

say that it has achieved positive results in its working this past year. However, there is no time to speak of the things which were accomplished. We deem it our duty to carry on a steady work for the improvement of our party, and we shall do our utmost to achieve this. Just as we insist on discipline within the Party, so do we ourselves submit to the control and discipline of the International. By this means we trust that we will be able not only to reorganise the Party on truly communist lines, but also to transform it into an active and militant section of our international army that will win the confidence of the International. We may expect important events in Czecho-Slovakia in the next twelve months. We are convinced that the united, consolidated and disciplined Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia will do justice to its great tasks, and that we shall be able to put before the International next year not only proofs of our work and struggle, but also of considerable successes.

We therefore declare on behalf of the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation, that we shall be able to vote for the resolution which was put before us.

### Errata.

Bulletin 20 Page 4, Col. 1, Line 25.

Speech by Comrade Lin-Yen-Chen:

"First was the downfall of the Southem....." should read: "First let me speak of the downfall....."

Also, line 47, "Before they had conquered Kwangtung in 1920 they established....." should read: "Before they con-

Chairman Neurath: Before proceeding with the vote I am obliged to make the following statement on behalf of the Presidium:

Comrade Sturz said in the course of his statement, that the Czecho-Slovakian question was not examined carefully enough. I wish to say that this assertion is not correct. The Opposition has, of course the right to make statements but we cannot accept the assertion that the Czecho-Slovakian question was not sufficiently examined.

The vote will now be taken. Is anyone against the resolution moved by the Commission?—I declare the resolution carried with one dissentient. (A voice—Bravo).

Comrades, this ends our labours for to-day. It is too late to deal to day with the report on the American question. I want to remind you that a Conference of all the women delegates will be held to-morrow at 11 a.m. The delegations are also invited to hand in, not later than to-morrow afternoon, to Comrade Humbert-Droz nominations for the Executive.

The next Session will be held to-morrow morning.

The Session adjourned at 4.50 p.m.

quered Kwangtung and established a government in 1920....."

Page 5, Col. 2, line 11: "The Peking-Mukden railway strike....." should read: "Peking-Hankow railway strike..."

Also, line 12, etc. "the centre of China..." should read "Central China....."

Also line 14 "Hongkong" should read "Hankow".

# BULLETIN

## OF THE IV CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

No 31.

Moscow.

December 12th 1922.

### Thirty-First Session.

December 5th 1922. 12.50 P. M.

Chairman: Comrade Neurath.

#### Contents:

Adoption of resolution on the Question of Relief for Soviet Russia. Report of the Jugo-Slavian Commission—Comrade Felix Kon. Statement by Comrade Stanitch. Statement by Comrade Raditch. Statement by Comrade Marykno. Adoption of Resolution on Jugo-Slavian Communist Party. Report of the Norwegian Commission—Comrade Bukharin. Adoption of Resolution on the Norwegian Question.

Chairman Neurath: I declare the session open.

The question before us is the resolution on Industrial Relief. Comrade Munzenberg has the floor, to report on the changes in the resolution.

Munzenberg. Comrades, the question of Industrial Relief has been dealt with by a commission elected by the Congress, then it was dealt with yesterday evening by the Presidium of the Congress, and finally by a Commission nominated by the Presidium. In the name of this Commission, allow me to read the following resolution for which I request unanimous adoption.

#### Resolution on the question of relief for Soviet Russia.

1) The workers of all countries, without distinction of political or trade union views, are interested in the preservation and strengthening of Soviet Russia. Besides the deep-rooted feeling of proletarian solidarity, it was the consciousness of this fact which led the working class parties to support the relief work and moved the working class to make the greatest sacrifices on its behalf. The support of the proletarian relief, which grew to one of the mightiest actions of

International solidarity enabled Soviet Russia to pull through the blackest days of famine and finally to conquer it.

But already during the time of the work of the famine relief was being conducted, large sections of the working class organisations engaged in this activity, recognised that this relief in form of food alone would not be of great help to Soviet Russia. The economic war of the capitalist countries against Soviet Russia continues. The blockade continues in the form of refusal of credits; in every case where capitalist groups take up business relations with Soviet Russia they do this in order to make profits and exploit Soviet Russia.

Just as in every other conflict between Soviet Russia and its imperialist enemies, it is the duty of the workers of all countries to take Russia's side against its enemies in this economic war and to help it with all the means in their power, including that of the industrial relief.

2) The best way for the workers to support Russia in the economic war is the political revolutionary struggle, and the increasing pressure upon their government to recognise Soviet Russia, and resume business relations with her on favourable terms. But if we take into consideration Russia's importance for all

workers, we must, in addition to political activity, strive also for the maximum of economic help from the world proletariat.

Every factory, every workshop, which Russia can get going without capitalist credits and with the support of the working class, is an objective support to Soviet Russia in its struggle against the imperialist robbers, and every improvement of the conditions within Russia, the best working class State in the world, strengthens the International proletariat in its struggle against its class enemy, the bourgeoisie.

The Fourth Congress of the Communist International therefore, regards it as the duty of every workers' party and organisation, and especially of the Communist Parties, to render practical support to Soviet Russia through economic relief action for the re-construction of her industry in addition to the political revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie.

3) The most important task of the proletarian economic relief outside of Russia consists in the gathering of means to purchase machines, war materials, etc., for Soviet Russia. Besides the old methods of collections, gifts, entertainments, etc., consideration should be given to subscription to workers' leon for Soviet Russia by Party groups, trade unions, co-operatives, and other organisations of the working class.

The propaganda for proletarian economic relief at the same time furnishes the best opportunity for agitation in favour of Soviet Russia. It is therefore to be carried out in close connection with the national sections in the various countries.

Since this problem of the economic support of Soviet Russia is of great importance for the working class as a whole, it is necessary to create committees consisting of delegates from the various working class organisations, similarly to the workers' Committees for Russian Famine Relief, to organise and lead this action. The task of these committees or corporations is to interest the largest possible masses of the workers in economic relief.

These committees are subordinated to the Communist International.

4) The employment of funds collected

by these committees or corporations must take place in close cooperation with the existing Russian economic bodies, be it those of the State or of the workers' organisations.

