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Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern

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Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern

Edited by
Akito YAMANOUCHI

Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
2022

PREFACE

The Communist International (Comintern) which had been founded in Moscow early March 1919 aimed at the beginning to create some strongpoints of its activities, that is, Foreign Bureaus in Europe, America and Asia. The Foreign Bureaus were expected to function as a means to come into contact with the external world under difficult circumstances of the military interventions inside, and the absence of the Communist Parties outside, Soviet Russia.

The editor had carried on research on an influential Foreign Bureau, the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern since 1999. In 2001 the editor put out a publication of scientific research results, *Basic Research on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern* [(1)]. It was regarded as the first step to the comprehensive research on the Sub-Bureau and 46 diverse documents were compiled, edited and printed in its Part 1. In parallel with the research, the editor set about researching a succeeding organization of the primary Foreign Bureaus, the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern, in 2004 and, likewise, published the research results, *Basic Research on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern* in 2007 [(2)]. In order to get the whole picture of the Agency, 35 key documents were compiled, edited and printed in its Part 2.

Based on these basic researches, the editor published his second book in Japanese and an article in English [(3)]. In them, however, the following problems for solution still remained to be tackled for the comprehensive research: In case of the Sub-Bureau, (1) A conflict over funds for activities of the Sub-Bureau and (2) The strife between headquarters of the Comintern and the Sub-Bureau over Trade Union issue and Parliamentarism; in case of the Agency, (3) A conflict over funds for activities of the Agency and (4) lack of elucidating of its activities in Canada and South America, subsequent to the USA and Mexico.

Therefore, since 2012 the editor has proceeded to further research on the Pan-American Agency and tackled on, and resolved, the above-mentioned problems, (3) and (4). Thus the editor has embodied the comprehensive research results in the following: One is the revised and enlarged edition of *Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern* under the changed title, published on the Internet in 2021 [(4)]. Further light is thrown on the Agency's activities in Canada and its financial reports (including those on South America) and 16 documents are added and in total 51 documents are printed in its Part 1. The other research results in Japanese are embodied in Supplementary Chapter (Some Problems with Funds for Activities of the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern) of editor's fourth book, *The Way to the Third International: S.J. Rutgers and the Founding of the Comintern*, published in 2021 [(5)]. And those in English are in Part 2 (the revised and enlarged — particularly in the latter half in relation to Part 1 — version of the above-mentioned article in English) of *Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern*.

As for the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau, in 2018 the editor has resumed further research on its above-mentioned problems, (1) and (2). The editor has embodied the research results in Japanese in Chapter 5 (Unresolved Research Topics of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern) of *The Way to the Third International*. The present work is the completely revised and enlarged version of collected documents. 18 documents are added and in total 64 documents are printed in its Part 1. And its Part 2 is once more revised and enlarged — particularly in the first half in

relation to Part 1 — version of Part 2 of *Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern*.

Thus the present work, *Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern*, is a companion to *Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern* and its Part 2 becomes the authorized version of "The Early Comintern in Amsterdam, New York and Mexico City."

April 2022

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JAPAN

(1) A. Yamanouchi, *Basic Research on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern.* Publication of Scientific Research Results promoted through the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)(2) of the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture in the Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000, March 2001, xi, 235 p.

(2) A. Yamanouchi, *Basic Research on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern.* Publication of Scientific Research Results promoted through the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science in the Fiscal Years 2004-2006, May 2007, xvi, 183 p.

(3) A. Yamanouchi, *The Early Comintern and Japanese Socialists Residing Abroad: A Transnational Network* (Kyoto, 2009), viii, 334 p. [in Japanese]; id., "The Early Comintern in Amsterdam, New York and Mexico City," *The Shien* or *the Journal of History* (Faculty of Humanities, Kyushu University), No. 147, March 2010, pp. 99-139.

(4) A. Yamanouchi, *Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern* (Fukuoka, July 2021), ix, 203 p. [Kyushu University Institutional Repository (QIR), File No. 4479595]

(5) A. Yamanouchi, *The Way to the Third International: S.J. Rutgers and the Founding of the Comintern* (Fukuoka, 2021), xvi, 411 p. [in Japanese]

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In reference to **Part 1** (Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern):

1) Those documents are roughly divided by difference in their forms into 3 parts, each of which is arranged according to subject or country.

2) A considerable number of documents are from the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (РГАСПИ; RGASPI) in Moscow. The reference number of them, for example, "РГАСПИ, ф. 495, оп. 1, д. 1, лл. 78-79" is abbreviated to "РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79."

3) Plain typing and grammatical errors are corrected without notice.

4) The phrases in square brackets are annotations by the editor of the present work. Editorial notes are put at the end of each document.

In reference to **Part 2** (Supplementary Research Results):

1) In quoting from Part 1 of the present work, the editor/author notes the reference numbers such as "**Doc. 1-1-1**."

2) In quoting from Part 1 of *Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern*, the editor/author notes only the reference numbers such as "**P-Doc. 1-12**" and, in principle, rewrites all amounts of money in the same form. For readers' information, the editor/author inserts the list of those documents at the end of Part 2.

3) The phrases in square brackets are annotations by the editor/author.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BSP	British Socialist Party
CEC	Central Executive Committee
CGT	Confederación General de Trabajadores
CLP(A)	Communist Labor Party (of America)
CPA	Communist Party of America
CPC	Communist Party of Canada
ECCI	Executive Committee of the Communist International
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
IISG	Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis
ILP	Independent Labour Party
IWW	Industrial Workers of the World
KAPD	Kommunistische Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands
MID	Military Intelligence Division
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
POB	Parti Ouvrier Belge
RLUI	Red Labor Union International
SLP	Socialist Labour Party
SPA	Socialist Party of America
SWSS	South Wales Socialist Society
UCPA	United Communist Party of America
USPD	Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
WES	Westeuropäisches Sekretariat
WPC	Workers' Party of Canada
WSF	Workers(') Socialist Federation
РГАСПИ	Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории

LIST OF PSEUDONYMS

Pseudonym	Person's Name
Allen, Henry	Cohen, Maximilian
Andrew(s), Joseph	Hourwich, Nicholas I.
Atwood, Henry	Harrison, Caleb
Bray, A.	Jansons, Karlis
Carr, John	Katterfeld, Ludwig E.
Carter	Fraina, Louis C.
Charlie	Jansons, Karlis
Corey, Lewis	Fraina, Louis C.
Damon, David	Ruthenberg, Charles E.
Harper, J.	Heiman (Hyman), Julius
Horner, K.	Pannekoek, Antonie
James	Reich, Jakob
Jansen	Proost, Johannes
Jansen, Karl	Jansons, Karlis
Kelley	Katayama, Sen
Littlebit / Lillebit	Fraina, Louis C.
Marshall, James A.	Bedacht, Max
Paley, M.	Levine, Herman M.
Ramírez, Jesús	Phillips, Charles F.
Raphael, A.	Bittelman, Alexander
Scott, Charles E.	Jansons, Karlis
Skála, Josef	Fraina, Louis C.
Snyder, Ralph	Fraina, Louis C.
Stirner, Alfred	Woog, Edgar
Thomas	Reich, Jakob
Thompson	Fraina, Louis C.
Trotter, G.L.	Rutgers, Sebald J.
Yavki	Katayama, Sen

Part 1

Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Breau of the Comintern

1 DECISIONS, STATEMENTS, REPORTS AND LETTERS

1-1 Key Decisions of the ECCI on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

1-1-1 28.09.1919 Minutes No. 28 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории, ф. 495, оп. 1, д. 1, лл. 78-79, Moscow (hereafter cited as РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79)]

1-1-2 14.10.1919 Minutes No. 29 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/80]

1-1-3 01.02.1920 Minutes No. 45 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/19]

1-1-4 02.02.1920 Minutes No. 46 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/21]

1-1-5 25.04.1920 [Decision of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/66]

1-1-1

28.09.1919 Minutes No. 28 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79]

ПРОТОКОЛ № 28

Заседания Бюро Исполнительного Комитета Коммунистического Интернационала от 28/IX -1919 г.

Присутствовали: Балабанова, Зиновьев, Руднянский, Карахан, Клингер, Литвинов, Садуль

-.-.-.

ИККИ не представится возможным командировать туда своего преставителя.

к) Установить следующий порядок дня конференции: [1)] отчет ИККИ, 2) отчеты с мест, 3) образование коммунистических партий во всех странах, 4) парламентаризм и советская власть, 5) образование профессионального Интернационала.

[4. ...../ 5. ...../ 6. ...../ 7. ...../ 8. ...../ 9. .....] [1] [4. ...../ 5. ...../ 6. ...../ 7. ...../ 8. ...../ 9. .....]

Управляющий Делами
ИККИ [sign:] Клингер

(1) The agenda items which are omitted here are as follows:
1. О делегировании представителя на Всероссийский Съезд Союза Молодежи.
2. О журналах и газетах для Бюро ИККИ в Москве.

4. Деклад тов. Садуля и тов. Балабановой о положении дел Южного Отделения.
5. Просьбу Еврейской Коммунистической Партии о принятии ее в III Интернационал. Такую же просьбу Еврейской партии С.Д.
6. Просьбу Украинской Партии Боротьбистов о принятии ее в III Интернационал.
7. Просьбу тов. Клингера об освобождении его от обязанностей управляющего делами в виду того, что при данных условиях работы он не в состоянии нести один ответственность за правильный ход работы.
8. О назначении заместителя управляющего Делами ИККИ.
9. О распределении функций между секретарями ИККИ тов. Берзиным и тов. Балабановой.

1-1-2

14.10.1919 Minutes No. 29 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/80]

ПРО[ТО]КОЛ № 29

Заседания Бюро Исполнительного Комитета Коммунистического Интернационала от 14/X -1919 г.

Присутствовали: Берзин, Бухарин, Балабанова, Клингер, Платтен, Рутгерс.

СЛУШАЛИ:	ПОСТАНОВИЛИ:
1. О названии Голландского Отделения ИККИ и назначении в это Отделение уполномоченного.	1. а) Назвать “Отделением Коммунистического Интернационала в Амстердаме”. б) Назначить уполномоченным ИККИ в это Отделение тов. Рутгерса и предоставить ему право подписывать всякие акты от имени ИККИ.

Управляющий Делами
ИККИ [sign:] Клингер

1-1-3

01.02.1920 Minutes No. 45 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/19]

ПРОТОКОЛ № 45

Заседания Бюро Исполнительного Комитета Коммунистического Интернационала от 1/II с.г.

Присутствовали: Зиновьев, Платтен, Клингер, Руднянский, Бухарин, Мархлевский, Милькич, Сирола, Берзин, Кобецкий, Радек, Карахан, Садуль, Раковский, Воровский.

СЛУШАЛИ:	ПОСТАНОВИЛИ:
1. О вызове в Россию тов. Гладнева.	1. По соглашению с Оргбюро Ц.К., предложить тов. Гладневу возможне скорее приехать в Москву и представить отчет, как о своей деятельности в Германии, так и о тех разногласиях, которые возникли между ним, и Ц.К. Коммунистической Партии Германии.
2. Прения по докладу тов. Радека, сделанныя в заседании 30/I с.г.	2. В виду того что дискуссия не закончена, постановления не было вынесено.
3. Проект ответа на предложение независимой социалистической партии Германии.	3. Включить в уже избранную по данному вопросу Комиссию из т.т. Ленина, Зиновьева, и Бухарина, ещё т. Радека и поручить им окончательную редакцию ответа, приняв во внимание замечания сделанные во время дискуссии т.т. Раковским, Радеком и Берзиным.
4. Просьбу тов. Гейриха о допущении его на заседание ИККИ для доклада о положении партии в Германии и выслушания пожеланий рабочей организации Германий, командировавшей его в Россию.	4. Поручить тов. Клингеру разъяснить тов. Гейнриху, что ИККИ имеет дело лишь с центральными организациями партии, а не с отдельными группами. б) Дать тов. Гейнриху на обратный проезд в Германию необходимую сумму денег.
5. Приглашение в Москву тов. Вольфгейма или одного из других рукводителей оппозиции Коммунистической партии Германии.	5. Пригласить руководителей оппозиции Коммунистической Партии Германии в Москву для ознакомления на месте с тактикой III-го Коммунистического Интернационала.

б) Просить оппозицию представить доклад с ответами согласно анкете.

в) Поручить тов. Радеку составить проект приглашения и анкеты и послать таковое по радио в Германию.

6. О мандате, данном ранее тов. Рутгерсу для посредничества между двумя течениями Коммунистической Партии Германии и для объединения их.

6. Мандат, выданный тов. Рутгерсу - аннулировать.

1-1-4

02.02.1920 Minutes No. 46 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/21]

ПРОТОКОЛ № 46

Заседания Бюро Исполнительного Комитета Коммунистического Интернационала от 2/II -1920 г.

Присутствовали: Зиновьев, Руднянский, Карахан, Мархлевский, Платтен, Сирола, Радек, Берзин, Милькич, Воровский, Клингер, Гильбо

-.-.-.

	настоящее время. д) Западно-европейский секретариат в Берлине должен обслуживать Германию, Францию, Бельгию, Швейцарию, Италию и Польшу. Состав Секретариата определяется Конференцией Партии перечисленных стран. Поручть Малому Бюро выработать инструкцию для З. Европ. Секретариата.
3. О командировании ответственных инстукторов.	3. Просить Ц.К.Р.К.П. откомандировать в распоряжение ИККИ 2-3 ответственных партийных работников, которых ИККИ откомандирует в свои заграничные Бюро для инструктирования и направления работы.

Управляющий Делами
ИККИ [sign:] Клингер

1-1-5

25.04.1920 [Decision of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/66]

Das holländische Bureau hat in einer Anzahl wichtiger Fragen eine Stellung eingenommen (Gewerkschaftsfrage, Parlamentarismus), die gegen die Stellung der Exekutive der III. Kommunistischen Internationale ausläuft. Das holländische Bureau hat die Exekutive von seiner entgegengesetzten Stellung nicht in Kenntnis gesetzt, bevor es die Internationale Konferenz in Amsterdam einberief. Auf Grund dessen erklärt die Exekutive das Mandat des holländischen Bureaus als erloschen und zieht dieses Mandat zurück.

Die Exekutive beauftragt ihrem engeren Bureau einen ausführlichen Brief darüber den holländischen Genossen zu senden. Die Funktionen des holländischen Bureaus werden dem Westeuropäischen Sekretariat übertragen. Das Skandinavische Bureau in Stockholm wird beauftragt, den Rechenschaftsbericht und den Rest des Geldes wie auch der Wertsachen in Empfang zu nehmen.

1-2 G.L. Trotter (S.J. Rutgers) in Amersfoort to Winter (J. Berzin) in Moscow

1-2-1 20/22.12.1919 Trotter to Winter
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/3/50-53 (signed); 495/172/59/6-9]

1-2-2 09.03.1920 Trotter to Winter and others
[РГАСПИ, 497/2/8/1-7; 581/1/95/33-39]

1-2-3 12.05.1920 Trotter to Winter and others
[РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/15-17 (signed); 497/2/8/8-10]

1-2-1

20/22.12.1919 Trotter to Winter
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/3/50-53 (signed); 495/172/59/6-9]

No 6 [1] ~~Amersfoort~~ [2] 20 Dez. 1919

Werter Freund Winter. Ich erhielt via J. [James (Gordon) = Jacob Reich] den Brief von L. auf Leinen [*sic*] d.d. 14 Oct. und ein zweites Dokument No 27002. Meine Nummer ist aber 97 und alle meine Bemühungen es zu entziffern waren fruchtlos. Ich schickte es zurück nach Berlin: dort oder bei Ihnen muss eine Verwechslung stattgefunden haben. James teilt mir noch ein Zitat aus einem Briefe von Ihnen mit, dass mir aber wenig ist: „_ _ _ _ R[ussland]. nach H[olland]. via Deutschland gefahren. Hat . . . . . Geld in St. Wird zu Ihnen kommen. Sie informieren, muss bald zurück mit mündlicher Information . . . . .“.

Soll das bedeuten, dass man mich wi[e]der zu Ihnen erwartet?（Man hat mich bei meiner Ankunft auf die Holländische Grenze eingesperrt) aber abgesehen von den technischen Schwierigkeiten wäre das jetzt kaum möglich meiner Gesundheit wegen. Schon mehrere Wochen liege ich in Bett und der Doktor verlangt sogar, dass ich eine Liegekur von sechs Monaten durchwache: Als ich mich in November einen ärzlichen Attest erbat, um ein Pass nach der Schweiz zu erzwingen zwecks Besuch der bekannten Konferenz, da untersuchte der Arzt mich und konstatierte Geräusche in der linken Lunge an mehreren Stellen. Er gab mir nur ein oder zwei Jahr, falls ich mich nicht unterwarf. Schliesslich erlaubte er eine Liegekur zu Hause und kann ich meine Korrespondenz führen. Besuche empfangen etc. Das Bureau versammelt von Zeit zu Zeit in ~~Amersfoort~~ [2]. Zu Glück fühle ich mich gut und hat der Doktor gerade schon eine Besserung konstatiert. Die grösste Schwierigkeit ist, dass ich jetzt im Winter immer beim offenen Fenster muss schlafen und liegen. Bartha, der ich meine Briefe anfangs diktierte hat dies wegen Rheumatismus einstellen müssen und ich muss mich selbst verständlich auch beschränken bei grosser Kälte.

Dies alles ist sehr ungelegen, aber wenn nicht absolut notwendig, darf ich jetzt nicht riskieren zu reisen.

Das bringt mich auch auf den ehrvollen Auftrag in Deutschland zu vermitteln. Das wäre allerdings eine Aufgabe, wobei Gesundheit keine Rolle spielen dürfte. Aber wir haben uns die Sache mit [Herman(n)] Gorter und [Anton(ie)] Pannekoek reichlich überlegt. Mein erster Gedanke nämlich, dass da mir die Kompetenz und die Autorität für eine solche Aufgabe jedenfalls fehlt Pannekoek der am geeignetste Holländer sei. Pannekoek wäre auch bereit persönliche grosse Beschwerden bei Seite zu schieben, aber wir glauben nicht an die Möglichkeit von Erfolg, noch an die Zweckmässigkeit eines Versuches der Vermittlung von aussen.

Was wir tun können und dann auch schon getan haben ist Thesen aufzustellen für die Internationale Konferenz in Januar, damit nicht die eine Partei (die Zentrale) diese Konferenz benutzt als Waffe in den internen Deutschen Streitigkeiten. Auch werden wir fordern, dass beide Teile auf der Konferenz zugelassen werden und werden versuchen den Plan der Zentrale die Opposition und die Hamburger Komm. Arb. Zeitung durch Entziehung von Geldmittel tot zu bluten zu durchkreuzen. Das scheint uns wirksamer als nutzloses Gerede, denn die Zentrale hat die Spaltung planmässig durchgefürt und wir sind fest überzeugt, dass Sie eine Verständigung nicht wünscht solange Sie glaubt Ihren Willen und Prinzipien durchsetzen zu können.

Es wurde zu weit führen die sachlichen und persönlichen Differenzen hier eingehend zu erörtern. Ausser meinem persönlichen Eindruck (ich besuchte auch eine illegale Versammlung der

Vertrauensleuten Berlins wo [Heinrich] Laufenberg, [Fritz] Wolfheim und [Paul] Levi sprachen) haben wir die Verfügung über die Deutschen Komm. Presse von beiden Seiten, Broschüren etc., und besonders auch Pannekoek hat die Verhältnisse genau verfolgt und darüber auch in der Komm. Arb. Z. Hamburgs etc. geschrieben. Es sind gewiss sachliche Unterschiede vorhanden, dazu auch ziemlich viel Unklarheit und Verwirrung. Erstens soll man die „nationale“ und auf Zusammengehen mit der Bourgeoisie in einem zukünftigen Kriege hinauslaufenden Tendenzen, wie Sie von Laufenberg verkündet werden, trennen von dem s.g. Syndikalismus. Diese „nationale“ Bestrebungen sind gewiss äusserst gefährlich und mit Kommunismus unvereinbar. [Karl] Radek hat das nach Gehören gewürdigt. Darinstehen aber nicht einmal die Hamburger Arbeiter und gewiss nicht die Mehrzahl der „Opposition“ aus Bremen und Berlin hinter Laufenberg-Aufklärung statt die ewige Wiederholung „Syndikalismus“ wäre hier am Platze, wie es über den Nationalen Bolschewismus von Radek getan ist. Wir meinen aber dass der letztere über die anderen Fragen in seiner Isolierung einigermassen einseitig informiert worden ist oder war.

Mit dem s.g. Syndikalismus steht es nach unsrer Meinung anders.

In der Frage des Parlamentarismus wünscht keine der beiden Gruppen eine prinzipielle Ablehnung. Es handelt sich nur um die Frage was jetzt gemacht werden soll. Die Mehrheit der ganzen Komm. Partei D. ist jetzt wahrscheinlich gegen Anteilname an der Nationalversammlung. Die Zentrale will das forcieren und treibt nach einem Zusammengehen bei der parlamentarischen Arbeit mit dem linken Flügel der U.S.P., wie das auch früher von den Spartakisten gemacht ist, schon damals gegen die Opposition von Hamburg, Bremen etc. Hier ist nicht zu vermitteln. Die Zentrale hätte sich der Mehrheit zu fügen, auch wenn man die Entscheidung bedauern würde, wie es Liebknecht und R.L. seinerzeit taten.

In der Frage der Gewerkschaften ist der Unterschied weniger schroff, weil hier nicht so sehr das Feld der eigentliche Tätigkeit der führenden Personen der Zentrale berührt wird. Beide Gruppen haben sich in Prinzip für Ausbau der Betriebsräte und Austritt aus den Gewerkschaften erklärt. Die Zentrale allerdings nur als geschlossene Einheit und nicht individuell und dabei mit der Tendenz die Taktik des Austritts wieder zu verlassen. Aber das wurde der praktische Kampf schon entscheiden und die Zentrale wurde darüber wohl nicht eine Spaltung durchführen.

Wichtiger ist für die Spaltungsfrage die Streitigkeit über die Organisation, über das Verhältnis von Partei und Führern zu den Massen. Dabei ist noch zu unterscheiden zwischen der Organisationsform der Partei und der Arbeiterunion als Massenorganisation. Auch die Illegalität spielt dabei eine verhängnisvolle Rolle, weil dadurch Missverständnisse und diktatoriale Uebergriffe befördert werden.

Auch hier ist eine Vermittlung aussichtslos. Die Massen werden zu beweisen haben inwieweit sie genügend vorgeschritten sind um die Vormundschaft von ein Par Führern zu entbehren. Pannekoek ist darüber ziemlich optimistisch. Wir sind überzeugt, dass die Mehrheit der Parteimitglieder auch in Berlin mit der Haltung der Zentrale und speziell den Genossen Levi nicht unterstützt ist. Auch wäre unsren Erachtens die grosse Mehrheit der K.P.D. nicht zu haben für einen so innigen Anschluss an die U.S.P. wie das in No 69 und 70 der wi[e]derbelebte Tageszeitung „Die Rote Fahne“ in den Artikel „Der Parteitag der U.S.P.“ wird in Aussicht gestellt.

Kurz: die Zentrale lässt sich nicht bemitteln [vermitteln]. Sie stützt nicht auf die Mehrheit der K.P.D. hat aber mittelst„ „höhere Politik“ die andern ausgeschlossen und behält dabei die Geldmittel: schon hat Sie eine Reihe von Parteibeamten entlassen und die Unterstützung der Oppositionspresse eingestellt, führt aber eine Kostspielige und rege Agitation für ihre Politik, speziell unter den Berliner Arbeitern. Wir können der Opposition nicht raten sich der Zentrale zu fügen. Eine Spaltung kann unter Umstände notwendig sein zur Weiterentwicklung. Nur soll man unbedingt die Parteispalter nicht einseitig finanzieren.

Und damit komme ich zu einem Weiteren Punkt das wenig erbaulich ist.

Wie ich schon schreib hat man mir in Berlin die augenblickliche finanzielle Lage als so dringend geschildert auch wegen Sendboten aus Polen und Oesterreich, einer Zeitung für die Wahlen in Frankreich Bedürfnisse für die Int. Konferenz in Oktober etc., dass ich mich entschloss eine grössere Summe für diese Zwecke sofort zu hinterlassen. Ich vertraute natürlich das Wort von [Eduard] Fuchs and Levi, da ich ja in Russland noch weniger mit der allgemeinen moralischen Entbindung nach den Weltkriegen bekannt geworden war. James begegnete ich leider erst später und er meinte sofort, dass ich hereingefallen war und die von mir abgetretene Summe wohl fast ausshliesslich der K.D.P. [K.P.D.] zu Gute kommen würde.

Wie Sie verstehen werden, musste ich damals alle meine Sache in Berlin zurücklassen denn ich konnte unmöglich mit neu verpackte Sachen weiter gehen, wo es fest stand, dass ich nachdem die Sendung von Bartha allgemein bekannt wurde, aufs genaueste nachgeprüft werden sollte. Es war aber gerade ein Holländischer Kurier in B. und der nahm zwei Stück meines Gepäcks mit. Wir wollten das Risiko des Transportes auf einige Reise verteilen und die Genossen meinten überdies in Berlin sehr vorteilhaft verkaufen zu können. Man versprach uns dann entweder das Produkt oder das Geld zu übermitteln. Wer beschreibt aber meine Erstaunung [Erstaunen] als wir unsren absolut vertrauenswerten Kurier nach Berlin schickten und er zurückkam mit dem Bericht dass Fuchs (mit Mitwissen von Levi) weigerte Geld oder Ware ab zu geben! Man versuchte erst einige Ausreden, aber erklärte schliesslich zynisch, dass man es einfach behielt. Wahrscheinlich fürchtete man, dass wir die Opposition nicht aushungern helfen wollten, welche Politik mir Levi schon in Berlin empfohlen hatte.

James ist über diesen Gaunerstreich auch wenig erbaut und es scheint, dass man ihm sogar noch ein Teil der Kosten der Konferenz hat bezahlen lassen, wofür ich Fuchs schon 80 t. Mark hinterlassen hatte.

Ich schreibe so ausführlich, weil Sie sich Rechenschaft geben müssen von den Gefahren der Korruption, die mit Geldsendungen verknüpft sind, sogar wenn es nicht für persönlichen Zwecken verloren geht. Auch möchte ich wissen, wie Sie über die finanzielle Unterstützung der sogenannten Opposition, die nichts heisser wünscht als die Spaltung nicht anzuerkennen, und der Komm. Arb. Zeitung, urteilen. Auch möchten wir darauf drängen die zugesagte direkte Verbindung mit Holland via Riga zu Stande zu bringen. Solange die Kuriere mit Geld über Berlin gehen, wird man Sie da schon ausplündern. Vielleicht wäre es dann wohl am besten alles streng nach James zu dirigieren und ihm bestimmte Instruktionen über die Verteilung zu geben.

Ueber die Intern. Konf. in Nov. wird James Ihnen wohl berichtet haben. Wir erhielten das desbezügliche Telegramm mit sechs Tage Verspätung und es war leider nicht mehr möglich für G. um hinzukommen. Die Konferenz war ausser von Deutschen nur von zwei Rumänen und von Sylvia Pankhurst besucht. Es wurde beschlossen eine neue Konferenz in Januar zu organisieren. Uebrigens hat man das West. Eur. Sekretariat das heisst James erweitert, dass heisst unter Kontrolle der Zentrale der K.P.D. gebracht. Die Organisierung der Januarkonferenz ist jetzt in den Händen des erweiterten W.E. Sekretariats und man hat unsre Mitwirkung gefragt. Das vorläufige Programm enthielt nur die Punkte Parlamentarismus und Gewerkschaften. Wir haben dazu noch vorgeschlagen:

1. Aufruf an das West-Eur. Proletariat;
2. Aufruf zur Einigung;
3. Internat. Aktion zur Unterstützung der Soviet Republik gegen Einmischung der konterrevolutionären Regierungen;
4. Nationalisierung

Ueber diese Punkte sowie über Parlamentarismus und Gewerkschaften hat Pannekoek Thesen ausgearbeitet, und werden wir diese hoffentlich mit Hilfe von James in der Komm. Intern. publizieren können. Genossin R.H. und vielleicht noch andere werden versuchen an der Konf. teilzunehmen, obgleich wir der Meinung sind, dass die Vorbereitung zu kurz ist. Wir glauben nämlich, dass wirkliche Resultate in der Richtung einer Aktion, und darauf kommt es doch an, nur

möglich sind, wenn man auch Delegierte bekommt die Massen repräsentieren, wie z.B. die shopstewards und „Triple Alliance“ in England, Syndik. Gruppen in Frankreich, the [*sic*] I.W.W. in Amerika. Sogar einige Führer der Triple Alliance sind wahrscheinlich zu haben, um direkt mit der 3te Intern. zusammen zu wirken, aber dann muss man ruhig überlegen und Ihnen eine Stimme bei der Vorbereitung geben.

Wir betrachten also die Januarzusammenkunft noch immer als eine Art Vorkonferenz, werden uns aber freuen über grösseren Erfolgen und dazu voll mitwirken. Inzwischen schicken wir einen völlig qualifizierten Genossen nach England, um dort die Lage zu studieren und eine weitere Konferenz schon jetzt vorzubereiten. Auch habe ich mich mit verschiedenen Freunden in Amerika in Verbindung gestellt und werden wir eine direkte Verbindung schaffen.

Was übrigens die Arbeit des Bureaus anbelangt, so muss man die West. Euro. Verhältnisse in Betracht ziehen, so wie auch die besonderen Verhältnisse in Holland. Alles geht hier etwas schwerfällig aber lassen wir hoffen solide. Ich schrieb schon über die Differenzen, über die weltpolitische Lage, die sich nur bei der praktischen Arbeit allmählig überwinden lassen werden.

Ich habe jetzt einen tüchtigen Genossen der bereit und im Stande ist ein Bibliothek Archiv zu organisieren, eine unter allen Umständen nützliche Institution. Auch mit der Abteilung Kurierdienste ist ein Vertrauter und für unsren Verhältnissen erfahrener Genosse beschäftigt. Dann haben wir noch einen Genossen herangezogen für die Leitung des Nachrichtendienstes, zwecks Bearbeitung der West-Europ. und amerikanischen Presse zu Diensten des Bureaus, des Bulletins und der Komm. Presse in verschiedenen Ländern. Schliesslich wird Genossin R.H. das Bulletin herausgeben und Sie ist heute gerade aus Ihrem Verbannungsort angelangt in der bewohnten Welt. Die Publikation von der Komm. Intern. wird vorläufig noch von Berlin aus erfolgen, kann aber später auch von Gen. R.H. übernommen werden. An der Vorbereitung der Januarkonf. nehmen wir, besonders Pannekoek und Gorter regen Anteil. Dr. [Willem] van Ravesteyn wird seine früher mit grossem Sachkenntnis geschriebene Uebersichte der Weltpolitik, für das Bulletin wi[e]der aufnehmen. Anfänglich wurden wir noch aufgehalten durch die Schwierigkeit der Realisierung der Werte. Ein Sozialverräter sagte öffentlich in den Gemeinderat von Amsterdam bei der Debatte mit [David J.] Wynkoop: die Kommunisten haben Steine von verdachter Herkunft etc. Jetzt können wir aber einen Anfang machen, obgleich die Mittel nicht lange reichen werden, wo Deutschland uns das Geld genommen hat. Ein Kurier von Ihnen ist bis jetzt nicht bei uns eingetroffen.

22. Dez. Die Thesen für die Internationale Konferenz werden heute nach Berlin geschickt mit Erläuterungen etc. Auch Artikel P. und R.H. für die Kommunistische Internationale und ich bat James Ihnen davon eine Kopie zu senden.

Die allgemeine Stimmung unter den Arbeitermassen West-Europas ist ziemlich matt aber der Kapitalismus bricht mehr und mehr zusammen mit einer ungeahnten Schnelligkeit. Es ist nicht aufzuhalten. Nur besteht die Gefahr einer völligen Chaos und Hungersnot. In Frankreich wird ein Kongress der Kommunistische Gruppen gehalten von 25-28 Dezember. Ich hoffe Ihren über die Bewegung in verschiedenen Ländern allmählich Berichte zugehen lassen zu können.

[The followings are handwritten by Sebald J. Rutgers:]
Mit herzlichen Grüsse an
allen Trauenden und Bekannten.

Agurski was bei mir und
wird in nächsten Tagen weiter
[a word: missing] werden.

[sign:] G.L. Tr.

(1) This is the sequential number of Rutgers' letter to Winter.
(2) This was deleted in the original letter.

1-2-2

09.03.1920 Trotter to Winter and others
[РГАСПИ, 497/2/8/1-7; 581/1/95/33-39]

HOLLAND 9/3-20.

Werter Winter c.s.

Diese spezielle Gelegenheit benutze ich, Ihnen kurz über meine Tätigkeiten seit meiner Abreise 15. Okt. 1919 zu berichten.

