

Dismissal of such members. The Congress members with resignations or the greatest demoralization of the Communist movement. Every leading post in a Communist Party belongs not to the bearer of the mandate, but to the Communist International as a whole.

The Congress resolves: Elected members of Central bodies of a section can resign their mandate only with the consent of the Executive. Resignations accepted by a Party Central Committee without the consent of the Executive committee are invalid.

Illegal activity.

In accordance with the decision of the Congress, in which it is pointed out that a number of important parties in all probability will be compelled for a time to adopt illegality, it is the duty of the Presidium to give its utmost attention to the training of the respective parties for their illegal work. Immediately after the close of the Congress the Presidium shall commence negotiations with the Parties in question.

International Women's Secretariat.

The International Women's Secretariat remains. The Executive appoints a women's Secretary and, in consultation with the latter, carries out all the further organisational work.

Representation in the Youth Communist Executive.

The Congress instructs the Executive to arrange for regular representation of the Comintern in the Youth Comintern. The Congress considers it to be one of the most important tasks of the Executive to promote the work of the Youth movement.

Representation in the Profintern.

The Congress instructs the Executive, in conjunction with the Executive of the Profintern, to work out the form of mutual relations of the Comintern and Profintern. The Congress further points out that now more than ever is the economic struggle closely bound up with the political campaign, and consequently a special internal coordination of forces of all the revolutionary organisations of the working class must be effected.

Revision of the Statutes

The Congress confirms the Statutes as adopted by the Second Congress, and instructs the Executive, on the basis of the newly adopted resolutions, to revise and to perfect these statutes. This work must be carried out in proper time, distributed for preliminary consideration to all the parties, and finally endorsed by the Fifth World Congress.

BULLETIN

OF THE IV CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

№ 30.

Moscow.

December 11 th, 1922.

Thirtieth Session.

December 4th, 1922

Chairman: Comrade Neurath.

Contents:

Report of the Italian Commission—Comrade Zinoviev. Statement by Comrade Bordiga. Statement by Comrade Serrati. Statement by Comrade Graziadei. Adoption of Resolution on the Italian Question. Report of Czecho-Slovakian Commission—Comrade Radek. Statement by Comrade Sturz. Statement by Comrade Smeral. Adoption of Resolution on Czecho-Slovakian C. P.

At 1.9 p. m. the chairman, Comrade Neurath declared the Session open, and called upon Comrade Zinoviev to report for the Italian Commission.

Zinoviev. Comrades, I have to submit to you a chapter in the history of our modern working class movement—a chapter written in the blood of the best members of the Italian working class. A chapter which illustrates the position of the whole working class, at least its weakest side. The historian of the proletarian revolution of the decade in which we now live, in describing this period, will say that this was the last decade of bourgeois rule, when the proletariat was numerically strong enough to overthrow the capitalist regime, but when this numerically strong proletariat was ideologically and politically too weak to perform its task. The tragedy of our class in recent years has been that, although we have long had the physical power of overthrowing capitalism, and the objective conditions for the victory of our class have long existed, we have had within our class such a large residue of bourgeois ideology, and the influence of the bourgeoisie within our class despite the numerical predominance of the workers has been so great that we are still incapable of gaining an immediate and com-

plete victory over the bourgeoisie. These are the lessons of 1914 and 1919, and the example of Italy has made them particularly apparent.

The years 1914 and 1919 are two dates of the greatest importance. The role of the social-democracy and of the Second International as the representatives of bourgeois influence within the working class has been illustrated by what these organisations have done in 1914 and 1919.

In 1914, the social-democracy, instead of guiding the working masses, misled them. The Social Democrats and the Second International led our class into war. They drove into the slaughter those of our class, who were opposed to war. In the period from 1919 to 1920, when the war ended and the discontent of the masses reached its highest point, when the workers of various countries after four terrible years, at last regained power of judgement and wished to enter into the struggle against the bourgeoisie, the Social-Democrats shielded the bourgeoisie holding the workers back and impeding them from proceeding against their chief enemy. The social democrats said: "You can only attack the bourgeoisie over my dead body." They stood between the working masses and the bourgeoisie. They

paralysed the hand which the workers had raised against their masters.

In 1914 the working class with their own hands placed a halter around their neck. In 1919 when the working class was prepared to cast off this halter—and perhaps to bind it round the neck of the bourgeoisie—the social democrats once more created confusion among the toilers, and so rescued the bourgeoisie. The whole situation during these years is characterised by the counter-revolutionary role of the old social-democratic parties. That is the cause of the tragedy which the working class has lived through during the last years. And, as I have said, this fact has been particularly well illustrated in Italy.

In 1919 and 1920 the spirit of the working masses was entirely revolutionary, especially in Italy. I believe that I could best describe the situation in Italy at this period by using the words which the Italian socialists themselves used for the same purpose. In the socialist Almanach, an official publication by the Italian Socialist Party, the situation in 1920 was described as follows:

"The proletariat rejoiced at the end of the war. It saw at last the end of its martyrdom. It saw before it a new era, which was to culminate in its final victory. It prepared for the struggle. It wanted no revenge. Glowing with wrath hitherto suppressed, bleeding from a thousand wounds, it was preparing to tear the power from the hands of the impotent and murderous bourgeoisie and to establish its rights. The eyes of the workers were fixed upon the Socialist Party, placing all their warmest hopes upon it. Hardly had they doffed the hated tunic of the soldier before they joined the ranks of our Party. They demanded of the Party counsel and deed. They demanded that it rally the working class and lead them to victory."

This was the feeling in the depths of the working class in Italy, in 1919/1920. The same mood prevailed in most other countries, but in Italy it advanced the farthest. The bourgeoisie was really impotent there. The capitalist government was flabby and decaying. The workers streamed into the ranks of our Party in

thousands and tens of thousands. In accordance with the statement just quoted the soldiers flocked in great masses to our Party and tried to press it forward into action.

I cannot help quoting also the report of Comrade Serrati to the Communist International in 1920, characterising the situation in Italy at that time. It reads as follows:

"Upon the conclusion of the Armistice, the situation in Italy became acute and involved. All sections of the bourgeoisie realised that the war had ended in bankruptcy and in complete negation of principles which were claimed to have called forth that war. The discontent of the masses grew from day to day, assuming forms which were not so much industrial as socialistic, as most clearly expressed in the current slogan of the time: "We will not work for the employers."

In short, the workers stood ready for action. The Party grew enormously. The following figures illustrate this. The Italian Socialist Party had 58,000 members at the beginning of 1914. In 1919 the membership rose to 83,000; and in 1920 it counted 216,000 members. Thus, in one year, the membership was almost tripled. From 1919/1920 in the year following the end of the war, the workers had the greatest confidence in the Party and entered it eagerly.

The trade union movement went through a similar experience at this period. At the beginning of the war, the Italian trade unions counted only 320,000 members. In 1919 their membership amounted to 1,150,000; and, in 1920, they had 2,150,000 members. Thus, the trade union membership was nearly doubled in one year. The masses had confidence in the unions and hoped that the unions and their party would lead them to the struggle and to victory.

One cannot, say, however, that our Party realised this at that time. If you read the resolutions—for example, the resolution of the National Party Conference in Bologne in 1919 you would think that the Italian Party clearly understood the situation. This resolution was written in a communist sense. I shall not quote it in its entirety. It will suffice if I just

remind you of what the Bologne Conference decided.

"(1) The organisation of the Italian Socialist Party must be based on the above-mentioned—that is, communist—principles.

(2) Affiliation to the Third International, the organisation of the world proletariat, expressing and defending these principles."

It then went on to say:

"The revolutionary struggle of the proletariat to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie and for the organisation of the proletariat as a ruling class must now begin. Whoever believes it possible to work together with the bourgeoisie, whoever believes that the life and death struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie can be shirked, whoever believes still in a friendly agreement and in a peaceful transition to socialism—he has no place in our Party... Whoever wavers, whoever is not with us is against us. We have a world to conquer. But one cannot conquer with weaklings and waverers. We must have courage and complete devotion to the ideal. Comrades, rally under our banner."

Yes, the Party spoke proud and golden words at the Bologne Congress; and it seemed as though it really stood upon the heights, and as though it were really ready to become the spokesman of these rebellious proletarian masses. But things turned out differently. After all these resolutions of the Bologne Congress the question came up as to whether the reformists should or should not remain in the Party. And then we witnessed the sad farce, that the majority resolved the reformists should stay in the Party.

The position of the reformists themselves is an interesting one. I must say that, if one only follows the history of reformism, one must grant them their due. As a historical phenomenon, reformism showed great elasticity and unlimited capacity for adaptation; which is a feature very valuable to the bourgeoisie, which cannot use wooden reformists but needs an elastic reformism that can adapt itself to all conditions. And the Italian reformists have shown us what an acceptable animal reformism really is.

Under such circumstances, when the working masses rallied round the red flag and pressed forward to conflict, when the soldier—as our quotations show—as soon as they had doffed their uniforms, entered the Socialist Party,—the reformists understood that they should not leave the Party but should remain in it and sabotage it from within.

The Russian Menshevism which we know so well—we have spent about 15 years studying it, and this early education has had a great influence upon us—was also able to show great elasticity in 1905. It put forward the slogan unity of the Party, and it was not until 1912 that we were able to free ourselves from its embrace.

The Italian Mensheviks have proved not less capable of adaption and elasticity; political acrobatics is the first characteristic of Italian Menshevism. The Italian Mensheviks have been able to accomplish much in this field of political acrobats. Turrati and D'Aragona declared that they will remain in the Party, submit to the Party, and co-operate and work for the revolution. This was a decisive moment. Many of our friends believed that the more members, the greater unity, the better for the Party; since the reformists declared that they would submit and remain, it was decided to keep them in the Party.

The masquerade began. D'Aragona, Serrati,—the latter probably not so much as the other,—and Turrati, an outspoken petty bourgeois who has been parading for years among the workers as a Socialist, these people dressed up as Communists and began the comedy.

Led by Serrati. D'Aragona and a number of others came to Russia. I have myself heard his apologetic speeches, which always ended by "Long Live Communism." This was at the time that Russia was blockaded, when the Russian workers were on their knees begging for international connections. Every comrade who came from a foreign country was received like a brother and we had to witness the sorry scene of our Petersburg and Moscow workers literally embracing D'Aragona and Colombino and carrying them on their hands, because they saw in them the representatives of the revo-

lutionary proletariat of Italy and believed in their words.

But this comedy did not last long. The international situation was such at that time that many reformists beside the Italians came to Moscow and begged admission to the Third International. This was the period which we had characterised in our resolution by the words: "The Third International is beginning to become the style." You may remember that in this same hall Messrs. Ditmann and Crispin held enthusiastic speeches for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and declared that they were no worse communists than any other and demanded admission to the Third International.