5) A mass immigration of foreign workers in Russia at the present time does not aid, but renders more difficult the re-construction of Russia and must not be advocated in any case. The importation of foreign workers into Russia must be limited to individual specialists which are especially necessary in certain enterprises. But even in such individual cases, this should take place only with the understanding and agreement of the Russian Trade Unions.

6) The proletarian economic relief must combine harmoniously our aspirations towards the ideal aim of concentrating the International solidarity of the workers upon the relief for the first proletarian country in the world, and the desire to produce concrete economic results.

7) In accordance with the principles of socialist co-operation, and industrial management, the surplus produce must be used only to enlarge the field of activity of the economic relief.

Chairman Neurath: We will proceed with the vote on the resolution which has been accepted by the Commission and the Presidium together with all amendments.

Is anybody against the present form of the resolution as read by Comrade Munzenberg? No! The resolution is unanimously accepted.

The next point on the agenda is the report on the work of the Jugo-Slavian Commission. Comrade Felix Kon has the floor.

Felix Kon: Esteemed comrades, in commencing my report on the Jugo-Slavian Party, on behalf of the Commission appointed for that purpose by the Congress, permit me to make reference to a quotation from a speech by Comrade Zinoviev. "We were born in the womb of the Second International and inherited many of its traditions which cannot be eradicated in one day, but if that day should last several years, we must insist that the process of eradication be accelerated." This fully applies to the Jugo-Slavian Party.

In reporting to the Congress about this

Party one must start from the standpoint, that the great force of communism consists in its ability to tell the truth even when it is bitter truth.

Unfortunately, in speaking of the Jugo-Slavian Party, we must utter this most bitter truth.

The Jugo-Slavian Party arose in the period of 1919—20, when the communist slogan attracted the masses, when the wave of the workers' movement—exemplified in the Italian movement—created in every country the possibility of the widest development for the Party. We saw how the Jugo-Slavian Party, hitherto very insignificant and only recently purged of the reformist elements, became suddenly one of the mightiest parties, capturing many municipal councils and sending to parliament 59 deputies. On the whole it appeared to be a big force.

This Party being strong in numbers, in view of the rapid growth and of the easy victory, did not realise for a long time that it was not yet a Communist Party by merely adopting the Communist label without passing through the acid test of the struggle. It did not realise the defects which it retained from the old social-democratic party; it remained a party of resolutions, a party which ascribed the greatest importance to its participation in parliament, which hoped in this way to be able to influence the bourgeoisie and defend the working class, nor realising the fact that the militancy of the masses which caused the growth of the Communist Party would also arouse the vigilance of the class enemy of the proletariat and prompt the bourgeoisie to take measure to crush the proletarian movement. In this respect the Party seemed to cling to legality with might and main. We must point out that the Jugo-Slavian Party is one of the—happily—few parties that did not publish the 21 conditions of admission to the International. The Party did not even publish the resolution of the Comintern or its attitude to parliamentarism, as though afraid lest it might weaken its parliamentary position. During the whole of this time, in spite of the quite clear indications that the easy victory may end in a similarly easy defeat, the Party took no measures to form an illegal organisation in prepa-

ration for fighting not by means of resolutions, but by action. When the notorious Defence of the Realm decree was promulgated (a decree is in force only for six months, and has yet to be approved by parliament to become law) instead of at once starting the fight, the Party hoped that parliament would refuse to approve it and prevent it becoming law. Meanwhile the communist and municipal councils were dissolved, and the communist deputies were thrown out of parliament. All this took place under circumstances which were unheard of in other countries. No appeal was made to the masses, no sign of life and protest, no attempt was made in Jugo-Slavia to fight in the usual communist way. The victory scored by the anti-proletarian class without a fight and without resistance, seemed to surprise even the victors themselves by the ease with which it had been achieved. Repressive measures were undertaken against the working class. The reactionaries began to suspend newspapers, to dissolve trade unions and to hand over their property to the reformist organisations. People were thrown into jail, while the Party did not manifest even the least hint at the fight against the raging counter-revolution. This was accompanied by repressive measures against the Party, resulting in a state of affairs that is similar to Russia and other countries which had to conduct underground activity. The major part of the active comrades had to flee abroad to escape imprisonment.

Emigration set in, with all its characteristic features. This was a new experience to the Jugo-Slavian organisation, but to the parties that had passed decades underground it was nothing new. The leaders, detached from direct activity and direct contact with the proletarian masses, were musing in exile over the causes of their defeat, and as usual, shifted the blame from one to the other. There was no Marxian analysis of the events that had occurred in Jugo-Slavia. Instead of this, the emigrants indulged in fruitless squabbles. Regardless of the absence of any differences of principle, there were quarrels that resulted from mutual mistrust, as one group differed from the other in the interpretation of the common

experience. There were no tactical differences, but the mistrust of one group of leaders towards the political tact and ability of the other group. This was lamentably manifested during the Vienna Conference.

Comrades, I now come to a question which cannot be approached by old experienced revolutionaries otherwise than with a sense of shame—before themselves and before their comrades—that they should have to talk of such questions. The Jugo-Slavian Party, during the period of its legality, had worked out certain statutes of organisation. Since then everything went by the board. Where there seemed to be all the indications for the development of the struggle, only smouldering ruins remained. It was necessary at all costs to create something (no matter what it be called), a conference, a congress, anything else—to get together the active comrades for a discussion of the way out of the predicament and of the way to revive the organisation that had been smashed to pieces. It is clear that under such circumstances it would be no use to study the statutes framed under legal conditions and to determine by time whether it was proper, on the basis of this or that article of the Statutes, to call a conference. One would think that the life of the Party and the interests of the working class should have been placed above such considerations. We also have to point out that the Vienna Conference under the circumstances, was called with all the possible regard for these articles of the statutes; but there were still a number of articles that had admittedly not been observed. On the other hand, if in order to observe these articles, the conference should not have been called, those guilty of not calling the conference would have been subject to trial by the Third International.