Meine Reise war ohne grösseren Schwierigkeiten über Riga, Reval, Stettin, Berlin. In Riga, das damals bombardiert wurde, bekam ich ein Visum auf 24 Stunden vom Oberkomm. durch unsren Lettischen Reisegenossen. Ich schlief in dem Ihnen wohlbekannten Hotel de Rome. Am nächsten Tage bekam ich ein Visum der englischen Militärkommission auf Fürsprache von Kol. Malone [1] und ich befand mich dazu noch einmal in den Räumen des Rittersaals. Damit gab sich dann auch der Estnische Oberkommandant zufrieden und so fuhren wir mit dem Zuge nach Reval. Dort fand ich Entgegenkommen beim Holländischen Konsul und bekam schiesslich alle Visa. Da ich Finnland vermeiden möchte, nahm ich schliesslich einen direkten Dampfer nach Stettin, und war Ende Oktober schon in Berlin.

Dort fand ich zuerst Fuchs, dann Levy [Levi], schliesslich auch James. Dann begegnete ich noch Dr. Frank aus Wien und besuchte eine illegale Versammlung aller Berliner Vertrauensmänner wo ausser Levy auch Dr. Laufenberg und Wolfheim sprachen. Da ich noch immer, auch jetzt nicht, den geringsten Bericht von Ihnen habe und nicht wisse ob meine Briefe (ich schrieb bis jetzt im ganzen 7 Briefe an Sie) auch ankamen, widerhole ich kurz meine Erfahrungen. Fuchs erzählte mir, dass die finanzielle Lage absolut verzweifelt war und gab mir detaillierte Angaben über unmittelbare sehr dringende Forderungen in einigen Ländern, die Kuriere nach Berlin geschickt hatten. Ich werde die Einzelheiten nicht wiederholen, die ich schon zweimal berichtete. Da ich meinte wenigstens in solchen Parteiangelegenheiten Genossen wie Fuchs und Levy vertrauen zu können und das Geld für intern. Zwecke anzuwenden war, beschloss ich sofort 400.000 Mark zu hinterlassen, wozu ich mein Gepäck liquidieren. Der Rest wurde dann entweder in Naturalien oder in Geld und auf ein Par Reisen verteilt, um das Risiko zu beschränken, von unsrem vollständig vertrauten Kurier nach Holland übermittelt werden. Da der Kurier gerade in Berlin war nahm er sofort zwei Stück: ein grosser und ein mittlerer gelbliche mit, die auch in H. kamen und dort verkauft wurden.

Ich werde nun nicht weiter in viel Besonderheiten treten; das kann mündlich geschehen, aber das Ende vom Lied war, dass wir weiter nichts bekamen aus Berlin. Man erkennt unsre Rechte an, (nachdem man zuerst glatt geweigert hatte), schreibt schöne Advokatenbriefe, bietet uns jetzt ein Restant von 3-400 t (ungefähr 10.000 Gulden) an, und auch das nur noch auf dem Papier. Sie werden verstehen dass, obgleich die Taxierungen bei Ihnen damals zu hoch waren, jetzt, wo der Mark weniger als 3 Holl. Cents gilt, die von Ihnen angedeuteten Summen nach dem Massstabe 1 R gleich 1 M zu niedrig sind, was auch beim Verkauf hier von zwei Stück unter ungünstigen Verhältnissen bestätigt wird. Mündlich wird man Ihnen die genaue Ziffer mitteilen können. Auch die Angaben im Briefe von 29/2/20, wovon eine Kopie Ihnen geschickt soll, stimmen nicht. Wie Sie leicht nachsehen können, nahm ich vier grosse welche zusammengehörten und ungefähr die Hälfte des ganzes Betrages ausmachen (sogar etwas mehr). Dazu noch ein grosser und der Rest mittlere und kleine. Aus B. nahm ich nur ein grossen und ein mittlere (gelbliche) zusammen: 25975 Gulden. Genau lässt sich alles natürlich nicht verfolgen, aber gerade deshalb sind solche

Praktiken, die das Vertrauen schädigen so bedauerlich.

Als ich in Holland kam, besuchte ich die von Ihnen angewiesen fünf Genossen zuerst persönlich. Dann hatten wir eine Zusammenkunft in Amsterdam am 22-ten November, wo alle zugegen waren. Da zeigte es sich schon, dass der Antagonismus zwischen Wynkoop und van Ravesteyn auf eine und besonders Gorter auf der anderen Seite sehr gross war. Van Ravesteyn fing an auch namens W. Bedenkungen gegen ein Zusammenarbeiten mit Gorter zu erheben. Gorter attackierte die frühere Politik der Tribune und die Haltung von W. und v. R. in der intern. Politik, und die Debatte bekam bald ein strak persönliche Wendung. Schliesslich beschloss man die nötigen technische Vorbereitungen sofort zur Hand zu nehmen und zu versuchen zu einer Verständigung zu kommen über die jetzigen intern. Verhältnisse und die sich daraus für uns ergebende allgemeine Richtlinien und Taktik. Bis dahin sollte das Bureau nicht definitiv konstituiert werden. Gorter entwarf kurze Thesen, die aber nicht als genügende Grundlage für eine Diskussion anerkannt wurden.

Inzwischen hatte sich herausgestellt, dass ich eine längere Liegekur durch machen musste, die 25 Nov. anfing und auch jetzt noch fortdauert. Es wurde so weitergearbeitet, indem die Genossen allein oder in Gruppen zu mir kamen, da ich in Bett arbeiten konnte, und so die dringenden Angelegenheiten erledigt wurden.

Es wurde in Amsterdam ein Bureau gemietet wo ein Chef de Bureau, zwei Stenografen, ein Beamte und ein Knabe, sowie auch eine Genossin arbeiten und in Rotterdam wurde ein Archiv gegründet. Da mit James übereingekommen war, dass die Ausgabetätigkeit von Büchern und Broschüren meistens in Berlin erfolgen wurde, wo schon ein Apparat geschaffen war und die Preisen sehr bedeutend billiger sind, und J. auch die Widerausgabe der Komm. Intern. fortführen wurde, so blieb für uns: die Ausgabe eines Bulletins in 3 Sprachen, ein Berichtendienst für die Komm. Presse in verschiedenen Ländern und das Archiv. Ueberdies beschlossen wir regelmässig eine russische Beilage zur Tribune zu publizieren und stellten wir f 7000,- zur Verfügung für die Ausgabe von 10 Broschüren von Gorter. Für das Archiv, vorläufig in beschränkten Massstabe wurde für die ersten 6 Monaten f 8000,- festgelegt; Pressebureau und Bulletin forderten f 3000,- per Monat; dazu kamen noch Ausgabe für Kurierdienste; allgemeine Ausgabe für das Sekretariat; Kosten für die Amsterdamer Konferenz eine Unterstützung der Tribune mit f 2000,- und die Russische Beilage etc.

Am 15-ten Dez. verfügten wir über den genannten Ertrag von 25975 vermehrt mit dem Restanten der Valuta (nach Abzug meiner Kosten bis auf Dez. 15 f 4700,-) und Sie werden verstehen, dass die Mittel schon zu Ende sind. Meinen Auftrag Gorter und Pannekoek freizumachen ist selbstverständlich nicht erfüllt. Gorter gibt Privatstunde an Knaben, was ihm wegen seiner Gesundheit ziemlich schwerfällt, auch hat er wegen der „Hetze“ noch Lehrlinge verloren. Pannekoek hat man wegen „Kommunismus“ nicht zugelassen als „Unter-Direktor der Sternenwarte“. Er verdient als Lektor an der Universität eine bescheidene Lehensunterhalt, hatte aber auch persönlich Bedenken dagegen, sich ganz in den bezahlten Diensten der Bewegung zu stellen. Keiner der sechs hat einigen Gehalt bekommen ausgenommen ich-selbst, was auch deshalb nötig war, weil man in Amerika mein Geld beschlagnahmt hat. Uebrigens ist das jetzt wi [e]der freigegeben und obgleich es keine Riesensumme ist, werde ich wenn nötig auch ohne Vergütung weiter arbeiten.

Wir haben uns jetzt entschliessen müssen das Lokal in Amsterdam aufzugeben und die Leute zu entlassen. Von dem Par tausend Gulden und kleinere Beiträge aus einigen Ländern werden wir die Arbeit des Sekretariats, Kurierdienste, beschränkter Berichtendienst, etc. weiter führen. Es wäre aber sehr schade wenn auch das Archiv, dass nur bis Mitten 1920 Mittel hat, verloren ging. Um das einigermassen richtig zu führen sind f 2000.- monatlich erforderlich. Vielleicht kann man auch mit f 1000,- etwas machen. Auch die Tribune wird sich bei den hohen Preisen nicht halten können.

Auf dem geplanten Massstabe wäre für das Bureau inklusive Tribune, Kuriere, Konferenzen,

etc. f 10,000,- monatlich nötig. Bei grössere Beschränkung konnte dies bis auf f 4000,- hinuntergeschraubt werden. Uebrigens kann man ein Sekretariat ohne technischen Propagandamittel, ohne Archiv, etc. auch mit geringerem Geldmittel betreiben. Aber Sie wissen, dass sogar Kuriere, Telegrammen, Reise ins Ausland u. dgl. unter den jetzigen Verhältnissen nicht billig sind.

Unser Bulletin No. 1 werden Sie vielleicht erhalten haben, No. 2 kommt vielleicht zusammen mit diesem Brief, No. 3 wird vielleicht schon der letzte sein. Aus No. 1 ersehen Sie auch eine kurze Notiz über den Archiv wofür wir einen tüchtigen Genossen haben.

Die Russischen Beilagen der Tribune erscheinen regelmässig, Kurierdienste entwickeln sich. Nach und von Deutschland können wir ungeachtet scharfer Bewachung, Personen und Briefe befördern. Nach England und Amerika haben wir Sendboten. Dann haben wir versucht durch persönliche Besuche uns über die Bewegung in verschiedenen Ländern zu orientieren. So ging ein vertrauter Genosse nach England, ein anderer besuchte die Schweiz, Belgien; Gorter war in Berlin; Mad. [Henriette] Roland Holst besuchte Frankreich und war auf dem Strassburger Kongress, wird aber schwer nochmals einen Pass für Fr. bekommen. Damit werden gute Resultate erzielt und allmählich Verbindungen hergestellt. Auch mit Spanien haben wir Beziehungen. Ein Holländer lebt dort und schreibt in der Tribune, [M.M.] Borodin besuchte uns und Spanien; Anguiano kommt bald, u.s.w. In Belgien könnten wie einen günstigen Einfluss haben; wenn wir Zeit und einige Mittel darauf verwenden können. Mit Schweden und Norwegen haben wir nur einige Briefe gewechselt, können die Genossen dort aber erreichen; gerade jetzt ist das wi[e]der gebessert. Mit Kopenhagen blieben die Versuche fruchtlos, können wir aber über Stockholm künftig verkehren. Für die Schweiz meinen wir, dass die junge Kommunistische Partei ([Jacob] Herzog c.s.) weniger vernachlässigt werden sollte; mit Italien haben wir leider fast keine Verbindung. Auch für Polen, Oesterreich, und die Balkanländer fehlen uns direkte Beziehungen mit Ausnahme der Slowakei, übrigens geht das jetzt über Berlin.

Was unseren politischen Bemühungen und die Konferenzen anbelangt folgendes:

Als ich in Berlin kam, fand ich sofort eine gewisse Animosität gegenüber Holland. Man erwartete wenig tüchtige Arbeit von den Holl. Genossen und war besonders dagegen, dass eine Konferenz oder ein Bureau in Amsterdam zusammenkommen würde. Besonders fürchtete man auch und sprach es offen aus, dass wir die Deutsche Opposition mit Geld unterstützen wurden. Noch jetzt stellt man das als eine Bedingung um uns auch nur ein Teil des Geldes auszuzahlen. Dagegen habe ich mich immer gewehrt, und darin wird wohl zum Teil die Erklärung liegen für die Haltung der Zentrale. Ich meine dass, wenn es zu einer Spaltung kommt in einer Lande, beide Gruppen für Unterstützung in Anmerkung kommen, so lange Sie sich auf dem Boden des Kommunismus stellen und danach handeln. Besonders wäre dies nötig, wo eine Spaltung forciert wird und eine Gruppe die Geldmittel benutzt um die andern an sich zu unterwerfen.

Ich werde hier auf diese Unterschiede nicht wi[e]der eingehen. Sie sind gewiss ermassen international und unvermeidlich, haben aber in Deutschland die Bewegung sehr vergiftet, teilweise unter die Drucke der Verhältnisse, teilweise nach unsrer Meinung zufolge der verfehlten und kleinlichen Taktik der Zentrale der Opposition gegenüber.

In Berlin fand ich James weniger einseitig, [M.] Bronski scheint aber wie auch Radek ganz die Meinung der Zentrale zu teilen, auch was die Haltung der Opposition gegenüber betrifft.

James hatte nichts dagegen, dass ein Bureau in Amsterdam als Zentralstelle für West-Europa und Amerika fungieren wurde und obgleich er sich damals schon unterschrieb: Sekretariat für West-Europa, erklärte er dies ohne Bedeutung und war bereit irgend einen Namen zu wählen in Uebereinstimmung mit uns. Wir verständigten uns auch leicht über eine Teilung der technischen Arbeit und da man schon gegen Ende November eine Konferenz in Wiesbaden oder Frankfurt geplant hatte, verabredeten wir Telegramme und Code damit auch versucht wurde einen Holländischen Genosse dorthin zu delegieren. Sobald ich in Holland mein Pass zurückbekam, der mir nach einer 24-stündigen Verhaftung abgenommen war, fragte ich einen Pass nach der Schweiz

um damit auch ohne Visum die Konferenz besuche zu können. Auch Gorter erklärte sich bereit und bereitete sich vor. Wir erhielten aber das Telegramm mit 6 Tage Verspätung, das Reisen illegal nimmt auch mehrere Tage und ich war inmittels [inmiddels (Dutch): in the meantime] untersucht worden und lag zu Bett. Wir schickten sofort einen Kurier, um zu untersuchen ob es noch nicht zu spät war und ob wirklich genügende Delegierte da zusammen waren, was wir bezweifelten. Das Resultat erwies sich als ungünstig und auch Gorter ging nicht. Dies alles nur um zu zeigen, dass er keinen Unwillen unserseits war. Auf der Konferenz waren nur Deutschen, ein Deutsch-Oesterreicher, ein Pole und zwei Rumänen. Von West-Europa nur Sylvia Pankhurst.

Jetzt wäre es selbstverständlich Pflicht der Deutschen gewesen sich mit uns in Verbindung zu stellen zwecks Organisierung einer Konferenz. Jedoch beschloss die Frankfurter Dezember „Konferenz“ ein West-Europäisches Sekr. in Deutschland zu gründen und (ohne genügende Zeit der Vorbereitung) sofort eine Konferenz zu berufen für Mitten Januar nach Frankfurt oder Wiesbaden. Wir werden von dieser Entscheidung benachrichtigt und obgleich wir damit nicht einverstanden waren, beschlossen wir uns beteiligen und arbeitete in grösster Eile. Thesen und Vorschläge aus, die mit Kurier nach Berlin geschickt wurden und Ihnen aus Bulletin No. 1 bekannt sein können. Wir schrieben jedoch nach Berlin, dass wir meinten, dass eine so vorbereitete Konferenz nur vorläufigen Bedeutung haben konnte und dass wir auch schon Vorbereitungen treffen wurden für eine weitere Konferenz wo Amerika und die unterschiedenen Gruppen in den Ländern vertreten sein konnten. Auf forderten wir sofort, dass auch die Deutsche Opposition zugelassen werden sollte, falls es zu einer Spaltung kam. Bis Mitte Januar kam aber kein Wort aus Berlin, wo inzwischen nach den bekannten Vorfällen der Belagerungszustand verhängt wurde und scharfe Verfolgungen stattfanden. Inzwischen kamen schon Delegierten von drei Gruppen in England (B.S.P. [British Socialist Party], W.S.F. [Workers(') Socialist Federation] und Shopstewards) so wie der Sekr. der „Comm. Party“ aus Amerika in Amsterdam und da diese ungeduldig waren, beschlossen wir die Konferenz für 3 Feb. in Amsterdam zu berufen. Ein Kurier ging nach Bremen und Berlin. Ein Genosse aus Bremen kam schon vor dem Anfang der Konferenz, da wir alles für illegale Ueberschreitung der Grenze vorbereitet hatten. Das zeigt, dass die Berliner Behauptung, Sie seien zu spät benachrichtigt, haltlos ist. Hätte man ein Ausschussversammlung verschoben oder sich teilweise daran nicht beteiligt, hätte man in Amsterdam sein können, wo man jetzt nach langem Zögern erst acht Tage später kam. Inmittels waren die Pässevisa einiger Delegierten über Zeit und wurde die ganze Konferenz von der Polizei unmöglich gemacht weiter zu tagen.

Was die Bedeutung der Konferenz anbelangt, verweise ich auf Bulletin No. 2 wo auch die vornehmsten Beschlüsse aufgenommen sind. Wir werden die Bedeutung nicht überschätzen, aber es ist doch das erste Mal das auch England wirklich und allseitig vertreten ist, so wie auch Amerika. Der amerikanische Delegierte ist gewiss, ungeachtet die Verleumdungen von [Santeri] Nuorteva, die meist repräsentative Figur aus der jungen Komm. Bewegung Amerikas. Ueber diese Bewegung und das Verhältnis zu dem Soviet-Bureau wird der Amerikaner Sie persönlich berichten, wenn man in Berlin wenigstens die versprochene Hilfe für seine Reise nicht weigert.

Es gab noch eine Ursache, dass wir diese Konferenz nicht gern wi[e]der unbestimmt hinausschieben möchten.

Obgleich ich nach der ersten allgemeinen Zusammenkunft am 22-ten Nov. der Mitglieder des Amsterdamer Bureaus, wie Sie von Ihnen angewiesen waren, ziemlich optimistisch war und meinte, dass eine Zusammenwirkung möglich war, erwies es sich auf der zweiten Sitzung wo alle mit Ausnahme von Gorter zugegen waren, ungefähr drei Woche später als unmöglich. Ohne jeder weitere Konflikt und ohne andere Begründung als die alten Meinungsverschiedenheiten und die persönliche Haltung von Gorter-Wynkoop und van Ravesteyn gegenüber, erklärten die beiden, letzten nicht in einem Bureau mit Gorter zusammenarbeiten zu können. Sie fürchteten dass Gorter seine Stellung im Internat. Bureau missbrauchen wurde um W. und van R. auch in Ihre Stellung in der Holl. Partei anzugreifen. Die Haltung war absolut, und mir und die anderen unverständlich.

Gorter aber, der wegen seiner schwachen Gesundheit nicht regelmässig sich an der Arbeit kann beteiligen, wollte sich unter diesen Umständen nicht zurückziehen und so war es schwer einen Weg zu finden. Schliesslich gelang es mir zu bewirken, dass man wenigstens formell zusammen blieb bis zur nächsten Konferenz, wo dann die Sache des Bureaus definitiv und auf eine mehr repräsentativen Weise geregelt werden sollte. Die Resultate werden Sie aus dem Bulletin No. 2 ersehen. Von den Holländern blieben dann nur Wynkoop, Roland Holst und ich, womit auch Gorter einverstanden war.

Persönlich kann ich, sowie auch Pannekoek und Mad. R.H. die Haltung von van Ravesteyn und Wynkoop in dieser Sache nicht billigen, aber letzterer wird Ihnen mündlich seine Meinung schon beleuchten.

Es wurde jetzt übereingekommen, in der 2-ten Hälfte von Mai nochmals eine Konferenz zu halten nach gemeinsamer Vorbereitung von Berlin und Amsterdam und wenn es gelingt, diese einigermassen repräsentativ zu gestalten, definitiv über das Bureau zu entscheiden. Die frage wäre nun auch Ihrerseits zu erwägen. Sie hängt ausser mit persönlichen und geographischen, auch mit allgemeinen intern. politischen Fragen zusammen. Wynkoop und van Ravesteyn meinen z.B., dass Deutschland ökonomisch, physisch und psychisch so heruntergekommen ist, dass eine revolutionäre Bewegung von D. aus nicht zu erwarten ist. Sie setzen besonders Ihre Hoffnung auf England, was selbverständlich einen längeren Prozess wäre. Teilt man diese Auffassung, dann ist ein Intern. Bureau in Deutschland unsinnig, weil das stärkste Motiv dafür angeführt, gerade ist die Behauptung das Bureau soll in einem Lande sein mit revolutionärer Bewegung und revolutionären Möglichkeiten. Die anderen, G[orter]-P[annekoek]-R.H. und ich, nehmen mit mehr oder wenig starken Ueberzeugung die Möglichkeit an, dass der schnelle Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Kapitals und die unglaubliche Verelendung, zu revolutionären Bewegungen treiben können, wobei dann in Kampfe die Formen und Führer sich entwickeln werden, und die Bewegung sich auf Frankreich, Polen u.s.w. ausdehnen wird. Aber auch unter dieser Voraussetzung meinen wir, dass Holland als Verbindungslied die geeignete Stelle für ein Bureau wäre. Indessen konnte man auch ein Amsterdamer Bureau als Durchgangsstelle mit Hauptsitz in Berlin sich sehr wohl denken. Natürlich geben wir auch die Möglichkeit zu, dass Deutschland versagt und dass man mit längerer Periode rechnen muss. Aber unter allen Umständen meinen wir, dass die prinzipiellste Taktik nötig ist. Also keine Hoffnungen auf intellektuellen Schichten, kein Entgegenkommende Haltung gegen Zentrumsgruppen; scharfer Kampf innerhalb oder ausserhalb aber jedenfalls gegen reaktionäre Gewerkschaften, gesetzlichen Betriebsräte, alle Formen der bürgerlichen Demokratie und Staatskapitalismus, Bekämpfung der Illusionen über „Frieden“ mit Soviet-Rusland. Dagegen alle Energie gerichtet auf Massenaktionen auch, wo diese mit syndikalistischen Tendenzen behaftet sind, grosse Wert auf Hebung der revolutionären Energie und der Bereitschaft grösserer Gruppen um auch ohne oder gegen Führer alten Stills Bewegungen durchaus setzen. Im allgemeinen bin ich der Auffassung, dass unsre Taktik auf die Diktatur gerichtet sein soll in dem Sinne, dass dieser Diktatur nur davon abhängt dass genügende Massen in Bewegung kommen und dass, obgleich dies nicht forciert werden kann, es auch unter Umständen sehr bald erfolgen kann.

Diese Stimmung war vor einigen Monaten in Russland ziemlich allgemein, scheint sich aber jetzt wenigstens nach Radek, Bronski, Abramovitz [A.E. Абрамович] u.a. zu urteilen, stark geändert zu haben. Für Russland ist, dass wohl begreiflich, aber ob es für West-Europa und die Intern. in allgemeinen richtig ist, bezweifle ich. Jedenfalls glauben die Holländer und besonders auch Gorter, Pannekoek, R.H. und ich auf prinzipielle Taktik, drängen zu müssen, auch wenn die unmittelbare grosse Spannung etwas nachgeben sollte. Wer das jetzt für verfehlt hält, soll nicht Amsterdam als Zentralstelle befürworten. Denn es gibt hier wie gesagt grosse Meinungsunterschiede und persönliche Animosität, und die technischen Vorbedingungen sind viel weniger günstig als ich zur Zeit in Moskau meinte. Wegen der hohen Valuta ist hier alles sehr teuer: Drucksachen, Löhne, etc. Es ist sehr schwer die nötigen Kräfte unter die beschränkten Zahl Parteigenossen aufzutreiben: sogar mit Uebersetzungen hatten wir grosse Mühe und sie

schriftstellerische Tätigkeit bleibt sehr weit hinter der Massenproduktion einiger russischen Genossen zurück. Das Land ist zu klein, die Bewegung zu eng und wenn Moskau wi[e]der Verbindungen bekommt, wären wir sehr glücklich und gerne bereit als eine untergeordnete Durchgangsstelle Dienste zu leisten. Jedenfalls hoffe ich doch endlich einmal etwas zu hören von meinen lieben Freunden.

Herzliche Grüsse

G.L. TROTTER.

(1) Cf. Colonel Malone, *The Russian Republic* (London, 1920). In the last chapter the progress of Rutgers' coming home in the autumn in 1919, who accompanied Malone, M.P., part of the way, was reported.

1-2-3

12.05.1920 Trotter to Winter and others
[РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/15-17 (signed) [1]; 497/2/8/8-10]

Holland 12/5-[19]20

Werter Genosse Winter c.s.

Wie Sie aus meinem Briefe vom 9-ten März 1920 (Kopie beigefügt) ersehen können, wird von mir durchaus nicht Amsterdam als Bureaustelle überschätzt. Es wird darin zum Schuss die Hoffnung ausgesprochen, dass Moskau bald in der Gelegenheit sein wird als Zentralstelle der Komm. Intern. wirklich zu funktionieren, damit wir an untergeordneter Stelle rücken können.

Seitdem hat sich folgendes entwickelt:

Erstens hat sich das Berliner W.E.S. nach unsrer Meinung immer mehr als Hemmnis für die Einheit und Aktionsfähigkeit in West-Europa erwiesen und

Zweitens haben sich unsre Verbindungen und unsrer Einfluss erweitert, trotzdem äusserst geringen Mittel und ungenügenden Kräfte.

Das Fiasko des Berliner W.E.S. stammt teilweise aus den Umständen dass es in seiner jetzigen Form nicht eine bona fide Internationale Organisation, sondern ein Produkt nationaler Zwistigkeiten und Intrigen ist. Die Demoralisation, die damit Verknüpft ist, hat ein allgemeines Widerwillen hervorgerufen und die Arbeit von vornherein vergiftet.

Weiter kommt aber in Betracht, dass sich in West-Europa unter den Kommunisten sehr deutlich zwei Tendenzen entwickeln: eine mehr opportunistische und eine mehr prinzipielle. Das W.E.S. das eigentlich nur eine Modifikation der Zentrale der K.P.D. ist, erkennt praktisch nur die opportunistische Richtung an, und wir haben es dagegen von Anfang an als unsre Pflicht betrachtet, auch die Oppositionsgruppen und Parteien Anerkennung und Unterstützung zu gewähren, so weit sie auf dem Boden der Moskauer Beschlüsse stehen. Es scheint uns dies schon an und für sich eine selbstverständliche Haltung für ein Organ der Internationale. Dazu kommt aber, dass wir in Amsterdam, in Einverständniss wenigstens mit den früheren Auffassungen in Moskau, uns scharf wenden gegen alles Versuchen der rechten Flügel oder Zentren sich der dritten Internationale anzuschliessen, ohne sich zur revolutionären Praxis zu bekennen.

Darüber kann selbstverständlich verschieden geurteilt werden, und darüber wird gewiss ein Kongress entscheiden müssen.

Jetzt erreicht uns ein Bericht, sei es auch für uns nicht ganz kontrollierbar und jedenfalls unvollständig, laut dessen wir ausgeschaltet werden und was bedauerlicher ist, das W.E.S. von Moskau als Zentralorgan anerkannt und damit sanktioniert wird. Wir hatten gerade gegen das W.E.S. öffentlich Stellung genommen in einer Mitteilung des Amsterdamer Bureaus über die Haltung des W.E.S. dem K.A.P.D. gegenüber. Da aber nur noch einige Exemplare der betreffenden Mitteilung in Deutschen Sprache und zwar nur an die Adresse des W.E.S. abgeschickt waren, haben wir die weitere Verbreitung eingestellt, und werden uns vorläufig politischer Kundgebungen enthalten.

Jetzt erreicht uns am 9-ten Mai für erste Mal ein Bericht aus Moskau via Berlin. Obgleich sich nicht alles genau entziffern lässt, (wir bitten sehr peinliche Sorgfalt in den Ziffern zu betrachten) so haben wir doch die Instruktionen 1 bis 5 in genügender Klarheit vor uns, aus denen hervorgeht, dass unsre Befugnisse schon früher auf Holland, England, Amerika und den Kolonien beschränkt wurden. Eine ähnliche Lösung wäre wohl praktisch, wenn nur die Verbindung mit Moskau eine

Wirklichkeit war oder wird. So wie es jetzt ist, kann man wohl kaum einer stellvertretenden Zentralinstanz in West-Europa entbehren. Vielleicht wäre diese in Italien einzurichten, wie es von der Italienischen Partei vorgeschlagen und von einer Reihe von Ländern unterstützt wird.

Falls das jetzige W.E.S. in Berlin unter Einfluss der K.P.D.-Zentrale als internationale Zentralstelle gehandhabt wird, sind wir überzeugt, dass die Spaltung in Europa noch weiter gehen wird, und werden wir eine solche Zwischenstelle praktisch wohl kaum ernst nehmen können. Dann bleibt vorläufig nur die Möglichkeit einer Zentralleitung in Moskau und Ausbildung der Verbindungen mit Moskau. Wäre es möglich in Berlin ein Organ zu schaffen, das wirklich eine Internationale Zusammensetzung hat, so könnten wir das selbstverständlich anerkennen; wir erachten die Möglichkeit dazu aber gering und fürchten, dass die Vorgeschichte der W.E.S. die Chancen vorläufig verdorben hat.

Was Sie in Ihren Instruktionen vorschlagen ist eine straffe Organisation von Moskau aus direkt geleitet. Wir bezweifeln, dass die West-Europäischen Arbeiter sich einer solchen Disziplin fügen werden. Jedenfalls bilden aber die Unzulänglichkeiten der Verbindungen eine überwältigende Schwierigkeit. Mit Ausnahem einer kurzen Notiz Sinoviefs via Stockholm worin Amendemente zu den Leitsätzen des W.E.S. angekündigt wurden, die uns bis jetzt nicht erreicht haben, habe ich seit meiner Abreise (15 Oktober 1919) bis 9 May 1920, also in einem halben Jahre keinerlei Berichte erhalten.

Unter dienen Umständen wurde die von Ihnen vorgeschlagene Einteilung in Ländergruppen vielleicht zu einer Dezentralisation führen, die gar nicht in Ihrem System passt. Möglich ist, dass die Verbindungen sich in Zukunft etwas bessern durch Ausbildung illegaler Kurierdienst. Wie Sie aus unsrer „Erklärung“ sehen können, haben wir in dieser Richtung schon etwas geleistet, und wir haben auch wohl Kräfte und Gelegenheiten dies weiter auszubilden. Es wäre wirklich sehr schade wenn jetzt das Geschaffene alles wi[e]der verloren ging. Wenn man schon mit unsrer politischer Tätigkeit nicht einverstanden ist, so bleibt Holland als Verbindungsglied ausserordentlich wichtig. Da man uns der Geldmittel beraubt hat, könnten wir auch die technischen Aufgaben nicht voll gerecht werden. Jetzt wo schon ein Par tausend Gulden Schuld gemacht wurden, muss alles bald ganz eingestellt werden.

Wir brauchen für einen guten technischen Apparat inklusive Kurierdienste etc. ungefähr zwei tausend Gulden monatlich. Ein Bibliothek-Archiv wurde gleichfalls diese Summe fordern, kann aber mit tausend Gulden monatlich nötigenfalls weitergeführt werden. Dann muss selbstverständlich die Tgeszeitung „De Tribune“ ohne finanzielle Unterstützung bei den jetzigen hohen Preisen schon sehr bald eingestellt werden. Auch hier wäre ein Par tausend Gulden monatlich nötig für die nackte Existenz. Rechnet man hinzu für die Ausgabe von Broschüren und Büchern sowie für Unterstützung der Gefangenen, etc., wie das in Ihren Instruktionen angegeben ist, was sich auch auf Belgien, England, Amerika und den Kolonien ausdehnen soll, so wäre für diesen beschränkten Zwecken insgesamt auf monatlich zehntausend Gulden zu rechnen, abgesehen von der Gründung neuer Tageszeitungen.

Wie aus einer Abrechnung; die ich beilege hervorgeht, haben wir jetzt eine Schuld von vier tausend Gulden und eine schnelle Entscheidung ist deshalb äusserst dringend. Wenn nicht die Geldmittel auf einigen Zeit im voraus festgelegt sind, kann man den Apparat nicht nach technischen Bedürfnissen einrichten. Abgesehen von den Entscheidungen in politischen Fragen, die auf einem Kongresse erfolgen wird, muss ich dringend raten sofort Massnahme zu treffen, dass die nötigen Geldmittel besorgt und zugesichert werden.

Persönlich bin ich bereit mich für die technischen Aufgaben vorläufig zur Verfügung zu stellen, wobei ich dann auch versuchen möchte, über die kolonialen und asiatischen Fragen einiges Material zusammen zu bringen. Leider erlaubt mir meine Gesundheit noch nicht einen ausländischen Kongress zu besuchen, obgleich ich seit dem ersten May nicht mehr eine regelmässige Liegekur durchmachen. Es werden doch gewiss Genossen aus Holland zugegen sein, die über unsre Aktivität näheren Auskünfte erteilen können.

