but that the economic aid for Russia, just as the political aid, should not be in the least diminished or enfeebled. We stand absolutely upon the ground that the political revolutionary struggle in each country is the best and most necessary support for Soviet Russia.

The only question which we have to settle in this Congress is: Is the political struggle the only method which the proletarians and the Communist International may use under the present political and economic reconstruction.

We are all united as to the importance of Soviet Russia. Through the addresses of Lenin, Trotsky, and Zinoviev, the Congress has once more affirmed, what is really the A. B. C. to every comrade, that without Soviet Russia a continuation of the present proletarian revolution is impossible. A new immediate release of proletarian power would be impossible. And the higher the waves of Fascism rise in other countries, the more must Soviet Russia be supported as the only line of retreat for the proletarian armies of the world. Therefore we ask, has the world proletariat to support Soviet Russia only by its political power? I say, No! It has yet a minimum of economic power. It is true we have no machines, no factories,—they belong to the capitalists—but we have technical knowledge, professional knowledge, and knowledge of organisation. This minimum of economic power should be mobilised through the economic help and placed to the credit of Soviet Russia in its economic war with the imperialists.

And now, comrades, let us take up a few of the tactical objections, which have

been made by certain comrades. They say, this is perhaps all very well, but we can do no more to-day. We are exhausted. The Famine Relief, which has lasted a whole year, has so tired us, that we cannot continue it.

Comrades, this is a reason which, among all the objections is the most to be considered. It is true that some of the proletariat—especially the workers of Central Europe—have exhausted all their strength through the length of the campaign. And there is no doubt that we must cease our collections, in the form in which they were made previously. The means we adopted in the past can no longer serve the purpose. But it is a different question, how we are to carry out the action from the standpoint of technical organisation after we have decided that it is necessary on principle and properly conceived. The collections in their present form should be discontinued. Other means could be devised for the purpose of mobilising the maximum of financial support to Soviet Russia.

Another objection was raised, that the financial resources of Party officials have been exhausted. All the appeals in the world will be in vain, since these people cannot give any money. This objection does not reflect upon the action itself, but rather upon those comrades who raised the objection. We have never demanded from the Communist International, or from any Communist Party, to so tax the financial resources of its officials and workers that they should not be able to pay their Party dues. Our demand was that every Communist Party should make use of its officials to arouse the interest in those matters that are passive but sympathetic to Soviet Russia, and we find that wherever this proposition was properly understood, it gave good results.

One of the important objections is that the appeal for economic aid is likely to be detrimental to the political revolutionary struggle of the Parties, taking away the best comrades. That is not true. Such parties like the German Party, with a membership of 200,000, do not consist entirely of political workers. As soon as we organise the Communist Party as an open Party which anyone can join on becoming converted by our agitation, we get a good many

elements which could not eventually devote themselves to daily political activity. Here we have thousands of workers and comrades unoccupied by Party work, and every Communist Party could—by a proper selection of forces in the manner it is done for activity among the youth, for Party work and for educational work—get together many forces everywhere for the special work of economic aid.

But we are told that the political character of the Party would become tainted with petty-bourgeois philanthropy. This only goes to show that these Parties do not make the best use of the tactics. It would be similar to saying that we ought to reject the United Front because some Party group might be likely to apply it wrongly. It is economic aid activity that furnishes a hundred points of contact with the masses to arouse universal interest for the Russian question and the general revolutionary questions associated therewith, to bring influence to bear upon the large masses in the daily political struggle and to lead on the proletarian revolution.

Finally let me deal with the principal objection. The comrades ask, what is the use of it all? We mobilise hundreds of Party members, we give half a column in our press week by week, and what is the success obtained? In my concluding words I will deal with the material success, but for the present let me speak of the political success.

Comrades, we are well aware that as workers and as the Communist International we could not hope to upbuild Soviet Russia by our own financial resources. If that were possible, our Executive would long ago have carried out this book-keeping transaction. Unfortunately that cannot be done. As against the few cases of overestimation of partial successes there are a majority of comrades inclined to underestimate the financial support which we are able to render. Most of the comrades have no idea of the vast amount of good that could be done by the international proletariat, if a wide mobilisation of forces for financial aid were to be carried out. In the famine relief campaign five million dollars were directly or indirectly collected by the proletariat. That amounts to ten million gold roubles. Comrades, you will recollect the speech of Comrade

Lenin in which he said, that the greatest achievements of the economic policy of last year consisted in the saving of twenty million gold roubles for the reconstruction of the heavy industries. The entire State machine effected a saving of twenty million gold roubles, yet the proletariat got together ten million gold roubles for famine relief without exhausting the resources of a single Communist Party, nor of the trade unions, the co-operatives and other labour parties. If all our Party forces would put their shoulder to the wheel, there is no doubt that the results would be doubled. I can easily imagine occasions when economic aid by workers would be ridiculous irony, but under the present economic situation of Soviet Russia the financial force of the proletariat is an important factor.

There is another objection, that the workers' relief organisation already has a number of its own enterprises in Russia: fisheries, farms, shoe factories etc. There were times when 30,000 workers were directly employed in the industrial enterprises maintained by the workers' relief organisation. Think of the words of Comrade Trotsky who said: One million workers in the State industries, and 10,000 in the capitalist industries!

Comrades, with a slight increase in our activity it would be possible to increase the number of workers employed in our industries and enterprises to 50,000 and more, perhaps to one tenth of the number of workers employed by the State in its industries, and at least as many as are employed in the petty capitalist enterprises.

I repeat that the main purpose of our economic relief activity for Soviet Russia is to give the world proletariat an opportunity of rendering practical aid without in any way retarding the progress of the political revolutionary movement.