Happily, the conference was called. In this connection we have to state that at that conference they worked out certain political and organisational resolutions which obtained the sanction of the Executive of the Comintern, and it should also be stated that these resolutions did not cause any difference of opinion on either side. Comrades, when the Commission has to examine the affairs of

the Jugo-Slavian Party under such conditions, when it sees the active comrades of that Party divided into two camps, it has—notwithstanding all their protests that there are no differences—to pause and ponder whether there are not such differences that have not yet come quite to the surface. The Commission resolved to analyse, in the presence of the comrades, all the political questions which usually cause differences to arise among other parties: the question of the political situation, the question of the Party's attitude to the trade unions; the question which is of paramount importance to such a Party as the Jugo-Slavian, namely, the national question; the question of the relation between the legal and illegal organisations and of the subordination of the legal organisation to the directives of the illegal organisation. All these questions were taken up and duly discussed in the Commission, and we must declare, comrades, that upon all these questions there are no differences between the groups. One naturally asks, what is the cause of all this turbulence. Well, it is the usual thing in the squabbles among political exiles.

Comrades, we ought to consider the situation quite seriously. Since there are no political differences, there is nothing to prevent the comrades from working out those organisational methods which will enable them to work together, and by working together forget all the sentiments of mutual distrust. For this purpose, the Commission worked out a series of proposals of an organisational character, which have been submitted to the Executive Committee of the Comintern. In view of the fact that we have to deal here with a party that has do to a considerable part of its work in a clandestine and illegal manner, it stands to reason that all these questions of an organisational character should not be discussed here at the Plenum, but be handed over to the Executive of the Comintern.

With regard to the political position of the Party, I will read to you the resolution elaborated by the Commission, expressing at the same time not only the hope, but the profound conviction that from the moment that the highest authority of the Party—the Fourth Congress—will have said its final word, all the

comrades of the Jugo-Slavian Party will not only take notice of it—as was their usual practice in this respect hitherto—but will take all the steps necessary to fulfil the decision and to start work in that country which waits for working hands. And I am convinced that at our next Congress we will have a united and militant Party in Jugo-Slavia that will lead great masses of the organised proletariat.

I will now read the resolution. It may appear to the comrades to be somewhat longer than the usual resolutions, but the Commission deemed it necessary—in this resolution (which is subject to publication)—to dot every "i" and to cross the "t's", so that there should be no room for misunderstanding or misinterpretation.

The resolution reads as follows:

The Communist Party of Jugo-Slavia was formed out of the organisations of the former Social-Democratic Party in those provinces which now constitute Jugo-Slavia. It came about by expelling the Right, and later also the Centrist elements, and by affiliating the Party with the Communist International (the Vukovara Congress of 1920). The growth of the Communist Party was greatly promoted by the general revolutionary ferment which spread over Central Europe at that time (The Red Army's march on Warsaw, the seizure of the metallurgical factories in Italy, the strike wave in Jugo-Slavia). In a short space of time the Party grew into a mass organisation, wielding tremendous influence over the large masses of workers and peasants. This was demonstrated by the municipal elections results, in which the Party captured many municipalities including Belgrade as well as by the subsequent elections for the Constituent Assembly, in which the Party elected 59 deputies. This momentous growth of the influence of the Communist Party caused alarm among the dominant military and financial oligarchy, forcing the latter to start a systematic campaign for the purpose of destroying the Communist movement. After the violent suppression of the railwaymen's General Strike in April 1920, the militant oligarchy dissolved by force the Municipal Councils at Agaram (in June of the same year), and on the 29th of September a decree was published

dissolving all the Communist and trade Union organisations; the Communist newspaper was suppressed, and the Communist clubs were handed over to the social-patriots. In the month of June The Defence of the Realm Decree was promulgated, which outlawed the Communist Party and drove it out of its last refuge—the parliament and the municipalities.

In addition to the objective reasons arising out of the general situation in the country, the destruction of the Communist Party of Jugo-Slavia is greatly due to its own internal weakness: its outward growth did not correspond either with the development and the consolidation of the organization, or to the level of the communist consciousness of the party members. The party had not time to complete its evolution towards communism. It is perfectly clear now that the leading organ of the party committed a number of serious errors and blunders owing to a wrong interpretation of the methods of struggle laid down by the Comintern. These blunders made the task of the counter-revolutionary government easy. While the working masses showed energy and revolutionary will in a series of strikes, the Party revealed no revolutionary initiative. Thus, when in 1920 the police prohibited the May Day demonstrations in Belgrade, the Central Committee of the Party made not the slightest attempt to arouse the masses to protest. The same thing happened in the following year. Neither did the party organize any mass action in defence of the municipal councillors who were forcibly ejected from the Belgrade municipality which was wrested from the communists. The passivity of the party encouraged the government to go to the very extreme. In fact, the government, taking advantage of the miners' strike which broke out at the end of December, dissolved the Party, which at the elections had returned 59 members to parliament, did not organize any mass action.

This passivity of the Party, in the face of the fierce attacks of the reactionaries, was the result of the party not being firm in its communist convictions. The Party was still burdened with the old social democratic conceptions.

Although the Party had enthusiastically

joined the Communist International, which showed the readiness of the masses for struggle, the leading organ was not yet quite familiar with the new path. Thus, for instance, it did not dare to publish the 21 conditions adopted by the Second Congress; nor did it publish the "Thesis on the Question of Revolutionary Parliamentarianism." Thus it left the Party and the masses which were following it in complete ignorance of the demands which the Communist International had put before the parties which wanted to be real communist parties. At the same time the leading organ of the Party did not take any serious steps for the education of the Party and of the masses for the struggle on all fields against the reaction which was threatening them. It concentrated its attention chiefly on its electoral victories, and took care not to alarm the petty bourgeois elements by showing them what the communist party meant and what its methods of struggle were. At a time when the financial and military oligarchy in Belgrade was getting ready to conduct a savage and decisive struggle against the revolutionary working class movement, the Central Committee of the Jugo-Slavian Communist Party was concentrating its attention and spending its energies on such secondary questions as parliamentarianism, leaving the rear of the Party undefended and unorganised. This was its fundamental mistake.

The Jugo-Slavian Party proved itself absolutely powerless and incapable of protecting itself against the White Terror. It had no underground organisation which could have enabled it to act under the new conditions and to remain in contact with the masses. Until the dissolution of the parliamentary group the communist deputies were the only link between the centre and the provinces. This link was severed with the dissolution. The arrest of the leading comrades in the centre and in the provinces left the movement without a lead. Owing to these arrests the Party almost ceased to exist. The same fate overtook the local organisations of the Party, and the danger arose of the workers' organisations, which were left entirely to themselves, becoming completely disrupted. The social-democrats, with the assistance of the police, endeavoured

to make use of these circumstances which were favourable to them, but they failed.