Mit Parteigruss

[sign:] G.L. Trotter

(1) On the blank space at the top of the first page the following is handwritten: "Dupl. für Moskau/Copie."

1-3 The Conflict between the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the Western European Secretariat

1-3-1 03.02.1920 Statement about the Branch Buro [*sic*] of the Communist International and the February Conference in Amsterdam (handwritten by Rutgers)
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/68-69]

1-3-2 14.02.1920 Br[onski]. / P.F[rölich]. / M[ünzenberg]. to the Amsterdam Bureau
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/70-72; (a different version; draft?) 495/293/6/10-13]

1-3-3 15.02.1920 Rutgers to "Werte Genossen" [of the WES]
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/73; cf. (handwritten carbon copy notebook) 497/2/4/33-35]

1-3-4 20.02.1920 Klara [Zetkin], "Bericht über die Konferenz in Amsterdam"
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/28/7-10]

1-3-1

03.02.1920 Statement about the Branch Buro [*sic*] of the Communist International and the February Conference in Amsterdam (handwritten by Rutgers)
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/68-69]

Statement about the Branch Buro [*sic*] of the Communist International and the February Conference in Amsterdam [handwritten by S.J. Rutgers].

Just about a year ago the Communist International was organized in Moscow. A product of revolutionary struggle, it could have no other birthplace than the capital and center of the revolution in action.

To our Russian comrades, Russian problems always assumed the form of world problems, they knew their victory dependent upon the results of the proletarian class war all over the world. The Communist International was considered the organized expression of the world revolution, in which the Soviet-republic held the most exposed front.

But general headquarters, the Executive Committee in Moscow, realized the growing importance of revolutionary developments in the West and the necessity for Western Europe and America to organize its own struggle and its own unity in this struggle.

The idea of calling a second international congress in Moscow therefore was rejected and in the beginning of October 1919 it was decided to form a Branch Bureau in Amsterdam, the main task of which would be to prepare an international Conference in Western Europe. As Holland was considered the best place to meet in and comrades in Holland were known by their revolutionary tactics of over ten years to express the essentials of the communist international, I was sent to Amsterdam to organize a Bureau, to which Moscow nominated our comrades Gorter, Roland Holst, Pannekoek, van Ravesteyn, Wynkoop and myself. This Bureau was to establish connections with the countries of Europe and America, to issue literature, a bulletin, a magazine, to organize archives, an international pressbureau and to prepare an international conference, at which conference the Bureau and its functions would have to be given a more definite shape.

When I arrived in Berlin in the beginning of November I found that an international conference was being planned by the representative of the Communist International in Germany for the end of November. This representative was already issuing translations of Russian literature, and a reedition of the Moscow monthly “The Communist International” supplemented for European use. He had formed a pressbureau, was in touch with different countries and had constituted himself: Western European Secretariat.

We agreed to cooperate and to divide the work: the Holland bureau to function as the authorized representative of the Communist International in Europe and America, issuing a bulletin, organizing an archive and preparing an international conference.

The preliminary conference in Germany failed on account of insufficient attendance: in addition to Germans there where only two Russians and Sylvia Pankhurst present. Nevertheless those present decided: 1-st to constitute definitely a Western European Secretariat in Germany, 2-nd to appoint Sylvia Pankhurst as secretary for England, 3-rd to hold another international conference in the second part of January in Germany [1)].

Although our Bureau did not agree with these decisions we decided to participate in the January conference. Suggestions and resolutions were prepared and brought to Berlin by courier; but nothing was heard from them until recently and conditions in Germany became more and more unfavorable for meetings of this character. When a delegate from America arrived here and

reports from different countries showed willingness to meet in Holland it was decided to arrange the present conference in Amsterdam.

[The followings are handwritten by Rutgers:] Amsterdam Febr. 3rd 1920

The Representative of the Ex. Committee
of the Comm. International

[original note] 1) Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst states, that her nomination as Secretary only had a temporary provisionary character.

1-3-2

14.02.1920 Br[onski]. / P.F[rölich]. / M[ünzenberg]. to the Amsterdam Bureau
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/70-72; (a different version; draft?) 495/293/6/10-13]

14.2.1920

An das

Amsterdamer Bureau.

Werter Genosse

Da es uns unmöglich war, an der Konferenz teilzunehmen, wie auch eine gründliche Aussprache mit dem hier noch anwesenden Teilnehmen der Konferenz herbeizuführen, sind die folgenden Bemerkungen notwendig geworden:

1.) Vor allem ist zu konstatieren, dass es nicht unsere Schuld war, dass wir nicht rechtzeitig hier eintrafen. Der mangelnden Organisierung dieser Konferenz ist es zuzuschreiben, dass diese Konferenz, die so gut hätte beschickt werden können, so unbefriedigend ausfiel. Die Einladung an das Westeuropäische Sekretariat — und die Parteien, die durch das Westeuropäische Sekretariat eingeladen werden sollten, kam am 31.I. in unsere Hände. Die Einladung war vom 25.I. datiert, und am 2. Februar sollten alle Delegierten in Holland sein. Wir sollten sowohl die deutsche Partei wie die österreichische K.P., polnische K.P., die rumänische, serbische, jugoslawische, griechischen komm. Parteien einladen.

Diese Einladung kam uns vollkommen unerwartet, gerade als wir organisatorische Vorarbeit für die Einberufung der Konferenz zu Ende führten. Die Einladungen sollten gerade abgehen, als Euer Brief kam. Wenn wir auch sofort die oben angeführten Parteien benachrichtigten, so konnten sie unmöglich in drei Tagen in Holland sein. Vor allem konnte die K.P.D. sich nicht sofort auf die Reise machen, da erstens am Sonntag, den 1.II. im ganzen Reichen wichtige Parteikonferenzen stattfanden, die von der Zentrale beschickt werden mussten. Zweitens auf den 7.-8.II. eine Zentralausschussitzung zusammenberufen war. Sofort nach Beendigung dieser Sitzung am 8.II. abends reisten die deutschen Delegierten und ein Delegierter der Jungendinternationale, und auch der Vertreter des W.E.S. zugleich Delegierter der Russischen K.P. ab.

Das West-europäische Sekretariat hat sofort nach Empfang Ihrer Einladung telegraphisch gebeten, die Konferenz bis zu unserer Ankunft zu vertagen.

2.) Nach unserer Ankunft stellte sich heraus, dass die Konferenz nicht zu Ende geführt werden konnte. Aus polizeilichen Gründen musste sie auseinandergehen. Festgestellt werden muss, dass an dieser Konferenz folgende Länder nicht teilgenommen haben:

1) Deutschland 2) Frankreich 3) Italien
4) Oesterreich 5) Ungarn 6) Tschecho-Slowakei
7) Polen 8) Balkanländer (Rumänien, Jugoslawien, Serbien, Bulgarien, Griechenland)
9) Russland (was leicht geschehen konnte)
10) Schweiz, deren Delegierter einen Tag vor unserer Ankunft angekommen ist und konnte an der Konferenz nicht teilnehmen.
11) Skandinavien (Schweden, Norwegen, Dänemark, Finnland)
12) Jugendinternationale
13) Spanien

Von allen diesen Ländern hätten Delegationen eintreffen können, wenn die Konferenz nicht so

nachlässig vorbereitet und wenn sie im Einvernehmen mit dem W.E.S. einberufen worden wäre.

Die stattgefundene Konferenz kann nicht als vollberechtigt anerkannt werden. Es waren Vertreter von drei europäischen Ländern (England, Holland, Belgien) und zwei amerikanische Delegierte anwesend. Die an der Konferenz anwesenden Genossen aus China und Ungarn können nicht als Delegierte betrachtet werden, ebensowenig das Mitglied des Informationsbüros in Bremen, das kein Mandat der oppositionellen Organisationen hatte.

3.) Wem wir auch die Notwendigkeit einer organisatorischen Zusammenfassung der verschiedenen Bureaus, Sekretariats und Vertretungen der III. Internationale in Europa und Amerika einsehen, um eine Zersplitterung und Schädigung des Ansehens der III. Internationale und ihrer programmatischen und taktischen Versumpfung vorzubeugen, so was doch eine der Hauptaufgaben der Konferenz der gegenseitige Austausch von Erfahrungen auf dem Gebiete des revolutionären Kampfes, die gegenseitige Aufklärung über den Stand des revolutionären Kampfes und über taktische Schwierigkeiten und Problem ― dadurch sollte der politisch-revolutionäre Horizont jeder kämpfenden Partei erweitern soll, auch versucht werden, die taktischen Probleme von den Standpunkten der Weltrevolution aus zu betrachten und zu lösen. Da keine Aussprache möglich war, so ist diese Aufgabe der Konferenz in keiner Weise gelöst worden, und die Arbeit der Konferenz auf diesem gebiete vollkommen unfruchtbar geblieben.

Bei der Behandlung der Frage der wirtschaftlichen Organisationen, der einzigen, deren Lösung versucht wurde, sind die Erfahrungen der meisten europäischen Ländern nicht in Betracht gezogen worden, die Vorschläge des W.E.S. über Grundsätze und Richtlinien der Kommunistischen Taktik wurden den Konferenzteilnehmern nicht einmal vorgelegt.

Wir müssen also die angenommene Resolution über den Unionismus als Meinung der internationalen Konferenz ausdrücklich ablehnen. Nicht nur aus formalen Gründen, sondern in Anbetracht der Wichtigkeit der Frage für eine ganze Anzahl von kontinentalen kommunistischen Parteien, die ihren Standpunkt gar nicht vertreten konnten. Er wird eine ungeheure Verwirrung in der K.P. der meisten Länder hervorrufen, wenn man die angenommene Resolution als Richtlinie für die Arbeit dieser Parteien ansehen wollte. Nicht nur für Deutschland, sondern auch für Frankreich, Oesterreich und auch Polen sind dies Fragen, die mit grosser Vorsicht behandelt werden müssen.

4.) Nach unserer Kenntnis ist ausser der Gewerkschafsfrage nur noch die organisatorische Frage besprochen worden und es wurde darüber ein Beschluss gefasst. Der Beschluss besteht darin, dass ein Büro in Amsterdam ― als das einzige zentrale Büro der III. Internationale für die gesamte Welt ― mit Ausschluss von Russland ― eingerichtet werden soll, dessen Exekutivkomitee aus drei holländischen Genossen bestehen soll. Wir erkennen die Notwendigkeit eines solchen Zentralsekretariates der III. Internationale an. Wir verkennen auch nicht die Schwierigkeiten, die die Verlegung eines solchen Büro nach Deutschland finden wird. Sie bestehen erstens in der Aufnahme der näheren Beziehungen zu Süd- und Nord-amerika und teilweise zu England. Zweitens die Illegalität der Kommunistischen Partei in Deutschland, die die Aufrechterhaltung der Beziehungen erschwert. Holland ist in dieser Richtung besser plaziert. Es kann die Beziehungen mit den angelsächsischen Ländern besser aufrechterhalten, auch scheint die Legalität in Holland eine grössere Bewegungsfreiheit zu gestatten. Man darf aber diese Legalität nicht überschätzen. Die auf geflogene Konferenz ist ein Vorzeichen dafür, dass die holländische Bourgeoisie ― ähnlich der schweizerischen ― rabiat werden wird, wenn es sich um die „Organisierung der Weltrevolution“ handelt. Am bedenklichsten aber ist, dass das Büro in Holland sich in einem Lande befinden würde, dass von der revolutionären Bewegung noch nicht ergriffen wird. Auch wird es den Genossen schwer werden, die taktischen und politischen Probleme der einzelnen Parteien scharf und richtig zu erfassen und ihnen entsprechenden politischen Ausdruck zu geben, wenn sie nicht in ständigem innigem Verkehr mit Vertretern der einzelnen Landesorganisationen

sein werden. Entweder also müsste sich das Amsterdamer Büro der grössten Vorsicht befleissigen, d.h. sich in seiner Tätigkeit eine grosse Beschränkung auferlegen, mehr in organisatorischer als in praktisch-politischer Betätigung sein besonderes Arbeitsfeld suchen oder öfters als vorgesehen war, Bürositzungen mit den Vertretern der vier Länder veranstalten. Dies wird wahrscheinlich unmöglich sein, wie die Praxis der Konferenz gezeigt hat.

5.) Der Beschluss der Konferenz will das Westeuropäische Sekretariat in seiner territorialen Beeinflussung auf die Zentralländer mit Süd-Osteuropa begrenzen. Frankreich, England, Belgien und Skandinavien sollen ausgeschlossen sein. Tatsächlich aber wird sich Süd-Osteuropa nicht als zu einem Z.E. Sekretariat gehörig betrachten und entweder direkt mit Holland in Verbindung treten oder verlangen, ein selbständiges Büro aufzurichten, welche Absicht schon vorzuliegen scheint. Auf alle Fälle ist der Name Zentral-Europäisches Büro nicht glücklich, deckt sich auch nicht mit dem erwähnten Territorium und wird zu verschiedenen Streitigkeiten führen.

6.) In der letzten Besprechung bei Genossen Rutgers wurde beschlossen, die Konferenz, die die organisatorischen Fragen endgültig lösen sollte, in etwa drei Monaten (zweite Hälfte des Maies) tagen zu lassen. Die Organisierung dieser Konferenz soll dem Amsterdamer Büro und dem W.E.S. übertragen werden.

Dieser Beschluss, der einzig mögliche in dieser Situation, macht es aber notwendig, einen modus vivendi zu finden, um der Doppelspurigkeit der Arbeit des W.E.S. und des provisorischen Amsterdamer Büros vorzubeugen.

Es wäre also notwendig, vorläufig folgenden Modus zu statuieren:

1) Das W.E.S. bleibt also solches bestehen.

2) Die Beziehungen des W.E.S. mit England, Skandinavien und N. u. S.-Amerika werden durch das Amsterdamer Büro aufrechterhalten.

3) Die politische- und Herausgeber-Tätigkeit des W.E.S. wird im engsten Kontakt mit dem Amsterdamer Büro geführt, ev.[eventuell] können die Publikationen des W.E.S. mit Unterschriften der Mitglieder der beiden Büros versehen werden.

4) Es können auch die taktischen Vorschläge zu der Konferenz gemeinsame ausgearbeitet werden, und gemeinsam das Bulletin des Büros redigiert werden.

Wir glauben, dass dieses Provisorium die Arbeit der III. Internationale in Europa und Amerika bis zur nächsten Konferenz nur fördern kann und dadurch Konflikte politischer und organisatorischer Art auf ein Minimum beschränkt werden.

Wir werden in diesem Sinne bei den von uns vertretenen Organisationen wirken.

Mit kommunistischem Gruss

gez. Br[onski].	P[aul].F[rölich].	[Willi] M[ünzenberg].
für W.E.S.	für K.P.D.	für J[ugend].I[nternationale].
und K.P.R[usslands].		

1-3-3

15.02.1920 Rutgers to “Werte Genossen” [of the WES]
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/73 [(1)]; cf. (handwritten carbon copy notebook) 497/2/4/33-35]

15. 2. 1920.

Werte Genossen!

Vier Dokumente werden erhalten:

I. Artikel und Brief M. [Münzenberg] in Dank erhalten. Werde nach Berlin antworten.

II. Protest werde ich Genossin R.H. [Roland Holst] per Express mitteilen; weiss nicht, ob schon abgedruckt.

III. Mitteilung Br. [Bronski] Nähere persönliche Zusammenwirkung h ö c h s t erwünscht. Genosse [*sic*] R.H. fährt nächsten Samstag nach Frankreich. Nach ihrer Rückkehr wäre Zusammenkunft sehr gut, letzte Woche Februar oder erste Märzwoche. [Ich] Werde „vorbehaltlich“ Ausgabe unserer Exekutive vorlegen und erwarte unvorbehaltlich St. oder Geld zu bekommen.

IV. Erklärung Fr. [Frölich]: Einige Uebereilung der Konferenz war nötig, da am und engl. Delegierte schon paar Wochen hier waren und nicht warten wollten. Ihr Telegramm trug paar Tage Aufenthalt. Wir tagten 3. Feb. statt 2. Feb. und schoben wichtige Fragen noch einige Tage hinaus. Dazu war von Ihnen Januar angegeben und erhielten wir keinerlei Nachrichten. Wir erkennen Austausch Ideen als Hauptsache an. Diese war nicht unfruchtbar, aber gewiss zu beschränkt. Ihre Leitsätze wurden vervielfältigt und vorgelegt, auch in englischer Uebersetzung. Nach Behandlung Einzelpunkte wie Gewerkschaft, Parl. etc. war auch Allg. Aufruf auf der Tagesordnung, wurde aber nicht behandelt.

Die Konferenz kann auch m.E. nicht als v o l l berechtigt angesehen werden und wir werden die Resultate publizieren mit einer Einleitung von Gen. R.H., die die Bedeutung und Beschränkung beleuchten wird.

Ausser der Gewerkschaftsfrage, die von den amerik. Verhältnissen stark beeinflusst wurde und dabei eine notwendige Ergänzung zu den deutschen Gesichtspunkten bietet, wurde noch die russische Frage und die Einheitsfrage behandelt.

Es freut mich, dass die Beschwerden gegen Deutschland als Stelle für ein Zentralbüro anerkannt werden und verkenne nicht, dass Fehlen von direktem Impuls einer holländischen Bewegung Nachteile hat. Dass es schwer ist, taktische Differenzen in anderen Ländern zu erfassen, mag wahr sein, aber schwerer ist es noch, taktische Differenzen im eigenen Lande unparteiisch zu beurteilen.

Beschränkung wollen wir uns auferlegen, können uns aber nicht auf technisch-organisatorische Tätigkeit beschränken, obgleich wir dabei Vorsicht betrachten können. Oeftere Bürositzungen scheinen kaum möglich, aber wären uns höchst angenehm. Leichter wäre jedenfalls öfters zusammenzukommen mit Ihnen. Gemeinsame Redigierung des Bulletins ist unmöglich, schon wegen technischer Beschwerden. Die nächsten Nummern werden wohl der Konferenz gewidmet sein, aber wir werden dabei vermeiden, die Bedeutung zu überschätzen. Uebrigens hat die holländische Bourgeoispresse schon für einige Publizität gesorgt, die unsere Arbeit noch wieder erschweren wird.

Ueber die Konferenz Ende Mai werden wir Vorschläge machen und nur nach Ueberlegung mit Ihnen vorgehen.

Wir sind selbstverständlich bereit, Vorschläge, Kundgebungen, Korrespondenzen etc.

vom W.E.S. nach anderen Ländern, besondere England, Skandinavien und Amerika, sowie auch nach Spanien und Mexiko zu befördern, und im allgemeinen wird engster Kontakt gewünscht. Eine politische Leitung des W.E.S. als solches erkennen wir nicht an; in einigen wichtigen Fällen wäre aber eine gemeinschaftliche Aktion und gemeinsame Unterschriften nach meiner persönlichen Meinung wohl möglich.

Es was heute nicht möglich, mich mit Gen. R.H. und Wynkoop zu verständigen, werde aber Ihre Ausführungen dem Urteil dieser Genossen unterbreiten und Sie so bald als möglich benachrichtigen. Mit dieser kurzen Angabe werde ich wohl für heute mich begnügen müssen.

Mit Parteigruss.

gez. W.[*sic*] Rutgers.

(1) On the left side of the top the following is handwritten: “An die Exekutive zur Kenntnisnahme./J.G. [James Gordon]”

1-3-4

20.02.1920 Klara [Zetkin], “Bericht über die Konferenz in Amsterdam”
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/28/7-10]

BERICHT UEBER DIE KONFERENZ IN AMSTERDAM [1]

Die von dem holländischen Büro der III. Internationale für Anfang Februar nach Amsterdam einberufene Konferenz hat nur den bedingten engumgrenzten Wert einer unzulänglichen, vorbereitenden Teilkonferenz. Sie kann in keiner Hinsieht als berechtigt anerkannt werden. In Namen der kommunistischen Parteien Westeuropas u. Amerikas bindende Beschlüsse zu fassen. Es trifft nicht zu, was ihre Veranstalter behaupten: dass sie die bestvorbereitete u. erfolgreichste internationale Konferenz seit Kriegsausbruch sei. So lieb mir persönlich die führenden Kommunisten Hollands sind, so hoch ich sie menschlich schätze, hat doch Vorbereitung u. Verlauf der Konferenz gezeigt, dass sie weder theoretisch noch praktisch als revolutionäre Kämpfer auf der Höhe stehen u. allein die Aktionen der III. Internationale in Westeuropa bestimmen u. leiten können./ Die Zusammensetzung der Konferenz war ein Produkt des Zufalls, nicht planmässiger Vorbereitung. Ihr Ausgangspunkt war die Anwesenheit des Gen. Praina oder Fraina aus Amerika, der in der kommunistischen Partei dort eine Rolle spielte u. eines engl. Gen., der zu den Führern der shop-stewards-Bewegung gehört. Zu ihnen kam aus England Sylvia Pankhurst, für die Schweiz Gen. Herzog, der die selbstständig organisiert winzige Minderheit der Kommunisten vertritt, nicht die vielen Tausend, die heute noch in der schweizerischen Sozialdemokratie stehen. Für Deutschland ein aus Bremen bezogener Vertreter der Opposition. Niemand aus Frankreich, Italien, Skandinavien, Oesterreich u. den Balkanländern. Dafür ein Chinese u. 2. Vertreter aus Kolonialländern, wenn ich nicht irre, aus Indien, u. Westindien. Dazu eingelaufene Berichte aus Spanien usw. u. Zustimmungsschreiben aus Frankreich, Norwegen usw. Als Vertreter Russlands galten Rutgers u. ein anderer holländischer Gen. Die Konferenz war am 3. Febr. zusammengetreten. Die K.P.D. u. das Westeuropäische Sekretariat in Berlin waren erst am 31 Jan. eingeladen worden. Unter den in Deutschland herrschenden Verhältnissen war es ganz ausgeschlossen, dass Delegierte von dort bis zum 3. im Amsterdam eintreffen konnten. Die Konferenz musste vor ihrer Ankunft geschlossen werden, weil sie unzweifelhaft von Spitzeln verraten worden war. Vor ihrem Auseinandergehen hatte sie Beschlüsse gefasst, die holländischen Freunde als endgültende u. bindende auffassten. // Der sicheren Grenzüberschreitung wegen hatten sich die Delegierten, die aus Deutschland kamen, in 2 Parteien geteilt. Zuerst gingen die Männer über die Grenze, in der Nacht darauf Genossin [Rosa] Grimm, die Delegierte der Schweizer Partei u. ich. Als wir beide Mittwoche, den II. 2. [11. Februar] in Amsterdam ankamen, begaben wir uns sofort an den angegebenen Treff-punkt. Dort wurden von holländischen Gen. mit dem Ausruf empfangen. „Kehren Sie nur gleich wieder um. Wir alle sind nicht sicher, sind verraten worden. Die Konferenz hat bereits getagt u. beschlossen. Sylvia Pankhurst ist aufgefallen, wurde von der Polizei angehalten, hat sich unklug u. ungeschickt gehalten, die Adr. des Gen. angegeben, wo sie wohnte. Sie ist noch in A[msterdam].., aber niemand kann zu ihr, u. sie muss abreisen.“ Ich wendete ein, dass mich das wundere, da Sylvia einige Monate in Deutschland war u. sich klug u. zurückhaltend benahm. Daraufhin wurde uns mitgeteilt, die Hauptsache sei offenbart, dass ein Spitzel in unmittelbarer Beziehung zu Konferenzteilnehmern stehen müsse. Der Verdacht sei so gut wie erwiesen, dass der Freund des amerik. Gen. ein Spitzel sei. Herzog habe sich deshalb verstecken müssen u. sei völlig isoliert./ Wir erklärten, nicht eher zurückreisen zu können, bis wir die anderen Delegierten aus Deutschland gesprochen u. mit ihnen unsere Stellungnahme

vereinbart, ferner auch eine Aussprache mit führenden holländischen Kommunisten gehabt hatten. Es hiess, dass sei schwierig, weil unsere Freunde ausserhalb A.'s verborgen seien u. die Holländer bespitzelt würden. Da wir jedoch auf unserem Verlangen beharrten, sollte ein Zusammentreffen versucht werden. Nachmittags kamen wir mit Gen. [David J.] Wijnkoop zusammen, der das Angeführte bestätigte, über die Konferenz, die eben wiedergegebenen Mitteilungen machte u. das angezogene Werturteil abgab. Man vereinbarte für den Abend eine Zusammenkunft mit unseren Freunden u. den Holländern ausserhalb A.'s bei Rutgers. // Die Zusammenkunft fand statt, wir aus Deutschland, der Vertreter des Westeuropäischen Sekretariats, der Jugendinternationale u. der Schweizer Partei inbegriffen, erhielten kurzen Bericht der stattgehabten Konferenz u. Mitteilung ihrer Beschlüsse. Da wir nur diese eine Zusammenkunft haben sollten, mussten wir uns darauf beschränken, den Beschluss zu erörtern, den wir für den wichtigsten hielten, nämlich den Beschluss über Zusammensetzung u. Aufgaben des Westeuropäischen Büros der III. Internationale. Wir waren einmütig in seiner Ablehnung aus Gründen Praktisch-organisatorischer Zweckmässigkeit u. politischer Aktionsfähigkeit. Wir bemängelten die organisatorische Gliederung. Der Beschuss schafft anstelle des jetzigen Dualismus sogar eine Dreiteilung, allerdings letzten indes unter der organisatorischen u. politischen Leitung der Holländer allein. Er sieht vor das Weiterbestehen des Westeuropäischen Sekretariates in Deutschland für die Länder Osteuropas, das des Büros in Amsterdam für die Staaten Westeuropas, England inbegriffen, die Gründung eines Büros für Nord- u. Südamerika mit dem Sitz in Mexiko wegen der vermittelnden geographischen Lage des Landes u. weil dort augenblicklich führende Flüchtlinge aus ganz Amerika seien. Jedes Büro soll in seiner Atmosphäre ziemlich weitgehende Befugnisse haben, für die Führung u. Leitung internationaler Aktionen soll jedoch die Exekutive in Amsterdam ausschlaggebend sein. Es ist beschlossen, dass sie aus drei holländischen Gen. besteht, von denen zwei von den jeweiligen internationalen Konferenzen gewählt, einer von der holländischen kommunistischen Partei ernannt wird. Die Exekutive war bereits zusammengesetzt. Sie besteht aus Henriette Roland-Holst u. Rutgers, gewählt von der Konferenz u. Wijkoop als Vertreter der holl. Partei. // Wir bekämpften diese Art der Organisation, weil sie unserer Meinung nach zu Zersplitterung der Kräfte u. Aktionen führen könne, statt zu straffster Zusammenfassung der Kräfte u. Einheitlichkeit der Aktionen. Wir wendeten uns auch gegen sie im Hinblick auf die ausschlaggebende Rolle, die die Exekutive in A. haben sollte. Wir vertraten die Auffassung, der Sitz der Leitung könne nicht in einem Transitlande der Revolution sein, sondern müsse sich in einem ihrer entscheidenden Mittelpunkte befinden. Die rasche Stellungnahme zu den Problemen u. Aufgaben der Revolution erfolge am besten dort, wo die Revolution selbst oft über Macht Probleme u. Aufgaben stellt. Die geschichtlich gegeben Situation lasse Deutschland als den Sitz des Westeuropäischen Büros erscheinen dem dauernd Vertreter der wichtigsten europäischen Länder angehören müssten. Wir begründeten unsere Auffassung u. Forderung eingehend, ohne jedoch unser holländisches Freunden überzeugen zu können. Nach ihnen ist Holland der geschichtlich gegebene Sitz der Leitung, u. die holl. Gen. sind die theoretisch u. praktisch zur Exekutive Berufenen. Sie machten dafür auch einen angeblichen Ausspruch Lenins geltend, obgleich sie von einer Einholung der Ansicht der Moskauer Exekutive u. einer Vertagung der Entscheidung nichts wissen wollten. Gen. Wijnkoop vertrat die Auffassung, Deutschland sei überhaupt für die Weiterentwicklung der Revolution nicht entscheidend. Die Revolution suche sich stets die schwächsten Punkte aus. Sie werde daher zunächst in Indien u. den anderen engl. Kolonialländern weitergehen, von dort auf England u. Frankreich überspringen u. erst zuletzt Deutschland ergreifen. Der überwolfheimte Wolfheim. // Spät in der Nacht musste die Aussprache abgebrochen werden. Es ward beschlossen, sie am nächsten Vormittag in Anwesenheit des amerik. u. engl. Delegierten fortzusetzen, die früh benachrichtigt werden sollten. Gen. Grimm u. ich übernachteten bei Rutgers. Der Umstand ist wichtig für das Verständnis des Folgenden. Die Beratung ging wie verabredet am Donnerstag Vormittag weiter. Die beiden Gen. nahmen daran teil. Sie brachte von keiner Seite neue Gesichtspunkte. Das praktische Ergebnis war, dass wir den

Beschluss über die Büros u. die Leitung als ein Provisorium erklärten, u. dass die Holl. einwilligten, eine neue, allgemeine internationale Konferenz solle baldmöglichst stattfinden u. die Frage endgültig regeln. Bis dahin sollen Amsterdamer Büro u. Westeuropäisches Sekretariat weiterfunktionieren, soviel als möglich einheitlich u. nach brüderlicher Verständigung, soweit nötig u. unvermeidlich, jedes für sich. Die Einladung zur allgemeinen Konferenz solle gemeinschaftlich erfolgen. Zugelassen sei auch die revolutionäre Opposition in den einzelnen Ländern, soweit sie ausserhalb der R.P. stehe u. selbstständig organisiert sei. Rutgers teilte noch mit, dass der amerik. Gen. Fraina über Deutschland nach Russland wolle, um sich dort von dem Verdacht zu reinigen, er sei ein Regierungsagent u. Spitzel. Diese Anklage sei gegen ihn in Amerika auch in der eigenen Partei erhoben worden. Der bolschewistische Gesandte in New-York Gen. [Ludwig K.] M[artens]. sei leider von der Richtigkeit der Beschuldigung überzeugt u. habe das angebliche Beweismaterial dafür nach Moskau gesandt. P[F]raina wolle sich nun dort rechtfertigen, u. wir möchten ihm behilflich sein, nach Russland zu kommen. Da Rutgers versicherte, P[F]raina sei unschuldig u. ihn als seinen Freund bezeichnete, versprachen wir das. // Der Amerikaner u. Engländer gingen fort. Wir anderen blieben noch, um Einzelheiten zu besprechen. Gegen 5 Uhr verliessen Genossin Grimm u. ich R[utgers].'s Haus in Begleitung eines holl. Jugendgenossen, der nach A. zurückbegleiten sollte, damit wir nicht als Fremde auffiele. Als wir nach dem Perron gingen, stürzten uns drei Männer nach, die am Eingang postiert waren, hielten uns als „Fremde" fest, forderten unsere Pässe, u. da diese zwar in Ordnung, aber nicht visiert waren, verhafteten sie uns u. brachten uns schliesslich nach Amsterdam auf die Fremdenpolizei. Dort wurden wir verhört, körperlich untersucht, ohne, dass man eine Zeile, einen Namen, eine Adresse bei uns gefunden hatte. Wir sagten aus, dass wir Donnertag, den 12 gegen Mittag in Amsterdam angekommen seien wo ich als internationale Sekretarin der Frauen mit mehreren Genossinnen, so-Frau Wibout, Pothurs-Smit u. Hele[e]n Ankersmit wegen einer längst geplanten Frauenkonferenz Rücksprache nehmen wollte. Hier hatten wir uns durch den Sonnenschein verlocken lassen, zunächst einen Ausflug in die Umgebung zu machen, zunächst nach einem Oertchen vor der Station, wo wir verhaftet worden seien, dass nach dem betreffenden Villenort, wir selbst dort spazieren gegangen, kannten niemand u. hatten mit niemand verkehrt. Genug, die Behörden erfuhren nichts u. konnten nichts nachweisen. Das Um- u. Auf unserer Verhaftung ist für Sie nicht interessant. Der Jugendgen. hatte den sozialdemokratischen Gen. Wibout davon benachrichtigt, der zweite Bürgermeister von A. ist u. sehr ritterlich für uns intervenierte. Wir wurden bis zur Abschiebung durch die Polizei in seinem Hause interniert, gegen das Ehren Oertliche Versprechen, mit niemand, als einigen bezeichneten Frauen zusammenzukommen. Ein Zusammentreffen mit Helen Ankersmit sogar in Anwesenheit eines Polizeibeamten wurde mir verwehrt, wahrscheinlich, weil sie als Kommunistin bekannt ist. Da wir erledigt hatten, was wir überhaupt erledigen konnten, war es uns nicht schwer, das geforderte Ehrenwort zu geben. // Wichtig ist der folgende Tatbestand. Ich wurde von dem Chef der Polizei in strenges Verhör genommen. Er sagte mir. „Frau Klara Zetkin. Sie sind zu einer internationalen Konferenz der Kommunisten nach hier gekommen. Sie sind höchstwahrscheinlich schon lange hier." Ich bestritt das mit den obigen Angaben. Er darauf. „Jedenfalls weiss ich ganz genau, dass Sie heute eine internationale Zusammenkunft gehabt haben, zu der die Teilnehmer gerade unter dem Hinweis darauf eingeladen worden seien ??? [*sic*] ihr teilnehmen würden. Diese Zusammenkunft hat im Hause Rutgers stattgefunden, u. man hat Sie dabei gesehen." Ich bestritt natürlich auch das alles, behauptete, dass mich niemand in einem Hause gesehen haben könne, dass mir unbekannt sei u. forderte, dass mir die Leute gegenübergestellt würden, die unter Eid aussagten, mich im Hause R. bei einer internationalen Zusammenkunft gesehen zu haben. Der Beamte blieb die Antwort schuldig, suchte aber vergeblich zu erfahren, wo wir in Amsterdam über Nacht geblieben waren, er wusste also offenbar nichts von der Sitzung des Abends vorher u. dem Uebernachten bei R., dagegen war er genau informiert über die Sitzung bei R., an der der engl. u. amerik. Gen. teilgenommen hatten. Ich muss daraus schlussfolgern, dass die Denunziation

u. Bespitzelung von Leuten ausgegangen sein muss, die den beiden nahestehen. Der holl. Jugendgen. erklärte, man sei nun sicher, dass der verdächtige Freund des amerik. Gen. der Spitzel sei. Vielleicht ist es aber auch dieser selbst. Der Zufall fügte es, dass ich im Hause Wibout einen Gen. traf, der mit dem russischen Gesandten in New-York viel verkehrte. Dieser Gen. hatte keine Ahnung von unserer Konferenz u. ihren Nachspielen. Er erzählte mir. Gen. M. habe ihn beauftragt, in Europa eindringlich vor P[F]raina zu warnen, er sei nachweislich Regierungsagent, Spitzel, u. Lockspitzel, ein gefährlicher Bursche, sollte er das nicht sein, so ist er jedenfalls leichtsinnig u. verkehrt freundschaftlich mit einem Spitzel. Ich teile Ihnen das mit, für den Fall, dass P[F]raina zu Ihnen kommen sollte./ Doch revenons à nos moutons. Das Geschehene erweist jedenfalls, dass der Sitz der Westeuropäischen Exekutive der III. Internationale nicht in Holland sein kann. Dass die holl. Gen. völlig der praktischen Erfahrung durch die Schule der Revol. ermangeln, um international organisieren u. leiten zu können. Die uns entwickelten Ansichten u. ihre Stellungnahme zu vorliegenden Problemen zeigt auch, dass ihre theoretische Erkenntnis dieser Aufgabe nicht gewachsen ist. Roland-Holst u. Gorter scheinen grundsätzliche Antiparlamentarier zu sein. Pannekoek ist taktisch für den Parlamentarismus in Holland, gegen ihn in Deutschland, Wijnkoop Parlamentarier. Pannekoek hat in der unverantwortlichsten Weise in unsere Parteistreitigkeiten eingegriffen, was er darüber in dem Bulletin des Amsterdamer Bureaus berichtet, lässt jede Objektivität vermisse, ist einseitige Parteinahme, überhaupt die Holländer sind geblieben, was sie jederzeit für die Theorie u. Praxis des Sozialismus waren: die verlangweiligsten, verlederten u. verseichtbeutelten Kautzkys der „guten Zeit“ dieses ihres Meisters. Sie wollen fortsetzen, was sie früher schon übten: sich mittels der Internationale das Ansehen u. den Einfluss zu erringen, die sie auf Grund ihrer Politik in ihrer Heimat nie erobern konnten. Ihr einziger Rechtstitel auf die Leitung der Internationale in Westeuropa ist das Geld. Die K.P.D. kann diesen Unfug nicht mitmachen. Es ist selbstverständlich, dass sie herzlichst die brüderlichen Mitarbeiter der Holländer als wertvoll begrüsse, das Geleithammelt-werden-durch sie kann sie nicht zugeben. Sie muss alle Kraft aufbieten, durch gute internationale Verbindungen eine wirklich allgemeine internationale Konferenz zusammenzubringen u. durch das Beispiel ihrer wirklich revolutionären Politik u. Aktion dem Westeuropäischen Proletariat wegweisend voranzugehen, ihnen die revolutionären Werte zu übermitteln u. lebendig zu machen, die SOWJETRUSSLAND ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! geschaffen hat u. schafft.