The reformists and semi-reformists of all countries hurried to our ranks. I remember quite well the case of a Spanish professor who came to Moscow as representative of the Spanish Party and asked for admission into the Third International. But this professor was typical. He was somewhat simple in the matters of politics (laughter). The professors present here will excuse me this statement, there are exceptions to every rule, comrade Graziadei; there are exceptions. This professor said with touching simplicity: "Well, comrades, personally I am a reformist, but the Spanish workers insist that they want to be admitted into the Third International and they have sent me here to secure this admission."

This professor was really a saint in comparison to some others; he came out openly with his reformism. D'Aragona and Colombino are far from being saints, or politically naive. These scoundrels preferred to come here with speeches in praise of communism.

The 21 conditions had a salutary effect upon our International; some have been able to go through this sieve, but in general we have been able to throw out the reformists.

Well then, this was a time when the Italian tragedy, or tragi-comedy, was being played here in Moscow.

The Italian workers were rising. It came to decisive events. In the fall, the Italian workers began the occupation of the factories. And this of course was where comfortable theorising ceased. When the workers begin to occupy the

factories, when they begin to create Red Guard armies, the position of the reformists ceases to be very pleasant, and at this moment D'Aragona was forced to throw off his mask. At that time D'Aragona was already back in Italy whilst Serrati was still in Moscow.

If we study this chapter of the Italian history, the events of the autumn of 1920, the occupation of the factories by the workers, the creation of white guards, and when we realise the role of the reformists, we cannot help asking: "Could there possibly be more open treason than that of these people in 1920?"

The deliberations of the trade union leaders and the Central Executive of the Socialist Party lasted five days and five nights at a time when the workers had already occupied the factories and were eager to proceed with the struggle; five days and five nights! when the next five hours might decide the fate of the workers. Today, when Mussolini has grasped the power, Messrs. Turrati and D'Aragona do not require any more five days and nights to decide upon the support of the Fascist Government. But at that time, when the workers attempted to realise the dream of their lives, when they really began to fight the bourgeoisie, they said to the workers: "Be quiet, we are deliberating the case, and we need five days and five nights to come to a decision"! At the end of this long discussion the following was decided:

The Trade Union Leaders entered into a formal alliance with the Socialist parties. This fact provided that the trade unions must follow the Socialist Party in all decisive conflicts. I remember that when we told Serrati in 1920 that the leadership of the trade unions was in the hands of the reformists and that this may result in the greatest calamity for our Party, he tried to quiet our fears by telling us that the treaty between the Socialist Party and the Trade Unions should be a sufficient guarantee for us.

During the struggle of 1920, the reformists naturally threw this agreement into the wastebasket. This is what happened. D'Aragona and his colleagues declared: "True, we have entered into this agreement, and we abide by it; but if you decide to continue the fight, they

we will have to resign, to give up the leadership of the trade unions.

This sufficed entirely to bring the Italian Centrists on their knees before D'Aragona. They said: "Old man D'Aragona wants to resign; this is a calamity which we will never be able to survive; it is better to betray the working class and give up the struggle, if only D'Aragona does not leave us."

It came to a vote; a million and half workers took part in it. After the treachery of the trade union leaders and the Socialist Party Executive, the decision to give up the fight, won out only by a small majority. D'Aragona came to the meeting still warm from the embraces of the bourgeoisie, of the bourgeois ministers. This is what happened: First, deliberation in the Ministry then conference of the Confederation of Labour, then conference of the Socialist Party.

We now see clearly how this chain of betrayals stretched from the bourgeoisie to the leaders of the Socialist Party.

The workers were betrayed, this is the chief point. From now on began the political and economic offensive of capital, the offensive which has now ended with the Fascists.

What part did the Communist International play in all these fights. We may state with pride, comrades, that the Communist International, in the person of its Executive, clearly realised the situation. Even before the occupation of the factories, at the end of the Second Congress, the Executive sent the following letter to the Italian Socialist Party:

"Italy is passing through a period when the failure of the proletarian revolution is quite possible due to the lack of preparation on the part of the working class; and the temporary victory of a savage bourgeois reaction is quite possible. Everyone who hinders the Party in finding a correct policy, everyone who attempts the union with the reformists and half-reformists is committing a crime against the working class revolution whether he wants it or not".

This was written before the September happenings. Our first conflict with Comrade Serrati took place during the Second Congress. If I ask myself now which was the basic error of Comrade Serrati, I

must answer, giving him credit for the best intentions, that it was his false position on the Socialist Party. The reformists have won most splendid victories over us with the slogan of "Unity of the Party". The idea of unity exercises such a fascination upon the working class that it helps the reformists to lead the proletariat by the nose. This is easy to understand, for the working class needs unity just as we need air. The only strength of the working class consists in its numbers. The working class first becomes capable of overthrowing the bourgeoisie when it has the masses on its side. This demand for unity has the force of an instinct which often throws overboard every other consideration. The reformist leaders, the reformist acrobats, these clever agents of the bourgeoisie know well enough how to make use of this desire for unity to fool the masses. As I said, always thinking the best of Serrati, he also fell into this error. The question of unity seemed to him the most important and all his other mistakes spring from this basic error.

In 1920, for instance, Serrati said this: "We are winning over hundreds of municipalities. Thousands of co-operatives and thousands of other proletarian institutions have already come over to our side or will do so in the near future. The Party is looking everywhere for people capable of conducting our work in the municipalities, the trade unions, the Chambers of Labour etc. We lack capable people, and now the Third International prescribes that we should put communists in these posts, whatever their capacity. This is a pure phantasy. Just imagine putting at the head of the Milan Municipality a group of green youths who proclaim at the last minute that they were enthusiastic communists."

We might pass over words of Serrati's with a witticism, but I believe that at the present time, when the fun has stopped, when the Italian situation is tragic enough, one cannot understand how a man like Serrati could have come to such conclusions. His main worry in 1920 was to know whether there would be enough men to fill certain positions. He sought people to occupy the position in thousands of villages and towns, and his chief worry was to find apt people for

the large municipalities. He asked whether we could put in these posts green, untried communists. This false position towards the United Front problem, this principle that the more the better, shows a wholly erroneous perspective of the whole situation. The slogan of unity became a fetish and unitarianism an idol. In this way, Serrati deprived himself of the possibility of solving the most important political problems of that period.

He made this fundamental mistake, and everything which followed was its inevitable result, such as the numerous other errors and the frivolous demonstrations against the Communist International and communism in general. We were told that immediately after the second Congress, Serrati formed a fraction which went by various names, such as: socialist, communist, unitarian, etc. Socialist,—is quite good, communist is not bad either and unitarian is still better, and taking it all together—socialist, communist and unitarian, one might think that nothing better could be desired. However, this was at best a hotch-potch, and taking it objectively, certainly not what we communists need. When, before the Party Conference in Leghorn, we were begged by Serrati not to insist on the split, our reply was that we could not possibly be made to believe that the "Critica Sociale" Turatti's organ, is a communist publication, and has been acquainted with this organ for over 10 years. We know that the late Plekhanov, in his Marxist days, had struggled against this periodical as a semi-bourgeois, semi-reformist publication. Our reply contained the following sentence: "All the unitarians in the world will not be able to persuade us that the "Critica Sociale" is a working class and not a bourgeois paper. At that time we did not know that the "Critica Sociale" and the "Banca Commerciana" really go together. (Laughter). We had only looked upon this from the theoretical viewpoint. Now, however, we know that "Critica Sociale" is identical with "Banca Commerciana", because it is a well known fact that the "Critica Sociale" is financially supported by the "Banca Commerciana". And those were the people with whom we had to remain in the same party.

Well, comrades, let us recall the situation as it was before Leghorn. In September 1920—the blackest betrayal of the working class took place. D'Aragona carried on negotiations for five days and nights with the result that the socialist party bowed down to him and betrayed the working class. The "Critica Sociale" remained within the socialist party, and all this was done under the cloak of working class unity.

Under such circumstances, the split was inevitable, and imperative, and we say distinctly and openly: "Should a similar situation arise anywhere and at any time, we will consider in the bounden duty of a revolutionist to again advocate a split. We are now in a new phase, and we are beginning anew to rally the communist forces. Generally speaking, the period of splits is over. It is precisely for this reason that we must declare that, on principle, we are not by any means against every split, but that in similar situations, we should certainly advocate another split.

Then came Leghorn. The centrists preferred a secession from the International to losing the 14 or 16 thousand reformists. You will probably remember the letter addressed by Comrade Lenin to Comrade Serrati in which he stated what all of us have stated: we do not demand of you to make a revolution immediately. We are only asking you to be a revolutionary party, and to get ready for the revolution, i.e., we ask that you expel those who are against revolution—the reformists. You will probably remember that Comrade Serrati wrote an article in answer to Comrade Lenin's letter,—I cannot help mentioning it—in which he said: "Allow me to answer your question, whether reformists can be tolerated within the ranks of the party, by another question: who is a reformist?" And Comrade Serrati put this quasi-philosophic question after all that had happened. I believe, that events have given us a clear answer to that question, and comrade Serrati could give us a lesson now on who the reformists are in Italy. The reformists are those who for years past were advocating the so-called collaboration of the classes. Reformists are those who like Serrati used their intellect and everything else (and the greater the

intellect, the worse it was for our Party) to ingratiate themselves with the working class. Reformists are those who in 1920, when hundreds of thousands of workers rallied under our banner, fully convinced that we would lead them into the struggle, sneaked into our ranks, in order to pacify the masses and keep them away from the struggle. Reformists are those who are now licking Mussolini's boots. To recognise all this does not, I am sure, require extraordinary political acumen, and I believe that even the sparrows in Italy could answer now Serrati's question—who are reformists? Neither was this particularly difficult even in 1920. One had to be blind and deaf not to see and hear what was happening already then in Italy.

In view of such a question, comrades, it was our duty to work for a split in the old party. And when we are asking ourselves now, two years after these events, whether the young Communist International and the Communist Party have reason to regret the split in Leghorn, our answer is: "Certainly not!" Should a similar situation again arise, we would have to insist once more on such a split. We have no reason whatever to regret it. The Italian Communist Party certainly has not led our class to victory—indeed, it could not do so, for it was too weak for that, and the right moment had been missed. Already in September, 1920, the historic moment had passed. Our young Communist Party could not achieve it, but it has nevertheless saved the honour of the Italian working class and the revolutionary banner in Italy. (Loud applause.) We must not fail to recognise this.