Under the reign of terror the central organ of the Party only very slowly acquired the organisational forms and methods of struggle dictated by the new conditions. For a long time it remained passive, hoping that as a consequence of the internal differences within the ruling class, this regime would soon pass away without the active intervention of the mass of the workers. It was only when all hopes of an amnesty for the communists, who were being tried before the tribunal, were dashed to the ground that the Central Committee of the Party began the work of reorganisation in order to call the Party again into life. It was only in July, 1922, that the first Enlarged Plenum of the Party Committee took place in Vienna. The Vienna Conference deserves warm commendation as the first attempt to re-establish the Party, notwithstanding the defects of its composition and of the viewpoint of the Party statutes. The conditions of the country at that time, the changes in the composition of the Party as a result of arrests and of the treachery of some of the Party members, and of the passivity of the Party for eighteen months, precluded all possibility of convening a legal plenum which could really represent the Party. The Executive of the Communist International did right, therefore, in declaring the Enlarged Plenum a sufficiently competent representative of the Jugo-Slavian Communist Party, and in endorsing its resolution with some extremely rational amendments concerning the composition of the newly elected Central Committee. For the same reason, the attempt of several Jugo-Slavian comrades to sabotage the Conference by leaving the Session on the 16th day, regardless of their good intentions must be condemned as objectively injurious to the Party.

The resolution of the Vienna Conference on the question of the general situation in Jugo-Slavia and the immediate task of the Communist Party, on the trade union movement and reorganization of the Party, and the resolutions on the Third Balkan Communist Conference, endorsed as they stand by the Comintern Executive, did not arouse any differences of opinion

among the representatives of the majority and the minority within the Party. This unanimity on questions which are of the greatest importance to the Party in the present period, is the best proof that there is no justification whatever for dividing the Jugo-Slavian Party into majority and minority factions, and that the split among the leaders which occurred at the Vienna Conference was entirely due to reasons of a personal character. At the moment of its revival, the Jugo-Slavian Party must represent a united whole.

This unity must also be preserved in the future. In the face of the capitalist and social-democratic reaction, which is now raging, nothing would be more damaging for the Party and the revolutionary movement in Jugo-Slavia than factionism. Therefore, it is the duty of the new Central Committee of the Party to do its utmost, and to take all the necessary steps, in order to set the minds within the Party at rest, to remove all suspicion, to re-establish mutual confidence within the Party and to rally under its banner all the active workers who have remained at their posts throughout the counter-revolutionary Terror.

In order to achieve this aim it is essential, on the one hand, to carry out the decisions of the Vienna Conference on the purging of the Party from the compromised element, and on the other hand, to bring into the responsible work of the Party comrades from the ranks of the Vienna Conference minority. The Jugo-Slavian Party can receive valuable assistance in this respect from the Balkan Communist Federation. In order to do this, the Jugo-Slavian Party must follow the example of the other Balkan Communist Parties, and must send without delay its representative into the Executive

Committee of the Balkan Federation. The Comintern must give substantial assistance in the matter of the re-establishment and the inner consolidation of the Jugo-Slavian Party. The Executive must maintain a closer connection with the C. C. of the Party than formerly. However, the future of the Party depends chiefly on those party comrades who are active and politically and morally sound. The Comintern depends on these comrades, and calls upon them to do their duty. The resuscitated Party, having profited by the harsh lessons of the recent past, and animated by faith in the ultimate triumph of the World Revolution, will be able to rally to its banner the proletarian elements which were left without a lead, and to organise and consolidate the Jugo-Slavian section of the Balkan Communist Federation.

The Congress authorises the Executive of the Comintern to take any organic measures which circumstances might demand.

Comrades, for the purpose of greater authority, for the purpose of enabling this resolution to exercise the maximum of influence in Jugo-Slavia which needs our decision, we ask you to accept this resolution unanimously. (Cheers.) I may add that the organisational measures elaborated by the Commission have already been submitted to the Executive.

Chairman Neurath: Two comrades have demanded the floor to report on the work of the Jugo-Slavian Commission. Comrade Stanitch has the floor to make a declaration on this question.

Stanitch: "In the name of the above-mentioned minority, that is, of the Left Wing of the Communist Party of Jugo-Slavia, I declare that we are in full agreement with the resolution of the Commission, i.e., with the criticism of the activity

of the opportunists and of the mistakes committed by the Communist Party of Jugo-Slavia during the last two years. The resolution corroborates our criticism of the Commission and the measures by which it proposes to settle the inner conflicts of the Party. For it leaves the leadership of the Party to those comrades who have had the support of the opportunists since the Vienna Conference.

We have demanded, and again demand, equal representation in the leadership of the Party, in spite of the fact that we have a right to claim the majority, since the majority is on our side in this conflict, and our attitude is anti-opportunist. We ask, therefore, that which has already been granted to the French Party."

Comrade Raditch has also asked for the floor for a declaration.

Raditch: In the name of three out of the four members of the Jugo-Slavian Delegation, I wish to make the following declaration:

"Although we take into consideration the fact that the last enlarged conference of the Party Council in Vienna had full power to formulate final decisions on all questions including the election of a new Executive, and that this has been approved by the Executive of the Comintern as well as by the Commission of the Jugo-Slavian question, nevertheless, in order to remove all misunderstandings and consolidate all the forces of the Party, we accept the decision of this Commission, we will apply ourselves to its execution with all our energy, and vote for the Revolution!" (Applause.)

Chairman Neurath: There is still a third declaration to be made by Comrade Marynko.

Marynko: Comrades, the delegation from the Communist Youth Federation of Jugo-Slavia agrees in all points with the declaration of Comrade Kon, and declares that the Communist Youth of Jugo-Slavia will not only accept the political and organisational resolutions, but will set all its energy to their execution, all the more so since the previous activity of the Federation agrees with the present resolution. (Applause.)

Chairman Neurath: We will now proceed to vote on the resolution presented by the Jugo-Slavian Commission. Is any one against the resolution? No. Does anyone abstain from voting? No.

The resolution is unanimously adopted.

We will now pass over to the Report of the Norwegian Commission. Comrade Bukharin has the floor.