20. Februar, 1920.

Bericht schrieb Klara [Zetkin], -Weiteres folgt mit der grossen Post.-

Gruss J.G. [James Gordon]

(1) In less than a week Zetkin gave the second report (“Die internationale Lage und Bericht von der internationalen Konferenz in Amsterdam”) in the Third Congress of the KPD on 26 February 1920. It was arranged more neatly than the first report and told starting from the beginning of conflict before the Conference. *Bericht über den 3. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (Spartakusbund) am 25. und 26. Februar 1920* (Berlin, n.d.), S. 69-84.

1-4 Conflicts over the Decision on Dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

1-4-1 09.05.1920 Fritz [Ström] to T[rotter].
[РГАСПИ, 497/2/5/18; РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/14]

1-4-2 10.05.1920 "Erklärung" (signed by H. Roland Holst / S.J. Rutgers / D.J. Wijnkoop)
[РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/22-24 (signed); 497/1/9/7-9; (draft) 581/1/95/19-21]

1-4-3 12.05.1920 Fritz [Ström] to T[rotter].
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/9/2; 581/1/95/18]

1-4-4 14.05.1920 Trotter to the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/172/60/21-23 (signed); 497/1/9/10-12; 581/1/95/26-28]

1-4-5 n.d. [after 07.08.1920] A. Pannekoek/H. Gorter/H. Roland Holst to the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/172/61/17 (handwritten; signed but not all in person)]

1-4-1

09.05.1920 Fritz [Ström] to T[rotter].
[РГАСПИ, 497/2/5/18; РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/14]

COPIE

STOCKHOLM 9/5-[19]20.

ontvangen 15/5-20.

Lieber Genosse T[rotter].

In Anschluss an meine Telegramme vom 7/5 und zu Beantwortung Ihres Briefes vom 25/4 folgendes:

Nachdem wir Ihre kurze Mitteilung, dass Sie nichts gegen Kristiania haben, bekommen hatten, hatten wir eine gemeine Beratschlagung zusammen mit den Norw. Genossen über die Konferenzfrage. Obgleich der Partei Kongress der Norw. Partei am Ende Mai ist, wurde einstimmig von praktischen Gründe beschlossen, dass der Konferenz nach dem gehalten werden wird. Gleich wurde eine Mitteilung an Sie nach Berlin, England und Russland geschickt. Nach erhalten Ihres Birefes vom 25/5[25/4] hatten wir eine neue Beratschlagung, wo wir noch einmal derselbe Beschluss angenommen wurden. Sie schrieben, dass eine illegale Reise fast unmöglich für Sie ist. Eine legale Reise nach Kristiania können die Norw. Genossen nur im Zusammenhang des Parteikongresses ordnen. Dies ist eine von den Tatsachen auf der wir unsren Beschluss gründen. Zweitens hatten wir soeben von der Exekutive der 3-ten Intern. ein Bericht bekommen, dass man auf einer intern. Konferenz in Petrograd am Ende April beschlossen hatte den Kongress der dritten Internationale am 15-ten Juli zu halten, und wenn die Reise nach Russland mindestens einen Monat in Anspruch nimmt, ist dann die Kristiania-Konferenz in der von Ihr vorgeschlagenen Zeit zu spät zu halten. Drittens hatten wir eine Einladung schon per Rario nach Russland und per Briefe an unsren Freunden in andren Ländern geschickt.

Die Konferenz wird jetzt zu der von uns bestimmten Zeit gehalten werden. Auf der Konferenz wird hauptsächlich die Fragen mit dem organisatorischen Charakter behandelt worden. Sie befasst sich gar nicht mit den prinzipiellen Fragen, weil Sie kein recht daran hat.

Wir haben ein Telegramm aus Moskau bekommen, wo mitgeteilt wird, dass die Exekutive der 3-ten Intern. das Mandat des Holl. Komitees aufgehoben hat und dass das West-Europäische Sekretariat in Berlin das Bestimmungsrecht über die West-Europäische Tätigkeit der 3-ten Intern. hat Diese Telegramm ist an Rosta hier angekommen und haben wir später Bekräftigung erhalten. Unsre Erfahrungen über die Tätigkeit des W.E.S. ist leider nicht gut. Wir bedauern dass die Exekutive einen solchen Schritt genommen hat, glauben aber dass alles noch gut geordnet wird.

Bitte sogleich über den Kongress der 3-tern Intern. am 15 Juli in Russland allen Komm. Parteien und Organisationen mit den Sie Verbindungen haben zu berichten.

Genosse Eliasson ist hier gewesen und hat uns erzählt, dass Sie den Kalender erhaltet haben. Meine Adresse ist noch gut und habe ich alle Ihre Briefe erhalten. Bitte grüssen Sie die Genossen. Mit brüderlichem Gruss FRITZ.

1-4-2

10.05.1920 "Erklärung" (signed by H. Roland Holst / S.J. Rutgers / D.J. Wijnkoop)
[РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/22-24 (signed); 497/1/9/7-9; (draft) 581/1/95/19-21]

ERKLÄRUNG*

Der Amsterdamer Zweig-Bureau der Kommunistischen Internationale hat Kenntnis genommen von einem Rosta-Bericht vom 4-ten Mai laut dessen am 30-ten April 1920 vom Exekutive Komitee der Komm. Intern. in Moskau beschlossen wurde das Mandat des Amsterdamer Bureaus zu beendigen und seine Funktion dem West-Europäischen Sekretariat zu übertragen.

Es wird weiterhin ein Internationaler Kongress in Aussicht gestellt, einzuberufen vom Exekutive Komitee in Moskau und Radek wird als allgemeiner Sekretär auftreten.

Obgleich die Mitteilung uns so weit nicht offiziell bestätigt wurde und jedenfalls der Form des Beschlusses uns nicht genau bekannt ist, glauben wir doch die allgemeine Richtigkeit annehmen zu müssen und bemerken dazu folgendes:

In ganz West-Europa und Amerika bestehen unter den Kommunisten Meinungsverschiedenheiten, die zur Bildung verschiedener Gruppen und sogar Parteien in fast allen Ländern Anlass gegeben haben. Dabei treten deutlich zwei Tendenzen hervor, eine mehr opportunistische Richtung, die Anschluss nach rechts sucht und ein Linker Flügel, der auf prinzipielle Propaganda und direkte Aktion der Massen unter Ausschliessung von alten bürgerlichen Organisationsformen und Auffassungen grösseren Wert legt.

Das Amsterdamer Bureau hat es als seine Pflicht betrachtet, in Anschluss an die bis jetzt verfolgte Politik in Moskau, die linken Gruppen so weit sie auf den Boden des Kommunismus stehen, auch wenn diese in der Minorität sind anzuerkennen und zu unterstützen. Das Bureau steht auf die Standpunkte dass jetzt zwar in der Richtung einer grösseren Einheit der Kommunistischen Bewegung in West-Europa gearbeitet werden kann, dass aber für eine einheitlich geleitete Internationale Bewegung die Verhältnisse nicht gegeben sind. Eine einheitliche straff disziplinierte internationale Organisation herbeizuführen ist heute noch unmöglich und wäre überhaupt unter dem Kapitalismus nur zu verwirklichen als Einheit der konsequenten Linken Flügel in einer illegalen internationalen Organisation.

Das W.E.S., ohne dazu aus Moskau ein Mandat bekommen zu haben hat sich gegenüber dem von Moskau eingesetzten Bureau gebildet und sich immer mehr von Deutsch-nationalen Parteierwägungen leiten lassen. Ausser den technischen Sekretär sind alle Mitglieder in engster Beziehung mit der Zentrale des Spartakusbundes und billigen die exklusive und opportunistische Politik dieser Zentrale. Ausnahme macht nur der offizielle Vertreter der Jugend-Internationale.

Es wurde vom Amsterdamer Bureau versucht eine Teilung der Arbeit und eine Zusammenwirkung herbeizuführen, was jedoch durch zwei Umstände immer schwieriger wurde. Erstens machte die Haltung der Mitglieder des W.E.S., ihre unaufrichtig-unkameradschaftliche Kniffe etc. eine Zusammenarbeit äusserst schwierig; zweitens erregte ihre opportunistische Politik in verschiedenen Ländern und Gruppen Missbilligung. Hier hat gewiss Radek einen grossen und u.E. verhängnisvollen Einfluss gehabt, wodurch nicht nur in Deutschland die Unterschiede auf der Spitze getrieben wurden, sondern auch international einen grossen Ruck nach rechts gemacht ist.

Über die Opportunität davon kann man verschieden urteilen und wir müssen jetzt annehmen, dass Moskau [sich] mit dieser Politik, wie sie ausführlich in dem Programmschrift „die Taktik der Kommunistischen Parteien in den Kämpfen um die Diktatur des Proletariats" von Karl Radek

dargelegt ist, einverstanden erklärt.

Indessen ist in West Europa der Unwillen gegen das W.E.S. schnell gewachsen und haben sich die Verbindungen von unsrem Bureau mit den verschiedenen Parteien und Gruppen [+ draft: schnell] ausgedehnt.

Wir haben jetzt Verkehr mit fünf Gruppen in England (B.S.P., W.S.F., I.L.P. [Independent Labour Party], S.L.P. [Socialist Labour Party], S.S. & W.C. [Shop Stewards and Workers Committees]) auch mittels Kuriere; mit drei Gruppen in Amerika (C.P. [Communist Party], C.L.P. [Communist Labor Party], I.W.W.) auch mit Kurieren; mit der Norwegischen Partei; mit Schweden (Kuriere); mit Belgien (Kuriere); mit Deutschland (Kuriere); mit drei Gruppen in Frankreich (Comm. de la 3-ième Int., Vie Ouvrière und Féd. des Soviets); mit Spanien (die neue Komm. Partei und Syndikalisten), so wie auch durch Spanien mit Mexiko; mit der Schweiz (Komm. Partei, Jugendbew. und weniger mit der Opposition in der S.P. Welti-Grimm); mit Italien, obgleich bis jetzt nicht mit der dort schnell wachsenden Opposition; mit Ostenreich und durch Ostenreich mit Polen; mit Bulgarien; mit Süd-Afrika; mit Japan und was auch nicht ohne Bedeutung ist mit Niederländisch-Indien.

Mit dem Balkan haben wir bis jetzt weniger Beziehungen unterhalten, weil wir dies als das mehr direkte Aktionsfeld für das W.E.S. betrachteten. Es zeigt sich aber, dass auch dort gegen die Leitung des W.E.S. wegen seines opportunistischen Charakters Bedenken bestehen.

Diese Bedenken sind ziemlich allgemein. Wir weisen auf eine öffentliche Erklärung des Kongresses der Schweizerischen Komm. Partei, so wie auch der Jugend Internationale. Charakteristisch ist auch das Urteil dreier Genossen, die nach der Amsterdamer Konferenz ein paar Monate in Berlin verbleiben mussten: der Sekretär der C.P. in Amerika L.C. Fraina, ein Vertreter der englischen Shopstewards- bewegung J.T. Murphy und Borodin, die mehrere Länder in Europa und Amerika besuchte. Alle drei waren einstimmig darüber, dass das W.E.S. als internationales Organ ein Unding ist und das Amst. Bureau sich gelten lassen soll, wäre es nur um das Treiben Berlins zu durchkreuzen.

Wir werden nicht verkennen, dass sich so allmählich ein bedauerlicher Antagonismus entwickelt hat zwischen Berlin und Amsterdam und dass eine Klärung und grössere Einheit höchst erwünscht sind. Dazu sollte der nächste Kongress benutzt werden und es kann uns nur angenehm sein, wenn dieser Kongress von Moskau einberufen wird.

Wir erachten es aber bedauerlich dass man in Moskau nach einseitigen Mitteilungen [+ draft: speziell von Radek,] sich dazu entschliesst das W.E.S. eine offizielle Sanktion zu geben. Ist man mit Amsterdam unzufrieden, und mit der dort getriebenen Politik nicht einverstanden, so kann man selbstverständlich ein gegebenes Mandat zurückziehen, obgleich auch das, kurz vor dem Kongresse nur demonstrative und wenig praktische Bedeutung hat, und man doch auch damit rechnen sollte, dass wir unsre Politik stützen auf die Beschlüsse einer Konferenz, die doch jedenfalls von England und Amerika besucht war und die Probleme in fünftägigen Diskussionen gründlich behandelte. Sich aber für einen so stark kompromittierten Organ als das W.E.S. zu erklären, hat eine sehr bedenkliche Seite und lässt sich nur aus Unbekanntheit mit den Verhältnissen in West-Europa erklären.

Wer aber eine so überwiegende Stellung in der Internationale einnimmt sollte sich für unnötigen voreiligen Entscheidungen besonders in Acht nehmen.

Wir halten die Handhabung der Russischen Soviet Republik für die alles weit überragende Aufgabe in der Internationalen Politik, und sind uns der unendlichen Schwierigkeiten ihrer Lage und den übermenschlichen Aufopferungen bewusst.

Man kann aber nichtsdestoweniger der Meinung sein, dass nur schärfster Kampf der Arbeiter in West-Europa die Situation retten kann, dass dagegen alle Friedensperspektive leider Illusionen bleiben müssen, wenn nicht das West-Europäische Proletariat endlich in Bewegung kommt.

Das war die Auffassung vieler russischen Freunden und wir glauben dass dies auch heute noch zutrifft. Der Prozess dauert unendlich lang, wir schwitzen Blut vor Ungeduld, und könnten wir Sie

retten durch Opportunismus wir wurden uns schnell bekehren. Sie haben uns aber das Gegenteil nur zu gut gelehrt und die West-Europäischen Arbeiter werden leider nicht in Bewegung kommen bis ihre Lebensmöglichkeiten, ihre uralten bürgerlichen Ideologien und Organisationen erschüttert werden. Der Zusammenbruch des Kapitalismus arbeitet stärker als unsre Propaganda, und wir gehen noch immer unaufhaltsam dem Chaos entgegen. Da helfen keine Schlauheit und kein Opportunismus. Eine klare, aktionsbewusste kommunistische Partei kann hier nur Dienste leisten.

Wir werden weiterhin nicht mehr in Namen Moskaus sprechen und nur unsre laufenden Sachen bis zum nächsten Kongresse besorgen. Wir sind uns unsrer Unzulänglichkeit voll bewusst und werden die Arbeit gerne besseren Händen übergeben. Nur möchten wir für die Gefahr, der zu grossen Einseitigkeit warnen. Es soll dabei von vornherein feststehen, dass wir uns der Entscheidung eines Kongresses vorbehaltlos und loyal fügen werden [+ draft: , da man ja selbstverständlich über den besten Ort für ein Zentralbureau verschieden urteilen kann]. Würde man sich aber entschliessen das W.E.S. unter dem Einflusse der Zentrale der K.P.D. einfach fortzuführen, dann sind wir überzeugt, dass die Einheit in West-Europa noch weiter hinausgeschoben wird. Eine einheitliche disziplinierte kommunistische Internationale ist nur möglich wenn auch mit den linken Flügeln volle Rechnung gehalten wird. Die Opposition ist das Gewissen der Partei, eine Garantie gegen Versteinerung und das Versprechen für die Zukunft.

Amsterdam 10 Mai 1920.

[sign:] Henriette Roland Holst
S.J. Rutgers
D.J. Wynkoop

1-4-3

12.05.1920 Fritz [Ström] to T[rotter].
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/9/2; 581/1/95/18]

COPIE. STOCKHOLM. 12/5-[19]20.
(Ontvangen 15/5-20).

Genosse T[rotter].

Hierdurch sende ich eine beglaubigte Abschrift von dem Briefe der Exekutive der 3-ten Komm. Intern., den wir heute bekommen haben.

Der Briefe ist vom folgenden Inhalt:

Das Holländische Bureau hat in einer Anzahl wichtiger Fragen eine Stellung eingenommen (Gewerkschaftsfrage, Parlamentarismus), die gegen die Stellung der Exekutive der 3-ten Komm. Intern. ausläuft. Das Holländische Bureau hat die Exekutive von seiner entgegengesetzten Stellung nicht in Kenntnis gesetzt, bevor es die Intern. Konferenz in Amsterdam einberief. Auf Grund dessen erklärt die Exekutive das Mandat des Holländischen Bureaus als erloschen und zieht dieses Mandat zurück.

Die Exekutive beauftragt ihren genferes [ihrem engeren] Bureau einen ausführlichen Brief darüber den Holländischen Genossen zu senden. Die Funktionen des Holländischen Bureaus werden dem West-Europäischen Sekretariat übertragen. Das Skandinavische Bureau in Stockholm wird beauftragt den Rechenschaftsbericht und den Rest des Geldes, wie auch der Wertsachen in Empfang zu nehmen.

Für die Exekutive der Komm. Int. Sekretär

K. Radek

Petrograd 25/4-20.

Auf der Konferenz in Kristiania ist unbedingt die Anwesenheit ihres Repräsentanten zu erwarten. Er soll einen vollständigen Bericht über ihre Rechenschaften mit sich haben, weil wir denselben in Empfang zu nehmen beauftragt worden sind.

Mit brüderlichen Gruss:

Fritzü [Fritz]

1-4-4

14.05.1920 Trotter to the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/172/60/21-23 (signed); 497/1/9/10-12; 581/1/95/26-28]

Amsterdam 14 Mai 1920.

An das Ex. Komm. der Komm. Intern.

Anschliessend an unsrer „Erklärung“ bemerken wir noch folgendes auf Grund näherer Mitteilungen.

Es wird behauptet, dass Amsterdam in allen Fragen eine dem Exekutivkomitee entgegengestellte Stellung einnimmt-

Diese Behauptung ist uns vollkommen unverständlich, da wir immer versucht haben in Einklang zu sein mit den Beschlüssen und Ausserungen, wie diese uns aus Moskau bekannt sind.

In der Frage des Parlamentarismus haben wir uns ganz gestellt auf dem Boden des Rundschreibens wie es bei meiner Abreise vorlag. Dass wir keineswegs gegen die Teilnahme an parlamentarische Tätigkeit sind, geht schon hervor aus dem Umstande, dass zwei der Mitglieder [Wijnkoop und van Ravesteyn] die von Ihnen in dem Amsterd. Bureau angewiesen sind, selber in Holländischen Parlament sitzen —

Es wurde aber immer in Moskau anerkennt, dass es Situationen geben kann, die eine Beteiligung am Parlament unratsam machen und weiter, dass Verschiedenheit der Meinung in dieser Angelegenheit nicht ein Hindernis zu Zugehörigkeit der dritten Intern. bilden sollte. Damit ist unsre Haltung durchwegs in Uebereinstimmung. Es scheint, dass man jetzt in Moskau der Beteiligungen an den Wahlen einen grösseren Wert beilegt, da man eine Ablehnung in „flagrante“ Widerstreit zu den proletarischen Interessen, und als „leere Phrase“ andeutet, ohne jede weitere Ausnahme.

Das bedeutet jedenfalls eine Aenderung im Standpunkt des Exektivkomitees, die ons [uns] niemals zur Kenntnis gebracht wurde und die ohne weitere Begründung nur noch grössere Verwirrung bringen kann. Wie verhält man sich z.B. zur Ablehnung der Parlamentswahlen durch Oesterreichischen Genossen?

Ein zweiter Punkt bildet die Gewerkschaften.

Wir haben uns niemals dagegen erklärt, dass man unter Umständen in den Gewerkschaften den Kampf von innen ausführt. Nur ist es eine lebendige Tatsache, dass neben den alten Gewerkschaften auch neuere revolutionäre ökonomische Organisationen sich bilden und es war doch gewiss immer die Ansicht auch in Moskau, die revolutionären Gewerkschaften nach Kräften zu unterstützen — Haben nicht gerade unsre russischen Gewerkschaftsfreunde die revolutionären Gewerkschaften der Welt, die sich zur 3-ten Intern.-bekennen zu einem Kongress aufgerufen! Wo reaktionäre und revolutionäre Gewerkschaften nebeneinander bestehen, wird man doch wohl die letztere bevorzugen dürfen? Aber auch wo diese noch nicht bestehen, kann es doch gewiss eine Situation geben, die zur Schaffung solcher Organismen günstig ist.

Jedenfalls war doch immer die Auffassung, dass man die reaktionären Gewerkschaften bekämpfen muss, auch wenn man in derselben hineingeht und dass es nicht genügt, einfach an Stelle der alten Führer neue zu bringen, da eine einfach Personsänderung doch schwerlich ein System umändern kann.

Abgelehnt haben wir somit niemals, die Gewerkschaften von ihnen aus revolutionär zu durchbringen, dass heisst diese umzugestalten und in Ihrer alten Form zu zerstören und aufzuheben. Es scheint aber, dass jetzt in Moskau die ganze Aktion auf eine Art friedlichen

Durchdringung zugeschnitten werden soll, was allerdings mit den Verhältnissen in verschiedenen Ländern, ich weise nur auf Amerika, in Wiederspruch steht.

Wir sind zwar der Meinung, dass man solche Genossen die es mit revolutionären Gewerkschaften versuchen wollen, nicht der Zutritt zur Komm. Intern. verweigern soll, um so weniger, wo die Verbürgerlichung in West-Europa und Amerika so tief in den Reihen des Proletariats eingedrungen ist.

Was die Einheit der Parteien und Gruppen in den verschiedenen Ländern anbetrifft, so scheint uns jetzt, dass Moskau überall eine straffe Zentralisation und Disziplin durchführen will. Bis jetzt war das nicht die Ansicht, da man alle mögliche linksstehende Gruppe immer aufgefordert hat auf verschiedenen Wege nach Moskau zu kommen. Man hat die Syndikalisten, Sozial-Anarchisten etc. immer aufgefordert, sowie man diese Schichten auch in Russland selbst zur Mitwirkung herangezogen hat. Bei den Verhältnissen wie diese in West-Europa bestehen ist dies einfach nicht auf kurzer Frist möglich durch Zusammenbringen in einer zentralisierten Partei, wohl aber nach unsrer Meinung in einer gemeinschaftlichen Aktion. Wo die Informationen über die Aussenwelt in Moskau so spärlich sind, hat das Vorauslaufen auf einen Intern. Kongress unter völliger Ausschaltung der eigens angewiesenen Genossen uns nicht wenig gewundert. Wir haben gemeint die linken Gruppen nicht unnötig abstossen zu müssen, dagegen dem immer wankelmütigen Zentrum gegenüber der revolutionären Tat als das entscheidende entgegenführen zu müssen. Auch dies meinten wir, war im Geiste unsrer russischen Freunden. Ich verweise z.B. auf einen Artikel des Genossen Lenins in der Komm. Intern., wo er Herrn [Ernst] Däumig vorwirft, sich wegwerflich [wegwerfend] über Putschisten geäussert zu haben.

Heutzutage befleissigen sich reaktionäre Parteien wie die Amerikanische S.P. u.a., um der Intern. in Moskau beizutreten und wir glauben in Uebereinstimmung mit der alten Taktik zu sein, wenn wir uns dagegen gewehrt haben.

Zuletzt oder besser als erste und wichtigste Aufgabe, haben wir uns über das Verhalten West-Europas zu Russland ausgesprochen und zu Taten aufgefordert. Dabei stellten wir uns auf den Standpunkt, dass nur eine Erhebung in West-Europa, oder wenigstens nur revolutionäre Aktionen im Stande sein können die Russischen Revolution zu Hilfe zu kommen. Wir haben von Anfang bestritten, dass ein wirklicher Frieden von den Kapitalisten mit Soviet-Russland möglich sei, ohne einen starken Druck von den Arbeitern in West-Europa. Auf die Amsterdamer Konferenz in Anfang Februar haben wir für ein Offensive schon gewarnt. Unser Maiaufruf war daran ganz gewidmet und hatte auch einigen Erfolg. Am 17-ten April als Japan vorging, haben wir wi[e]der einen Aufruf erlassen und die Offensive vom Westen vorausgesagt und dagegen schon zur Tat aufgerufen, was vom W.E.S. erst ein Par Wochen spätererfolgte. Wir haben hier eine sehr konsequente Linie gefolgt und glauben damit im Einverständnis mit solchen Genossen als Lenin, [N.I.] Bucharin, [J.] Berzin u.a. zu handeln.

Zwar entging es uns nicht, dass das auswärtige Ambt [(Dutch) = Amt] in Soviet-Russland die Friedens- und Handelsvorschläge sehr ernst nahm und alles versuchte um diese zu befördern. Diese Politik war aber eine selbstverständliche und brauchte noch nicht die Intern. in Moskau zu beeinflussen. Zinovief [G.E. Zinoviev] hat sogar sehr offenherzig und klar der Unterschied zwischen die Haltung Soviet-Russlands als solches und die Internationale klargelegt.

Für ein Organ der Internationale in West-Europa scheint uns die Sache aber ganz einleuchtend, denn für uns muss die Gelegenheit einer Aktion zu Gunsten Soviet-Russlands voll ausgenutzt werden. Die Massen einschlafen zu lassen in der Meinung, dass „Frieden“ kommen wird, oder dass Russland sich selbst schon helfen wird, wäre einfach ein Verbrechen. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass wir auch hier in Uebereinstimmung mit den Tatsachen waren. Was bleibt dann aber von dieser schweren öffentlichen Anschuldigung?

Mit komm. Gruss

G.L. Trotter

[sign:] G.L. Trotter

1-4-5

n.d. [after 07.08.1920] A. Pannekoek / H. Gorter / H. Roland Holst to the ECCI [1]
[РГАСПИ, 495/172/61/17 (handwritten by Gorter; signed but not all in person)]

An das Exekutiv-Komitee der dritten Internationale.

Die Unterzeichneten, die Marxistischen Mitglieder des ehemaligen von der dritten Internationale ernannten Amsterdamer Büro's, protestieren hiermit gegen die Taktik, die vom 2 en Kongresse der dritten Internationale in den Fragen der Gewerkschaften und des Parlamentarismus angenommen wurde. Sie sehen in dieser Taktik, wie auch in der Aufnahme vieler nicht-revolutionär kommunistischen Elemente in die dritte Internationale, den Beweis eines neuen Opportunismus, der der Arbeiterklasse, der Weltrevolution und besonders der russischen Revolution nur Unheil bringen wird, und sie weisen darum jede Verantwortlichkeit für diese Taktik ab.

A. Pannekoek
H. Gorter
Henriette Roland Holst

(1) a receipt stamp: Архив / КОМИНТЕРН / No. 829 / МОСКВА

2 PROCEEDINGS AND POLICE REPORTS

2-1 Proceedings

2-1-1

Conference of the 3d International,
held at Amsterdam, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Febr. 1920 [(1)].

1st Session.

Tuesday 3 Febr. 3 P.M., Amsterdam.

§1. Opening.

Comrade R u t g e r s opens the meeting with a brief statement, showing how this conference came about in connection with instructions from the Executive Committee of the Comm. International in Moscow.

Comrade [Fred] W i l l i s (B.S.P.) objects to the admittance of one of the persons present, who accompanies Comrade [Louis C.] Fraina as a courier. Comrade Fraina fully answering for this person he is not excluded, Comrade Willis declaring himself satisfied if his protest is recorded in the minutes of the congress.

§2. Standing order Committee.

Comrade R u t g e r s suggests the following comrades as member of the Standing Order Committee:

[Edouard] van Overstraeten, Belgium,
Wijnkoop & Roland Holst, Holland,
Fraina, America,
[John F.] Hodgson, England;

Two seats to be left open for other delegates, that have not yet arrived: Agreed. Comrade Wijnkoop is appointed as chairman. Comrade Wijnkoop reads the list of the delegates and other persons present (secretaries and interpreters)

More delegates from Scandinavia, Germany, Switzerland, Russia and German-Austria are expected. Letters of sympathy have come in from Yugo Slavony [*sic*] from Rob[ert]. Williams (Triple Alliance) and from Merino Gracia (Spain). It is suggested to give every country 3 votes. Agreed. Comrade [Gerrit] Mannoury will act as a secretary. The following agenda is agreed upon:

1 Opening.

2 Election of officers.

3 Reports of Delegates.

4 Action against counterrev. intervention in Soviet-Russia and other Soviet Republics.

5 Parliamentarism.

6 Unionism and Soviets.

7 Nationalization and control of industry.

8 Peasants and the Revolution.

9 Anti-militarism and the Red Army.

10 Uniting groups into Communist Parties in various countries.

11 Organization of an International Bureau.
- a functions.
- b composition.
- c mutual intercourse.
- d relations with other groups.
- e attitude towards Centrists.
- f relations in regard to foreign representatives of Soviet-Republics.