Let us now consider what the reformists have made of the Party and of the trade unions. As to the Party, it suffices to give figures. I have already told you that in 1920 the Socialist Party had 216,000 members. In 1919-20 "Avanti" had a circulation of 400,000. This was the maximum it could produce, owing to technical difficulties. It was not only the workers', but the people's paper for the whole of Italy. That was the heyday of this paper. At that time it set an example as a revolutionary paper, reminding one of the best times of the French Revolution. What have the reformists

made of this paper? Comrades, you know that the Italian Socialist Party is as weak as possible. When we asked Serrati in 1920 to separate from the reformists, his answer was that one must wait for the opportune moment when the masses will understand such a move.

Well, comrades, it is sufficient to give you the following figures. In Leghorn Serrati had nearly 100,000, the communists 58,000, and the reformists 14,000. In Rome, a few weeks ago the reformists and maximalists of both fractions had almost the same number, about 25,000 each. Thus the reformists had almost doubled their number during a month in which the general number has decreased fourfold. Thus, this unitarian policy had led to the result that the reformists, who at the time of Leghorn were a negligible quantity, have now become a power to be reckoned with. If we are told that in 1920 the split was misunderstood, and that it was understood in 1922, we say that this is nothing but sophistry. The masses would have stood the split much better and much easier in 1920 than in 1922, and the Party would not have been ruined.

This is what the reformists have made of the Party. The idea was that the more the better. It was said that the old proud edifice of the party must be kept intact. And the result was that it broke to pieces, one half of the membership deserting into the reformist camp. Not only the revolution but the Party itself was betrayed, if one can separate the party from the revolution. There are people who do this. The social democracy too said in 1914 that it would have fought against the war, if it had not been afraid to lose the fine trade unions and the splendid masses which it had been so difficult to rally.

Well, comrades, not only has the working class been ruined in Italy, but also the Party, because the Party is the leading section of the working class. The ruin of the working class means the ruin of the Party.

What have the reformists done with the trade union? Trade union unity is as necessary as our daily bread. We are for trade union unity and for great caution in this field. We have learned how severely history punishes us if we

leave the leadership of the trade unions too long in the hands of the reformists. The trade unions which in 1920 had over 2 millions members, have at present only $\frac{1}{2}$ million. We must now realise that if we do not snatch away the trade unions from D'Aragona, he will hand them over to Mussolini thus playing into the hands of the bourgeoisie.

Comrades, I will tell you about a little discussion which took place lately in the Italian parliament.

As you know Mussolini made a program speech, which in some respects was very interesting. He said, among other things,

"Not so much empty babbling, my good Sirs! Fifty two speakers, have already written their names down to take part in the discussion on my statements—that is too much!"

Mussolini finished his speech in the following way.

"And may God aid me to bring my difficult task to a victorious conclusion."

So you see Mussolini is also a friend of God. That is part of his business—the bourgeois dictatorship must always be on friendly terms with God.

But it is interesting to note that Mussolini is also on friendly terms with Turrati. I will now read to you a dialogue which took place in parliament between Mussolini and Turrati.

Turrati said that he was opposed to the march of the Fascisti on Rome and stated that what Mussolini had so far accomplished in Parliament was nothing more than an accompaniment of this march on Rome; or, as he expressed it:

"This is nothing more than the march on Rome dressed in a frock coat."

Mussolini then interrupted him saying, "Not in a frock coat but in a black shirt."

Turrati then continued:

"This means that—and I do not need documents to prove it—according to the government, the Italian Parliament, in spite of the vote of confidence which has been given it, now ceases to exist politically."

Turrati continued:

"The Italian Parliament, elected by Italians, has ceased to exist. We do not deny the right to revolution. We wish to be, and are, a revolutionary Party."

In this place, the report states that

there was "ironical laughter from the Fascisti." I can well understand that the Fascisti laughed ironically when Turrati declared that his Party was a revolutionary Party.

Turrati said:

"We do not deny the rights of the Fascisti to revolution; but we do deny that your seizure of power is of a revolutionary character..."

Mussolini said:

"You will soon see it."

And then Turrati:

"...And we deny that you have followed any logical process."

So Turrati finds that Mussolini is not quite consistent.

"...whether it be the logic of a revolution, or even of a revolt—for there is a logic in revolutions—You have not kept your promise to get rid of half of the political ruling class."

And Mussolini has not yet kept this little promise.

Mussolini said:

"I shall keep this promise..."

And then Turrati:

"As a Socialist and Patriot I praise the foreign policy of Mussolini, in spite of its nationalistic terminology. But I am not in agreement with Mussolini on the methods of restoring internal peace. These conflicts will go on yet..."

Mussolini said:

"In two weeks there were only four killed. Think of the past!"

Turrati continued:

"The financial and economic policies of the government follow the same lines as those recently adopted by the General League of Industry."

"...Mussolini has called up all his demagogic reserves in order to carry out his programme; namely, the nationalist unions. Democracy must conquer. The proletariat has nothing to fear. Democracy is history."

Mussolini then had the pleasure to remark:

"History has no compelling power."

And this was the altercation between Mussolini and Turrati.

You must allow me to give you a debate between Mussolini and D'Aragona on the Trade Unions.

D'Aragona begins by stating that he

did not represent a political Party, but the Trade Union movement.

I must give you a short explanation of this. We have already seen that a pact existed between the Unions and the Party until 1922. This pact, this precious document which comrade Serrati always carried in his breast pocket, and through which he felt secure against all treachery of the reformists, is now cheerfully cancelled. After the split in Rome had taken place the Trade Union leaders declared that the pact no longer existed.

And then came another interesting phenomenon. D'Aragona immediately assumed the cloak of independence, of Trade Union neutrality. He said: Politics do not concern us; we are neutral. We are independent, and do not wish to take part in politics.

This is a very interesting phenomenon. D'Aragona is one of the founders of the new Social Democratic Party to which he has been able to attract a certain number of workers whom he controlled.

We can see how crude the reformist game sometimes is—

At one moment—on the stroke of twelve, noon—he founded a reformist Party with an openly collaborationist programme; and at one o'clock he said: I as Trade Unionist am neutral; my Unions are independent and take no political stand. It was every bit as crude as this. And yet many working men are so inexperienced that they are even taken in by a raw game like this.

It is an interesting proof of the reformist Party that they do not now dare to let their Trade Unions declare themselves openly as reformists; but use instead the mask of the independence of the Trade Unions.

D'Aragona stated also that he did not speak as a member of the Party, but as an independent Trade unionist. He said:

"I would like to have from the Government—that is, from Mussolini—a statement in the Chamber, in terms as precise and as clear as possible, what intentions they have with regard to the working class and the trade union movement."

And Mussolini said:

"Good."

D'Aragona then continued:

"We want a trades union movement that will be within the law. I have often

declared this. It is well known that the Conferazione di Lavarò has never been responsible for any illegality."

And thus he bowed before Mussolini: "I have always said that it is easier to give the working class four soldi a day higher wages, and an hour a day less work, than to educate them and bring them to consciousness."

That is what he told Mussolini about the working class. It is with such impudence and audacity that this man speaks of the working class.

He said further:

"I ask the Government whether such a movement, which protects the working class, has a right to exist?"

Then Mussolini rose, and said:

"Yes, such a movement may exist."

This is all, word for word, in the report. D'Aragona then continued:

"If what we hear from many sources is true, it would appear that only such unions will be permitted to exist as renounce all relations with the unions of other lands."

This meant the Amsterdam International. And D'Aragona is, as you all know, a pronounced internationalist.

Incidentally, D'Aragona, together with us, founded the Profintern, here in Moscow. In the first session, in which the Profintern was founded, D'Aragona, as the representative of the Italian workers, signed the report with us. You can find this in the archives of our Revolutionary Museum, if you so desire. So now this gentleman spoke as follows to Mussolini, on the question of the International:

"We are connected with an International movement, just as are the white unions, and even the Industrial League. We want to stay in the International, and believe, that we shall not be opposed to the interests of the country through this. As Italians, we could protect the interests of our fellow-countrymen who emigrate to foreign countries."

Would you like to know the reason why D'Aragona belongs to the International? It is because he wants to protect the interests of Italians who emigrate to foreign countries.

"I have heard it said that a large part of our workers must leave for abroad. I hope that this may be done. Only we must see to it that our workers are not

reduced by the trade union movement abroad to a position of inferiority. This is also a case where we must defend the name of Italy. We want to put an end to the time when foreigners regard our emigration as an evil. I was an emigrant, and you also (Mussolini does not agree), and you know that whatever raises the standard of the emigrant, also aids the prestige of the fatherland."

As you see, the quality of D'Arragona is the quality of the whole Amsterdam International. They are quite similar worthies, and I really envy them for having such a worthy representative in Italy. I believe that Mussolini, with a nod of his head, would agree that D'Arragona could safely remain in the Amsterdam International.

Mr. D'Arragona, at the end of his speech states that he cannot participate in a pogrom on the Communists. He concludes his speech with the following words:

"We are opposed to every form of violence, whether it proceeds from these benches—(D'Arragona points to the extreme Left)—or from the Right; because we believe that violence, even if victorious, brings always a great danger with it."

We have already heard this tune. Mussolini's violence is a fact; and the handful of Communists, who sit on the extreme Left of the Chamber, are denounced to Mussolini by Mr. D'Arragona.

Such, comrades, is the present situation in the Italian trade unions. You will see that comrade Serrati was not able to keep the trade unions faithful to the working class, even with the precious document which he kept in his pocket. This document has not prevented the trade unions becoming an instrument in the hands of our most dangerous enemies. I have with me the last resolution of the leader of the Conferazione de Iavaro, in which it is stated that the congress of trade unions, which has been demanded, will not be held. It has been decided that this Congress, which the Communists and Socialists have asked for, is postponed indefinitely. D'Arragona also said in his resolution that the Congress would be called at a later epoch. He has shown that he only thinks in epochs. For seven years, covering the period of the war, he did not call the Congress of the Trade Unions, although we were continually pres-

sing him to do so; and now he says that we shall have to wait for a new epoch. This means that D'Arragona, although the majority was against him, has now completely sold this organisation to the bourgeoisie. Such is the situation of the Trade Unions in Italy. They have been wrecked. What we still have there has been handed over to the control of D'Arragona. Whatever is left of the Trade Unions D'Arragona can deliver over daily to Mussolini; and he will do so unless we seriously resist this. That is the result of two years of unitarism.

They wanted unity; they wanted a big Party; a unified working class movement, and now everything is shattered. The masses are betrayed. D'Arragona has introduced the question of sacrifice. He says: "I am for you, only I will not see the blood of the workers flow. Therefore I am for an evolutionary development of the movement." But we have not had an evolution; and the workers are the victims of violence. The usands and tens of thousands of them have fallen in the battle; and the Italian proletariat is now at the beginning of a new rally and a new struggle.