Bukharin (greeted with 'applause): Comrades, as you all know, the Norwegian Workers Party is passing through a severe crisis. This crisis is expressed by the existence of two factions. These two factions fight each other, and one of them stands in rather strained relations with the Executive, at least there are certain facts before us which may be taken as a symptom of a crisis in the relations between the Norwegian Workers' Party and the Executive.

First of all, I would like to characterise briefly the two Norwegian factions. The existence of these factions has deep historical roots and can be understood only by knowing the history of the Norwegian Party. The first tendency, forming the majority in the Norwegian Party, is partly syndicalist and partly reformist. The existence of these tendencies in the Norwegian Workers' Party finds expression in certain minor phenomena. First in

federalism, which is a result of syndicalist traditions. Formerly, when the comrades of this group fought against the social-democracy, this syndicalist federalism was the instrument for the disruption of the old social-democratic organisation. There existed the centralised social-democrats and the centralised trade unions, and further, the revolutionary opposition, especially in the trade unions. This opposition was based upon federalist principles. We might say that some of the leaders of this trade union opposition were the disciples of the American I.W.W., a revolutionary federalistic organisation. They have transplanted the principles of the I.W.W. into Norway, and at that time we cannot say that these principles were bad. Quite the opposite. It was a good instrument to disrupt the old organisation and conquer important strategic positions in the Norwegian trade union movement.

But these federalist tendencies still maintain their influence to-day, when the majority belong to our party, having come under the influence of the revolutionary movement and when the social-democracy had been fully conquered and destroyed. Naturally, at the present time, these federalistic principles have turned into their opposite and have become faulty. A certain group in the Party is guilty of this error. The second characteristic of this tendency is seen in the laying of particular emphasis on the economic struggle and on the trade unions in general. We can also easily understand why this is the case. The greatest part of the Party originated from this trade union opposition. Our strength grew from this group, and it is natural now that the

trade unions be assigned a place of primary importance.

This is the theoretical point of view of these comrades. This explains the specific and original structure of the Party. Until very recently, and even now our Norwegian brother-party has been having its basis in the trade unions. The trade unions had entered the Party en bloc, and this produces the peculiar situation that there are no communists in the Communist Party. This finds its explanation in the whole history of the Norwegian movement.

The third political tendency which is characteristic of this group is a separation of politics from economics, and of politics in general from parliamentary politics. This can also be easily understood from the standpoint of the historical development of the Party. When the primary interest lies in the trade union struggle, when the trade unions are regarded as the most important organisations, such a tendency naturally results, and the idea prevails more or less that economics and politics are two wholly different fields.

This standpoint is absolutely incorrect. We all know that politics are only a concentrated expression of economics. But such a tendency does exist within this group.

Another characteristic of this tendency is its incapacity to manoeuvre. This incapacity is usually being theoretically based upon high-sounding revolutionary phrases. For instance, they say that we must maintain a rigid line of proletarian action. No compromises are necessary—ours is a straight line to revolution. We need not

make use of the conflicting forces within the bourgeoisie, etc.

This sounds very revolutionary. In reality, however, it can be explained as follows. The above group considers the capitalist system as something basic and unchanging. Within this system they represent the specific interests of a certain class of workers and do not take into consideration any other classes which might be used as auxiliary groups for the overthrow of capitalism. And this original view, which at first seems very revolutionary, is based upon a reformistic idea of revolution. Naturally, I do not mean to say that these thoughts are actually present in the minds of the comrades of the above groups. But the analysis of all these phenomena together with that of other problems and other questions of tactics supports my contention.

The second group of the Party, the second faction, finds its basis historically considered, in the development of the Youth movement. While the first group originated from the old trade unions, and more especially from the trade union opposition, this group grew up from the Youth movement. During the war the Youth movement developed rapidly into an extremely revolutionary movement. The characteristic of this group, as opposed to the first, is the greater insistence upon the necessity for political struggle. While the first tendency shows a sort of anti-political policy, the second advances the importance of politics and the conquest of political power. From a Marxian standpoint, we can say that the second faction is more orthodox, more imbued with the Marxian principles. Until now neither tendency held the leadership in our par-

liamentary group. For various reasons, especially because revolutionary parliamentarianism is something quite new to Norway, this second group has been guilty of a great many mistakes in its parliamentary activity. These mistakes have been sharply criticised by the Executive and cannot be ignored.

This, then, is the general situation of the Party. In the first faction we have various elements, some with syndicalist, some with reformist tendencies. The third tendency in this group combines peculiarly the reformistic element with a syndicalist cover.

Neither is the second faction quite homogeneous. There are certain comrades there who are very good Marxians, but there are also opportunist elements. And so it often happens that the first tendency opposes this second group from a reformist standpoint and nevertheless, with revolutionary phraseology. The whole complex of tendencies, movements, groups and sub-groups within the Norwegian Party is, therefore, rather difficult to picture in a few words. This is, I believe, the whole difficulty of the problem. But in general, this is the relation of the two factions. The first faction now controls the majority of the Party and of the Executive, and many tactical and theoretical mistakes of the Party have their cause in this leadership.

I would like to say a few words upon the concrete mistakes of the Party. First the question of federalism. This federalism appears most crassly in the attitude of the Party towards the Comintern. We are developing towards ever-increasing centralisation. Our Congress has adopted a resolution on the question of organisa-

tion, which shows clearly our tendency to stricter centralisation. This is also the opinion of most delegations, of most parties. But it is not the view of the Norwegian Party.

During one of the conflicts between the Norwegian Party and the Executive, the central organ of the Norwegian Party published an official announcement to represent the standpoint of the Central Executive of the Party, to state clearly the relation of the national sections of the Comintern to the whole International.

This declaration contained certain crude formulas which enlighten us upon the attitude of the Norwegian Party towards the Comintern. During the conflict the Central organ of the Norwegian Party "Sozialdemokraten" wrote literally as follows:

"It is regrettable that an International organisation should interfere in an internal conflict of a party as the Comintern has done in the present case".

What does this mean? It means that the Norwegian Party considers it a regrettable happening when the Executive of the Comintern interferes in the internal affairs of the Party. This formula is as crude as any formula could be.

This is another section of this same article:

"A certain faction has attempted to get the Executive to interfere in the inner Party affairs of Norway, and as a result the authority of the International has become undermined".