12 Manifests and resolutions.
- a Manifests to the West Eur. and Am. proletariat.
- b Resolution concerning persecutions specially in Hungary, Germany and America.
- c Resolution about freedom of intercourse, passes, censor, espionage, etc.
- d Resolution about the League of Nations.

13 Organization of the next Congress: place and time.

§3. Reports of the delegates.

It is resolved every delegation will send in a written report, to be published, as far as possible, in three languages. Comrade Fraina reports orally about the American Movement and about the persecutions to which the Communist Party, the Communist Labour Party and the I.W.W. are subjected.

2nd Session.

Wednesday 4 Febr. 2.15 P.M.

Comrade Wijnkoop reads letters of sympathy from [Fernand] Loriot and [Boris] Souvarine (France). A Chinese comrade Kwa Yoan Sioe requests to be admitted to the conference as a guest. Agreed.

§4. Action against Intervention in Russia.

Comrade Roland Holst gives a preamble to the subject, pointing out, that although a direct military intervention on a big scale, that is the sending out of large armies by the Western or Middle European states or by America may not seem very probable, it is almost certain, the imperialist governments will continue supporting the direct military intervention on a smaller scale in the form of attacks on Soviet-Russia by the border states and by Japan. The workers of the world will have strongly to oppose against such direct and indirect intervention, and the best thing to do would be an international general strike . . . [*sic*] Experience however has taught us that we are not yet strong enough for international mass action. But perhaps general strikes within national limits will prove to be possible and strikes of a partial and local character ought to be urged, chiefly in those towns where ammunition is made or is shipped. Also the possibilities of urging the sailors and troops to be sent to Russia to refuse service once being there, ought to be considered. Secondly it must be made clear to the workers, that the future of the European and American working class is bound up with the fate of Soviet-Russia, and that only the raising of the blockade, and the economic development of Soviet-Russia itself, offer a chance of escape from the impending economic and social ruin.

Comrade [Willem] Van Leuven treats the same subject from the economic point of view, as well in connection with the needs of Soviet-Russia itself as with those of the other countries, whose vital interests are in danger as long as normal economic relations with Soviet-Russia are not restored.

Comrade Pankhurst asks the conference to declare in favor of propaganda on strict class-lines. She does not consider a direct action in England against intervention impossible, but she fears the influence of the reformists, the communists not having a daily organ in England, whilst the "Daily Herald" must be regarded as a purely reformist organ "under the heel of Henderson". She moves the

following resolutions:

"That an effort be made to secure an international strike against intervention in Russia and the propaganda and organization to achieve it be taken in hand at once by a Committee to be appointed at this conference in conjunction with Communists in all countries.

It must be recognized that direct propaganda for organizing a strike must begin at least three months beforehand to secure a successful strike unless some special circumstance brings about a crisis.

Comrade G o r t e r vigorously supports comrade Pankhurst's view. He says that as now worldcapitalism has come to international unity of action also the proletariat may come to unity of action, while the 2e International could only come to unity of theory.

We must also be prepared for the possibility of a communist revolution in Germany and in that case must endeavour to prevent the intervention of the capitalist nations. He moves the following addendum to the resolution Pankhurst:

to add to the resolution Pankhurst ("after: in all countries") "and that, already now, the same measures (for a general strike a strike of transport workers etc.) be taken, in case of, on an eventual renewal of the German revolution, this revolution in any way is being opposed or hindered by England, France, the U.S.A. etc".

Comrade [John T.] M u r p h y asks the Bureau to study in every country the forms of organization which contain the elements of the future Soviets. In England the Shop Stewards and Workers Committees contain such elements.

Comrade F r a i n a says the American communist movement has been too much neglected by Russia. Our Russian comrades have too much concentrated their attention upon Germany and what was done in Britain and especially in America, was done without the aid, even the moral aid of Russia. As to the blockade of Russia, it will have to be broken by the revolution itself, but if it is raised by capitalist influences it will be the worse for the revolution of the world. As to the communist propaganda for the demand of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the soviet-republic, it must not be severed from that for other less general demands of the workers in the different countries.

Comrade F r a i n a thinks that circumstances may arise making it unavoidable for Soviet-Russia to carry on the war no longer as a war of defense solely, but to take an offensive action against some of the neighbouring states. In that case we must call upon the workers of those countries not to resist the bolsjevist [*sic*] armies but to bring about the revolution in their own country.

3rd Session.

Thursday 5 Febr. 1920.

Continuation of the discussions on item 4:

"Action against intervention in Soviet-Russia".

Comrade W ij n k o o p reads a letter from Comrade [Richard A.] Manuel (Hungary) warning against the centralized organizing of an international action; an eventual failure would be disastrous. He reminds of July 21st. 1919.

Comrade d e V i s s e r (Holland) supports this view. The possibility of international action can not be made, is has to grow.

Comrade W i l l i s (B.S.P.) supports Manuel and [Louis] de Visser. To decide here on an international strike is phrasemongering. In England the situation is apparently quiet but all is unrest underneath; the moment will come when the situation is ripe for action.

A G e r m a n d e l e g a t e (Bremen) moves some redactional corrections in the thesis, read by comrade Roland Holst.

Comrade W ij n k o o p says the thesis is not meant as a proposed resolution but as a basis for the discussion.

Comrade [Jacob H.] N o s o w i t s k i (C.P. America) is astonished to hear that an action for international strike is thought impossible. He thinks that even when the action for such a strike should result in a failure it would have the effect of winning the masses to our ideas.

Comrade W ij n k o o p (C.P. Holl.) does not think the resolutions of Pankhurst and Gorter will bring us the revolution. Neither does he think Gorter right in his opinion that capitalism has gained greater unity by the war: international antagonism and rivalries are greater than before and that renders a unified revolutionary action more difficult. Our action must embrace the direct demands of every proletariat.

Comrade W ij n k o o p does not expect a communist revolution in Germany before long: the whole country as well as the proletariat is considerably weakened. He supports Fraina in asking a committee of five to formulate a new resolution.

After discussion a Committee of redaction for a resolution is appointed as follows: Fraina, Roland Holst, Pankhurst, Murphy, Gorter.

4th Session.

Thursday 5th. Febr. 1920 afternoon.

Comrade R u t g e r s being present at this session, the further discussion of item 4 is postponed till the next session and item 11:

"Organizing of an International Bureau" in brought in discussion.

I n t e r n a t i o n a l E x e c u t i v e C o m m.

Comrade R u t g e r s says it is necessary to establish an International Bureau, Moscow being too much isolated. The comrades in Moscow think Holland the fittest place for it, but the coming congress has to decide that definitively.

Comrade F r a i n a says that the Bureau must be formed by political organizations only and not by economic ones.

Comrade G o r t e r objects to the Bureau having more than one delegate nominated by the Dutch Party because the leaders of the Dutch Communist Party have proved opportunists.

Comrade W ij n k o o p denies absolutely Gorter's allegations against the Dutch party. After discussion it is resolved:

1. The Bureau will bear the name of: "International Sub-Bureau of the Communist International" and will act in concert with Moscow.
2. Every country will have one vote. If a country sends more than one delegate, its vote will be divided equally among them.

Comrade F r a i n a requests that it be decided now that no economic organization (e.g. the Shop Stewards and workers Committees etc.) can be represented in the Sub-Bureau.

After discussion it is moved that the Shop Stewards Committees will be represented. Carried: for: 3 1/2 vote (Holland, Belgium; Germany and 1/2 England: Murphy & Willis); against; 1 1/2 vote (America and 1/2 England: Hodgson and Pankhurst).

Comrade F r a i n a strongly objects against this decision being taken by a conference when not all countries are represented. He asks that the Shop Stewards delegates will not assume function before the next congress. Rejected: 1 1/2 against 3 1/2 (same votes as before).

5th Session.

Friday 6 Febr. 1920, 11 A.M.

Continuation of the discussions on item 4 “Action against intervention in Soviet-Russia”.

Comrade M u r p h y reads the resolution prepared by the Committee, appointed yesterday:

Resolution on Soviet-Russia.

A revolutionary action of the workers to force International Capital to make peace with Russia is a necessary condition to save Soviet-Russia and to hasten the worldrevolution.

To further this action, the Communists of all lands must utilize every strike-movement, every mass-demonstration:

1. to place this aspect of their responsibilities to the Russian Revolution before the workers.
2. to convince them that their interests are identical with those of Soviet-Russia.
3. to develop a strong feeling of revolutionary solidarity and rev. action the world over.

As the pressure of the workers upon the Governments is increasing, the tendency is for the capitalist Governments to propose a compromise-peace, with the object of disintegrating Soviet-Russia from within. The latest proposal to take up commercial relations through reactionary representatives of prerevolutionary cooperative societies that have since merged into the Sovietorganizations, aims at separating the peasants from the workers, and destroying the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade. Under the cloak of such manoeuvres a great military offensive is being prepared which must be prevented at all costs.

It is therefore essential, that this international Bureau takes immediate steps to prepare an international demonstration-strike against intervention in Soviet-Russia. Such a strike not alone to demand ending the blockade and the intervention in Soviet Russia, but to include political and economic demands adapted to the revolutionary requirements of the conditions prevailing in each nation. This demonstration to be supplemented by coercive strikes as the workers gain strength for such further action, in which special attention has to be paid to the expedition and transportation of war materials and equipment, propaganda being carried on, to withhold labor in such instances.

The appeal to the workers for international strike-action must not be made exclusively through the bureaucracy of the trade-unions, but emphasis must be placed upon the masses in the unions, upon extra-union mass organs and the creation of such organs if necessary.

When the revolution again arises in Germany or in any other country the forces of the intern. prol. (especially the transportworkers in Britain, America, France, Italy, Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland) must be prepared for a general strike the moment the capitalist powers attempt intervention. The Bureau is to take immediate steps for organizing this action in time to prevent the workers being again forestalled by the Governments.

Comrade F r a i n a moves the following addenda:

1. (After: “An international demonstration-strike against intervention in S.R.”) “Such a strike not only to demand the raising of the blockade and the ceasing of intervention in S.R. but to include political and economic demands adapted to the revolutionary requirements of the conditions prevailing in each nation”.

2. (after: “to withhold labor in such instance”) “The appeal to the workers for international strike-action must not be made exclusively through the bureaucracy of the Trade-Unions, but emphasis must be placed upon the masses in the unions, upon extra-union mass-organs, and the creation of such organs if necessary”.

3 (to add) “The imperialist government, in order to justify their own aggression, attribute aggressive designs to the Soviet Government of Russia. Soviet Russia realizes that revolutions are not produced by alien aggression, but by the development of the internal forces of a country. S.R. now wages a defensive war, forced upon her by the imperialist positions. This war will cease the moment the imperialist governments accept peace on the terms repeatedly made public by S.R. Should however the imperialist’s

opposition compel S.R. to transform her defensive war into a military offensive either in the East or in the West, then this becomes a phase in the international class struggle, and we call upon the workers in the nations involved not to resist the Soviet army, but to rise in revolt against their bourgeoisie and establish their own Soviet Republic".

After discussion the first of these addenda is voted with 1 vote against (Sa.[*sic*] Pankhurst)[,] the second with unanimity, and likewise the whole resolution. As to addendum No. 3 of comrade Fraina, it will be revised and discussed in the afternoon session.

6th Session.

Friday 6 Febr. 1920, 3 P.M.

Comrade W ij n k o o p reopens the discussions on the 3rd. addendum Fraina. He has serious objections against it.

Comrade R u t g e r s also opposes the add. Fraina: Soviet Russia will never march into a country where there has not already a revolution developed. Our Russian friends want peace not only for their own reconstruction, but also because they do not believe in bringing about revolutions by outside interference. The addendum is withdrawn.

In discussion is item 6: "Unionism and Soviets".

U n i o n i s m a n d S o v i e t s.

Comrade F r a i n a reads the following thesis:

Thesis on Unionism.

1. Unions are necessary organizations in the economic struggle of the workers against their employers, since, in spite of their limitations, the unions are means for resisting and often improving the most inhuman conditions of labor. Nor are the unions transitory in character, since they can particularly as industrial unions, become active means of revolutionary struggle, and a factor in the Communist reconstruction of society.

2. The trade-unions persisting in the defensive struggle against capitalism, do not materially improve labor conditions; the rise of wages is, in general, exceeded by the rise of prices; while the policy of compromise, wage agreements and industrial peace weakens the fighting spirit of the workers.

3. The trade unions arose during the epoch of small industry, with its consequent division of the workers into crafts or trades. The artisan conception prevailed that a workers' craft or skill was a form of property, developing a property and petty bourgeois ideology; and this, together with the circumstance that trade unionism acquired power during a period of intense national economic development (1870-1900) produced the concept of limiting the proletarian struggle within the limits of capitalism and the nation.

4. Trade unionism represented (and still largely represents) the upper layers of the working class, excluding the bulk of the unskilled workers; and where these workers are organized in trade unions, they are dominated by the concepts and practice of the upper layers, the "aristocracy of labor".

5. The development of Imperialism merges the trades unions definitely in Capitalism, the upper layers of the working class being bribed with a "share" in the profits of Imperialism by means of slightly higher wages, steady employment and labor legislation.

The "aristocracy of labor" dominant in trade unionism accepts Imperialism, uses the unions to assist Capitalism in "stabilizing" labor in industry, and becomes the source of the corrupt ideology of social-Imperialism. The decisive factor in the collapse of the old International was the immersion of socialism in trade-unionism, with its practice of social-Imperialism, petty bourgeois democracy and its fundamental counter-revolutionary tendency.

6. Trade unionism (as typically expressed in the American Federation of Labor) is impotent to

improve materially the conditions of labor or to conquer power, since the division of the workers into craft or trade organizations splits them into innumerable unions, each antagonistic to the other, making hopeless the struggle against concentrated Capitalism, which largely expropriates the worker of his skill, eliminates the craft divisions of small industry, and brings masses of the proletariat together regardless of particular occupational functions. The general mass strike alone is capable of decisive action against concentrated capitalism; but trade unionism, in form and spirit is antagonistic to the mass strike.

7. Trade unionism comes to realize its economic impotence and proceeds to parliamentary action, — which, represented by Laborism (as typically expressed in the British Labor Party) is as impotent as trade unionism to accomplish fundamental conquests, since Laborism necessarily accepts the dominant union concepts and practice. Laborism unites with petty bourgeois democracy against the proletarian revolution — that petty bourgeois democracy which is seduced by Imperialism.

8. The governmental form of expression of Laborism is State Capitalism the merger in the state of the capitalists, the small bourgeoisie, and the upper layers of the working class dominant in the trade-unions; the state is used to regulate equally industry and labor, for purposes of imperialism, the proletarian masses being compelled to accept this arrangement by means of deception and force.

9. The tendency is for Laborism and Socialism to unite (either formally or by means of trade union domination of the Socialist Party) each necessarily accepting social-Imperialism, since their activity is limited within the limits of Capitalism and the nation; and, under the ascendency of monopoly and finance-capital, the "prosperity" of a nation depends on Imperialism.

10. Laborism becomes the final bulwark of defence of capitalism against the oncoming proletarian revolution; accordingly, a merciless struggle against Laborism is imperative. But while politically Laborism expresses itself as State Capitalism and petty bourgeois democracy, its animating impulse and force is in trade unionism. The struggle against this form of unionism, accordingly, is an inseparable phase of the struggle against Laborism, proceeding.

a In general, by the Communist Party agitation to drive the unions to more revolutionary action.

b Encouraging every movement in the unions that tends to break the permanency of bureaucracy, and insuring control to the masses by means of delegates who are subject directly to instructions and recall.

c By the formation of organization such as the Shop Stewards, Workers Committees, economic Workers Councils and direct branches of the Communist Party in the shops, mills and mines, which are not only means for moving the masses and the unions to more revolutionary action but which at the moment of crisis may develop into Soviets

d by endeavoring to transform the trade unions into industrial unions that is a unionism in form paralleling the economic integration of modern capitalism, and in spirit animated by the struggle for political power and economic mastery.

11. The agitation for, and construction of, industrial unions provides, in an immediate and practical way, the opportunity to mobilize the militant spirit of discontent developing in the old unions, to carry on the struggle against the corrupt bureaucracy and the "aristocracy of labor". Industrial Unionism, moreover, provides the opportunity of calling to action the unorganized unskilled workers, and to release the unskilled organized in the trade unions from their bondage to the reactionary upper layers of the working class.

The struggle for revolutionary industrial Unionism is a factor for the development of communist knowledge, and for the conquest of the power.

12. Unionism, trade and industrial must not limit itself to economic strikes but must acquire the concept and practice of the general political strike, must cooperate with the Communist Party to develop the general mass struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeois state.

13. The concept that industrial unionism alone is necessary for the conquest of capitalism must be

decisively rejected. It is sheer Utopia to imagine that all the workers, or an overwhelming majority, can be organized in industrial unions under capitalism; economic conditions interrere [?; according to the French version [2]: ..... en Unions industrielles dans les conditions économiques créés par le capitalisme]; [t]he upper layers of the working class, being the impulse of Laborism, will necessarily reject revolutionary industrial unionism; while the lower layers will not move very rapidly until thrown into action by the impact of revolution itself. Moreover, the concept that the workers under capitalism must in their industrial unions acquire the experience and technical management of industry, "growing into" the new society by the industrial unions gradual acquisition of industrial control, is identical (although inverted in form) with the proposals of parliamentary Socialism that the working class must gradually "grow into" socialism by acquiring experience of state affairs and "absorbing" control of the bourgeois state. Each concept, in its own way, rejects the fundamental problem of the revolutionary conquest of state power.

14. The conquest of the power of the state is the object of the revolutionary proletariat. Neither the parliaments nor the industrial unions are the means for this conquest of power, but mass action and the Soviet-mass action to rally the workers, organized and unorganized, in the open revolutionary struggle for power; the Soviets to constitute the mechanism of the revolutionary proletarian state, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the moment of active revolution the struggle becomes, not a struggle for industrial unions, but a struggle for the construction of Soviets.

15. After the conquest of political power and under the protection of the Soviet Dictatorship, industrial unionism comes actually to function in the economic reconstruction of society on a Communist basis; and the stronger the industrial unions, the easier the process of reconstruction. The government of Soviets, of proletarian dictatorship, is political and transitory in character, the necessary agency of repression to expropriate and crush capitalism. While industrial in its constituents and representation, the government of Soviets functions geographically and politically; but alongside of itself it constructs a central administration of industry — wholly economic in character, equally in representation and functions, perfecting the organism of proletarian control and management of industry on the basis of the industrially organized producers.

Comrade F r a i n a gives a historical survey of the industrial movement in general. As to the present period, we have to support industrial unionism, of which the I.W.W. in America is the expression.

Comrade M u r p h y in general agrees with Fraina but adds: we must not forget that industrial unions are not always revolutionary.

A B e l g i a n comrade also urges the necessity of avoiding doctrinal strictness in the matter of the form of organizations.

[Engelbertus] B o u m a n (Holland) thinks the line of separation between reaction and revolution is another now than it was before the war. Before the war that line in his opinion ran between the syndicalist movement on one side and the political and "modern" labor union movement on the other side, but now it lies between the bourgeois and reformist unions on one side and revolutionary (political and industrial) organizations on the other. It must be confessed that the syndicalist movement in Holland is not free from reformism in some respects. Therefore more mutual help and understanding of the political and industrial revolutionary organizations is needed.

After discussion the thesis Fraina is adopted with unanimity.

7th Session.

Saturday 7 Febr. 1920, [*sic*] A.M.

U n i t y o f c o m m u n i s t g r o u p s.

In discussion: item 10: T h e U n i t i n g o f c o m m u n i s t g r o u p s i n d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s.

Comrade W ij n k o o p reads the following resolution:

In various countries groups have formed, which, starting from different origins have been brought to communism by the present world-development, and have joined the Third International. The congress invites the communists of every country to unite into one communist Party on the basis of the following generally adopted points.

1. Class-war of the workers without any compromise with bourgeois and social patriotic parties.
2. Direct action of the working masses as a means of conquering power.
3. Dictatorship of the proletariat.
4. Soviet constitution as the proper form of proletarian democracy.

The questions of organization and tactics upon which unanimity has not yet has been arrived at, are to be cleared up within the Party by discussion and examination of the facts.

Comrade F r a i n a thinks it dangerous to urge unity on too general terms. That would help the opportunists. He suggests the following:

Resolution on Unity:

1. The social-patriots and opportunists, particularly when catering to the "Left" tendency, constitute a most dangerous enemy of the proletarian revolution.
2. To associate or cooperate with these corrupt and counter-revolutionary elements means seriously hampering the development of the conscious communist movement. Rigorous separation of the communists from the social-patriots is absolutely necessary.
3. The toleration of opportunist or social-patriotic elements in a communist party on the plea of unity means violation of the only unity promoting the revolutionary-unity consisting not merely in formal acceptance of general principles, but in agreement on fundamental action.
4. It is necessary that communist groups still in the old reformist and opportunist parties (even if these repudiate the Second international) should sever their compromising relations and unite in the communist Party (or from a communist Party if necessary).
5. Unity depends upon local conditions; but must be animated not only by formal acceptance of the communist theory, but by uncompromising emphasis on the revolutionary practice developing out of that theory. In general, the fundamental considerations in establishing unity are:

a. The uncompromising class struggle of the proletariat — no compromise with the bourgeois or social-patriotic parties, with parties affiliated to the Second International, or with the agents of capitalism in the Labor movement.

b. Mass action of the proletariat as the means for the conquest of power, the communist Party as the conscious and directive force in the development of this mass action.

c. Dictatorship of the proletariat (and consequent repudiation of bourgeois democracy).

d. The Soviet System as the necessary form of the proletarian democracy.

Comrade W i l l i s says he can agree to the resolution because it is not coercive. He gives a survey of what has been done in England in order to form a new communist party. He thinks it probable that such a party will soon be formed by the B.S.P. and a part of the S.L.P. and perhaps other smaller groups. The new party will have to decide on their tactics, especially as regards affiliation to the Labour Party.

Comrade P a n k h u r s t objects to the supposed possibility, that the new Engl. Comm. Party should be connected with the Labour Party. This Party is affiliated to the 2nd. International and it is absurd for a comm. party to adhere to it.

The situation in England is discussed by Comrades Murphy, Willis and Pankhurst.

8th Session.

S a t u r d a y 6 [7] Febr. 1920. 3 P.M.

Comrade F r a i n a says it is of importance not to lay stress on unity in general but to point out an exact basis for the different communist parties. We prefer disunion to a unity that is not consciously revolutionary. It is suggested to add “or parties affiliated to the 2nd. International”.

This addendum is taken over by Fraina.

T h e G e r m a n d e l e g a t e (Bremen) supports the view of Fraina and having heard the discussions in this conference, is inclined to think it is not such an evil when the present German Comm. Party may split up into its incongruent parts.

Comrade W i l l i s strongly objects to the doctrinal addendum that makes it impossible for the new Comm. Party to join the Labour Party. This is a question that must not be decided beforehand by outsiders, but by the new party itself.

Comrade M u r p h y does not agree on this point with Willis, Comrade H o d g s o n does.

After discussion the resolution Fraina (with the addendum) is voted with two votes against (1 vote for Holland: [Willem] van Leuven, and 1 vote for England: B.S.P. delegates). The votes against must be understood (only to refer to the addendum).

9th Session.

S u n d a y 8 F e b r. 11 A.M.

O r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e B u r e a u.

In discussion is the organization of the Executive.

Comrade W ij n k o o p suggests the Executive of the Bureau to be formed by Comrades Rutgers and Roland Holst, together with the delegate of the Dutch Communist Party. Agreed.

After discussion it is resolved:

R e s o l u t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l B u r e a u:

An International Bureau has been established in Amsterdam as a sub-bureau of the Executive Committee in Moscow.

The Bureau consists of delegates of the countries affiliated to Moscow, each country sending one delegate, designated by the communist parties affiliated to Moscow existing in that country. If the several parties and groups of a country cannot agree as to the choice of a delegate, each party will have the right to designate a delegate, and the vote of the country will be divided amongst its delegates.

The Bureau will meet, if possible every three months. A quorum will be considered to be present if out of the four countries England, Germany, France and Italy, three are represented, it being allowed however, that in lieu of every one of these three, two of the other countries be represented, countries represented by members of the Executive committee to be excluded.

The Executive Committee consists of three members, who must reside permanently in Holland. One of these three is the representative of the Dutch Communist Party in the Bureau. As the two others comrade S.J. Rutgers and comrade H. Roland Holst are designated.

The Executive Committee executes the resolutions voted by the Bureau in its sessions, and the instructions it receives from Moscow, with which if possible, it maintains a direct communication. Communication with the members of the Bureau by means of letters or couriers will be maintained as far as possible. In case of necessity resolutions may be voted in this same way. So long as France and Germany are not yet affiliated two of the four countries mentioned above will be sufficient for a quorum. When circumstances render it imperative, or when a meeting proves impossible, the Executive Committee can take independent action as many delegates as possible having been previously consulted.

The Communist Party of America is commissioned to take measures for the formation of a

Sub-Bureau for Northern and Southern America, and for the organization of a pan-American Conference, for which the preparations made in Mexico are to be utilized. This bureau will probably elect Mexico for its residence.

The West European Secretariat in Berlin will be requested to constitute itself as a Secretariat for Central Europe, consisting of delegates of Germany, the countries formerly constituting the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Balkan States, Poland. The Central European Secretariat to maintain communications with these countries as well as with Moscow and with Amsterdam, and form a subdivision of the Amsterdam Bureau. On its own account it will issue such manifestoes and appeals only as concern Central Europe. For the publication of general manifestoes it will act in concert with Amsterdam. The arrangements for International Conferences will likewise require to be made in concert with Amsterdam.

The publishing of the Russian correspondence, of books and pamphlets translated from the Russian, and of the new edition of The Communist International in three languages will take place, as far as possible in Berlin, under the responsibility of the representative of the Third International for Germany and with the cooperation of the Central-European Secretariat and of the Amsterdam Bureau.

The Amsterdam Bureau issues a bulletin in three languages, organizes a Press-Bureau with an information service and an archive, arranges international conferences and congresses, and executes the resolutions voted.

International appeals, proclamations and actions proceed from the Amsterdam Bureau solely. This entire regulation bears a provisional character until an international Congress decides upon it, or until circumstances change by the establishment of free communication with Moscow.

It is resolved that the various countries shall contribute towards the supporting of the Bureau. If sufficient sums be forthcoming from Moscow resolutions concerning the use and distribution will be voted, towards which the several delegates are requested to furnish data.

If necessary retributions will be levied for the several services of the Bureau, such a information service, archive etc., a decision about which matter will have to be taken within the next few months.

Cooperation is requested for the Archive and all delegates are invited to communicate with some one member of the Executive Committee in the matter of addresses, etc.

Comrade F r a i n a moves a resolution on the forming of an American Sub-Bureau. Agreed.

Resolution Concerning Sub-Bureau America.

The Conference of the Communist International authorizes the Communist Party of America to organize, provisionally the American Bureau of the Communist International, this Bureau to call a Pan-American Conference of Communist Organizations, at which the Bureau shall be organized on a permanent basis.

The functions of the Bureau shall be:

1. To direct the general activity of the Communist International on American continents, with particular reference to Soviet Russia.
2. To concentrate and unify the Communist organizations of the Americas and insure their adequate representation at the coming congress of the International.
3. To issue proclamations concerning problems that immediately concern the proletariat of the Americas — such as intervention in Mexico.
4. To establish connections with the European Bureau and with Russia — thereby insuring adequate contact with, and response from, the revolutionary movement of the Americas.
5. The [To] secure the co-operation of a Japanese comrade, for purposes of activity in, and connections with, Japan and the Far East.

The American Bureau shall issue a Bulletin, devoted to affairs of the American continents and a resume of general affairs of the International.

Comrade R u t g e r s says the new Executive will have to act in concert with the existing “West

European Bureau". The task has to be divided.

After discussion the proposed resolution is voted.

10th Session.

S u n d a y 8 F e b r. 1920. 2.50 P.M.

The resolution on S. Russia is voted with unanimity.

Comrade R o l a n d H o l s t asks that the resolutions be published after the delegates shall have returned to their own countries. Agreed.

F i n a n c e s o f t h e B u r e a u.

Comrade W ij n k o o p says that there may possibly be received financial aid from Moscow, but till then it is necessary that the different countries contribute to the costs of the Bureau. He suggests that every country give about f 100.- (£ 10 etc.) at present and in the future a regular contribution. Agreed.

Comrade P a n k h u r s t thinks every one of the three English parties could begin with giving £ 5 each. Agreed.

Comrade R u t g e r s says that it is also possible for the international pressbureau to charge the different communist papers for their items of information. If money should come in from Moscow the Bureau will have to regulate the distribution of it among the different countries. He asks the delegates to furnish to the Bureau particulars about the financial abilities and needs of their parties.

G e r m a n d e l e g a t i o n.

A Swiss delegate from the Communist Party, just arriving from Berlin reports that the West-European Secretariat has resolved to send delegates to this meeting. Comrades representing the German communist Party (Spartacus), the Russian Communist Party, the Western European Secretariat and the Communist Young People's organization leave Berlin today and will probably arrive to morrow. More delegates from Austria, Hungary and Italy will probably be coming in a few days.

Comrade W ij n k o o p asks why the Western European Secretariat has waited so long before sending delegates.

The Swiss delegate says the W.E. Secretariat has discussed this question for a long time.

Comrade W ij n k o o p suggests the postponing of further discussions till the other delegates shall have arrived. Agreed. Next session fixed on Wednesday 11th. Febr., next. Session closed.

G. Mannoury, secr.

With the delegates mentioned above and others from Spain, Scotland, Finland and Switzerland no regular sessions could be held on account of police interference. Only informal conversations of the Executive with such comrades coming and going, could be held and used for establishing mutual relations and exchange of views.

The german delegates thereby maintained their opinion that the conference was not sufficiently general to have full authority.

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(1) Reprinted from: *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* (Amsterdam), No. 2, III.1920, pp. 3-9; cf. (French draft) РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/6-35.

(2) *Bulletin du Bureau auxiliaire d'Amsterdam de l'Internationale Communiste*, No. 2, III.1920, p. 7.

2-2 Police Reports

2-2-1

Inlichtingendienst.

Amsterdam, 6 Februari 1920

A No 37 Geheim [1].

3e Internationale.

Hedenmorgen te 10.55 werd de conferentie van de derde Internationale in het gebouw HEYSTEE te Amsterdam voortgezet. Vanaf 9 uur had in dezelfde zaal de commissie vergaderd tot vaststelling van de resolutie, in A No 36 genoemd.

Als Voorzitter fungeerde wederom WYNKOOP. Voor zoover kon worden nagegaan, waren wederom dezelfde personen aanwezig, als in A No 36 genoemd. Bovendien waren nog ter conferentie LOUIS DE VISSER uit Den Haag, Mevr. RUTGERS, de student [Johan] VALKHOFF. Voorts was nog aanwezig zekere NOVOWITSKI of NOSOWITSKI.

WYNKOOP stelde aan de orde punt 4 van de agenda: de actie tegen de contra-revolutionaire interventie in Rusland. MURPHY leest de resolutie in het Engelsch voor en Mevr. ROLAND HOLST in het Nederlandsch. De resolutie — opgemaakt door de commissie bovengenoemd — luidt als volgt.

"Vrede met Sovjet-Rusland is noodzakelyk, niet alleen voor het behoud van Rusland, maar ter bevordering der wereldrevolutie tot heil van alle volkeren der wereld. Om hiertoe te geraken, moeten alle Communisten in alle landen: 1° dit aan het proletariaat duidelyk maken[;] 2° het proletariaat overtuigen, dat hun belangen dezelfde zyn als die van Sovjet-Rusland[;] 3° den arbeiders een sterk gevoel bybrengen van revolutionaire solidariteit. De kapitalistische regeeringen willen tot overeenstemming komen met Sovjet-Rusland, om Rusland te ontbinden. Een voorjaarsoffensief tegen Rusland wordt door de Entente voorbereid.

Het sub-bureau moet daarom eene algemeene staking voorbereiden om dit te verhinderen.

Wanneer de revolutie in Duitschland of andere landen weder mocht opleven, dan moet het proletariaat en vooral de transportarbeiders in Frankryk, Engeland, Zweden en ook Holland tot staking overgaan. De subcommissie moet stappen nemen om te voorkomen, dat de arbeiders opnieuw te laat komen".

WYNKOOP zegt, dat thans in tweede instantie over de resolutie zal worden gediscussieerd en stelt, met goedkeuring der conferentie, voor ieder spreker een spreektyd van 5 minuten vast.