If an error committed by the Party leader during a revolutionary period, it naturally leads to a number of other mistakes and leads eventually, through force of circumstances, to catastrophe. So has it been in Italy; and thus in this country which once stood on the brink of revolution, we have the clearest lessons on the general tactics of the Communist International and on our dealings with Centrism, etc. In the first part of our resolution we endeavoured to state certain points which we had learned from this experience. They are as follows.

Reformism is the chief enemy. Centrism is a moral danger to any proletarian Party. These two lessons are the most important which we have learned from the Italian chapter in the general tragedy of our times; and this Congress must take them well to heart. On no account must we forget this. The most important feature of these years is the Italian situation. The question is not to place the blame on this or that leader, although the history of our movement will, of course, judge all the errors which have been made and all the good which some of us may have done for the move-

ment. But the question is now as to what lesson we have learned from the civil war in Italy. At the time when the working masses are ready for the struggle, we must not appeal to a superficial idea of unity, nor this slogan of the common front of Social Democrats and Communists, but we must go to the masses with clear communist tactics. Thus comrades, does our commission judge the past.

The past is important enough; but we apply ourselves to the future. The commission has unanimously resolved that a rapid union of the Italian Communist Party with the Italian Socialist Party which has now freed itself from the Reformists, must be brought about. Our friends of the majority of the Italian Communist Party fought against this. I trust that this resistance has now been overcome.

I must say that I can understand the psychological basis of the opposition which our friends of the majority have manifested. The struggle during these last months was bitter; not on the part of the Communists but on the part of the Maximalists. And now the Communist workers are saying: "Yes, in 1920 we could have won everything; but we lost everything. Now we stand at the beginning of a hard and bloody struggle. Victory has been dashed from our hands!" This mood reigns now among the workers; and it is a healthy mood. We understand this sentiment of the majority of the Italian Communist Party.

But comrades, we must not let ourselves be led by moods. Before us is the great political question: is the Socialist Party of Italy, as it now is, after the split, in a condition to enter the Communist Party? Has it the human material, among its proletarian elements which we can use? That is the political question and which the commission has replied to in the affirmative and of which I am personally fully convinced. In the commission it was said that we had in Russia the following examples. During our revolution we organised a Party Week, during which practically any worker was accepted as a member of our Party who desired to enter it. Tens of thousands of workers became members. This was at the time when Denikin was appro-

ching Moscow, and Yudenitch stood before Petrograd. It was the worst time for the Russian Communists. That was the time when the Russian Communists passed sleepless nights, when any day a decisive blow might be struck at the heart of Russia. It was a moment when everything hung by a hair. At that moment, we said to ourselves, we can test the thing out; and so we called all the workers who would share our danger with us, who in this grave and decisive hour wished to come to us, to join us. And I believe that a similar situation exists now in Italy. It is true that the cases are not exactly the same, but there is a sufficiently close resemblance. The situation in Italy is now very dangerous for the Communists. One must have courage to join the Communist Party nowadays. It requires personal courage to come to the Communist International at this moment. Now is the time to make the test. It is true that Mussolini declared that only four murders have occurred recently. But we realise that we are now only at the beginning of the Fascist period. Now is the time when we can say: We must try to get together with these comrades who have expelled the reformists and who desire to become part of the Communist International. It is true the Socialist Party of Italy has shirked much. It has done but little organisation work. And in the first days of the Mussolini regime it has shown great weakness. But then we can also observe that the Socialists have learned something since. I have before me an appeal of the Socialist Party which has only just come to hand. This appeal is very important. The comrades mention a number of measures for the creation of an illegal organisation. They say that the leaders of the organisation must be authorised beforehand, and the officials of the organisation must be at all costs protected. This is a correct attitude. It is necessary to set up an illegal organisation; but actually to build up the legal organisation is another question. Therefore it is a good sign that the Socialist Party has understood this.

The general situation in Italy is such that we believe the experiment ought to be made quietly. And it is by no means a frivolous experiment, but an attempt at really uniting that which should be

united. This does not mean to say that the Socialist Party, as it is, must entirely join us. The Commission resolved not to accept, but to expel Deputy Vella and the others who identify themselves with him, and to reject all those who make reservations to the 21 conditions. Vella, who is personally considered as an honest man—I do not know him personally—delivered a speech at the Party Conference in Rome, in which he declared himself against the 21 conditions and for retaining the old name of the Socialist Party. He even proposed that the Communist Party be dissolved and the Socialist Party be retained. It is he who asserted that the Communist International is a tool of the Russian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. To this assertion Comrade Serrati made something like the following rejoinder in one of his latest articles: "Well, let us grant for argument's sake that the International is really a tool in the hands of the Russian proletarian State, even if that be so, it is by no means an evil thing, for the Russian State is indeed a proletarian State." Serrati's rejoinder is quite beside the point, for we know the circumstances, and they are not as Comrade Serrati represented them. In a word, Vella is not a Communist, and we must keep him out of the United Party as well as those who are with him. This was the decision of the Commission, and I trust it will be endorsed by the Congress.

Nevertheless, it is necessary that the Congress should unanimously declare to our communist comrades, i. e. the majority of the Italian delegation, that unity is an absolute necessity and that the psychological resistance must be overcome at all costs. We are convinced that the advent of a united party in Italy will be hailed by the Italian workers as the opening of a new era. The simple workingman will say to himself that the time is gone for splits and defeats, for helplessness, for treason and demoralisation. A new chapter begins where, in consequence of all the defeats, of all the terrible mistakes and helplessness, we have reached a new turning-point which ought to mark the beginning of the concentration of all the proletarian forces. The Italian worker will give a sigh of relief on the cessation of splits and on the beginning of a con-

centration of all the revolutionary proletarian elements under the banner of the Communist International. I am by no means unmindful of the fact that we have not yet reached the end of the Italian chapter, that we are only in the middle, or probably only at the beginning of a new chapter. There are yet hard struggles ahead. The irreconcilable communists tell us: "To-day, in 1922, you unite the two parts, and at the Fifth Congress in 1923 you will be compelled to make a speech upon the Italian question which will be similar to the one made by Comrade Trotsky upon the French question." These are the gloomy prospects held up to us. I have no wish to minimise the difficulties, for there will surely be difficulties. A communist party cannot be made: it requires a good deal of time. There will be yet some regrouping. Even of the most prominent leaders it cannot be said with certainty which way they will eventually go. This will be seen during the struggle, in the course of time, and I hope the near future will show the result. Nevertheless, the Communist International must do its utmost to furnish the opportunity for the individual leaders—not to speak of the masses—to rejoin the masses.

It is not a question of privileges, it is a question of gathering the upright communist elements to the ranks of the united party. Great mistakes were committed, many blows were sustained. But there is a Russian proverb which says, "One beaten is worth two that have not been beaten," meaning that the one that was beaten has been taught a lesson. The Italian Maximalists have had a sound beating. Perhaps the Russian saying might be applied in their case.

There are difficulties ahead, but I do not believe we shall meet with the same difficulties in Italy as we have in the French Party at this Congress. The present acute experience of some of the tendencies in the French Party was already gone through in a different form by the Italian Party before the split, and now the period of recovery is beginning. Of course, a certain weakness may be anticipated as after effects, but I believe that the severe disease of Centralism in Italy is already a thing of the past, and that the state of convalescence has set in.

The process is to a certain extent the opposite of the development that took place in some parts of the French Party during this year.

There are difficulties ahead and it were folly to assume that if we now decide to have a united party everything from now on will be well. No, there will still be regroupings. The Executive tells the Italian comrades quite frankly: "We shall consider it our duty to watch the movement and support those elements of the United Party which are really communists and desire to rebuild a communist party."

There are bound to be regroupings. This was demonstrated by the German example. In Germany the wound is now completely healed. The word 'United' Party became superfluous a year ago or even before.

In Italy this process will probably not be so swift. We will support those elements in Italy which really wish to be communists. We will not ask, "Where do you come from, from the old party or the new, and from what Wing?" We will merely ask, "What are you doing now, where do you stand to-day, what are your present aims, what is your present tactical line?"

But we tell you in advance, that there will be difficulties, and the Communist International must see the situation as it is.

What do we now ask of the comrades; what shall now be the tactics of the Party? On this there are six points. The first task. We must beat reformism by our united forces. It is a task that can easily be solved in Italy now, because Italy is in the stage of civil war and because this task is now quite clear to every worker in Italy.

The second task. We must carry out the United Front in Italy both in the political and economic field. If there be a country that is best suitable for the United Front, it is the present-day Italy; every worker, every non-party worker, will now be ready to fight against fascism. Hence the second task represents the real application of the United Front both in the economic and political fields. The Italian Communist Party has neglected much in this respect, as was already shown in the debate.

The third task: the slogan of the wor-

kers' government. If there be a country where the maximum could be achieved by this slogan, it is Italy. Every week that passes will make the Mussolini regime more hated, every week will confront the large masses with the question: what shall it be now? What government shall dissolve the Mussolini government? It is the opportune moment to launch a popular slogan which will be understood by every worker and by every peasant, and it is the slogan of the workers' government.

The fourth task: to permeate the fascist trade unions! This may sound somewhat strange, but it has to be done. Many comrades resent it, and I think they do so unjustly. I have before me the Minutes of the last meeting of the Central Committee of the Fascist Trade Unions held a couple of weeks ago. The leaders of the fascist trade unions claim a membership of one and a half millions. To put it mildly, this seems rather exaggerated. There were represented among others the unions of the mercantile marine, of agriculture, of art, of theatres and technical industrial committees, and also 46 trade union secretaries from the provinces. It is quite obvious that the Fascist gentry are trying to drive the workers into their unions by sheer force. If any proof were needed that fascism is indeed a petty-bourgeois phenomenon, it suffices to glance at the program of their trade unions, of which I will make a brief quotation. Rossi, a leader of the fascist trade unions, made the following statement:

"The middle classes have always paid the penalty, because they would not stoop to the dishonest method of ruining the nation for the sake of their own interests. The middle classes are the brains of the nation, the class of culture and of talent. The national syndicalism, which aims at being the syndicalism of 'elite', reckons above all with these middle classes which—after the battle will be fought out by the peasants and workers as a mass—will replace the ranks of our admirable officers..."

The present position of the unions is characterised by the fact that the number of adherents has surpassed one million...

We have won, but the revolution

is not yet complete. Our revolution is not yet complete in order to up-build the new harmony in the name of labour and with the recognition of the value of syndicalism. The profits should be justly divided between the employers and the workers".