Which is to say that it is a regrettable fact when a section of the Party appeals to the International. This is then a quite clear point of view, which may be formulated like this. The Communist International may adopt various resolutions. The Congress may express its view on these resolutions etc. but the Comintern must not interfere with the internal business of a Party. This is the application of the purest federalism to our International organisation, and this federalism will suffer no criticism. We all must protest sharply against this.

There is still another case.

Our Commission has often invited the Norwegian comrades, putting various questions to them. Within the scope of

this problem, we inquired very distinctly into the relations between the Norwegian Party, the Communist International and certain Norwegian comrades, with more or less reserve. Doubt has been expressed as to whether the International should intervene in the internal affairs of a national section with such "brutality" so to say.

Then we have a case which is much to be regretted, in connection with this very Congress. That is the so-called Tranmael case. We already had various misunderstandings and minor conflicts between the International and the executive previous to this. We therefore asked that the most prominent representative of the majority on the Norwegian Executive be sent to the Congress. Three times we asked this of the Norwegian Party. First, Zinoviev sent a telegram; then the Executive sent a telegram, and then another one, after the Norwegians had arrived here. The majority of the Executive, and comrade Tranmael personally, refused to attend the Congress despite the fact that the Executive Committee of the Communist International officially requested them to do so. They naturally gave many reasons for this, technical grounds, grounds of internal policy and many others. We looked upon this case at the time as absolutely irregular. We also had a precedent to this case in our relations with the French Communist Party. As you know, one of the leaders of the majority of the French Communist Party, Comrade Cachin, did come recently to attend the Congress, after all. The Tranmael case was however, unique in as much as the many letters of the Executive asking, urging and commanding that the most prominent representative of the Party be sent here, were not complied with, which made the situation much worse.

All this has its cause in general matter of principle. Of course it was not just the personal fault of Comrade Tranmael, but an expression of the entire political atmosphere which until now unfortunately existed among the majority of the Norwegian Party. This, perhaps, is not the case as far as the mass of the Norwegian Party is concerned, but it exists quite definitely among the officials. It was the expression of the fede-

ralist tradition is so deeply rooted that the problem; and it is precisely because this federalist is so difficult. Therefore we should seek to overcome this tendency.

This same lack of desire to work harmoniously with the Communist International showed itself also in the nonfulfillment of the instructions of the Communist International; or rather in the delaying of such fulfillment. We next come to the question of the organization of the Party. In this regard it is quite evident, as I have already remarked, that we must reorganise the Party. Under the present circumstances we must have a completely unified Party; and a Party is not unified when it has non-Communists among its members, who were automatically drawn into the Party with the rest of the Comrades. When Comrade Zinoviev was for the first time in Halle, as a representative of the Executive of the Communist International, an agreement was entered into with Comrade Tranmael personally that the Party must be reorganised. A long time has elapsed since then and the reorganisation of the Norwegian Party proceeds but very slowly. So far this task has not been accomplished. It is being claimed naturally that there are great difficulties in the way. The Norwegian transport communications are very bad; the financial position of the Norwegian Party is bad; the work is hampered by the strength of old traditions, and so on. We recognize all these difficulties, but we put to our Norwegian comrades two examples from the life of the Russian Party. We have had two great reorganisations in Russia: 1) the purification of the Party; and 2) the reorganisation of our Trade Unions. And we carried out both of these tasks within a few months. We excluded 170,000 members from our Party. This was a very great task, extending over wide areas of Soviet Russia. But we carried out this work within the limits of a very brief period. Then came the reorganisations of Trade Unions. After the new economic policy had been introduced, we realized that the former conditions when all workers in any given factory automatically became members of the Unions—have become absolutely impossible, for it is quite clear that the new economic policy involving the growth

of privately owned factories requires not the mere mechanical inclusion of all workers in a Union, but a close and conscious formation of the ranks of Labor. And this great organisational task, which meant the placing of our unions on an entirely new basis, and their complete reorganisation, was also accomplished within a very few months. It must be remembered in this connection, that our unions contain several million members. And we also had a completely shattered system of transportation at that time, unfavorable financial conditions, famine, etc., etc. Despite all this we accomplished both these tasks of reorganisation in a short time. Therefore we ask of our Norwegian comrades: Why cannot you accelerate your work on these lines, why cannot you carry out more quickly this undeniably essential work, which is being opposed by nobody? In the course of several sharp debates we characterized this slowness of the Norwegian comrades as a kind of unconscious sabotage of the resolutions of the Communist International. I will not use such sharp terms here, but it is clear that this matter has been delayed so long that we are compelled to include in our resolution the demand that the Norwegian Party accomplish the organization of their Party in the shortest possible time.

Then comes the question of the name of the Party. It sounds almost ridiculous that the majority of the Party—which is tainted with Syndicalism—should have postponed this question for so long a time. The matter stands formally as follows: Already at the Second Congress of the Communist International it was resolved that in all cases the word Social-Democratic should be stricken out. Since then we have written several letters to the Norwegian Party, but about two years have already passed, and the old names are retained. You have heard, comrades, Comrade Meyer stating from this rostrum that the question of the name was only a trifle. But how do we deal with this matter? We have had a number of precedents; I remember the Italian case, the French case, and now the Vella case within the Italian Party. And we know quite well how important this question of the name of the Party is, and our enemies know it too. I will read you the

following quotation from an article which appeared on September 8th of this year, in the "Arbeider-Politikken," the organ of the Right Social-Democrats of Norway: "Social-Democraten", dette blad hys nava allerede er nok til as vize forvee vligen innen det kommunistiske parti i Norge.

That means:

"Social-Democraten" is the expression of the confusion within the Communist Party of Norway".

Thus the Right Social Democrat quite rightly characterize the use of the world "Socialdemocraten" as a sign of the confusion existing within the Norwegian Party. The Commission proposes therefore that the name be altered in the shortest possible time, as this is for us no trifle but an important matter.

I shall now proceed to the question of general tactics. As I have already remarked, there is a difference of opinion between two factions. The antagonism between those two factions may be described somewhat in the following manner: The first faction, the majority faction, says: We are a real proletarian Party, and must carry on the class struggle against the entire bourgeoisie. We are against all maneuvering, etc. The other faction the minority, represented by Comrade Scheflo, says: We must fight of course, against the whole capitalist system, but we must distinguish between the various sections of the bourgeoisie; and especially must we distinguish between the large capitalists and the large landowners on the one hand and the peasantry and its various groupings on the other. The Executive has supported this second tendency; consequently I shall defend it now.