FRAINA — het blykt thans, dat deze de vertegenwoordiger van Noord-Amerika is — stelt de navolgende amendementen voor op de resolutie: "dat by interventie in Sovjet-Rusland de arbeiders het werk moeten neerleggen; dat zy moeten weigeren tegen de Sovjetlegers te stryden, indien Rusland gedwongen wordt aanvallend op te treden en in opstand moeten komen tegen hun eigen regeeringen en zelf moeten trachten een sovjetrepubliek te stichten in eigen land.

WILLIS (ENGELAND) zegt, dat in Engeland reeds vele vakvereenigingen zyn, (spoorwegarbeiders, machinisten) die het werk willen nederleggen ingeval van interventie in Rusland.

VAN LEUVEN wenscht uit de resolutie te verwyderen de passage over het aanvallend optreden van Sovjet-Rusland, uit tactische overwegingen. Het imperialisme kan er munt uit slaan, als wy erover spreken.

WYNKOOP zegt, dat de oproep aan de arbeiders voor de internationale staking in geval van interventie niet moet geschieden onder toezicht van de bureaucratie der vakbeweging, maar er moet gesproken worden tot de massa der vakvereeniging over de hoofden van de leiders heen.

RUTGERS zegt, dat de Russen eene agressieve politiek verwerpen, omdat zy vinden, dat het onmogelyk is de revolutie te verbreiden door middel van wapengeweld; dit kan wel door beschikbaarstellen [a line omitted in copying]. Hy is het daarom eens met VAN LEUVEN.

HODGIN zegt, dat de proclamatie van de staking tegen eene interventie in Rusland parallel moet loopen met de groote bewegingen in de andere landen. Daarby moeten op den voorgrond worden gebracht, nevens den eisch tot staking der interventie in Rusland, de byzondere eischen der arbeiders in elk land afzonderlyk. Anders krygen wy de arbeiders niet tot de staking. In Engeland moet byvoorbeeld ook de nationalisatie der mynen op den voorgrond worden gebracht.

WYNKOOP stelt nu voor, den aanvang van de resolutie als volgt te veranderen: “De vrede met Rusland is noodzakelyk, niet alleen voor de Russische Sovjetregeering maar ook voor de ontwikkeling van de wereldrevolutie”.

Miss Sylvia PANKHURST (Engeland) zegt, dat de afgevaardigden van Engeland verklaren, dat binnen een afzienbaren tyd eene dergelyke staking in Engeland NIET mogelyk is.

WILLIS (ENGELAND) zegt, dat hy, die zegt NU in Engeland eene dergelyke staking te kunnen verwekken, niets van de arbeidersbeweging in Engeland afweet.

FRAINA verdedigt een eventueel offensief van Rusland, omdat het een revolutionair offensief is. Rusland wil geen offensief. Het internationaal proletariaat moet echter niet wachten met hulp bieden, tot Sovjet-Rusland genoodzaakt zal zyn agressief op te treden. Hy wenscht ook verder, dat eene staking zal worden geproclameerd tot de massa der vakbeweging. De staking op 21 Juli j.l. is mislukt, omdat de hoofden der vakbeweging niet wilden; daarom moet het de volgende maal geschieden over de hoofden der vakvereenigingleiders heen.

NOVOWITSKI, of NOSOWITSKI stelt voor een oproep aan de arbeiders, om wanneer Sovjet-Rusland agressief moet optreden, om te stryden tegen hun kapitalistische regeering en in hun land de sovjetrepubliek uit te roepen (verbetering motie FRAINA op dit punt).

MISS SMILES of SMITES [Nora V.L. Smyth] wenscht, dat het congres, dat thans byeen is, den datum zal noemen voor de demonstratieve staking. Zy zegt, dat voor Engeland noodig is, dat daartoe een impuls van buiten komt. In Engeland mist men revolutionaire voortvarendheid. Zy haalt daarby aan de houding van WILLIAMS en SMILLY by de laatste staking in Engeland. Zy verklaart ten slotte teleurgesteld te zyn over den slappen geest, die op het congres heerscht.

WYNKOOP deelt mede, dat zoo juist een telegram is ingekomen, dat de nog niet aanwezige Duitschers a.s. DINSDAG zullen komen.

Aangezien het congres Maandag a.s. afloopt, verwekt dit hilariteit.

WYNKOOP wenscht thans over te gaan tot de tweede lezing van de resolutie, zooals die thans wordt voorgesteld in gewyzigden vorm. Hy legt er den nadruk op, dat het is eene RESOLUTIE, alzoo een leiddraad voor het bureau en geen manifest. Men zal de resolutie aan de andere Communistische partyen en aan het bureau in Moscou opzenden. De resolutie luidt thans als volgt:

“De vrede met Rusland is een noodzakelykheid, niet alleen voor het behoud van de Russische Sovjetrepubliek, maar ook voor de ontwikkeling van de wereldrevolutie. Deze vrede moet een vrede zyn, die gebracht wordt door de werkers (arbeiders) van de wereld. Om dit resultaat te bereiken, moeten de communisten van alle landen elke stakingsbeweging en elke massale demonstratie gebruiken, om dezen kyk (dit inzicht) op onze verantwoordelykheid voor de Russische revolutie voor de arbeiders te brengen; om den arbeiders te overtuigen, dat hun belangen identiek zyn met die van Sovjet-Rusland; om den arbeiders een sterk gevoel van revolutionaire solidariteit by te brengen.

Op het moment nu de druk van de arbeiders op hunne regeeringen gaat toenemen, is het een streven van de kapitalistische regeeringen met Sovjet-Rusland tot overeenstemming te komen met de bedoeling Sovjet-Rusland uiteen te rukken. Onder den dekmantel van deze machinatie wordt een groot militair offensief in deze landen voorbereid, welk offensief in alle geval moet worden voorkomen. Het is daarom volstrekt noodzakelyk, dat dit sub-bureau onmiddellyk stappen neemt (bedoeld wordt het op deze conferentie samen te stellen bureau) om eene internationale demonstratieve staking te krygen [a line omitted in copying] door dwangstakingen, waardoor de arbeiders de kracht krygen tot zulk een

verstrekkende actie".

RUTGERS verklaart zich tegen de redactie van de eerste alinea en zegt verder, dat niet elke vrede met Rusland wenschelyk is.

WYNKOOP neemt de redactie van RUTGERS over, "dat de revolutionaire actie van de arbeiders het internationaal kapitalisme moet dwingen, om vrede te maken met Sovjet-Rusland. Dit is eene volstrekte noodzakelykheid voor het behoud van Rusland en om de wereldrevolutie te verhaasten".

GORTER stelt voor, dat de resolutie nog eens in handen zal worden gesteld van RUTGERS, die — als zynde op de hoogte van de Russische revolutie — de details nog eens zal kunnen nazien.

WYNKOOP neemt dit voorstel over. Hy zegt, dat de resolutie er één is, waarop het bureau — dat thans zal worden gevormd — moet gaan werken. De resolutie zal ook naar Rusland worden gezonden.

De resolutie wordt thans met algemeene stemmen aangenomen.

Thans komt aan de orde het eerste amendement, door FRAINA voorgesteld en luidende als volgt:

"Eene internationale staking voor Sovjet-Rusland moet inhouden niet alleen de eisch, om de blokkade en de interventie in Rusland te doen eindigen, maar moet zich aanpassen by de nooden van elk land afzonderlyk".

PANKHURST zegt, dat geen nationale eisch in de schaduw kan staan by den eisch "vrede met Sovjet-Rusland".

FRAINA zegt, dat, waar de hoofdeisch te abstract is, moeten er andere, landelyke revolutionaire eischen bykomen.

Het 1e amendement FRAINA wordt daarna met vrywel algemeene stemmen aangenomen.

Aan de orde is thans het tweede amendement FRAINA luidende: "Ingeval Rusland gedwongen wordt tot agressieve maatregelen tot zelfverdediging, dan roepen wy de arbeiders op, zich niet tegen die maatregelen te verzetten en zelf een sovjetrepubliek te stichten".

Na eenige discussie wordt besloten, dat FRAINA en MURPHY dit amendement nog eens zullen bestudeeren om te zien, hoe het zal moeten worden geredigeerd.

Thans is aan de orde het derde amendement van FRAINA luidende: "De oproep tot de arbeiders voor de internationale staking moet niet gaan door middel van de bureaucratie van de vakbeweging maar moet gericht worden tot de massale organisaties; desnoods moeten dergelyke organisaties worden geschapen".

Dit amendement wordt aangenomen.

VAN LEUVEN zegt, dat speciale aandacht moet worden gewyd aan de fabrieken en verzendplaatsen van munitie.

WYNKOOP leest thans de tweede resolutie voor luidende als volgt:

"Als de revolutie opnieuw opkomt in Duitschland of in eenig ander land, dan moet de kracht van het internationale proletariaat en vooral van de transportarbeiders in België, Frankryk, Engeland, Scandinavië en Nederland gereed zyn voor eene algemeene staking op het moment, dat de kwestie eene dergelyke actie noodig maakt. Het sub-bureau moet stappen nemen om deze staking te organiseeren, om te voorkomen, dat de arbeiders achter het net visschen.

VAN LEUVEN zegt, dat het niet mogelyk zal zyn het proletariaat langen tyd voor zulk een staking in spanning te houden.

WYNKOOP zegt, dat het bureau gereed moet zyn, voor het geval eene revolutie in Duitschland opnieuw uitbreekt, in welk geval de Entente zeker zal ingrypen. Eene staking moet dan worden geproclameerd.

De tweede resolutie wordt nu met algemeene stemmen aangenomen. De conferentie wordt gesloten tot des namiddags 3 uur.

Verslag middagzitting.

Aanwezig zyn nog [Engelbertus] BOUWMAN en VAN DER POEL.

Aan de orde is punt 6 van de agenda: “De vakbeweging in verband met de sovjets”.

WYNKOOP zegt, dat de leider van de federatie van transportarbeiders in Nederland BOUWMAN in verband met dit onderwerp aanwezig is.

Eerst is nog aan de orde het tweede amendement van FRAINA, thans opnieuw geredigeerd door hemzelf en MURPHY. Het luidt thans als volgt:

“De imperialistische regeeringen, om hun eigen aanvallen te rechtvaardigen, verwyten aan de Sovjetregeering van Rusland agressieve bedoelingen. Sovjet-Rusland, erkennende, dat revoluties niet hun oorzaak hebben in de aanvallen uit een vreemd land maar door de ontwikkeling van de krachten in het land zelf. Sovjet-Rusland voert op het oogenblik een verdedigingsoorlog, die het opgelegd wordt door de imperialistische tegenstanders. Deze oorlog zal ophouden op het moment, dat de imperialistische regeeringen den vrede aanvaarden op de voorwaarden, die vaak genoeg door Sovjet-Rusland zyn gepubliceerd. Indien echter de oppositie van de imperialistische regeeringen Sovjet-Rusland ertoe zou dwingen om zyn verdedigingsoorlog te veranderen in een militair offensief hetzy naar het Westen, hetzy naar het Oosten, dan zouden tegelykertyd de arbeiders worden opgeroepen in de andere landen, om zich niet te verzetten tegen de Sovjetlegers, maar hun eigen bourgeoisregeering te verjagen en de sovjetrepubliek uit te roepen”.

WYNKOOP zegt dat hy tegen deze resolutie is, omdat men daarmede materiaal in handen speelt van de reactionaire regeeringen. Het is wel waarheid en op deze conferentie mag het wel gezegd worden, als de bourgeoisie er echter achter komt, dat wy dergelyke plannen hebben, dan zullen zy dat tegen ons uitspelen en kunnen zy zeggen, dat wy er ernstig rekening mede houden, dat de Sovjetlegers buiten Rusland zullen komen en dat wy die legers dan zullen helpen. Ik wensch te vernemen, wat RUTGERS daarvan zegt. De Russische Sovjetregeering voert een zeer voorzichtige politiek.

RUTGERS meent, dat Sovjet-Rusland deze resolutie minder gewenscht zou achten. Hy vindt deze resolutie ontydig. De situatie is zoo, dat er maanden kunnen voorbygaan, eer de Sovjettroepen een offensief beginnen, buiten Rusland.

De resolutie wordt hierop teruggenomen.

Aan de orde is thans punt 6.

FRAINA houdt daarover eene inleidende rede. Hy zegt, dat het uitgangspunt van de onmiddellyke actie moet zyn de dictatuur van het proletariaat. Vakbeweging en politieke actie moeten één worden. FRAINA wenscht omvorming van de vakvereenigingen tot bedryfsorganisaties of sovjets.

MURPHY geeft een overzicht van de vakbeweging en zegt, dat vertrouwensmannen zich in de werkliedenorganisaties moeten begeven om de revolutionaire ideeën ingang te doen vinden en tevens om de organisaties los te maken van de aan hun bureaus vastgeroeste vakvereenigingleiders. Hy eindigt met de opmerking, dat het congres niet te veel waarde moet hechten aan vaste vormen der vakbeweging. Het komt op de revolutionaire gezindheid aan en niet op den vorm.

De rede van MURPHY wordt vertaald door Prof. MANNOURY.

De Belg SMETS zegt, dat de communistische beweging in België nog in de kinderschoenen is.

BOUWMAN houdt eene rede, waarin hy zegt, dat het anarchisme uit de onafhankelyke vakbeweging in Holland is verdwenen en dat daarvoor in de plaats is gekomen een bewust revolutionair streven. De onafhankelyken doen niet mede aan de vermeerdering der productie, omdat dit het kapitalisme in stand houdt. Wy zullen deze maatschappy afbreken. Wy moeten ons niet blindstaren op den vorm der vakbeweging. Hy zegt te meenen, dat het revisionisme, dat opkomt in de onafhankelyke vakbeweging in Nederland wel zal verdwynen. In Duitschland moeten syndicalisten en Communisten samenwerken.

MANUEL geeft een overzicht van het verraad der moderne vakbeweging in Hongarye.

WYNKOOP heeft eene opmerking aan BOUWMAN. Deze zegt toch, dat in het N.A.S.

[Nationaal Arbeids-Secretariaat] eene sterke strooming is naar reformisme, maar dat het revolutionaire karakter toch wel zal worden bewaard. WYNKOOP meent echter, dat het reformisme in het N.A.S. zal zegevieren. Mocht dit zoo zyn, dan is het z.i. beter, dat N.A.S. en N.V.V. [Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen] samensmelten. Twee reformistische vakvereenigingen naast elkaar hebben geen zin. Zyn zy samen één, dan kan men in den boezem van deze groote arbeidscentrale de revolutioneering van het geheel aanvangen.

Het congres wordt nu verdaagd tot 7 Februari v/m. 10 uur.

VOOR ZOOVER BY CONTROLE IS KUNNEN BLYKEN, ZYN DE BUITENLANDSCHE DEELNEMERS AAN DEZE DERDE INTERNATIONALE ALLEN VOOR ZIEN VAN GEVISEERDE PASPOORTEN.

Verzonden aan:

Centralen Inlichtingendienst.
Procureur-Generaal te Amsterdam.
Kapitein-Commandant Koninkl. Maréchaussée

(1) Verbaalarchief en Kabinetsarchief van het Ministerie van Justitie 1915-1955, Geheime verbalen 1915-1931, Inventaris nr. 16453 [hereafter cited as Verbaalarchief ..... Ministerie van Justitie, 16453], Nationaal Archief, Den Haag.

2-2-2

Inlichtingendienst.

Amsterdam, 7 Februari 1920

A No 38 Geheim [1].

Derde Internationale.

Zaterdag, 7 Februari j.l. des morgens te 9.30 uur zouden de deelnemers aan de conferentie der 3e Internationale wederom byeenkomen, en wel in het gebouw HEYSTEE. De student VALKHOFF en Professor MANNOURY (van de Amsterdamsche Universiteit) zyn de eenigen geweest, die in den loop van den dag zyn gekomen. Op de bestuurstafel was door VALKHOFF een aankondiging neergelegd, waarop de aanteekening, dat eventueele congressisten, die daar kwamen, zich moesten begeven naar het gebouw van DE TRIBUNE Amstel 85.

Een en ander wekt den indruk, dat de deelnemers van het congres gewaarschuwd zyn, niet verder by HEYSTEE te vergaderen.

Op Zaterdag 7 dezer zyn verschillende congressisten gevolgd, en kan met vry groote zekerheid gezegd worden, dat geen congres is gehouden.

Op Zondag 8 Februari j.l. zyn de congressisten byeengekomen van 11 tot 1 en van 3 tot 4.30 ten huize van Professor Gerrit MANNOURY, geboren te WORMERVEER, 17.5. '67 wonende Koninginneweg 192 vry bovenhuis. Aanwezig waren de congressisten, in de vorige rapporten genoemd. Bovendien werden nog opgemerkt [Jan C.] CETON, Louis de VISSER, P[etrus].F. van HOORN (Johannes Verhulststraat 187), de Chinees Tjoean Sioe KWA, geb, te Salatiga 7.1. '93, wonende Nassaukade 348 te Amsterdam.

Des avonds van Zondag 8 Februari j.l. vergaderden de congressisten ten huize van DAVID WYNKOOP.

Van beide byeenkomsten zyn geen byzonderheden uit eigen waarneming bekend.

Na afloop der vergadering zyn de passen van alle vreemdelingen-congressisten gecontroleerd. Een nadere opgave van alle deelnemers van het congres zal worden toegezonden. Een der deelnemers, de Belg EDOUARD, LEONARD HONORé VAN OVERSTRAETEN, geboren te Wetteren, 8.1. '91, kunstschilder wonende rue Clementine 4 te Brussel. Ook hy was, evenals de andere gecontroleerde vreemdelingen, voorzien van een geviseerd paspoort (het visum was verstrekt te Brussel, 30.1. '20 door den Nederlandschen Vice-Consul verm. Van Selwerk genaamd. Aangezien het visum juist den vorigen dag was afgeloopen is deze vreemdeling gearresteerd kunnen worden. Uit de op hem bevonden aanteekeningen, kan ten naasteby worden gereconstrueerd, wat in de conferenties ten huize van Prof. MANNOURY en van D. WYNKOOP is besproken.

Henriëtte Roland HOLST: De resolutie moet gepubliceerd worden in de verschillende landen, nadat het bureau deze resolutie heeft rondgezonden. (voor resolutie vide A 37)

WYNKOOP: Dit kan aan het bureau worden overgelaten. Wat het bureau betreft, de landen moeten in de kosten bydragen per lid. Van elk moet een bydrage komen.

RUTGERS: De verwachte (uit Rusland verwachte ?? [*sic*] rapp.) sommen, zyn niet voldoende. De landen zouden moeten bydragen naarmate zy belang by het bureau hebben.

HERZOG: In den aanvang ging het Berlynsche bureau niet accoord om op deze conferentie te komen.

Een brief wordt voorgelezen van de Spaansche Communisten, waaruit blykt, dat men gedacht had, dat het bureau in Spanje zou worden gevestigd. Men vindt daar echter, dat Holland ook een goede plaats is voor het bureau. Wat in Holland gebeurt is ook goed voor Spanje. De aandacht wordt in het schryven erop gevestigd, dat Spanje een goed land is voor het onderhouden van contact met

Amerika.

Besloten wordt, de brief te laten vertalen.

BESLOTEN WORDT VOORTS IN CONGRES TE HOUDEN IN MEXICO VOOR GEDELEGEERDEN UIT GEHEEL AMERIKA.

In Spanje zal eene scheiding in de revolutionaire party onvermydelyk zyn. De oude garde is niet van zins toe te geven en dreigen, de rebellen eruit te zullen smyten. Men zal daar een referendum onder de leden houden.

Er heerscht tusschen de verschillende Communistische partyen in de verschillende landen nog te veel verschil van opvatting en moet men komen tot unificatie der verschillende groepen en partyen, die zich Communisten noemen.

WYNKOOP: vindt de voorstellen te abstract. Hy vindt te groote eenheid een gevaar en wel het gevaar is; dat de opportunisten zich dan ook zullen aansluiten by de Communistische partyen, waardoor de zaak verwatert. Zulk een eenheid, door terzydestelling van principes wenscht hy niet. De eenheid moet voortkomen uit dieperen stryd.

WILLIS vindt de voorstellen tot unificatie niet abstract. Men kan hier niet over de situatie in de verschillende landen oordeelen.

In Engeland zyn vier partyen en is het tot heden niet gelukt, daarin eenheid te brengen. Men zal ook in Engeland trachten in die vier partyen een referendum te houden. In geen geval mag men komen tot aansluiting by de Labour Party.

Miss PANKHURST verklaart, dat het derde punt voor haar het gewichtigste is nml.: Zal de Communistische Party de leiding nemen in de revolutionaire beweging.

STUCKE zegt, dat hy tegen eenheid van elkaar bestrydende groepen is. Er moet een werkelyke eenheid komen, maar geen schyneenheid. In alle geval moet men het eens zyn op de punten Parlementarisme [en] Dictatuur.

Roland Holst zegt, bang te zyn voor sektarisme, men moet komen tot spontaan optreden der massa. De eerbied voor de oude lichamen moet weg. Men moet trachten de massa van onze begrippen te doordringen

WYNKOOP zegt het niet eens te zyn met PANNEKOEK (Dr Pannekoek, eveneens verbonden aan de Amsterdamsche Universiteit, blykt ook aanwezig te zyn rapp.) over diens interpretatie van den Berlynschen brief betreffende de blokkade.

HODGSON zegt, dat men niet moet zwelgen aan revolutionaire woorden.

Nog andere sprekers voeren het woord over het vraagstuk, om eenheid tot stand te brengen tusschen de verschillende revolutionaire Communistische partyen en groepen.

BESLOTEN WORDT, het bureau der Internationale ─ het bureau executief ─ in Holland te vestigen. Rutgers en Henriëtte Roland Holst zullen leden zyn en wordt daaraan als gedelegeerde van de Nederlandsche Communistische Party WYNKOOP toegevoegd.

RUTGERS verklaart in communicatie te zyn met RUSLAND en HONGARYE; ROLAND HOLST zegt in relatie te staan met verschillende andere landen.

WYNKOOP zegt het steunpunt voor eene revolutie ligt in Frankryk. (VAN OVERSTRAETEN zet hierachter een vraagteeken in zyne aanteekeningen)

FRAYNA [*sic*] zegt, dat men moet komen tot het oprichten van een bureau in Amerika, nevens dat in Moscou en Holland. Het Amerikaansch bureau zal een bulletin uitgeven. Hy vraagt aan de conferentie opdracht tot het vormen van een bureau in Amerika.

WYNKOOP verklaart zich in principe voor het voorstel FRAYNA. Men kan toch Amerika niet vanuit Spanje gaan besturen. Hy wil wel een inlichtingenbureau in Spanje oprichten.

FRAYNA zegt, op een vraag van ROLAND HOLST, dat er twee groepen in Amerika bestaan, een Latynsche en een Angel-Saksische. Hy vindt Mexico een geschikte plaats voor een bureau. In Spanje is gevaar voor patriottisme. Mexico is goed gelegen.

RUTGERS zegt, dat het bureau te Berlyn het werk zal kunnen blyven voortzetten in

Centraal Europa.

Het Communistisch bureau te Berlyn moet ophouden met het uitgeven van manifesten. Wy moeten daarom weten, of dat bureau werkelyk wil samenwerken met het bureau in Holland.

WYNKOOP verwerpt het uitgeven van het Bulletin door het bureau te Berlyn. Berlyn mag dit in den vervolge slechts doen onder controle van het Bureau executief in Holland. Het bureau te Berlyn mag slechts technisch werk verrichten.

RUTGERS verklaart te Berlyn te zyn geweest. Hy zegt daar gesproken te hebben met kameraad JAMES of JANSEN [Jansen; Johannes Proost]. Deze zag de zaken niet in, zooals wy thans doen, nml. dat het Berlynsche bureau ondergeschikt zou zyn. Hy wenschte wel artikelen van GORTER, PANNEKOEK, ROLAND HOLST e.a.

Pankhurst wil ook contact met Afrika.

Onder de aanteekeningen van Van Overstraeten komt nog voor het navolgende adres.

Executive K.J.I.
Fraülein PFEIFER

Wilhelmshöherstrasse 9

Berlin-Friedenau.

Geen afzender op de enveloppe vermelden.

VANTER ([G.J.M.] Van ’t Reve) Leidschestraat 23

Opmerking rapporteur: Leidschestraat 23 boven is een zeer verdacht adres. Beneden in het winkelhuis is een z.g. vliegende winkel gevestigd in sigaren. Op de eerste verdieping is een z.g. informatiebureau, gedreven door den naar Indië vertrokken Communist [Asser] Baars. Aldaar zyn thans werkzaam de uit Indië geexterneerde Communist [Jacob A.] Brandsteder en de echtgenoote of concubine van den Communist Henk Eikeboom. Huisbewaarder is zekere Blauwendraad, eveneens Communist.

Uit de by hem bevonden papieren blykt, dat Van OVERSTRAETEN, gedelegeerde van de Belgische Werkliedenparty, lid van den Vlaamschen Socialistischen Kring, medewerker en lid van de “Union Centrale des Jeunes Gardes Socialistes de l’Arrondissement de Bruxelles”, lid van de Ligue Ouvrière Ixelloise, lid en medewerker van het “comité Bruxelloise d’Education Ouvrière.”

Uit andere by hem bevonden papieren blykt eveneens, dat de “Union Centrale des Jeunes Gardes de Bruxelles eene communistische organisatie is. By de firma Bos, communistische boekhandel Kinkerstraat 300 I te Amsterdam voor f 33,30 cent aan Communistische brochures heeft besteld.

Verzonden aan:
Centralen Inlichtingendienst te ’s-Gravenhage
Procureur-Generaal te Amsterdam
Kapitein-Districtscommandant Kon. Maréchaussée Amsterdam

(1) Verbaalarchief ..... Ministerie van Justitie, 16453.

2-2-3

Inlichtingendienst.
Amsterdam. Amsterdam, 10 Februari 1920
A No 40 Geheim [1].

Derde Internationale.

Als Bylagen worden hierby toegezonden:

1° De agenda van het Amsterdamsche Congres der 3e Internationale.
2° Leitsätze über die Taktik der Kommunistischen Internationale im Kampfe um die proletarische Diktatur (Entwurf).
3° Resolutie over Rusland, door het congres aangenomen (punt 4 agenda),
4° Resolutie over parlementarisme (punt 5 agenda).
5° Stellingen over de vakbeweging, aangenomen ten congresse, behoorende by punt 6 der agenda.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Ter verduidelyking diene, dat bovengenoemde 5 documenten behooren by het congres der 3e Internationale, dat thans te Amsterdam wordt gehouden.

Verzonden aan Centralen Inlichtingendienst.
Procureur-Generaal te Amsterdam.
Kapitein-Commandant Kon. Maréchaussée Amsterdam.

A g e n d a.

1 Opening.
2 Verkiezing Congresbureau.
3 Rapporten afgevaardigden.
4 Actie in zake contra-revolutionaire inmenging in Sovjet-Rusland en andere Sovjet-republieken.
5 Parlementarisme.
6 Vakbeweging en Sovjets.
7 Socialisatie en bedryfscontrole.
8 De boeren en de revolutie.
9 Anti-Militarisme en het Roode Leger.
10 Aaneensluiting van groepen tot partyen in de verschillende landen.
11 Oarganisatie van een Internationaal Bureau:
   a Functie.
   b Samenstelling.
   c Onderling verkeer, courieverbindingen, bulletin, pers, radio's, berichtendienst, maandblad, archief, controle tegen spionnen, financiën.
   d verhouding ten opzichte van andere groepen: Communistische Jeugd, revolutionaire vrouwenbeweging, revolutionaire intellectueelen, revolutionaire studenten, Clarté-groep, enz.
   e verhouding ten opzichte van Centrumpartijen, als U.S.P., Longuetisten, etc.
   f verhouding ten opzichte van buitenlandsche vertegenwoordingers van Sovjetrepublieken.
12 Oproepen en moties:
   a Deklaratie aan het West-Eur. en Am. proletariaat.
   b Motie inzake vervolgingen speciaal in Hongarije, Duitschland en Amerika.
   c Motie inzakke verkeersvrijheid: passen, censuur, spionage, etc.
   d Motie inzake Volkerenbond.
13 Organisatie volgend congres: plaats en tijd.

(1) Verbaalarchief ..... Ministerie van Justitie, 16453. No. 39 of Inlichtendienst is not filed.

2-2-4

Inlichtingendienst.

Amsterdam, 11 Februari 1920

A No 41 Geheim [1].

Derde Internationale. (Vervolg op de vorige verslagen). Voor de Inlichtingendiensten te Rotterdam en te Amersfoort, die deze vorige verslagen niet ontvingen, volgt hieronder aan het einde een kort resumé.

Maandag noch Dinsdag zyn vergaderingen der derde Internationale gehouden. Het vermoeden is, dat de derde Internationale geen verdere zittingen zal houden en zal worden opgebroken. Dit is het gevolg van de controle der politie. Ten huize van David WYNKOOP Pretoriusplein 3 derde verdieping houden verblyf de Duitsche afgevaardigde STUCKE en de Zwitsersche afgevaardigde HERZ of HERZOG, die zonder pas in Nederland gekomen zyn en het huis niet durven verlaten; de Engelsche afgevaardigde Miss SYLVIA PANKHURST ligt ziek in haar hotel (hotel Rembrandt); de afgevaardigden van de West-Europeesche en Amerikaansche naties wenschen zoo spoedig mogelyk weg te komen, bang als zy zyn, dat de Nederlandsche autoriteiten hun aankomst in Engeland zullen signaleeren en hen alsdan zullen fouilleren. Uitgezonderd Miss PANKHURST en nog een paar afgevaardigden, woont geen afgevaardigde meer in een hotel uit vrees voor controle; zy zyn by partygenooten ondergebracht. De afgevaardigden doen Wynkoop verwytingen, dat deze de conferentie zoo stom in elkander heeft gezet. De afgevaardigden ter conferentie weten thans, dat de politie op de hoogte is, dat er zoo iets als eene conferentie van communisten gaande is en dat had niet mogen uitlekken.

Deelnemers aan de conferentie zyn:

Duitschland : STUCKE of STUCKERT uit BREMEN. Eenige andere Duitsche afgevaardigden worden nog verwacht o.a. CLARA ZETKIN.

BELGIË : Edouard Leonard Honoré VAN OVERSTRAETEN, geb. te WETTEREN, 8.1. ’91, kunstschilder, wonende Brussel, Rue Clémentine 4 (heeft visum Nederl. Vice-Consul Brussel). Hy wordt uitgeleid naar België, aangezien visum is verloopen. Foto gaat hierby.

ENGELAND 1: Estelle SYLVIA PANKHURST, geb. te Manchester, 5 Mei 1884, journaliste. Heeft visum Ned. Consul Generaal te Londen; heeft haar paspoort voor verlenging opgezonden naar Rykspaspoortenbureau. Foto gaat hierby.

2 John Frederick HODGSON, geb. te YORK, 10.4. ’67; heeft visum Ned. Consul-Generaal Londen. Portret gaat hierby. Is Zondag j.l. vertrokken.

3 WILLIS, Frederick George, geb. te Londen 23.1. ’75, handelsagent. Heeft visum Ned. Consul Generaal Londen (foto).

4 Nora Veronica Lyle SMYTH, geb. te Chester, 22.3. ’74. Foto ingesloten. Heeft visum Ned. Consul Generaal Londen.

5 John Thomas MURPHY, geb. te Manchester, 9.12. ’88, engineer, wonende te Sheffield. Heeft visum Ned. Consul Generaal te Londen. Foto ingesloten.

Amerika. Ralph SNYDER, geb. te Montreal (Canada) 13.10. ’07, arts. Heeft op zyn paspoort, dat stellig valsch is, een visum van den Ned. Consul-Generaal te Londen. Zyn juiste naam is Louis FRAYNA. Foto gaat hierby. Hy is klein en draagt een schildpadden bril met groote glazen, waarschynlyk om zyn opvallend schele oogen te bedekken.

Sovjet-Rusland: Sebald Justinus RUTGERS, Ingenieur, geb te Leiden 25.1.1879, wonende te Amersfoort. Van Campenstraat 9.

Hogarye Richard André MANUEL, geb. te Amsterdam, 3.5. ’89, 1e Jan Van der Heydenstraat

125 II te Amsterdam.

Nederland David Wynkoop, Pretoriusplein 3.
Dr H. GORTER, Bussum.
Johan Valkhoff, student, Corn. Trooststraat 41 II Amsterdam.
Willem Van LEUVEN, Jacob Marisstraat 30 Sloten N.H.
Henriette ROLAND HOLST, hotel Nieuw Bussum, Bussum.
Anna Augusta Henriette DE WIT, Vondelstraat 77 A'dam.
Prof. MANNOURY (Gerrit), Koninginneweg 192 boven, A'dam.
Petrus Franciscus VAN HOORN, leeraar Wiskunde, Johannes Verhulststraat 187 A'dam.
Tjoan Sioe KWA, geb Salatiga, 7.1. '93, Nassaukade 348 A'dam.
Dr. Anton PANNEKOEK, Ruthardlaan te Bussum.
Mevrouw RUTGERS, Amersfoort.