Thus, comrades, you see the ideology of this fascist syndicalism. It is the petty-bourgeois ideology which is indeed not so far removed from the social-democracy as is at times imagined. It is substantially the same ideology served up with a different sauce. It is rather the Noske brand of social-democracy served under the Italian conditions. This thesis should be easily substantiated. The modern fascism in Italy is not quite removed from the social-democracy of Noske adapted to the present Italian conditions. It is substantially the same ideology of the middle class "elite" of the nation which should harmonise the interests of labour with those of the "nation."

Now the question arises: must we hold aloof from these trade unions? Not at all. We must have the courage to directly advance the slogan: "permeate the fascist trade unions." Never mind the fact that they have not a membership of one and a half millions as they boast, but perhaps half a million. Their number is bound to increase now that the machinery of government has fallen into the hands of the fascists. We must permeate these trade unions, as well as the fascist co-operatives. The real communist will not cease to be a communist by entering them. We must be present in these organisations in order to win the majority of the workers. It is quite a peculiar situation. Our Confederazione del Lavoro may be smashed up to-morrow.

Those of our trade unions, which are still in existence are powerless. The fascist trade unions comprise, — in addition to a large number of civil servants, — workers, and especially agricultural labourers and poor peasants whom Mussolini was clever enough to attract by his social demogogy. If we wish to be a mass party, we must penetrate into these trade unions, and we must establish our nuclei within them. If we fail to do this, we will not be able to come forward as a mass party at the proper moment. For this reason, this

watchword must be brought forward regardless of it being rather unpalatable. We, the Russian Bolsheviks, have also participated in the so-called "Zubatov" trade unions and in various other workers' organisations which were established by a Tsarist general. We sent our best workers into these unions, and let them work for our interests. Of course, this requires a class conscious, well organised and firmly established Communist Party. We must propose to these non-communist trade unions to join the united front in connection with various events. We must not be afraid of doing this, and I believe it would be best for the Congress to express itself in this sense.

Fifthly: we must now endeavour to become the vanguard for the struggle against fascism.

Our Communist Party has committed serious mistakes in this field. It completely failed to turn the "Arditi del Popolo" which was an organisation of demobilised soldiers, officers, revolutionary soldiers, but also of muddle headed people, into "shock" troops against fascism. Our Communist Party was too doctrinaire (this is a special failing of the Communist Party) to take use of the "Arditi del Popolo". Our Italian comrades treated this organisation with contempt. They said: the members of this organisation are not Communist and therefore they do not concern us. This was a great error of judgement on the part of the Communists. If we say again that we have a Communist Party and therefore do not require these people any more, we would commit a great mistake as I have already stated in the Commission, quoting Lenin who said: we have among us a species of Communists who are convinced that they know all and can do all. In Russian this is called Kom-Tehvanstvo-Communist priggishness with which many of our Italian comrades are afflicted. This phenomenon became very evident in connection with the "Arditi del Popolo". It was said: can we really do anything with such muddle headed people? Those who spoke thus, had evidently not read their third volume of Marx's capital. Far from reading it, perhaps they have not even seen not only the third, but even the first volume of this work. Nevertheless, those were people who were ready

to fight against fascism. Therefore, it is essential to amalgamate all the Italian working class circles which are ready to fight against fascism, irrespective of whether their members are workers, peasants or muddle headed soldiers. We must rally to our banner all the elements, which does not mean that we must include them into our Party. Our Party must not be open to anyone and everyone. — Nevertheless, we must be able to lead the masses. The watchword "against fascism", which is as yet not very impressive, will grow in strength from day to day until it will become a clarion call for the struggle against the ruling class. We must be able to group around ourselves this rapidly growing movement against fascism and become the true vanguard of the proletarian revolution. This was our fifth point.

The sixth point is unity. A United Communist Party in Italy, as laid down in the Commission, will be a symbol for the entire working class. It will be the beginning of a new epoch and will rouse the class consciousness of our workers. At present the workers have lost courage. After all these defeats and blows, and after the splits and the breaking of our organisations, this is only natural. However, the amalgamation will put new spirit into the masses. The amalgamation will arouse the masses for a real struggle against the reformist and the fascists. Therefore, unity is absolutely necessary and must be brought about.

Such are the proposals which we have to put before you. The chapter of errors of the Italian working class is, so to speak written with the heart's blood of the Italian workers. Of course, one cannot so easily get over these so-called errors (this is a very euphemistic expression for what happened in Italy), and behave as if nothing had happened. We must not concern ourselves with the future, and we trust that this great defeat, and the terrible faith of our Italian Party, will result in our Party turning over a new leaf and showing, when the hour comes that it has at least profited by the lessons of the past. In no other country have we been so lead by the case by the reformists and by the Second International, as in Italy. I therefore trust that nowhere else, will there be

such a hatred against the reformists as in Italy. I hope that we shall seek the day, when the hour of revolution will have struck on which we shall remind Signor D'Aragona of the long beard, and the other reformist gentry of the five sleepless nights they spent in discussion of the dialogues with Mussolini and of all the treachery they are guilty against the Italian working class. The latter will never forgive or forget these events, and will retaliate on them according to their deserts. Comrades, I believe that this moment will come, and that it is not far distant.

Our Comrades must take advantage of the present temper of the working masses for the establishment of unity. We must have a United Front with all the other workers in this struggle against the fascists. The fascists reign will soon come to end, and during this reign every Party leader must prove his worth and show what he can do, and what is left in his inner-most self for our cause. We Russians, say: the darker the night, the brighter the stars. The darker the fascist night in Italy, the brighter will be the influence of the Communist actions on the future of the workers. When every leader will do his duty, the Italian working masses will be led through all the troubles and defeats to final victory (Loud Applause).

Resolution on the Italian Problem.

The Second and Third World Congresses of the Communist International had to devote much time to the Italian problem. The Fourth Congress is now able to summarise the whole matter.

At the end of the Imperialist World War, the situation in Italy was objectively revolutionary. The reins of government had fallen from the hands of the bourgeoisie. The apparatus of the bourgeois state had become disrupted. The ruling class felt insecure, the whole of the working class was aroused against the war, and in many parts of the country was in a state of open insurrection. Considerable numbers of the peasantry were rising against the large landowners and the government they were willing to support the working class in its revolutionary struggle. The soldiers were

against the war and ready to fraternise with the workers.

The objective conditions for a victorious revolution were at hand. But the most important subjective factor was lacking,—namely a determined, trained, prepared, alert, revolutionary working class party, i. e. a real Communist Party ready to take over the leadership of the masses.

Such was the situation in almost all belligerent countries at the end of the war. That the workers did not accomplish the revolution in the years 1919/20 was due to the lack of a revolutionary working class party. This was demonstrated with particular clearness in Italy, a country where the revolution seemed nearest, and which has now been plunged into the most fearful horrors of the counter-revolution.

The occupation of the factories by the Italian workers in autumn 1920 was a most decisive moment in the development of the class struggle in Italy. Instinctively, the Italian workers sought for a revolutionary solution of the crisis. But the absence of a revolutionary proletarian party decided the fate of the working class, sealed their defeat, and prepared the present victory of the Fascists. The working class owing to this lack of revolutionary leadership, did not find the necessary strength to take the power into its own hands. And so it happened that after a short time, the bourgeoisie conquered the proletariat and established the Dictatorship of its most radical wing, the Fascists. The example of Italy is of great importance. Nowhere is the proof of the importance of the historical mission of the Communist Party so evident as in Italy, where, as a result of the absence of such a party, events were turned to the advantage of the bourgeoisie.

It is not that there were no working class parties in Italy in this decisive hour. The old Socialist Party had a large membership and to all appearances exercised a great influence. But it contained in its ranks the reformist elements that paralysed every revolutionary action. In spite of the first split in 1912 (expulsion of the extreme Right) and of the second secession in 1914, there were still a great number of reformists and Centrists in the Socialist Party of Italy. These reformists and Centrists acted as a dead-

weight upon the party at every decisive moment. Nowhere did it become so clear as in Italy that the Reformists were the most dangerous agents of the bourgeoisie among the working class. They did not leave any means untried to betray the working class to the bourgeoisie. Such treachery as that of the reformists during the occupation of the factories has often been demonstrated in the history of reformism, which is in reality nothing but a long unbroken chain of betrayals. The real forerunner of Fascism was Reformism. The treachery of the reformists is primarily responsible for the great sufferings of the Italian proletariat. If the Italian working class has to begin over again the difficult road which leads to revolution, it is because the reformists have been tolerated so long in the Italian Party.

At the beginning of 1921 the breach of the majority of the Socialist Party with the Communist International took place. In Livorno, the centre showed itself willing to split away from the Comintern and from 58,000 Italian Communists, forming an independent organisation with 16,000 members. Two parties were created. The young Communist Party was resolute in its struggle against the bourgeoisie and its reformist accomplices, but in spite of all its courage, too weak to lead the working class to victory; and the old Socialist Party, where, after Livorno, the influence of the reformists became ever more pronounced. The working class stood divided and helpless. The bourgeoisie kept the upper hand with the help of the reformists. It was then that the political and economic offensive of capital really began. It took two full years of defeats and of the blackest betrayals on the part of the reformists to convince the leaders of the Centre, under the pressure of the masses, of their irremediable error, and induce them to draw the consequence of their actions.

It was not until October, 1921, at the Congress of Rome, that the reformists were expelled from the Socialist Party. It had come so far that the most prominent leaders of the reformists were boasting openly that they had been able to sabotage the revolution by remaining in the Socialist Party of Italy, and forcing it to inactivity at every decisive moment.

The reformists went openly from the ranks of the S.P.I. into the camp of the counter-revolution. They left the masses powerless, discouraged, and greatly weakened the Socialist Party, both numerically and politically.

These sorry, but instinctive examples of Italian history must convince the class-conscious workers of every country, that: 1) reformism is their chief enemy; that, 2) the oscillations and hesitations of the Centrists are dangerous to the existence of a working class party; and that 3) the existence of a determined and alert Communist Party is the first condition for the victorious struggle of the proletariat. These are the lessons of the Italian tragedy.

Considering the resolutions of the S.P.I. in Rome (October 1922) expelling the reformists from the Party and declaring itself ready to adhere unconditionally to the Communist International, the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern resolved:

1) The general situation of Italy, especially since the victory of the Fascist reaction, requires imperiously the rapid union of all revolutionary forces of the proletariat. The Italian worker will come to his feet again when, after the many defeats and splits, a new rallying of all revolutionary forces is started.

2) The Communist International sends its brotherly greeting to the hard pressed working class of Italy. It is thoroughly convinced of the honest revolutionary spirit of the Socialist Party of Italy, now it is freed from its reformist elements, and resolves to admit the S.P.I. to the Communist International.