We formulated our resolution in this manner, because this question is fairly important in Norway. If we assume that it is our business only to protect the craft interests of the workers without taking care of the large masses of the labour reserves of the people whom we will have to draw upon during the revolution, then of course the attitude of the first tendency is perfectly justified. But this is not the case in Norway, where the first beginnings of fascism are already noticeable. We demand that our Party shall set its goal on the social revolution.

There is a vast amount of antagonism between the various elements of the bourgeoisie. Part of the peasantry are already voting for us, another part—the wealthier peasants—are dominated by the bourgeois-radical party. It is absolutely necessary for us to steadily broaden our basis. This does not mean to say that we should draw these peasants into our Party, but that we should use them in our manuevering against the entire capitalist system. We should never be contented only with those elements that are already with us, but we should strive to break up the radical-bourgeois-peasant Party and attract to our side those elements of the peasantry which are really desirous of protecting the interests of the peasantry as a class. This is our duty, and it is no transgression against Marxism, but the practical application of the Marxian doctrine to the present situation in Norway.

This question plays a fairly important role. In our discussions with the Norwegian comrades in the Commission we learnt that this question plays a really big political part in Norway: it should therefore be properly fixed in our resolution.

On the other hand, we must once again tell our comrades of the Scheflo tendency, that in their parliamentary activity, based on the whole upon a proper political orientation, they nevertheless committed several grave mistakes. Their biggest mistake consisted in supporting the compulsory arbitration law. Our comrades voted in parliament in support of compulsory arbitration in case of conflicts between the workers and the employers. The great power, the power in the hands of the capitalist class, was thus sanctioned by our comrades. There were various reasons for this. The state of things was indeed complicated. The comrades thought that legal arbitration would ameliorate the condition of the workers. Yet, objectively speaking, it was a great mistake. The mistake was particularly great, because there is an old tradition in Norway, to fight against these things. I recollect for instance, that several years ago there was even a general strike a Christiania against the introduction of compulsory arbitration. We must therefore repeat that it was a mistake that cannot be denied.

But at the same time we must say that it is absolutely Marxian and Communist to take advantage of the antagonism between the contending bourgeois forces.

I now come to the question of the "Mot Tag" magazine. This subject was already handled by Comrade Zinoviev, and also by Comrade Myer, in connection with another subject. It is a group of academic Communists, and a fairly exclusive one. It is dominated by a faction which, in our opinion, maintains a wrong tactical position. We ought to seek some way out. The sins of this group, from the point of view of organisation, consist in that they are an exclusive group. It means that a new member can be admitted only upon consent of the existing members of the group. And we know that such groups always join the germs of new factions. In view of the wrong tactical orientation of this embryonic faction, the Congress and the Communist International should combat this false tendency and take the necessary organisational measures in this respect.

The Commission arrived at a unanimous decision on this question to the effect that the group must cease to exist as an exclusive group, which obviously means that there should be no academic group as such, but it should become an open group to which every communist student may belong, and which, so to speak, would be an open communist nucleus of students.

With regard to the magazine published by this group, we resolved that it should not continue to exist as an organ independent of the Party. In the Commission we quoted various articles from this review, e.g., an article by the editor of the review in which he designated our entire German Party as an intellectual clique. Naturally this ought not to be tolerated, and the spreading of such 'false reports' about our two communist parties should not be tolerated.

In the first draft we outlined two possible solutions. Either to discontinue this review, or to convert it into a party organ. Our Norwegian comrades declared themselves in favour of the second solution, and we have acceded to their desire in the matter.

Now I come to the communist Press and to the central organ. On this subject

we will merely say the following. The Norwegian comrades must carry out the decisions of the previous Congresses of the Communist International with regard to their Party Press and their central organ. Even at the very first glance the appearance of the "Sozialdemokrat" makes a peculiar impression. As to its contents, it discusses all sorts of things, but it contains nothing to indicate a definite political course. It has discussions about the attitude to the International, it discusses the decisions of the Central Committee of the Party, it discusses all questions, it is always full of discussion. Discussion is a good thing, but it should not be carried to extremes. The Party organisation must carry out a definite and strictly defined policy. Of this we find no place in the Central organ of our Norwegian Party. I must therefore emphasise, that with regard to our Norwegian press and its central organ, it is high time to carry out the decisions of the Communist International and of the past Congress.

We now have two "personal" matters.

There are two comrades in Norway on whose behalf there has been some strike in the Party, as well as at the meetings of our Commission that were attended by the Norwegian comrades. It concerns the comrades Karl Johansen and Halvord Olsen.

The case of the first comrade is as follows. Karl Johansen is quite a new Party member, who was formerly a bourgeois journalist. Subsequently he became a member of the Party, and as such he immediately started an offensive against the Communist International. We have thus a peculiar situation where a former bourgeois journalist is one of the most active collaborators of the Central organ of our brother party. He writes articles which are on the whole directed against the Communist International. We look upon this gentleman as an agency of the bourgeoisie within our Norwegian brother party. Already once before we decided to expel this gentleman, and the Executive endorsed our decision, but made his expulsion depend on certain conditions. Now, we are asking the Congress to expel him absolutely. The Norwegian comrades told us that this is a personal affair which it is not the business of the

Congress to decide upon. However, comrades, taking into consideration the whole situation, we discovered in various directions many dangerous tendencies, which are all the more dangerous as they are of the nature of bourgeois agencies within our own ranks. We have noticed the same thing in connection with our Norwegian comrades. Basing ourselves on our past experience, we ask you to expell this fellow.

The Halvord Olsen case is of a different nature. He as an old worker and party official. Hitherto he has been a true and faithful comrade, but he has committed very great mistakes. At the Congress of the metal workers' unions in Norway he committed a serious breach of discipline. He voted against the candidate of our Norwegian brother party in favour of a syndicalist and the right socialists, and he also made several statements at that Congress which cannot by any means be termed communistic. The Party has expelled him, but we want to adopt in this case the same policy as in the Czecho-Slovakian affair. We differentiate between the bourgeois journalist Karl Johansen and the working man Comrade Halvord Olsen. We want to give him an opportunity to turn a new leaf. Therefore, we deem it right to restore this comrade again to our ranks. But this does not mean that we shall put up with further mistakes and blunders on his part. The Executive will then decide what steps to take depending upon the future conduct of the comrade. But we trust that he will improve. Therefore, we propose on behalf of the Commission to re-instate Comrade Halvord Olsen. Subsequently the Executive will deal with this comrade according to his attitude and actions.