De conferentie werd met een bezoek vereerd door
Jan Cornelis CETON, Laing Neckstraat 33 III A'dam.
BOUWMAN, leider Federatie Transportarbeiders, Rotterdam.
Louis de VISSER, Den Haag.
Hendricus Josephus Marie SNEEVLIET, Rustenburgerstraat 389 II Amsterdam.
Ds DE LIGT, DE BILT (UTR).
Ds [John William] KRUYT, Utrecht.
Heleen ANKERSMIT, Gabriël Metsustraat 6 Amsterdam.
D[irk].J. STRUIK, Tollensstraat 104 B, te Rotterdam.
Mejuffrouw DYKHUIS, woonachtig ??????????????????

Het is thans zeker, dat de conferentie niet verder zal worden voortgezet. STUCKE en HERTZ [Herzog] bevinden zich nog ten huize van WYNKOOP, waarop dit oogenblik (11 Febr. n/m 1 uur) RUTGERS met echtgenoote, VAN DER POEL (Gouderegenstraat 25 Den Haag), Dr GORTER, en eenige andere Communisten byeen zyn. Met vry groote zekerheid kan worden gezegd, dat thans in deze kleine conferentie eenige slotbesprekingen plaats hebben met de Duitsche en Zwitsersche afgevaardigden STUCKE en HERTZ. De andere buitenlandsche vertegenwoordigers zyn daar niet tegenwoordig. Morgen zullen allen afreizen.

In aansluiting met de reeds verzonden verslagen der 3e Internationale, kan nog het volgende worden medegedeeld:

RUTGERS heeft van LENIN en TROTZKI opdracht gekregen, de conferentie voor West-EUROPA en AMERIKA der Derde Internationale voor te bereiden, welke conferentie dus thans te Amsterdam heeft plaats gehad. Ten einde deze conferentie voor te bereiden, hebben Dr GORTER, Henriette ROLAND-HOLST, WYNKOOP, Dr VAN RAVESTEYN en Anton PANNEKOEK van de Sovjetregeering in Rusland opdracht gekregen met RUTGERS het bureau van voorbereiding van dit congres te vormen.

(Met aan zekerheid grenzende waarschynlykheid kan worden gezegd, dat de technische voorbereiding van het congres geschiedde in het kantoor Leidschestraat 23 Amsterdam, dat aanvankelyk onder leiding stond van den thans naar Ned. Indië vertrokken Communist BAARS en nu onder leiding staat van VAN DER POEL bovengenoemd uit Den Haag. Ook thans worden daar de stukken voor de conferentie zeer waarschynlyk op de schryfmachine gemaakt.)

Het archief der derde Internationale berust — naar uit zeer goed ingelichte bron wordt medegedeeld — ten huize van W[illem].L. BRUSSE, Bergsingel 172a te Rotterdam. Zeer waarschynlyk komen de coeriers uit het buitenland met stukken en geldzendingen het eerst by Rutgers te Amersfoort; daarna worden de stukken naar BRUSSE gezonden om in het archief te worden opgelegd.

Een der coeriers, die thans onderweg is, is de Rus AGURSKI.

De resolutie over Parlementarisme, welke by A. No 40 is gevoegd, was van Mevrouw PANKHURST en is nog niet ten congresse behandeld.

Het stuk "Leitsätze über die Taktik der Kommunistischen Internationale im Kampfe um die proletarische Diktatur" is een ontwerp van het Communistisch bureau te Berlyn, dat thans ondergeschikt is aan dat van HOLLAND. Genoemd stuk bevindt zich by A. No 40.

HET LIGT STELLIG IN DE BEDOELING, BINNEN DRIE MAANDEN TE KOMEN TOT EENE REVOLUTIONAIRE ACTIE./ Men zal trachten internationaal in elke fabriek onder de werklieden een groep te vormen, die by REVOLUTIE DE KERN MOETEN UITMAKEN VAN DEN IN DIE FABRIEK TE VORMEN BEDRYFSRAAD OF SOVJET.

RUTGERS heeft medegedeeld, DAT IN HET VOORJAAR DE RUSSISCHE SOVJET REPUBLIEK EEN OFFENSIEF NAAR HET WESTEN ZAL ONDER NEMEN MET HET DOEL. DE SOVJETREGEERINGSVORM IN DE ANDERE LANDEN VAN EUROPA TOT STAND TE BRENGEN. DE TAAK VAN HET BUREAU IN NEDERLAND IS, DE LANDEN IN WESTEUROPA ZOODANIG TE BEWERKEN DAT BY AANKOMST DER SOVJETLEGERS GEEN TEGENSTAND ZAL WORDEN GEBODEN (VIDE DE DESBETREFFENDE RESOLUTIE.) EN IN DE LANDEN ZELF DE SOVJETREPUBLIEK ZAL WORDEN UITGEROEPEN ALS GEVOLG VAN DE GETROFFEN MAATREGELEN VAN HET BUREAU.

TOT BEREIKING VAN DIT DOEL ZAL HET BUREAU VAN DE RUSSISCHE SOVJETREGEERING DE BESCHIKKING KRYGEN OVER EEN BEDRAG VAN 20.000.000 ROEBEL /OUDE WAARDE/ EN WEL IN DEN VORM VAN DIAMANTEN, PAARLEN EN EDELGESTEENTEN, VERTEGENWOORDIGENDE ALZOO RUIM 22.000.000 gulden. Dit bedrag is door RUTGERS, ECHTER NOG NIET ONTVANGEN (Vide vorige rapporten).

ALLE STAKINGEN, DIE EEN REVOLUTIONAIR KARAKTER DRAGEN, ZULLEN DOOR HET BUREAU EXECUTIF IN NEDERLAND WORDEN ONDERSTEUND. TOT DE STAKINGEN, DIE ONDERSTEUND ZULLEN WORDEN, BEHOORT OOK DE a.s. STAKING DER TRANSPORTARBEIDERS/ (vide het bezoek van BOUWMAN aan de conferentie).

BYZONDERE AANDACHT ZAL GEWYD WORDEN AAN DUITSCHLAND/ OM DAAR IEDERE REVORUTIONAIRE POGING TE STEUNEN.

IN DE OPENINGSSPEECH, WELKE HENRIETTE ROLAND HOLST HIELD, ZEIDE ZY, DAT HET CONGRES BYEENGEROEPEN WAS, OM DEFINITIEVE PLANNEN TE MAKEN HOE EENE REVOLUTIE TOT STAND TE BRENGEN IN DE HAASTE TOEKOMST/

HET BUREAU BESTAAT UIT RUTGERS EN MEVROUW ROLAND HOLST EN IS DAVID WYNKOOP DAARAAN TOEGEVOEGD.

In het bovenstaande is ook een resumé opgenomen van het meest belangryke, dat ten congresse is behandeld.

Nader wordt medegedeeld, dat de zich noemende RALPH SNYDER, in werkelykheid genaamd moet zyn Louis FABIANO, of Louis FRAYNA.

Aangezien niet genoeg afdrukken voorhanden zyn, worden portretten van de buitenlandsche congressisten slechts toegezonden aan de Inlichtingendienst te Rotterdam, den Centralen Inlichtingendienst en den Procureur-Generaal te Amsterdam.

Voorts worden den Procureur-Generaal te Amsterdam en den Centralen Inlichtingendienst toegezonden reproducties van het Nederlandsche visum van VAN OVERSTRAETEN.

Verzonden aan:
Procureur-Generaal te Amsterdam.
Centralen Inlichtingendienst
Kapitein-Districtscommandant Kon. Maréchaussée te Amsterdam
Hoofdcommissaris van Politie Rotterdam
Commissaris van Politie te Amersfoort

(1) Verbaalarchief ..... Ministerie van Justitie, 16453.

2-2-5

Inlichtingendienst.

Amsterdam, 11 Februari 1920

A No 42 Geheim [1].

Derde Internationale.

Ingesloten worden toegezonden fotografische reproductie van stellingen en resoluties welke op het congres der derde Internationale te Amsterdam zyn behandeld en zouden worden behandeld. Zy zyn genummerd 1 tot en met 13.

Bekend is nog geworden, dat het punt 11 van de agenda: (vide A No 40 Geheim) Organisatie van een internationaal bureau, by besluit van de conferentie opgedragen is aan de drie leden RUTGERS, ROLAND HOLST en WYNKOOP. De verschillende onderdeelen van dit punt als: "Controle tegen spionnen" zyn dus niet behandeld.

Verzonden aan:
Centralen Inlichtingendienst
Procureur-Generaal te Amsterdam
Kapitein-Commandant Kon. Maréchaussée Amsterdam.

(1) Verbaalarchief ..... Ministerie van Justitie, 16453.

2-2-6

Inlichtingendienst.

Amsterdam, 11 Februari 1920

A No 43 Geheim [1].

Derde Internationale.

Op heden heeft wederom geen vereenigde zitting van de Internationale plaats gehad.
Ten huize van WYNKOOP, Pretoriusplein 3 heeft eene vergadering plaats gehad van:
Wynkoop, (en de te diens huize verblyfhoudende STUCKE en HERTZ)
Rutgers en echtgenoote,
Van der POEL,
VAN 't REVE,
VALKHOFF,
Dr PANNEKOEK,
Mevr. ROLAND HOLST

Ten huize van Professor MANNOURY, Koninginneweg 192, hebben de volgende personen eene byeenkomst gehad:
Augusta DE WIT,
Louis FRAYNA (N. Amerika; deze afgevaardigde vorbergt zich ten huize van den Professor Mannoury),
MURPHY (Engeland),
Louis DE VISSER (is zoogenaamd mandataris van Ned. Indië),
Nosovitzky,
Dr Pannekoek,
MANUEL,
Dr KWA (Chinees uit Ned. Indië)

In de eerstgenoemde byeenkomst is besloten dat het congres zou uiteengaan, daar de belangrykste punten toch behandeld zyn en dat de detailkwesties door het bureau (WYNKOOP, RUTGERS en ROLAND HOLST) zouden worden geregeld.

Uit zeer goed ingelichte bron wordt medegedeeld, dat RUTGERS by zyn terugkomst uit Rusland DRIE diamanten van groote waarde heeft medegebracht (verm. de bekende diamanten, die later in het bezit van [Alexander] LISSER waren).

Behalve VAN 't REVE, zyn de bovengenoemde personen allen deelnemers van het congres der derde Internationale.

Verzonden aan:
Centralen Inlichtingendienst.
Procureur-Generaal te Amsterdam.
Kapitein-Districtscommandant Kon. Maréchaussée Amsterdam.

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(1) Verbaalarchief ..... Ministerie van Justitie, 16453.

2-2-7

The Hague, February 12, 1920.

Translation of Police Report
on
THIRD BOLSHEVISTS INTERNATIONAL [1]

[No. 41:]
Derde Internationale. (Vervolg op de vorige verslagen). Voor de Inlichtingendiensten te Rotterdam en te Amersfoort, die deze vorige verslagen niet ontvingen, volgt hieronder aan het einde een kort resumé.

Maandag noch Dinsdag zyn vergaderingen der derde Internationale gehouden. Het vermoeden is, dat de derde Internationale geen verdere zittingen zal houden en zal worden opgebroken. Dit is het gevolg van de controle der politie. Ten huize van David WYNKOOP Pretoriusplein 3 derde verdieping houden verblyf de Duitsche afgevaardigde STUCKE en de Zwitsersche afgevaardigde HERZ of HERZOG, die zonder pas in Nederland gekomen zyn en het huis niet durven verlaten; de Engelsche afgevaardigde Miss SYLVIA PANKHURST ligt ziek in haar hotel (hotel Rembrandt); de afgevaardigden van de West-Europeesche en Amerikaansche naties wenschen zoo spoedig mogelyk weg te komen, bang als zy zyn, dat de Nederlandsche autoriteiten hun aankomst in Engeland zullen signaleeren en hen alsdan zullen fouilleren. Uitgezonderd Miss PANKHURST en nog een paar afgevaardigden, woont geen afgevaardigde meer in een hotel uit vrees voor controle; zy zyn by partygenooten ondergebracht. De afgevaardigden doen Wynkoop verwyingten, dat deze de conferentie zoo stom in elkander heeftgezet. De afgevaardigden ter conferentie weten thans, dat de politie op de hoogte is, dat er zooiets als eene conferentie van communisten gaande is en dat had niet mogen uitlekken.

Deelnemers aan de conferentie zyn:

Duitschland: STUCKE of STUCKERT uit

No meetings were held on Monday or Tuesday [February 9th or 10th] and it is presumed that no further meetings will be held. This is the result of Police Control. The German depute Stucke and the Swiss depute Herz (or Hertzog) who have come to the Netherlands without a pass are staying at David Wynkoop's house No. 3 Pretorius plein, 3rd floor and they dare not leave the house; The English deputy Miss Sylvia Pankhurst is sick and confined to her hotel (Hotel Rembrandt). The representatives of the West-European and American nations have only one wish to get away, being afraid of being reported by the Dutch authorities to England where they fear to be searched.

With exception of Miss Pankhurst and a few others, no representatives are staying in a Hotel for fear of control; they are staying with partisans. They reproach Wijnkoop for having arranged the Conference inefficiently. They representatives now know that the police know all about the CommunistConference and that ought not to be the case.

The following are the names of those who attend the conference:
GERMANY: Stucke, or Stuckert, Bremen. A few

BREMEN. Eenige andere Duitsche afgevaardigden worden nog verwacht o.a. CLARA ZETKIN.

more are expected, one of whom is Clara Zetkin.

BELGIË: Edouard Leonard Honoré VAN OVERSTRAETEN, geb. te WETTEREN, 8.1. ’91, kunstschilder, wonende Brussel, Rue Clémentine 4 (heeft visum Nederl. Vice-Consul Brussel). Hy wordt uitgeleid naar België, aangezien visum is verloopen. Foto gaat hierby.

BELGIUM: Edouard Leonard Honore van Overstraeten, born at Wetteren, 8-1-1891, fine art painter residing at Brussels, 4 Rue Clementine, — Obtained a visa from the Netherlands Consul at Brussels. As the time for which this visa was given has expired, he will be expelled to Belgium.

ENGELAND 1: Estelle SYLVIA PANKHURST, geb. te Manchester, 5 Mei 1884, journaliste. Heeft visum Ned. Consul Generaal te Londen; heeft haar paspoort voor verlenging opgezonden naar Rykspaspoortenbureau. Foto gaat hierby.

ENGLAND: 1. Estelle Sylvia Pankhurst, journalist, born on 5-5-1884 at Manchester. Obtained a visa from Netherlands Consul General at London; sent her passport for extension to Dutch passport Bureau.

2 John Frederick HODGSON, geb. te YORK, 10.4. ’67; heeft visum Ned.Consul-Generaal Londen. Portret gaat hierby. Is Zondag j.l. vertrokken.

2. John Frederick Hodgson, born at York 10-4-67. Visa Dutch Consul General London. Left last Sunday.

3 WILLIS, Frederick George, geb. te Londen 23.1. ’75, handelsagent. Heeft visum Ned. Consul Generaal Londen (foto).

3. Frederick George Willis, born 23-1-75 London. Commercial Agent. Visa Dutch Consul General.

4 Nora Veronica Lyle SMYTH, geb. te Chester, 22.3. ’74. Foto ingesloten. Heeft visum Ned. Consul Generaal Londen.

4. Nora Veronica Lyle Smyth, born at Chester, 22-3-74. Visa Dutch Consul General, London.

5 John Thomas MURPHY, geb. te Manchester, 9.12. ’88, engineer, wonende te Sheffield. Heeft visum Ned. Consul Generaal te Londen. Foto ingesloten.

5. John Thomas Murphy, born at Manchester, 9-12-88. Engineer residing at Sheffield. Visa Dutch Consul General London.

Amerika. Ralph SNYDER, geb. te Montreal (Canada) 13.10. ’07, arts. Heeft op zyn paspoort, dat stellig valsch is, een visum van den Ned. Consul-Generaal te Londen. Zyn juiste naam is Louis FRAYNA. Foto gaat hierby. Hy is klein en draagt een schildpadden bril met groote glazen, waarschynlyk om zyn opvallend schele oogen te bedekken.

AMERICA: Ralph Snyder, born at Montreal, Canada, 13-10-87. Med. Doctor. Has passport which must be false bears a visa of the Dutch Consul General. His real name is Louis Fraina. He is a short man and wears big glasses with tortoise frame, apparently to hide his squinting eyes.

Sovjet-Rusland: Sebald Justinus RUTGERS, Ingenieur, geb te Leiden 25.1.1879, wonende te Amersfoort. Van Campenstraat 9.

SOVIET RUSSIA:

Sebald Justinus Rutgers, engineer, born at Leiden (Holland) 25-1-79, residing at Amersfoort, 9 van Campen St.

Hogarye Richard André MANUEL, geb. te Amsterdam, 3.5. ’89, 1e Jan Van der Heydenstraat 125 II te Amsterdam.

HUNGARY: Richard Andre Manuel, born at Amsterdam 3-5-89. Eerste Jan v. d. Heyde St.125 2nd fl. Amsterdam.

Nederland David Wynkoop, Pretoriusplein

NETHERLANDS:

3.

Dr H. GORTER, Bussum.

Johan Valkhoff, student, Corn. Trooststraat 41 II Amsterdam.

Willem Van LEUVEN, Jacob Marisstraat 30 Sloten N.H.

Henriette ROLAND HOLST, hotel Nieuw Bussum, Bussum.

Anna Augusta Henriette DE WIT, Vondelstraat 77 A'dam.

Prof. MANNOURY (Gerrit), Koninginneweg 192 boven, A'dam.

Petrus Franciscus VAN HOORN, leeraar Wiskunde, Johannes Verhulststraat 187 A'dam.

Tjoan Sioe KWA, geb Salatiga, 7.1. '93, Nassaukade 348 A'dam.

Dr. Anton PANNEKOEK, Ruthardlaan te Bussum.

Mevrouw RUTGERS, Amersfoort.

De conferentie werd met een bezoek vereerd door

Jan Cornelis CETON, Laing Neckstraat 33 III A'dam.

BOUWMAN, leider Federatie Transportarbeiders, Rotterdam.

Louis de VISSER, Den Haag.

Hendricus Josephus Marie SNEEVLIET, Rustenburgerstraat 389 II Amsterdam.

Ds DE LIGT, DE BILT(UTR).

Ds KRUYT, Utrecht.

Heleen ANKERSMIT, Gabriël Metsustraat 6 Amsterdam.

D.J. STRUIK, Tollensstraat 104 B, te Rotterdam.

Mejuffrouw DYKHUIS, woonachtig ??????????????????

Het is thans zeker, dat de conferentie niet verder zal worden voortgezet. STUCKE en HERTZ bevinden zich nog ten huize van WYNKOOP, waarop dit oogenblik (11 Febr. n/m 1 uur) RUTGERS met echtgenoote, VAN DER POEL (Gouderegenstraat 25 Den Haag), Dr GORTER, en eenige andere Communisten byeen zyn. Met vry groote zekerheid kan worden gezegd, dat thans in deze kleine conferentie eenige

David Wynkoop, Pretoriusplein 3, Amsterdam.

Dr. Gorter, Bussum.

Johann Valkhoff, student, Corn Troost St. 41 2[nd Fl.] Amsterdam.

Willem van Leuven, Jacob Maris St. 30, Sloten (Near Amsterdam).

Henriette Roland Holst, Hotel Nieuw Bussum, Bussum.

Anna Augusta de Wit, 77 Vondel St., Amsterdam.

Prof. Gerrit Mannoury, 192 Koninginneweg, Amsterdam.

[*sic*] Joh Verhulst, St. Amsterdam.

Tjoan Sioe Kwa, born at Sataliga, 7-1-93, 348 Nassaukade, Amsterdam.

Dr. Anton Pannekoek, Ruthardlaan, Bussum.

Mrs. Rutgers, Amersfoort.

The following visited the Conference:

Jan Cornelis Ceton, Laigns Nek St. 33 3rd Fl. Amsterdam.

Bouwman, leader of the Federation of Transport Laborers, Rotterdam.

Louis de Visser, The Hague.

Hendricus Josephus Marie Sneevliet, Rustenburger St. 389 2nd Fl. Amsterdam.

Dr. de Ligt, De Bilt.

Dr. Kruijt, Utrecht.

Heleen Ankersmit, Gabriel Metsu St. 2, Amsterdam.

D.J. Struik, Tolens St. 104 b, Rotterdam.

Miss Kykhuis. Residence unknown.

It is certain that the conference will not be continued. Stucke & Hertz are still at Wynkoop's house where today Feb. 11th Mr. and Mrs. Rutgers, Van der Poel (25 Gouden Regen St., The Hague), Dr. Gorter and a few more communists are assembling. It is rather certain that a final discussion takes place between the above and the German and Swiss representatives, Stucke and Hertz. The other foreign representatives are not there. They will all leave

slotbesprekingen plaats hebben met de Duitsche en Zwitsersche afgevaardigden STUCKE en HERTZ. De andere buitenlandsche vertegenwoordigers zyn daar niet tegenwoordig. Morgen zullen allen afreizen.

tomorrow.

In aansluiting met de reeds verzonden verslagen der 3e Internationale, kan nog het volgende worden medegedeeld:

In addition to the reports about the 3rd International the following:

RUTGERS heeft van LENIN en TROTZKI opdracht gekregen, de conferentie voor West-EUROPA en AMERIKA der Derde Internationale voor te bereiden, welke conferentie dus thans te Amsterdam heeft plaats gehad. Ten einde deze conferentie voor te bereiden, hebben Dr GORTER, Henriette ROLAND-HOLST, WYNKOOP, Dr VAN RAVESTEYN en Anton PANNEKOEK van de Sovjetregeering in Rusland opdracht gekregen met RUTGERS het bureau van voorbereiding van dit congres te vormen.

Rutgers received the instruction from Lenine and Trotsky to prepare the Conference of the 3rd International for West-Europe and America, which Conference has not been held at Amsterdam.

The Russian Soviet Government instructed Dr. Gorter, Henriette Roland Holst, Wynkoop, Dr. van Ravesteyn and Anton Pannekoek to assist Rutgers in making the necessary arrangements for this purpose.

(Met aan zekerheid grenzende waarschynlykheid kan worden gezegd, dat de technische voorbereiding van het congres geschiedde in het kantoor Leidschestraat 23 Amsterdam, dat aanvankelyk onder leiding stond van den thans naar Ned. Indië vertrokken Communist BAARS en nu onder leiding staat van VAN DER POEL bovengenoemd uit Den Haag. Ook thans worden daar de stukken voor de conferentie zeer waarschynlyk op de schryfmachine gemaakt.)

It may be said that in all probability the technical preparations for the Congress were made in the office of 23 Leidsche St. Amsterdam which is now under the management of the above mentioned van der Poel, The Hague (formerly under the Communist Baars who went to India). The documents for the conference are being typewritten in this office.

Het archief der derde Internationale berust ─ naar uit zeer goed ingelichte bron wordt medegedeeld ─ ten huize van W.L. BRUSSE, Bergsingel 172a te Rotterdam. Zeer waarschynlyk komen de coeriers uit het buitenland met stukken en geldzendingen het eerst by Rutgers te Amersfoort; daarna worden de stukken naar BRUSSE gezonden om in het archief te worden opgelegd.

It is stated from a very well informed source that the archives of the Third International are deposited at the house of W.L. Brusse, 172 Bergsingel at Rotterdam. Very probably the couriers from abroad come with their documents and funds firstly to Rutgers at Amersfoort, afterwards the documents are sent to Brusse to be deposited in the Archives. [/]

Een der coeriers, die thans onderweg is, is de Rus AGURSKI.

One of the couriers who is now on his way is the Russian Agurski. [/]

De resolutie over Parlementarisme, welke by A. No 40 is gevoegd, was van Mevrouw PANKHURST en is nog niet ten congresse behandeld.

The resolution Parliamentarism was strong [strongly urged by] Mrs. Pankhurst but has not yet been handled at the Congress. [/]

Het stuk “Leitsätze über die Taktik der Kommunistischen Internationale im Kampfe um die proletarische Diktatur” is een ontwerp van het

Communistisch bureau te Berlyn, dat thans ondergeschikt is aan dat van HOLLAND. Genoemd stuk bevindt zich by A. No 40.

HET LIGT STELLIG IN DE BEDOELING, BINNEN DRIE MAANDEN TE KOMEN TOT EENE REVOLUTIONAIRE ACTIE./ Men zal trachten internationaal in elke fabriek onder de werklieden een groep te vormen, die by REVOLUTIE DE KERN MOETEN UITMAKEN VAN DEN IN DIE FABRIEK TE VORMEN BEDRYFSRAAD OF SOVJET.

It is certainly the intention to bring about revolutionary action within 3 months. An endeavor will be made to form an International group among the work people in every factory that on revolution taking place must form the kernel of an industrial council or soviet in that factory.[/]

RUTGERS heeft medegedeeld, DAT IN HET VOORJAAR DE RUSSISCHE SOVJET REPUBLIEK EEN OFFENSIEF NAAR HET WESTEN ZAL ONDER NEMEN MET HET DOEL. DE SOVJETREGEERINGSVORM IN DE ANDERE LANDEN VAN EUROPA TOT STAND TE BRENGEN. DE TAAK VAN HET BUREAU IN NEDERLAND IS, DE LANDEN IN WESTEUROPA ZOODANIG TE BEWERKEN DAT BY AANKOMST DER SOVJETLEGERS GEEN TEGENSTAND ZAL WORDEN GEBODEN (VIDE DE DESBETREFFENDE RESOLUTIE.) EN IN DE LANDEN ZELF DE SOVJETREPUBLIEK ZAL WORDEN UITGEROEPEN ALS GEVOLG VAN DE GETROFFEN MAATREGELEN VAN HET BUREAU.

Rutgers stated that in the spring the Russian Soviet Republic will undertake an offensive towards the West with the purpose of bringing about the Soviet form of Government in the other countries of Europe. The task of the bureau in Holland is to work the countries in Western Europe in such a manner that on the arrival of the Soviet Armies no opposition shall be offered and that in these countries themselves the Soviet Republic shall be proclaimed as the consequence of measures taken by the bureau. [/]

TOT BEREIKING VAN DIT DOEL ZAL HET BUREAU VAN DE RUSSISCHE SOVJETREGEERING DE BESCHIKKING KRYGEN OVER EEN BEDRAG VAN 20.000.000 ROEBEL /OUDE WAARDE/ EN WEL IN DEN VORM VAN DIAMANTEN, PAARLEN EN EDELGESTEENTEN, VERTEGENWOORDIGENDE ALZOO RUIM 22.000.000 gulden. Dit bedrag is door RUTGERS, ECHTER NOG NIET ONTVANGEN (Vide vorige rapporten).

For the achievement of this purpose the office will obtain at its disposal an amount of 20,000,000 rubles of the old value from the Russian Soviet Government and this in the form of diamonds, pearls, and precious stones representing thus more than 22,000,000 guilders. This amount however has not yet been received by Rutgers.[/]

ALLE STAKINGEN, DIE EEN REVOLUTIONAIR KARAKTER DRAGEN, ZULLEN DOOR HET BUREAU EXECUTIF IN NEDERLAND WORDEN ONDERSTEUND. TOT DE STAKINGEN, DIE ONDERSTEUND ZULLEN WORDEN, BEHOORT OOK DE a.s. STAKING DER TRANSPORTARBEIDERS/ (vide het bezoek van BOUWMAN aan de conferentie).

All strikes bearing a revolutionary character will be supported by the Bureau in Holland. Among [To] the strikes that will be supported belong[s] also the pending strike of Transport Workers (See the visits of Bouwman to the Conference).

BYZONDERE AANDACHT ZAL GEWYD

Special attention will be devoted to Germany in

WORDEN AAN DUITSCHLAND/ OM DAAR IEDERE REVORUTIONNAIRE POGING TE STEUNEN.

order to support every revolutionary attempt there.[/]

IN DE OPENINGSSPEECH, WELKE HENRIETTE ROLAND HOLST HIELD, ZEIDE ZY, DAT HET CONGRES BYEENGEROEPEN WAS, OM DEFINITIEVE PLANNEN TE MAKEN HOE EENE REVOLUTIE TOT STAND TE BRENGEN IN DE HAASTE TOEKOMST/

In the opening speech that was made by Mrs. Henriette Roland Holst, she said that the Congress has been convened in order to make definite plans as to how a revolution could be brought about in the near future.[/]

HET BUREAU BESTAAT UIT RUTGERS EN MEVROUW ROLAND HOLST EN IS D A V I D W Y N K O O P D A A R A A N TOEGEVOEGD.

The bureau consists of Rutgers and Mrs. Roland Holst and David Wijnkoop has been attached to it.

In het bovenstaande is ook een resumé opgenomen van het meest belangryke, dat ten congresse is behandeld.

In the foregoing a resume has been inserted of the most important matters treated at the Congress.

Nader wordt medegedeeld, dat de zich noemende RALPH SNYDER, in werkelykheid genaamd moet zyn Louis FABIANO, of Louis FRAYNA.

It is further stated that the man calling himself Ralph Snyder is really called Louis Fabiano or Louis Frayna.

[No. 38:]
Derde Internationale.

Zaterdag, 7 Februari j.l. des morgens te 9.30 uur zouden de deelnemers aan de conferentie der 3e Internationale wederom byeenkomen, en wel in het gebouw HEYSTEE. De student VALKHOFF en Professor MANNOURY (van de Amsterdamsche Universiteit) zyn de eenigen geweest, die in den loop van den dag zyn gekomen. Op de bestuurstafel was door VALKHOFF een aankondiging neergelegd, waarop de aanteekening, dat eventueele congressisten, die daar kwamen, zich moesten begeven naar het gebouw van DE TRIBUNE Amstel 85.

On Saturday the 7th of February last the participants at the conference of the Third International should again meet at 9:30 AM in the building Heystee. The students Valkhoff and Professor Mannoury, of the University of Amsterdam were the only ones who put in an appearance in the course of the day. An announcement was laid on the table of the committee by Valkhoff in which it was stated that any of the delegates who came there must proceed to the premises of the Tribune 85 Amstel. [/]

Een en ander wekt den indruk, dat de deelnemers van het congres gewaarschuwd zyn, niet verder by HEYSTEE te vergaderen.

The impression appears to have been aroused that these participants at the congress were warned not to meet any longer at Heystee. [/]

Op Zaterdag 7 dezer zyn verschillende congressisten gevolgd, en kan met vry groote zekerheid gezegd worden, dat geen congres is gehouden.

Several of the delegates were shadowed on Saturday on the 7th instant and it can be said with fairly great certainty that no congress was held. [/]

Op Zondag 8 Februari j.l. zyn de congressisten byeengekomen van 11 tot 1 en van 3 tot 4.30 ten huize van Professor Gerrit MANNOURY, geboren te WORMERVEER,

On Sunday February 8th the delegates met from 11 till 1 and [from] 3 to 4:30 at the home of Professor Mannoury who was born at Wormerveer on May the 17th 1867, who resided at 192 Koninginneweg in a

17.5. ’67 wonende Koninginneweg 192 vry bovenhuis. Aanwezig waren de congressisten, in de vorige rapporten genoemd. Bovendien werden nog opgemerkt CETON, Louis de VISSER, P.F. van HOORN (Johannes Verhulststraat 187), de Chinees Tjoean Sioe KWA, geb, te Salatiga 7.1. ’93, wonende Nassaukade 348 te Amsterdam.

Des avonds van Zondag 8 Februari j.l. vergaderden de congressisten ten huize van DAVID WYNKOOP.

Van beide byeenkomsten zyn geen byzonderheden uit eigen waarneming bekend.

Na afloop der vergadering zyn de passen van alle vreemdelingen-congressisten gecontroleerd. Een nadere opgave van alle deelnemers van het congres zal worden toegezonden. Een der deelnemers, de Belg EDOUARD, LEONARD HONORé VAN OVERSTRAETEN, geboren te Wetteren, 8.1. ’91, kunstschilder wonende rue Clementine 4 te Brussel. Ook hy was, evenals de andere gecontroleerde vreemdelingen, voorzien van een geviseerd paspoort (het visum was verstrekt te Brussel, 30.1. ’20 door den Nederlandschen Vice-Consul verm. Van Selwerk genaamd. Aangezien het visum juist den vorigen dag was afgeloopen is deze vreemdeling gearresteerd kunnen worden. Uit de op hem bevonden aanteekeningen, kan ten naasteby worden gereconstrueerd, wat in de conferenties ten huize van Prof. MANNOURY en van D.WYNKOOP is besproken.

Henriëtte Roland HOLST: De resolutie moet gepubliceerd worden in de verschillende landen, nadat het bureau deze resolutie heeft rondgezonden. (voor resolutie vide A 37)

WYNKOOP: Dit kan aan het bureau worden overgelaten. Wat het bureau betreft, de landen moeten in de kosten bydragen per lid. Van elk moet een bydrage komen.