As I have already said during the last nine months, we successfully conducted various enterprises in Russia. We maintain three farms in vicinity of Kazan which have yielded sufficient produce to feed over 100 children. We have established a successful fishery in Astrakhan, where we caught large quantities of fish which we are now distributing in the famine regions. At the present moment we are negotiating with the Russian

Government for the realisation of a million dollar loan. We may use that fund partly in reorganising the leather industry. Just now we are asked to arrange for the supply of millions of railway sleepers on a five year contract. Thus we see that all our experiences so far demonstrate the possibility of practical aid in the reconstruction of Soviet Russia.

As I said, we have floated a million dollar loan in order to get more money for our enterprises in Russia. It is interesting to recall the reception that was accorded to this loan. Not only the workers and the Communists, but even among the bourgeoisie there were liberal subscriptions to this loan. The Deutsche Bank of Berlin and the State Bank of Brussels were among the subscribers to the loan, as well as great numbers of the middle class. The Dutch workers subscription cards brought in the sum of 75,000 florins. I therefore have no reason to doubt that by the coming spring the one million dollar loan will be fully subscribed, furnishing us with new resources for our enterprises in Russia.

My answer to the question of the effectiveness of this financial activity can only be in the affirmative. The experiences as well as the prospects indicate the assurance of mobilising a sufficient amount of money for doing practical work in Russia.

The purely material side of this loan is a secondary consideration in our economic aid. The main purpose of our economic activities is to influence the large masses to whose primitive way of thinking our ordinary communist propaganda can hardly make effective appeal. This economic action affords us the opportunity of approaching the indifferent masses by means of moving pictures and through the newspapers, and this constitutes the great propaganda value of this work. On these grounds we expect that the Congress will decide in favour of continuing the work of famine relief in the shape of economic aid.

The next step is the attempt to centralise all the existing groups. We have made a beginning by uniting with the Dutch engineer Rutgers. The tendency of all the organs of economic aid is mainly in the direction of uniting all the active groups and forces.

I think it of importance in a few words to indicate the political tendency of this work once more. It is a question of recognising that there has been a good deal of exaggeration, which I readily admit, but it cannot be gainsaid on the other hand, that our economic aid will be a useful practical supplement to our political activity. This activity will not be necessary of course if the revolution should triumph tomorrow in Germany or France; but in the present political situation of the world, and in view of the circumstances in Russia, the economic aid activity will be a useful and direct adjunct to our political action, and will mean the practical assistance of Soviet Russia. (Prolonged applause.)

Chairman Neurath: While the translation is being made, I wish to announce that there will be no session to-night. But the Presidium will meet at 6 p.m. There will be other conferences as follows:

The Versailles Peace Commission at 5 p.m.

The Small Italian Commission at 6.45 p.m.

The French Commission at 7 p.m.

The Agrarian Commission at 6.30 p.m.

The Czecho-Slovakian Commission at 8 p.m., and the Negro Commission at 12 p.m.

The Latvian, Rumanian, Bulgarian and Czecho-Slovakian delegates are requested to attend the Agrarian Commission without fail.

Next session will be opened tomorrow morning at 11 o'clock. The session is now adjourned.

(Session closed at 4 p.m.).

BULLETIN

OF THE IV CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

№ 19.

Moscow.

December 1 st 1922.

Nineteenth Session.

November 22nd 1922.

Chairman: Comrades Kolaroff, Carr.

Appointment of commission on Comrade Muenzenberg's Report. Report on the Eastern Question. Resolution by Japanese and Chinese delegations condemning the occupation of Saghalin by Japan. Telegram to the Factory Councils—Berlin.

Speakers: Van Ravenstein, Van Overstraeten, Roy, Katayama, Tahar Boudengha.

Chairman: Yesterday evening the Presidium decided to propose that a commission be formed to examine the report of Comrade Muenzenberg and to put the resolution submitted by him in final form for presentation to the Congress. This commission should be composed of one comrade from each of the following countries: France, Germany, Czecho-Slovakia, Holland, England, Russia, the Balkans, Scandinavia, America, Canada, and representatives of the Profintern, the Co-operative Section and the Young Communist International. Comrade Muenzenberg shall also be a member of the commission and shall convene it.

Is there anyone opposed to this?... There is no opposition. The proposal of the Presidium is accepted.

The Presidium has also decided, in view of the fact that on the Eastern question which is on to-day's agenda there are four reporters, the time of each speaker shall be limited; that Comrades Roy and Ravenstein shall have three-quarters of an hour each, and Comrades Boudengha and Katayama, half an hour each.

Comrade Ravenstein now has the floor on a point of order.

Van Ravenstein (Holland): Comrades. I cannot declare myself in agreement with this proposal of the Presidium. So far the speakers on important questions

have had—I will not say unlimited time—but at least a good deal longer than three-quarters of an hour (hear, hear!). It is not our fault, comrades and also not my fault that a good deal of time has been wasted, while we have sat here and done nothing. It is simply impossible for me, in the short time you propose to allow me, to deal with this question as I have intended. I was specially invited by the Executive to deal with this question, so that if the Congress votes for the Presidium's proposal, I shall be forced to cut short my address at a given point, before its completion, and to beg you to include the remainder of my address in the minutes of the Congress.

Kolaroff: I must insist upon the proposal of the Presidium. I understand Comrade Ravenstein's objection quite well. He has been called upon by us for this purpose; he has prepared his report, having in view the possibility that he would speak for a longer time; but the Congress must take into account our general programme of work. If every reporter and speaker is allowed the liberty of speaking for all the time necessary for him to express all his thoughts, we would have to prolong the sitting of this Congress for another three weeks. I am sure that should not be allowed. We must remember that the Congress has not yet accomplished