3) The Fourth World Congress regards the fulfillment of the 21 conditions as something which is self-understood, and in view of events in Italy, charges the Executive Committee to insist upon their being carried out with the utmost rigour and with all resulting consequences.

4) The Fourth World Congress resolves that, after his speech at the Congress of Rome, the representative Vella and his followers have no place in the Communist Party of Italy. The Fourth World Congress demands from the Central Executive of the Socialist Party of Italy,

to expel all these who do not accept the 21 conditions unconditionally.

5) Since, according to the Statutes of the Communist International, there can be only one section of the Comintern in one country, the Fourth World Congress decides upon the immediate union of the Communist Party with the Socialist Party of Italy. The united Party to be known as "The United Communist Party (Section of the Communist International)".

6) To get this union carried into life the Fourth Congress nominates a special Organisation Committee consisting of three members from each party under the chairmanship of a member of the Executive. This Committee is to consist of Comrades Tasca, Gransei, and Sessimandro from the Communist Party; from the Socialist Party, Comrades Serrati, Maffi, and Tonetti, and from the Executive, Comrade Zinoviev. The Executive reserves the right to replace Comrade Zinoviev by any other member. This committee is to prepare in Moscow a detailed statement of the conditions for the reunion and direct the carrying out of this union in Italy. The Executive is to be considered as the court of last resort in all conflicting issues.

The Central Executives of both parties are to conduct the general business of their parties until the unification congress; however, they are subordinated in their whole political activity as well as in their work of preparing the unification, to the Organisation Committee.

7) Such Organisation committee shall also be created in the large factories and in the cities, consisting of two members from each party, the chairman to be appointed by the representative of the Executive.

8) The task of these Organisation committees, central as well as local, will be not only to prepare the unification, but to conduct the common political activity of both organisations from that time on.

9) There is also to be created a common trade union committee whose task it should be to agitate in the Confederation of Labour against the Amsterdammers and to win over the majority of the trade unions to the Profintern. This committee should also consist of two representatives from each party, presided over by a comrade appointed by the

Executive of the Comintern or the Organisation committee. The trade union committee works according to the instructions and under the control of the Organisation Committee.

10) In every city where a communist and a socialist newspaper exist, these must be consolidated until January 1st, 1923, at the latest. The editorship of the central organ for the coming year to be named by the Executive of the Comintern.

11) The unification Congress should take place not later than on the 15th of March, 1923. The Executive is to decide when, and under what conditions separate conferences of both parties should take place before the unification congress, for the purpose of preparation and information of the working class.

(12) Illegal activity has become an absolute necessity in Italy at the present day. The Comrades of the Socialist Party of Italy must make good now what they have neglected to do. It would be most dangerous to entertain any illusions as to the nature of Fascism and its probable development. We must reckon with the possibility that the revolutionary working class movement of Italy will be forced underground for a certain period of time. The near future will bring the acid test for every revolutionary proletarian organisation and for every individual revolutionist.

The Congress leaves it to the Central Committee of Five to formulate a detailed plan of illegal activity and to its utmost to put this plan into operation.

(13) The Fourth Congress resolves that a manifesto shall be published on the question of unity to be signed by the Presidium of the Fourth World Congress and the delegation of both parties, to be distributed at once.

(14) The Congress reminds all the Italian comrades of the necessity of strict discipline. It is the duty of all comrades without exception to do their utmost to help bring about the unification without any delay, and without any disturbance. Every breach of discipline in the present situation becomes a crime against the Italian proletariat and the Communist International.

Chairman Neurath: Before taking the vote on the resolution which the Ita-

lian Commission put before us, the Italian delegation wishes to make some statements. Comrade Bordiga has the floor.

Bordiga: Statement of the majority of the Italian delegation at the plenary Session of the Congress;

The Majority of the Italian delegation expressed its opinion before the Italian Commission and sub-committee on the subject of the fusion between the Italian Communist Party and the Italian Socialist Party.

Since the constitution of the Italian Communist Party at Leghorn, the majority of the Italian Communist Party, considered the whole problem of the Italian situation and of the relations with the Italian Socialist Party, in the light of winning the Italian masses for the Communist International and for the formation of a revolutionary force by gradually enlisting in the Italian Communist Party the workers who have left the other parties. This line of action led to the exclusion of any fusion, even after the Socialist Congress in Rome.

The Communist International has considered this problem from a different viewpoint, and from the resolution of the Commission on which all the delegations are unanimously agreed, it is clear that the Fourth Congress is in favour of fusion.

After the discussion of the Italian question, the majority of the Italian delegation took part in the debates on the practical guarantees to be required in connection with united action, and made proposals, which it is not going to bring forward here since the resolution of the Commission has been drafted and adopted.

Considering that under the present circumstances, when the position of the Communist International has been clearly defined, a vote is not merely a theoretic expression of opinion (and this opinion has just been expressed), but is a political act on the strength of which the loyalty of the Italian Communist Party in carrying out the resolutions of the International, will be judged, we solemnly declare that the whole Party will carry on its activity and its policy according to the instructions of the Fourth Congress without controversy or hesitation.

In order to give clear proof of its submission to discipline, and in this spirit the majority of the Italian Delega-

tion, limiting its share in the discussions to this statement, will vote for the resolution moved by the Commission, and declares that it will do its utmost to put this resolution into practice.

Serrati: The Delegation of the Italian Socialist Party, having taken cognisance of the proposals made by the Commission on the Italian question and having discussed their text, declares:

(1) The last Congress of the Italian Socialist Party held in Rome, having expelled the Reformists and all the open or secret collaborationists, decided by unanimous vote to adhere to the Third International.

(2) Consequently, this adhesion is an unequivocal acceptance of the 21 points, and at the same time an expression of determination to amalgamate with the Communist Party, in order to form with it a single section of the International.

(3) We are in agreement with the proposal of the Congress to accept the immediate fusion and the general conditions established by the Commission on the Italian question, and we shall immediately set to work here in order to elaborate the conditions of the fusion and to put them into practice in Italy.

(4) Nevertheless, as ours is an advisory referendum mandate, and as we are in duty bound to inform the Managing Committee of our Party about our action, we have asked leave to send a part of our delegation to Italy, in order to obtain our Managing Committees' consent and approval of our personal decisions here, and also its authorisation to continue our work in connection with the organisation of the fusion of the two parties.

(5) This request was dictated by the unanimous determination of all the members of our delegation to avoid any polemics on our return to Italy, and to work as expeditiously as possible at the realisation of the unity of the Communist revolutionary movement.

(6) The conditions under which the Rome split took place, at a time when the reactionaries were making a violent attack on the Italian proletariat and on the entire revolutionary movement, have led to a very clear and radical selection within our Party. This is not the time for opportunists and aspiring politicians. Those who have remained with us are

sincere comrades who followed the Left, while the opportunists in Italy, as in all other countries, veered to the Right. This fact should be a token of the sincerity of our adhesion, and a guarantee of our determination to work energetically and under discipline for the programme and the tactics of the Communist International. We only wish that the controversies of the past, the memory of which can only serve as an example and a lesson for the future, will not be used by anyone to create revision and strife between those who want to see all the true Communists united for the defence of the proletariat against reaction, and for the triumph of the Social Revolution.

Graziadei: Although fusion has its perils and difficulties, against which the minority has demanded the necessary guarantees, this same minority will vote for the proposed resolution with full conviction.

It is convinced that the discipline evidenced by the comrades of the majority of the Italian delegation, which is beyond doubt, will meet with the warm and sincere approval on the part of the working masses which will see in the fusion one of the indispensable conditions for a renewed vigorous working class movement.

Chairman (Neurath): Before we come to a vote on the Italian resolution, I would like to remark that a few alterations were made in the original text. The altered text of the resolution is published so that members of all delegations may see it. So the text of the resolution is known. Does someone still wish to speak to the resolution? As no one desires to speak, we shall proceed to the vote. Those opposed to this resolution please show. Who abstains? None. I therefore declare that this resolution of such high importance to the Italian working class and the international proletariat, has been unanimously adopted. Long live the Italian proletariat! Long live the Communist Party of Italy! (Loud Applause).

We shall now deal with the Czecho-Slovakian question, and if possible, later with the American question. Comrade Radek now has the floor as reporter for the Czecho-Slovakian Commission.

Radek: Comrades, the Commission which has been engaged in a study of the Czecho-Slovakian question wishes to make known to you the resolution which was unanimously adopted by them. This is of particularly great importance, as you know that the conflict in the Czecho-Slovakian Party has been regarded as a fundamental conflict between the Left and Right wings of the Party. In our Commission there were comrades who, do not in many points of principle agree with the Executive and who were more or less with the Left Wing of the Party. But we all arrived at the same resolution.

The history of the struggle within the Czecho-Slovakian Party is less well-known to the C.I. than similar conflicts within other Parties, as it has only recently become apparent. It had quite a long previous history. It would be well if we glance briefly at the previous history of this party. The Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party owed its growth to the fact that the majority of the old Social-Democratic Party had been educated into Communism. In the process of this development certain comrades, who began to follow this road hopefully, took a somewhat backward position at a certain stage in the journey. Thus, comrade Smeral for example, who played a prominent part in the struggles of the Czecho-Slovakian Party, towards the end of 1920, as the question of the construction of the Party was already ripe, took the stand that the time was not yet ripe. Through this strife in the Party with regard to the correct moment for its construction, a certain lack of confidence was aroused in some circles. It began with the struggles in the young Czecho-Communist Party, of which we were informed at the Third Congress already; and as for the rest of this mistrust, we now have it in the conflicts in the Czecho-Slovakian Party.

The Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party, is like all our mass parties, a party which had worked through slowly to practical communism. As we have no single mass party which was suddenly born as a full-grown Communist Party, we cannot expect this to be the case with the Czecho-Slovakian Party. This party has only existed for a short time,

and arose from the union of a whole series of national communist organisations. Its centralisation is still not very perfect, and does not yet lay down definitely the task of the Party. The Party has committed many sins of omission. Together with the representatives of the present Opposition, and with the representatives of the Party Executive, the Enlarged Executive carefully examined these faults last July. One of the principle omissions in Party work is that trade union nuclei have hardly been established, and that in the fight with the Amsterdam International they have often been unable to control the course of events. It is also charged that the parliamentary representatives of the Party in the Czecho-Slovakian parliament, have not taken a position which was sufficiently one of agitation and obstruction. The elected members of parliament, representing the communist Party, were not sufficiently informed as to how they might unite their parliamentary activities with the general outside activities of the Party. If you will take such a question as our work among the soldiers, you will find that this question raised a lot of dust even in the bourgeois press, and the Czecho-Slovakian Government seeks to prove that terrible conspiracies against Massaryk and his Republic were hatched here in Moscow. In Czecho-Slovakia the soldiers have the right to vote; according to the Constitution they also have the right to take part in political life. Therefore we told the Party that it was their duty to use these constitutional rights so that the Czecho-Slovakian soldiers should not only know what the struggle in Czecho-Slovakia was about, but also, as workers or peasants, they should understand that their place is by the side of the working masses. And when the Czecho-Slovakian bourgeoisie believes that this question gives them the opportunity to launch an attack against the Party, we would reply that this attack would be principally an attack upon the political rights of the soldiers; and then we would see whether the Czecho-Slovakian bourgeoisie would carry on this attack. The Party has so far done too little in this particular field. This too limited activity of the Party is on a par with their handling of unemployed

ment, which is increasing at every moment. It is not sufficient to seek to cause the unemployed to unite in order to pursue their case in parliament. It is necessary to work in the trade unions and to get the workers to work together with the unemployed in the struggle. These weaknesses and faults of the Party have already strengthened the mistrust of a group of old and good Party comrades. Had these comrades been satisfied merely to emphasise this fault, which has also been recognised by the Central Committee of the Party and by the International, and had then offered practical methods of repairing it, we would have nothing to say against such positive criticism; it would be a healthy symptom of the general work of the Party. Unfortunately, however, our comrades have fallen into such a state of mistrust, and have let themselves be driven into such a bad mood, that they can no longer be responsible. Sometimes in the Party such opinions were disseminated as had absolutely no foundation. The comrades of the Opposition have spread the rumour that the Party Leadership, under Comrade Smeral, had quietly spread the idea of a coalition with the bourgeoisie. It was enough that in Marienbad some sort of bourgeois assembly took place. Comrade Smeral did not have to be in Marienbad, —he was in Karlsbad. And also not in a bourgeois assembly, but at a Party meeting. However, that was enough for them "Bad (bath) is "Bad", and with whom he had this bath is not quite clear (laughter)."

Malicious rumours were set afloat among the Party membership as to the intrigues of the Party leadership with the bourgeois parties. We say that such opinions are pure madness. They then said that the Party stated it was for the United Front and the Workers Government, that Smeral was pressing this and at the same time carrying on negotiations for joining the Government. If he were as crazy as all that he would perhaps have got into the government, but he would also have been thrown out of the Party. It sufficed that bourgeois papers wrote—when dealing with this conflict in the Party,—that Smeral was purifying the Party from the Left elements, and immediately the Opposition comrades

said: "Here is the proof that Smeral has been in communion with the bourgeoisie". When they were in this mood certain good comrades let themselves be led to believe that they must absolutely have a factional organ. In the old Czechish Social-Democratic Party, when we were in the opposition, we also had our paper "Kommunista". This was our dynamite in the Czechish Social-Democratic Party. This paper continued to exist, but only because accidentally Comrade Sturc was the publisher. The Opposition went so far as to address an appeal to the Party officials, for which they were warned by the Central Executive Committee not to disturb the masses of the Party with untrue statements. The Opposition did not accept the decision of the Party leadership. At the Party Conference the Opposition's charges were characterised as unjust and it was demanded that they withdraw them. The Opposition did not withdraw and was therefore excluded from the Party Conference. The Executive did not confirm this decision to exclude the Opposition and therefore was attacked by the majority of the Czech comrades. They were attacked in this way because it was said in this manner the discipline of the Party was being undermined. Now comrades, discipline was not in a good condition in the Czechish party. Such things occurred for instance, as when the editor of a provincial paper said: "I have been here long enough", they answered him, "stay where you are because we have not any substitutes". Then the comrade would give them three months notice so that he could move to Prague. Or, we can illustrate the position with another example. The editorial staff would insert an article in one of the papers which did not represent the opinion of the Party, and it was not indicated that the article only expressed the opinion of the author. When the editor was reproved he would say: "We are the Holy Ghost, and we are autonomous in our politics."

An end must finally be made to this lack of discipline, which is an inheritance from the old social-democracy. But, that they tolerated this lack of discipline for so long, and now suddenly throw Comrade Sturc and other comrades out of the party—this is what we cannot under-

stand. We believe that they could have waited until the Congress, in order to discuss the matter seriously with us and with the comrades of the Czech Opposition.

But it was not only these reasons which made us form our decision. Around every Opposition are collected many elements about whose loyalty to the Party I have doubts. But there are also old and honest comrades whom we want to keep in the Party; not because we think that they are better than others, but because we are convinced of their proletarian sentiments and because, once their distrust has been removed, they will become excellent comrades.

We have gone to some trouble to examine and prove these things in the Commission. Some charges were made against Comrade Smeral about which we had to say: "No! these charges are not true; and we shall not participate in them". However, we have come to the conclusion that the expulsions from the Party should not be confirmed. As the comrades have indeed committed a grave breach of discipline, and as we are interested in having the Czechish comrades understand that there can be no fighting Party without discipline, we are in favour that these comrades be not excluded, but that they merely be suspended from their posts until the next Congress of the Party. If they show, after the World Congress, that they are willing to work earnestly in the Party, nothing will stand in the way of their being elected again. But comrades, I would like to say a few words there which I hope these comrades will take to heart. In the Commission it sometimes happened that we could prove in the clearest way that a certain charge was ridiculous, and ten minutes later a comrade would stand up and say that it had been proven here that such-and-such were true. The comrades brought the charge against the Party that the Party Leadership sought to link it up with the bourgeoisie. We proved that no such thing had taken place; that the Czechoslovakian Party is a good proletarian Party. Then came these comrades and claimed that we had just proved that they were right. I refer now especially to comrades Bolen and Sturc. If you intend to start by acting in this manner, the International will not

be in a condition to aid the Party when it is fighting for its life. There must be an end to this false reports about the Party. If you see anything bad in the Party, fight against it, apply to the International. But the Party must have the feeling that traitors and renegades are not at its head, but comrades who have been developed in Party work and in whom the comrades must have confidence. If you want to characterise comrades Smeral, Kreibich, and others as traitors, we must state that we know these comrades too long to believe such a thing of them. We show you the faults which have come to light in the Party, and the Opposition is no more responsible for these faults than the other section (Hear, hear) Only by working together in a brotherly spirit can we aid the Party to extricate itself from this situation. The Czechoslovakian Party is in a more serious position than any other party in the International. As a country with three million industrial workers and 600,000 unemployed, a country with 12 million inhabitants, among whom there is a deep mistrust among the Slovaks and the Germans—that is, a country where the stage is set for great national and social conflicts—in such a situation Czechoslovakia is undoubtedly one of these countries where great crises may come about at any moment. I doubt whether the Czechoslovakian Party is in a position to deal with such crises at present. Our work must be so directed that in the immediate future we use our utmost efforts to put the Party in a position that whatever may happen, it will not be enfeebled through accusation and mistrust, but will be a good party, in a condition to achieve positive revolutionary tasks.

We propose that you accept the resolution which we present to you. In the Commission it was unanimously accepted, both by these comrades who—if I may so express myself—stand more often upon their left foot, and also by those who sometimes glance towards the right. Yes, it was unanimously adopted. After a long discussion and the examination of an immense mass of material, which we were compelled to read through although it was by no means cheerful material. This material gave us proof that we had here a starting point in the direction of an anarcho-syndicalism. But we do not wish to have

this outside of the Party; we would rather use it within the Party in earnest and positive work. We ask of you to refrain from any debate and to accept the resolution of the Commission. (Loud Applause).

Chairman Neurath. Since all the delegations, or nearly all the delegations, were represented in the Czechoslovakian Commission and the members of this Commission are acquainted with the resolution, it is not really necessary to read it over again. But I must ask the assembly for consent to forego the reading of the resolution.

(Voices: Read the resolution.)

I will read it to you:

Resolution of the relations in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party.

1. The Opposition.

The expulsion of Comrades Jilek, Bolen etc. was the result of repeated violation of discipline, committed by these comrades against the Party. After the representative of this group, Comrade Jilek, in common with the representative of the Committee of the Party, Comrade Smeral in Moscow, had given his consent to the resolution which stated that in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party there are no basic differences, but at the same time pointed out that there were certain shortcomings in the practice of the Party,—it was the duty of all the comrades to rectify the errors which they admitted. Instead of this, the opposition demanded the continued existence of a factional organ—"Kommunista"—which was a contradiction to the resolution of the Third Congress which forbade the formation of factions. In the fight for its fractional organ, the Opposition committed a gross violation of discipline when a few days before the meeting of the Council of the Party and of the Party Conference, it circulated an appeal containing the gravest accusations against the Central Committee. The Opposition, by hesitating to withdraw these accusations, caused extreme irritation to the Party Council and to the Party Conference, and thus unwisely provoked their own expulsion.

In the forum of the International, the Opposition preferred a charge against the

majority of the Central Committee and against Comrade Smeral, that the latter were working for a governmental coalition with the Left elements of the bourgeoisie. This charge is in direct contradiction to the known facts of the activity of the Party and must be rejected as totally unsubstantiated. The program demands of the Opposition as expressed in the draft program of Vajtauer, contain syndicalist and anarchist, but no Marxian and no communist conceptions.

The fact that such demands were advanced by the Opposition demonstrates an anarcho-syndicalist deviation on their part from the basic principles of the Communist International.

Nevertheless, the Fourth Congress is of the opinion that the expulsion of the Opposition was inexpedient. The Congress substitutes for this expulsion a stern rebuke and their suspension until the next Conference of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. The decision to revoke expulsion as inexpedient should by no means be interpreted as an expression of consent with the program of the Opposition, but it was prompted by the following considerations: The Council of the Party had failed to make it clear to the Opposition at the outset that the formation of factions would not be tolerated; the Opposition therefore deemed itself justified in fighting for the existence of its factional organ. Furthermore a number of previous breaches of discipline had been tolerated, which caused a weakening of respect for discipline and responsibility on the part of the Opposition. The Fourth Congress leaves the expelled comrades within the Party, but it emphasises the imperative duty of Opposition implicitly to submit itself to the discipline of the Party and to strictly discharge all its obligations.

This subordination to the discipline of the Party makes it incumbent upon the Opposition to withdraw the assertions and charges which are damaging to the unity of the Party, which were found to be unsubstantiated and untrue on investigation by the Commission. Henceforth they must obey all the orders of the Central Committee. If any member should feel convinced that an injustice has been done to him, he ought to appeal to the nearest competent organ of the Party (Enlarged

National Council, National Conference) and in the last instance to the Controlling Organ of the Communist International. Until a decision is rendered by the highest instance, every member must absolutely and unconditionally submit to the decisions adopted by the Party organisations.