Comrades, I will read to you now the draft resolution on the Norwegian question. This draft was accepted by the members of the Commission, having eliminated from it all personal matters. We left out entirely what I have just told you about the Tranmael case etc. We have made great concessions to our Norwegian comrades with respect to the re-organisation of the Party and the interval of time within which the titles of the Party organs be altered etc. Therefore we trust that the resolution

will meet with unanimous support and will assist in overcoming the crisis within our Norwegian Party. The resolution is as follows.

### Resolution on the Nerwegian Question.

After having heard the Report of the Norwegian Commission the Congress resolves:

1) It is necessary to inform the Executive of the Norwegian Party of the necessity of a more exact fulfilment of all decisions of the International and its Congress, as well as of its Executive organs. In the Party organs, as well as in the decisions and resolutions of the directing committees of the Party, there should be no doubt whatever expressed of the possibility of their application to all eventualities which may occur in the life of the Party.

2) The Congress orders the carrying out of Party reorganisation on the basis of individual membership within one year at most after the next national conference of the Party. The Executive must report, not less than once every two months, on the practical measures taken in the carrying out of this work, and their results.

3) With regard to the contents of the Party press, the Party is obliged to comply immediately with the decisions of the previous World Congress as well as those contained in the letter from the International Executive of 23rd of last September. The social democratic names of the Party papers must be altered within three months from the date of closing of this International Congress.

4) The Congress supports the standpoint of the Executive in its references to the parliamentary mistakes of the representatives of the Norwegian Party. The Congress is of the opinion that the Communist parliamentary representatives must submit to the control of the Party and the criticism of the Party press. This criticism must, however, always be well founded and of a comradely nature.

5) The Congress believes it to be quite admissible, and even necessary, to use the antagonism between various sections of the struggle against the whole bourgeoisie. This refers especially to the anta-



gains between the representatives of large-scale industry and the landed proprietors on the one hand, and the peasants on the other hand. The struggle to win the peasantry must be one of the special tasks of the Norwegian Party.

6) The Congress states once again that the parliamentary group, as well as the Party press, must unconditionally submit to the control of the Central Committee in every detail.

7) The group "Not Dag", which is an independent organisation, must be dissolved. We must by all means encourage the formation of a Communist student group, which shall be open to every Communist and under the full control of the Party Executive. The review "Not Dag" may become a Party organ on condition that its editor be chosen by the Central Committee of the Norwegian Party, in agreement with the Executive of the Communist International.

8) The Congress sustains the appeal of Comrade H. Olsen, and as he is an old and faithful comrade and was a most active worker and official in the Party, the Congress reinstates him in his rights as a Party member. At the same time the Congress definitely states that his

conduct at the Congress of the Metal Workers Union was incorrect.

9) This Congress resolves to expell Karl Johannsen from the Communist International and the Norwegian Party.

10) With the object of bringing about a closer co-operation between the Norwegian Party and the International Executive, and to help overcome the present conflicts with as little friction as possible, this Congress instructs the future Executive to send its plenipotentiary representative to the next National Conference of the Norwegian Party.

11) This Congress entrusts the Executive with the task of drawing up a letter to the Norwegian Party elucidating this resolution.

12) The above resolution and the letter of the Executive shall be published in all Party organs, and shall be communicated to all branch organisations of the Party, before the delegates to the next Party Conference are elected.

This is our resolution and I ask you all to support it. (Loud applause).

Chairman Neurath: The session stands adjourned till six p.m. to-day. (Adjournment at 3.35 p.m.).

# BULLETIN

## OF THE IV CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

No. 32.

Moscow.

December 9 th, 1922.

### Thirty-Second Session.

December 5th, 1922 (evening).

Chairman: Comrade Neurath.

#### Contents:

Declaration by the Majority of Norwegian Delegation. Adoption of Resolution on the Norwegian Question. Adoption of Resolution on the Executions in Ireland. Adoption of Resolution on Versailles Treaty. Report of Tactics Commission and Theses on Tactics. Declaration by Majority of Italian Delegation. Adoption of Theses on Tactics. Adoption of Resolution on Eastern Question. Adoption of Resolution on Education. Adoption of Programme of Action of the French Party. Adoption of Resolution on Russian Revolution. Report of Commission on Election of the Executive. Statement by comrade Billings (America). Statement by comrade Grün (Austria). Statement by comrade Torp (Norway). Election of Executive. Closing Speech by comrade Zinoviev. Kolaroff Thanks Russian Proletariat and Peasants for hospitality.

Speakers: Meyer, Conolly, Hoernle, Bardiga, Zetkin, Kolaroff.

The session was opened by Chairman Neurath at 6 p. m.

Chairman (Neurath). The session is now open.

Comrade Meyer now has the floor for a statement on the Report on the Norwegian Commission.

Haakon Meyer. The majority of the Norwegian Delegation states that it is not satisfied with the submitted resolution. A number of the clauses do not express our point of view. In certain cases we are of the opinion that the Commission has dealt with concrete facts in too abstract a manner. This applies, for example, in the case of Halvard Olsen and in the case of Karl Johannsen. With regard to this last point, a proposal was made by the Delegation calling for a different wording, but it was defeated by the Commission. In other cases, it seems to us that the resolution is not objective enough. This applies to the point dealing with "Not Dag", which group we do not consider to be an isolated group, and to point 4, containing the criticism.

As all points at issue have been thoroughly discussed in the Commission, we do not wish to introduce any more discussion in this plenary session, but would state that the majority will also vote for the resolution.

Chairman Neurath. We now come to the vote on the resolution proposed by the Norwegian Commission. Is anyone against this resolution? Are there any delegates abstaining from voting? There are not. The resolution is adopted.

Conolly-Ireland. Comrades, In the name of the delegation of the Irish Communist Party I propose the following resolution:

The Fourth Congress of the Communist International vigorously protests against the executions by the Irish Free State of the five national revolutionaries on the 17th and 23th November. It draws the attention of all the workers and peasants of the world to this savage culmination of a widespread and ferocious terror in Ireland. Already more than 6,000 valiant fighters against British Imperialism have