2. The Press.

The press of the Party must be placed under the uniform leadership of the Central Committee. It is impermissible that the Central Organ of the Party should venture not only to conduct its own separate policy, but even to consider itself entitled to conduct such a policy. Even if the Editorial Board be of opinion that the responsible leadership of the Party was wrong on a certain concrete question, it is their duty to abide by that decision. The editorial position should not be regarded as a higher instance, but on a line with the other organs of the Party it should be subordinated to the Central Committee. This does not mean to say that the Party editors are not free to express their own opinion in discussions and in signed articles. The discussions on Party questions should be conducted in the general Party press, but these discussions should in no case be conducted in a manner detrimental to Party discipline.

It is the duty of all the Parties and of all the organisations to prepare their actions by thorough discussion in the Party organisations.

3. The Shortcomings of the Party.

The Fourth Congress fully endorses the July Theses of the Enlarged Executive, in which we find that the shortcomings of the Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party may be explained by their transition from a social-democratic to a Communist Party. The fact that these shortcomings were recognised by the Central Committee no less than by the Opposition makes it even more the imperative duty of all the comrades to do their utmost to remove them. The Congress asserts that the Party is making but slow progress in removing these shortcomings. Thus, for instance, the Party was not sufficiently active in arran-

ging for the propaganda of communist ideas in the Czecho-Slovakian army, although the legality of the Party and the franchise of the soldiers furnished a good opportunity.

The Fourth Congress instructs the Communist Party to give more attention than hitherto to the question of unemployment. In view of the magnitude of unemployment in Czecho-Slovakia and the precarious position of the unemployed, it is the duty of the Party not to content itself with this or that demonstration, but to carry on systematic agitation and demonstration among the unemployed throughout the country, in parliament and in municipal councils, and to combine parliamentary action on behalf of the unemployed with action in the Trade Unions and in street demonstrations.

The parliamentary action of the Party must be of a much more demonstrative character. It must completely reveal to the masses the attitude of the Communist Party towards the policies of the ruling class, and awaken the desire of the masses to capture the power of the State.

In view of the great economic struggles raging in Czecho-Slovakia, which may turn into political struggles any day, the Central Committee should be so reorganised as to be able to take quick decision upon every question. The Party organisation and the Party membership must strictly maintain the discipline of the Party, permitting no wavering or hesitation.

The question of the United Front and of the Workers' Government was properly carried out by the Party as a whole. The Party Council acted quite properly in repudiating individual misconceptions, like the conception of Comrade Votava who thought that the question of a workers government was one of a purely parliamentary combination. The Party must be aware of the fact that the workers government will be possible in Czecho-Slovakia only if it will convince by its agitation the large masses of the National-Socialist, Social-Democratic and indifferent workers, of the necessity to break with the bourgeoisie, if it will succeed in detaching parts of the peasantry and of the petty-bourgeoisie of the city — suffering under the

burden of the high cost of living — from the bourgeoisie and in attracting them to the ranks of the Anti-Capitalist Front. In order to achieve this, the Party must take part in all the conflicts, and by its determined leadership and expansion of the conflicts, bring home to the masses that the Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party is the centre of the United Front of all the anti-capitalist elements, that it is willing to turn the correlation of forces in Czecho-Slovakia into the mass struggle in favour of the toiling elements.

In all that the workers' government shall be formed as well as maintained, the Party must exert all efforts to bring together all the workers expelled by the Amsterdam Trade Unions and to organise them into powerful unions. It should at least win support of the workers and peasants to the struggle for the defence of the interests of the working class and thus obviate the danger of pacifism and of oppression of the working class by the armed violence of the bourgeoisie. Hence the propaganda and the campaign for the workers government must always be conducted in connection with the propaganda and campaign for proletarian mass organs (Defence Councils, Control Committees, Factory Councils, and the like). It is also necessary to hold prominently before the masses the program of the workers government (shifting the burden of State expenditures on to the possessing classes, control of production by the workers organs, arming of the working class), in order to emphasise the difference between a bourgeois social-democratic coalition and a workers government relying upon the organs of the working class.

This work should have the co-operation of all the members of the Party. There should be no vain grumbling, no spreading of false accusations, no sowing of distrust against the leaders of the Party, but pointed criticism of their shortcomings, daily positive work to remove the shortcomings. Only in this way will the Party become a militant communist organisation equal to the great tasks imposed upon it by the development of events in Czecho-Slovakia.

Chairman Neurath: Before the vote is taken, I will call upon Comrade Sturz

to make a statement on behalf of the Opposition.

Sturz (Czecho-Slovakia): We came to Moscow on behalf of the workers of the Opposition in order to bring to your notice the dangerous symptoms of stagnation and deterioration within our Party. Our warnings were not given due consideration, our statements were not sufficiently examined. The Congress, therefore, solves our Party crisis by a compromise, although we warned you against such a solution.

The proposed resolution will not remove the peril to which we called attention in good time.

While submitting to the decision of the majority of the Congress, we deem it our duty to emphasise the fact that we are the representatives of wide masses of dissatisfied workers who will probably fail to understand this resolution, and whom it will be difficult to prevent from continuing the work of elimination of all that is unhealthy in the Czech Communist Party.

Chairman Neurath: Before proceeding with the translations, I call upon Comrade Smeral to make a statement.

Smeral (Czecho-Slovakia): Comrades, I declare on behalf of the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation that we are in agreement with the resolution and will vote for it. The Executive Committee of our Party and the National Conference were not so much concerned about expulsion at all costs as about the enforcement of discipline. In view of the conditions prevailing in our Party before the Congress, we were at a loss to know how to deal with the viewpoint on which the expelled comrades insisted. It is correctly stated in the resolution that owing to their determination not to give in, they provoked the decision of the National Conference. We trust, however, that the decisions of the World Congress will be a sufficient lesson, and that with the assistance of the Executive, true communist discipline will be established in our Party.

Recognition of the leaders' authority and discipline are absolutely necessary to enable our Party to get rid of the shortcomings pointed out in the resolution and recognised by us all. Our Party is only twelve months old. The conditions under which it grows and develops are rather complicated, and we venture to

say that it has achieved positive results in its working this past year. However, there is no time to speak of the things which were accomplished. We deem it our duty to carry on a steady work for the improvement of our party, and we shall do our utmost to achieve this. Just as we insist on discipline within the Party, so do we ourselves submit to the control and discipline of the International. By this means we trust that we will be able not only to reorganise the Party on truly communist lines, but also to transform it into an active and militant section of our international army that will win the confidence of the International. We may expect important events in Czecho-Slovakia in the next twelve months. We are convinced that the united, consolidated and disciplined Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia will do justice to its great tasks, and that we shall be able to put before the International next year not only proofs of our work and struggle, but also of considerable successes.

We therefore declare on behalf of the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation, that we shall be able to vote for the resolution which was put before us.

Errata.

Bulletin 20 Page 4, Col. 1, Line 25.

Speech by Comrade Lin-Yen-Chen:

"First was the downfall of the Southem....." should read: "First let me speak of the downfall....."

Also, line 47, "Before they had conquered Kwangtung in 1920 they established....." should read: "Before they con-

Chairman Neurath: Before proceeding with the vote I am obliged to make the following statement on behalf of the Presidium:

Comrade Sturz said in the course of his statement, that the Czecho-Slovakian question was not examined carefully enough. I wish to say that this assertion is not correct. The Opposition has, of course the right to make statements but we cannot accept the assertion that the Czecho-Slovakian question was not sufficiently examined.

The vote will now be taken. Is anyone against the resolution moved by the Commission?—I declare the resolution carried with one dissentient. (A voice—Bravo).

Comrades, this ends our labours for to-day. It is too late to deal to day with the report on the American question. I want to remind you that a Conference of all the women delegates will be held to-morrow at 11 a.m. The delegations are also invited to hand in, not later than to-morrow afternoon, to Comrade Humbert-Droz nominations for the Executive.

The next Session will be held to-morrow morning.

The Session adjourned at 4.50 p.m.

quered Kwangtung and established a government in 1920....."

Page 5, Col. 2, line 11: "The Peking-Mukden railway strike....." should read: "Peking-Hankow railway strike..."

Also, line 12, etc. "the centre of China..." should read "Central China....."

Also line 14 "Hongkong" should read "Hankow".

BULLETIN

OF THE IV CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

No 31.

Moscow.

December 12th 1922.

Thirty-First Session.

December 5th 1922. 12.50 P. M.

Chairman: Comrade Neurath.

Contents:

Adoption of resolution on the Question of Relief for Soviet Russia. Report of the Jugo-Slavian Commission—Comrade Felix Kon. Statement by Comrade Stanitch. Statement by Comrade Raditch. Statement by Comrade Marykno. Adoption of Resolution on Jugo-Slavian Communist Party. Report of the Norwegian Commission—Comrade Bukharin. Adoption of Resolution on the Norwegian Question.

Chairman Neurath: I declare the session open.

The question before us is the resolution on Industrial Relief. Comrade Munzenberg has the floor, to report on the changes in the resolution.

Munzenberg. Comrades, the question of Industrial Relief has been dealt with by a commission elected by the Congress, then it was dealt with yesterday evening by the Presidium of the Congress, and finally by a Commission nominated by the Presidium. In the name of this Commission, allow me to read the following resolution for which I request unanimous adoption.

Resolution on the question of relief for Soviet Russia.

1) The workers of all countries, without distinction of political or trade union views, are interested in the preservation and strengthening of Soviet Russia. Besides the deep-rooted feeling of proletarian solidarity, it was the consciousness of this fact which led the working class parties to support the relief work and moved the working class to make the greatest sacrifices on its behalf. The support of the proletarian relief, which grew to one of the mightiest actions of

International solidarity enabled Soviet Russia to pull through the blackest days of famine and finally to conquer it.

But already during the time of the work of the famine relief was being conducted, large sections of the working class organisations engaged in this activity, recognised that this relief in form of food alone would not be of great help to Soviet Russia. The economic war of the capitalist countries against Soviet Russia continues. The blockade continues in the form of refusal of credits; in every case where capitalist groups take up business relations with Soviet Russia they do this in order to make profits and exploit Soviet Russia.

Just as in every other conflict between Soviet Russia and its imperialist enemies, it is the duty of the workers of all countries to take Russia's side against its enemies in this economic war and to help it with all the means in their power, including that of the industrial relief.

2) The best way for the workers to support Russia in the economic war is the political revolutionary struggle, and the increasing pressure upon their government to recognise Soviet Russia, and resume business relations with her on favourable terms. But if we take into consideration Russia's importance for all