RUTGERS: De verwachte (uit Rusland verwachte ?? [*sic*] rapp.) sommen, zyn niet voldoende. De landen zouden moeten bydragen naarmate zy belang by het bureau hebben.

HERZOG : In den aanvang ging het Berlynsche bureau niet accoord om op deze conferentie te komen.

Een brief wordt voorgelezen van de Spaansche Communisten, waaruit blykt, dat men gedacht had, dat het bureau in Spanje zou worden

free upper house. There were present the delegates mentioned in the former report in addition Ceton, Louis de Visser, P.F. van Hoorn, the Chinaman Tjoan Sioe Kwa born at Salatiga on January the 7th, 1893, residing at 348 Nassaukade Amsterdam. [/]

In the evening of Sunday the 8th of February the delegates met at the house of David Wijnkoop. [/]

No particulars are known from own observation of either of these meetings. [/]

On termination of the meeting the passes of all foreigners attending the Congress were checked. A further report of all participants at the Congress will be sent on. One of the participants, the Belgian Edouard Leonard Honore van Overstraeten, born at Wetteren on January the 8th 1891, an artist residing at 4 Rue Clementine, Brussels. He, just as the foreigners who were checked was also provided with a passport duly visaed (The visum [visa] was furnished at Brussels on January the 30th by the Dutch Vice Consul name van Halwerk). Seeing that that visa lapsed on the previous day it was possible to arrest this man. From the notes found upon him it can be gathered fairly accurately what was discussed at the conference at the dwellings of Professor Mannoury and Wijnkoop.

Mrs. H. Roland Holst: The resolutions must be published in the several countries after having been sent round by the bureau.

WIJNKOOP: This may be left to the Bureau. As far as the Bureau is concerned the country must contribute to the expenses per member. A contribution must come from each.

RUTGERS: The sums extracted (expected from Russia??) are not sufficient. The members would have to contribute according to the interests they have in Bureau.

HERZOG: At the commencement the Berlin Bureau did not agree to appearing at this conference. [/]

A letter was read from the Spanish Communists from which it appears that it was thought that the Bureau would be established in Spain. It was however

gevestigd. Men vindt daar echter, dat Holland ook een goede plaats is voor het bureau. Wat in Holland gebeurt is ook goed voor Spanje. De aandacht wordt in het schryven erop gevestigd, dat Spanje een goed land is voor het onderhouden van contact met Amerika.

considered there that Holland is also a good place for the Bureau. What takes place in Holland is also good for Spain. Attention is drawn in the letter to the fact that Spain is a good country for keeping up contact with America.[/]

Besloten wordt, de brief te laten vertalen.

It was decided to have the letter translated. [/]

BESLOTEN WORDT VOORTS IN CONGRES TE HOUDEN IN MEXICO VOOR GEDELEGEERDEN UIT GEHEEL AMERIKA.

It was further decided to hold a congress in Mexico for delegates from the whole of America.[/]

In Spanje zal eene scheiding in de revolutionaire party onvermydelyk zyn. De oude garde is niet van zins toe te geven en dreigen, de rebellen eruit te zullen smyten. Men zal daar een referendum onder de leden houden.

A schism is inevitable in the Revolutionary party in Spain. The old guard is not inclined to give in and threatens to throw out the rebels. A referendum among the members will be held there.[/]

Er heerscht tusschen de verschillende Communistische partyen in de verschillende landen nog te veel verschil van opvatting en moet men komen tot unificatie der verschillende groepen en partyen, die zich Communisten noemen.

Among the various Communists parties in the several countries there still prevails too great differences of conception and unification of the various groups and parties calling themselves communists must be brought about.

WYNKOOP: vindt de voorstellen te abstract. Hy vindt te groote eenheid een gevaar en wel het gevaar is; dat de opportunisten zich dan ook zullen aansluiten by de Communistische partyen, waardoor de zaak verwatert. Zulk een eenheid, door terzydestelling van principes wenscht hy niet. De eenheid moet voortkomen uit dieperen stryd.

WIJNKOOP considers the proposals too abstract. He considers too great unity is a danger, that the Opportunists will then also join the Communist parties by which the cause will be weakened. Such a unity by any setting aside of principles is not desirable. Unity must arise from the deeper struggle.

WILLIS vindt de voorstellen tot unificatie niet abstract. Men kan hier niet over de situatie in de verschillende landen oordeelen.

WILLIS consider[s] the proposal for the unification as not being abstract. It is impossible to judge here concerning the situation in the various countries.[/]

In Engeland zyn vier partyen en is het tot heden niet gelukt, daarin eenheid te brengen. Men zal ook in Engeland trachten in die vier partyen een referendum te houden. In geen geval mag men komen tot aansluiting by de Labour Party.

In England there are 4 parties and down to the present they have not succeeded in bringing about unity in these. An effort will also be made in England to hold a referendum among those 4 parties. In no case must there be any affiliation with the labor party.

Miss PANKHURST verklaart, dat het derde punt voor haar het gewichtigste is nml.: Zal de Communistische Party de leiding nemen in de revolutionaire beweging.

MISS PANKHURST stated that the 3rd point was the most important for her, viz, shall the Communist party take the lead in the revolutionary movement

STUCKE zegt, dat hy tegen eenheid van elkaar bestrydende groepen is. Er moet een werkelyke eenheid komen, maar geen schyneenheid. In alle geval moet men het eens zyn op de punten Parlementarisme [en] Dictatuur.

STUCKE says that he is against unity of groups fighting against each other. There must be real unity but no apparent unity. In any case they must be agreed upon the points parliamentarism and the dictatorship.

Roland Holst zegt, bang te zyn voor sektarisme, men moet komen tot spontaan optreden der massa. De eerbied voor de oude lichamen moet weg. Men moet trachten de massa van onze begrippen te doordringen

WYNKOOP zegt het niet eens te zyn met PANNEKOEK (Dr Pannekoek, eveneens verbonden aan de Amsterdamsche Universiteit, blykt ook aanwezig te zyn rapp.) over diens interpretatie van den Berlynschen brief betreffende de blokkade.

HODGSON zegt, dat men niet moet zwelgen aan revolutionaire woorden.

Nog andere sprekers voeren het woord over het vraagstuk, om eenheid tot stand te brengen tusschen de verschillende revolutionaire Communistische partyen en groepen.

BESLOTEN WORDT, het bureau der Internationale — het bureau executief — in Holland te vestigen. Rutgers en Henriëtte Roland Holst zullen leden zyn en wordt daaraan als gedelegeerde van de Nederlandsche Communistische Party WYNKOOP toegevoegd.

RUTGERS verklaart in communicatie te zyn met RUSLAND en HONGARYE; ROLAND HOLST zegt in relatie te staan met verschillende andere landen.

WYNKOOP zegt het steunpunt voor eene revolutie ligt in Frankryk. (VAN OVERSTRAETEN zet hierachter een vraagteeken in zyne aanteekeningen)

FRAYNA zegt, dat men moet komen tot het oprichten van een bureau in Amerika, nevens dat in Moscou en Holland. Het Amerikaansch bureau zal een bulletin uitgeven. Hy vraagt aan de conferentie opdracht tot het vormen van een bureau in Amerika.

WYNKOOP verklaart zich in principe voor het voorstel FRAYNA. Men kan toch Amerika niet vanuit Spanje gaan besturen. Hy wil wel een inlichtingenbureau in Spanje oprichten.

FRAYNA zegt, op een vraag van ROLAND HOLST, dat er twee groepen in Amerika bestaan, een Latynsche en een Angel-Saksische. Hy vindt Mexico een geschikte plaats voor een bureau. In Spanje is gevaar voor patriottisme. Mexico is goed gelegen.

MRS. ROLAND HOLST expressed herself as being afraid for sectarianism. There must be spontaneous action by the masses. Respect for old bodies must be got rid of. An endeavor must be made to imbue the masses without ideas.

WIJNKOOP was unable to agree with Dr. Pannekoek, who is also connected with the Amsterdam University, and who appeared also to have been present, concerning his interpretation of the Berlin letter concerning the blockade.

HODGSON says, they must not have surfeit of revolutionary words.

Other speakers made speeches on the question of bringing about unity among the various revolutionary communist parties and groups. [/]

It was decided to establish the Bureau of the International, the executive office in Holland. RUTGERS and Henriette Roland Holst will be members and as a delegate from the Dutch Communist Party will be attached Wijnkoop. [/]

Rutgers stated that he was in communication with Russia and Hungary. Mrs. Roland Holst said that she was in relations with various other countries. [/]

Wijnkoop considers the central point for a revolution lies in France. (At the end of this line van Overstraeten has put some question marks.)

FRAINA says that a Bureau should be opened in America besides that in Moscow and Holland. The American Bureau will issue a bulletin. He asked the Conference to instruct him to form a Bureau in America.[/]

Wijnkoop expressed himself as being in favor of the Fraina proposal in principle. America cannot be governed from Spain. He was desirous of establishing an information office in Spain.[/]

In reply to Mrs. Roland Holst Fraina said that 2 groups existed in America, a Latin and an Anglo Saxon group. He considered Mexico as a suitable place for a Bureau. There is a danger of patriotism in Spain. Mexico is well situated.[/]

RUTGERS zegt, dat het bureau te Berlyn het werk zal kunnen blyven voortzetten in Centraal Europa.

Het Communistisch bureau te Berlyn moet ophouden met het uitgeven van manifesten. Wy moeten daarom weten, of dat bureau werkelyk wil samenwerken met het bureau in Holland.

WYNKOOP verwerpt het uitgeven van het Bulletin door het bureau te Berlyn. Berlyn mag dit in den vervolge slechts doen onder controle van het Bureau executief in Holland. Het bureau te Berlyn mag slechts technisch werk verrichten.

RUTGERS verklaart te Berlyn te zyn geweest. Hy zegt daar gesproken te hebben met kameraad JAMES of JANSEN. Deze zag de zaken niet in, zooals wy thans doen, nml. dat het Berlynsche bureau ondergeschikt zou zyn. Hy wenschte wel artikelen van GORTER, PANNEKOEK, ROLAND HOLST e.a.

Pankhurst wil ook contact met Afrika.

Onder de aanteekeningen van Van Overstraeten komt nog voor het navolgende adres.
Executive K.J.I.
Fraülein PFEIFER
Wilhelmshöherstrasse 9
Berlin-Friedenau.
Geen afzender op de enveloppe vermelden.

VANTER (Van 't Reve) Leidschestraat 23

Opmerking rapporteur: Leidschestraat 23 boven is een zeer verdacht adres. Beneden in het winkelhuis is een z.g. vliegende winkel gevestigd in sigaren. Op de eerste verdieping is een z.g. informatiebureau, gedreven door den naar Indië vertrokken Communist Baars. Aldaar zyn thans werkzaam de uit Indië geexterneerde Communist Brandsteder en de echtgenoote of concubine van den Communist Henk Eikeboom. Huisbewaarder is zekere Blauwendraad, eveneens Communist.

Uit de by hem bevonden papieren blykt, dat Van OVERSTRAETEN, gedelegeerde van de Belgische Werkliedenparty, lid van den Vlaamschen Socialistischen Kring, medewerker en lid van de "Union Centrale des Jeunes Gardes Socialistes de l'Arrondissement de Bruxelles", lid van de Ligue Ouvrière Ixelloise, lid en

Rutgers said that the Bureau in Berlin will be able to go on with the work in Central Europe.

The Communist Bureau at Berlin, must cease issuing manifestos. It must therefore be known whether that Bureau really will cooperate with the Bureau in Holland.[/]
Wijnkoop rejected the issuing of the bulletin by the Bureau at Berlin. Berlin may only do this in future under the control of the Executive Bureau in Holland. The Berlin Bureau may only perform technical work. [/]
Rutgers stated that he had been in Berlin and said that he had seen there Comrade James or Jansen. The latter did not see matters as they are seen now. Namely, that the Berlin Bureau should be inferior. He desired, however, to have articles from Gorter, Pannekoek, Roland Holst, etc.[/]

Mrs. Pankhurst, was also desirous contact with Africa.

Under van Overstraeten's notes, the following address appears, Executive K.J.I. Fraulein Pfeifer, Wilhelmshoherstrasse 9, Berlin-Friedenau. No name of sender was mentioned on the envelope.

VANTER (van 't REVE) Leidsche Straat 35 (23).

Reporter's remark. Leidsche Straat 23, upper house is a very suspicious address. Below in the shop is a so called promiscuous shop dealing in cigars. On the first floor is a so called information office, carried on by the Communist Baars who has left for the [Dutch] Indies. In this place works the Communist BRANSTEDEREN [*sic*] who has been deported from the Indies, the wife concubine of the Communist Henk RIKSBOOM [*sic*] caretaker in a certain Blauwenvrad, also a Communist.

From the papers found upon van Overstraeten it appears that he is the delegate of the Belgian Workers party [and] that he is a member of the Flemish Socialist Circle, contributor and member of the Union Centrale des Jeunes Gardes Socialistes de l'Arrondissement de Bruxelles, member of the Workers League Ixelloise [Bruxelloise], member and

medewerker van het "comité Bruxelloise d'Education Ouvrière."

Uit andere by hem bevonden papieren blykt eveneens, dat de "Union Centrale des Jeunes Gardes de Bruxelles eene communistische organisatie is. By de firma Bos, communistische boekhandel Kinkerstraat 300 I te Amsterdam voor f 33,30 cent aan Communistische brochures heeft besteld.

contributor of the Comite Bruxelloise d'Education Ouvriere.

From other papers found upon him it would also appear that the Union Centrale des Jeunes Gardes de Bruxelles is also a Communist Organization. He gave orders to the firm Bosch, Communist Book-Seller at 300 Kinkerstraat Amsterdam for Communist pamphlets to the value of 33.30 guilders.

(1) Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, 1917-1941, RG 165, File No. 10058-24-88, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Correspondence of MID, 10058-24-88). The original reports are recorded in: Inlichtingendienst, A Nos. 38 and 41 (**Doc. 2-2-2** and **2-2-4**). They are arranged in order of the English translation and printed in the left-hand column.

2-2-8

[Report of "Doctor," J. Nosovitszky] (1)

COPY.

The "Doctor" came to Scotland House on the morning on the 14th February, and reported as follows:—

"I left London on the 31st January arriving in AMSTERDAM late in the afternoon of the 1st February. I saw SNYDER [Fraina] and learnt from him that not all the delegates to the Conference had arrived yet and that the Conference might be held within a couple of days.

On the 2nd February Sylvia PANKHURST and Doctor SNYDER came to my hotel and we had a long conversation on general topics. Sylvia PANKHURST told me confidentially that because of her extreme views she felt a little isolated from the comrades and asked me if she could expect my and FRAINA's support at the Conference. I told her that I believed in her sincerely and therefore I saw no objection to supporting her at the Conference if her views were in harmony with my views and the views of Doctor SNYDER and based upon the principles of true Communism.

In the evening SNYDER called at my Hotel and told me that he had seen WYNKOOP and other comrades and that the Conference would start to-morrow the 3rd February at 2 p.m.

On the 3rd February I went to the place where the conference was supposed to be held which is an office building located at HEERNCRAGCHAT. In a small hall in the building I found a large audience of delegates and guests. The following delegates were present:—

Holland	Roland HOLST, WYNKOOP, Van LEUVEN, PENIKOOP [Pannekoek], HORTA [Gorter]
Dutch Indies	De FESSA
BELGIUM	Von Ober-Strasse [Van Overstraeten]
GERMANY	(From the Bremen Opposition Group) STUKA
AMERICA	Louis FRAINA and Jacob Nosovitszky
England	Sylvia PANKHURST, MURPHY, WILLIS, HODGSON
CHINA	Doctor QUA
RUSSIA	RUTGERS

The Conference was opened by RUTGERS. Before proceedings started, WILLIS, representing the British Socialist Party, made objections to Doctor Nosovitszky's presence at the Conference. This is what WILLIS said:

"I am authorized to raise objections to Comrade Nosovitszky being present at this Conference. The reasons for my objections are that Comrade Nosovitszky through his intrigues in London has caused a great friction between Sylvia PANKHURST and representative of the Soviet Republic and consequently between the Workers' Socialist Federation and the British Socialist Party which was the barrier to unity as far as the organizing of the Communist Party of England is concerned and endangered the Revolutionary movement in England". When asked by the Chairman to state more definitely what he meant WILLIS said:— "The Comrade being the courier for the Soviet Republic has on one occasion betrayed the confidence of [Theodore] ROTHSTEIN by delivering a certain package of literature to the Communist Party of AMERICA instead of to MARTENS and that certain statements which ROTHSTEIN made to him regarding Sylvia PANKHURST, Comrade NOSOVITSZKY informed her of what ROTHSTEIN had said".

WIILIS was asked "Is that all that is against Comrade NOSOVITSZKY", and WILLIS said "Yes".

Comrade FRAINA took the floor then and made the following statement:—

"Comrade NOSOVITSZKY is a duly accredited representative of the Communist Party of America which has a membership of 45,000 people. Comrade NOSOVITSZKY although not very long in the movement, has, to my knowledge and to the knowledge of many other comrades who are of high standing in the Revolutionary Movement accomplished more than the whole British Socialist Party throughout its existence. Comrade NOSOVITSZKY has always performed his duties as a true communist. The accusations of Comrade WILLIS are absolutely absurd, unfounded and silly and I am astonished that Comrade WILLIS, directed by ROTHSTEIN, brings personal matters to this Conference. The package referred to by WILLIS which was delivered to the Communist Party of America instead of to MARTENS consisted of revolutionary literature and the reason why Comrade NOSOVITSZKY delivered that package to the Party instead of the MARTENS was that he was convinced himself that MARTENS never gave anything for publication to the Communist Party and therefore does not assist in any way the revolutionary movement in America and Comrade NOSOVITSZKY, by delivering the package of literature to the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of America, has performed his duties as a true Communist and I, or any of you present here, would do the same thing. Regarding the other accusation that Comrade NOSOVITSZKY has made certain statements to Sylvia PANKHURST about ROTHSTEIN, I am personally convinced that he also acted not under a feeling of foolish impulse but according to his principles and he has not got such personal feelings as ROTHSTEIN possesses of stabbing comrades in the back".

Sylvia PANKHURST then said:— "Yes, it is true Comrade NOSOVITSZKY made certain statements to me and I am convinced now that all these statements are true and correct and I am also convinced that Comrade NOSOVITSZKY made these statements to me for the benefit of the movement. More than that, those statements were given to me in writing by Comrade NOSOVITSZKY and were sent by me personally to MOSCOW and there is no doubt about it that the Soviet Government is going to act upon those statements and facts presented by Comrade NOSOVITSZKY through me".

Here ended the statements from FRAINA and Sylvia PANKHURST. Chairman Comrade RUTGERS asked WILLIS if he had anything else to say with reference to Comrade NOSOVITSZKY. WILLIS said "That is all" and added. "I would like that the objection raised by me would be taken into consideration and I demand from the Chairman that my objection shall be put to the vote by the Comrades present". The Chairman declined to put the matter to the vote and said "If you insist I will ask the Comrades if they want to consider your objection". Before the Chairman was able to ask the delegates what they thought about it, everyone present protested against WILLIS' objection and declined to consider the matter at all.

The Conference began with a statement from RUTGERS. This is what RUTGERS said:—

"In the name of the Third International, in the name of our cause, I declare the Conference open. Before we start the official proceedings I want to emphasize the reasons why this Conference has been called and why the Conference has been called in HOLLAND. A few months ago while I was in Russia and was on my way to proceed to Holland, I was given a mandate by the Central Executive Committee of the Third International to establish a temporary Bureau of the Third International which shall undertake the duties of the Third International and call, in the near future, a Conference of representatives of the Communist Parties and the revolutionary groups of the whole world and such Conference shall elect a permanent Bureau of the Third International. "I was authorized", said RUTGERS, to appoint Comrades Roland HOLST, HORTA, RAVESTEIN, WYNKOOP, PENIKOOP as members of the Bureau before calling the Conference. We were unable to accomplish much first of all owing to the lack of facilities of communication between the Communist Parties and lack of funds. When I came to Europe with my mandate there was, and is in existence still, the so-called Western European Secretariat of the Communist International, Comrade James or REICH and Comrade BRONSKE [Bronski] being the heads of the Bureau. The duties of the Bureau consist in publishing literature; assisting the Communist Party of Germany financially; establishing communications with different countries and spreading revolutionary propaganda in Germany and throughout the world. The

Western European Bureau has done a lot for Germany but neglected other countries especially England and France. Millions and millions of marks have been spent in Germany for revolutionary propaganda without any results while the same amount of money spent in England or France or any other country would certainly bring greater and more definite results. “Of course”, continued RUTGERS, “it is not only the mistake of the Bureau for laying so much stress on Germany, it is also the mistake of the Soviet Government for paying so much attention to the German Revolutionary Movement”. “It looks as if” continued RUTGERS, “our Comrades in MOSCOW and even those Comrades who represent Moscow in Germany do not realize that a revolution in Germany is practically hopeless at the present moment and it is unnecessary to waste millions of marks in revolutionary propaganda at the present time in Germany where the proletariat is physically and mentally tired and unable to start a revolution while the proletariat in England and other countries is just in the right revolutionary spirit and the only thing that is necessary is to give them moral and financial support and it will be the duty of this Conference and the newly established Bureau of the Third International to lay down definite plans for the future work, and for the future plans of the revolutionary propaganda throughout Europe and America, especially in England, France and Italy”.

Comrade Roland HOLST followed RUTGERS and said:－

“We start this Conference with the determination to work our plans to bring the proletariat to the world revolution and, Comrades, I want to tell you that it is foolish to think that the Allies have decided to raise the blockade on Soviet Russia by establishing commercial relations. It is a diplomatic move to cross Soviet Russia from the inside instead of from the outside and the Soviet Government understands the Allies’ plans and will never agree to begin commercial relations with England or any other allied country unless it will greatly benefit Russia and will bring no harm to the Soviet Republic, politically or economically. Even if commercial relations are established, the Allies, especially England, will continue plotting against the Soviet Government. They will start a blockade in the Black Sea, perhaps beginning at Odessa. We have information now that military trains are leaving COBLENTZ practically every day laden with ammunition for Poland and that England, America and other countries are trying to get volunteering and send them in small groups into Poland and organize them into a strong army for the purpose of invading Russia. It seems highly probable that within a short period of time Japan will mobilize a big army and will start intervention on a big scale but, Comrades, we must remember another thing, and that is that no matter what the Allies are trying to do to Soviet Russia, intervention cannot continue very long. The Revolutionary movement in the European countries will not allow the Allies to risk any longer the Russia adventure”.

Sylvia PANKHUST’s speech －

Sylvia PANKHURST made a violent attack on those comrades who still believe that the raising of the blockade and the establishment of commercial relations with Russia will benefit the Soviet Republic. It is impossible. England and other countries will never rest in peace while the Soviet Republic is existing and therefore extreme measures must be taken to force the Allies to raise the blockade, not to force them by demonstrations, not to force them by objections or by showing the great benefits the Allies will derive from Russia by establishing commercial relations but by bringing the proletariat of England and other countries to such a revolutionary state of mind as to force the British and other Governments to leave Russia alone and even, if necessary, to recognize and respect the Soviet Republic. “She believed”, continued Sylvia PANKHURST, “that if this Conference will instruct the Bureau to start immediate action it is possible to proclaim a general strike throughout the world within three months, providing the representatives of the Communist Parties present at the Conference will impress upon their respective parties to start propaganda in favour of Soviet Russia at once”. She continued, “It is not advisable to delay such action any longer. Three months is the limit for a general strike and when the general strike is declared there is only one step to revolution”.

Sylvia PANKHURST made a great impression with her speech and the delegates were inclined to pass a resolution to have a general strike in favour of Soviet Russia declared within three

months but NOSOVITSZKY objected to it on the grounds that "it is unwise to state in our resolutions a definite date for the strike and it is also unwise", emphasized NOSOVITSZKY, "to force upon the workers our will and the workers are not prepared to come out in the open and demand the raising of the blockade on Russia". NOSOVITSZKY stated further that "the proletarian masses at the present moment are not class conscious enough to come out on a general strike on the ground of protest against intervention in Russia. If such a strike is possible, which he very much doubted, it is possible only if a general strike is declared upon an economic basis. Where many economic demands are presented to the Governments of the various Allied countries, the demand for the raising of the blockade on Russia shall be included, but, continued NOSOVITSZKY, if this proposition is accepted by the Conference, there is another aspect that must be taken into consideration and that is, for instance, if the working class of England declares a general strike and are demanding — say — a standard eight hour day, a raising of wages 50 per cent and many other economic demands and include in their demands the raising of the blockade on Russia, then it is possible that the British Government, taking into consideration the danger of the general strike, might accede to the economic demands and if the workers are practically satisfied in their economic demands, then the question of the raising of the blockade on Russia will recede and the whole Russian issue will fade away, because you cannot expect the workers of England or any other country at the present moment when their economic demands are satisfied to insist upon a demand for the raising of the blockade on Russia and on account of that to continue the general strike".

NOSOVITSZKY's points were supported by many of the delegates including FRAINA and Sylvia PANKHURST's proposition to declare a general strike in three months' time was rejected. Instead of that a resolution was drawn up by FRAINA and NOSOVITSZKY which was presented by them and finally adopted by the Conference as follows:—

RESOLUTION ON SOVIET RUSSIA

"A revolutionary action of the workers to force International Capital to make peace with Russia is a necessary condition to save Soviet Russia and to hasten the world revolution.

To further this action, the Communists of all lands must utilize every strike movement, every mass demonstration:

1st to place this aspect of their responsibilities to the Russian Revolution before the workers.

2nd to convince them that their interests are identical with those of Soviet Russia.

3rd to develop a strong feeling of revolutionary solidarity and re-action the world over.

As the pressure of the workers upon the Governments is increasing, the tendency is for the capitalist Governments to propose a compromise peace, with the object of disintegrating Soviet Russia from within. The latest proposal to take up commercial relations through reactionary representatives of pro-revolutionary co-operative societies that have since merged into the Soviet organizations, aims at separating the peasants from the workers and destroying the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade. Under the cloak of such manoeuvres a great military spring offensive is being prepared which must be prevented at all costs.

It is therefore essential that this international Bureau takes immediate steps to prepare an international demonstration strike against intervention in Soviet Russia. Such strike not alone to demand ending the blockade and intervention in Soviet Russia, but to include political and economic demands adapted to the revolutionary requirements of the conditions prevailing in each nation. This demonstration to be supplemented by coercive strikes as the workers gain strength for such further action, in which special attention has to be paid to the expedition and transportation of war materials and equipment, propaganda being carried on to withhold labor in such instances.

The appeal to the workers for international strike action must not be made exclusively through the bureaucracy of the trade-unions but emphasis must be placed upon the masses in the unions upon extra unions mass organs and the creation of such organs if necessary.

When the revolution again arises in Germany or in any other country the forces of the intern. prol. (especially the transport workers in Britain, America, France, Italy, Scandinavia, Holland,

Belgium and Switzerland) must be prepared for a general strike the moment the capitalist powers attempt intervention. The Bureau is to take immediate steps for organizing this action in time to prevent the workers being again forestalled by the Governments".

A clause has been introduced into the Resolution to the following effect:—

"If aggressive measures are taken by the Soviet Republic, the workers of the world must not arrest the attack of the Red Army but revolt and establish Soviet Republics in their own countries".

RUTGERS opposed that clause giving as reason that such a clause adopted by this Conference will give the capitalists a good weapon against Soviet Russia, confirming the capitalists statements which have appeared in the press that Soviet Russia has aggressive plans and imperialistic intentions and therefore, said RUTGERS, we know very well that there is a revolutionary movement in Poland, Germany, Austria, Hungary, France, England or any other country, and if the Soviet Army is in a position to help these countries, undoubtedly they will proceed to those countries and will help the proletariat to establish a Soviet Republic. Therefore, said RUTGERS, I insist that the clause shall not be inserted in the Resolution. Clause withdrawn.

While making this report I am not in a position to give all the official resolutions passed by the Conference because some of the resolutions are very long and are not type-written yet, but within a few days, the Bureau from Holland will have these resolutions sent to me to London by special courier to be delivered to America and some of the Latin-America countries, so, at the present moment, I am simply dealing with those resolutions and plans laid by the Conference which are of a most confidential character and which are only for the guidance and use of the Delegates of the Communist Parties. It is very hard to report the proceedings of the Conference day by day because most of the questions were discussed on different sessions of the Conference and therefore I am dealing with every subject separately although the subjects were discussed on different sessions of the Conference.

It has been decided that after the Conference is over, the delegates shall return to their respective countries and start revolutionary propaganda with more energy and intensive effort than ever.

WYNKOOP, who was elected permanent Chairman of the Conference, made a short speech in which he said "In order not to let England crush the Russian, German or any other revolution, it is of vital importance that we shall create a strong revolutionary movement in England and that is the only remedy for the British Government's action against Soviet Russia and therefore the Shop Stewards movement in England must be recognized and supported morally and financially by this Bureau because the Shop Stewards movement bears a strong soviet character".

HORTA said that it was a great mistake that we lay so much stress on the working class of the world in connection with the Russian problem because the real factor which will help to bring revolution in England, France, Holland and other European countries, is not Russia but Germany. If a dictatorship of the proletariat is declared in Germany all the neighbouring countries such as Holland, Belgium, Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, England and other countries will be directly affected by that proletarian revolution and it is possible that other revolutions will follow.

This is practically all that is of any interest with reference to the Russian situation.

The most important questions which were discussed at the Conference are as follows:—

Nationalization and control of Industry, the business of the revolution and militarism and the Red Army, the uniting of groups into the Communist parties in different countries, the organization of the International Bureau.

<u>Organization of the International Bureau.</u>

A. Functions
B. Composition
C. Mutual intercourse, couriers, bulletins, personal Service, monthly magazines, archives, control against spies, finances.

D. Relation to other groups, Communist Young People's and Revolutionary Women's Movement, Revolutionary Intellectuals, Revolutionary Students, Charter Groups and so on.

E. Attitude towards the Centrists as the U.S.P., Longuetists, and so on.

F. Relations in regard to foreign representatives of the Soviet Republic, on account of money difficulties which arose during the sitting of the Conference.

G. Manifests and Motions. Manifesto of the Western European Bureau and American Proletariat. Motions regarding prosecution especially in Hungary, Germany and America.
Motion regarding freedom of intercourse, passes, censors, espionage and so on.

H. Motion regarding the League of Nations, organization of the next Conference, place and time.

I. Trade Unionism and Parliamentarism.

J. Technical questions as for instance, the establishment of mutual intercourse by couriers, the printing of revolutionary literature and other technical questions were not discussed at the Conference but it has been decided that the Bureau elected by the Conference shall arrange these technical matters.

A very hot discussion arose which lasted practically for 1 1/2 days regarding Trade Unionism and the attitude of the Communist party. Reference to that subject was prepared by the Bureau but was rejected by the Conference. (I enclose here the original thesis on Trade Unionism which, as I said was rejected by the Conference and the new thesis prepared by Louis FRAINA and adopted by the Conference. The thesis adopted needs no comments on my part ― they are strictly of a Communist character and bitterly opposed to the present state of trade unionism especially in England. The official Thesis will be published by the Revolutionary press, while all the amendments to these Thesis which are of a secret character I am giving in this report. They are as follows:

"The Communist Parties, groups and organizations in England and in other countries must in any event try to create as it is possible, Communist groups within the working masses. Say, for instance, take England ― the Communist Party of England which it is hoped to organize very soon, is to select a trusted class conscious comrades from among the ranks and send them into the various shops. These comrades must not try to work on a big scale but, on their part, select another one or two workers and organize a small group within the shop and then, little by little, by gaining the confidence of their fellow workers in their respective shops, these members of these little groups will be able, after a very short time, to create thousands and thousands of little Communist Groups within the Labour movement even if the labour movement is dominated by reactionary trade unionism [(2)].

The Bureau of the Third International shall see to it that these groups shall grow larger and larger and the Bureau of the Third International will support these little groups both morally and financially through the official Communist parties of the various countries or any other accredited organizations.

During the discussion about trade unionism especially about the state of affairs of the labour movement in England, the English delegates even more than anybody else participated in this discussion. Murphy gave a very detailed and clever report about trade unionism, the Shop Stewards movement and the revolutionary movement in England. Murphy does not believe that the proletariat of England will be able to accomplish anything through reactionary trade unionism which exists now in England. As a representative of the Shop Stewards movement at the Conference he laid great stress upon this movement in England and said that there is a great tendency among the trade unionists to get rid of all reactionary and traditional tactics of the trade union movement and that the rank and file, mostly of the younger generation, are in a revolutionary spirit against their reactionary leaders. He believes that by having support from the Third international and the official revolutionary movement in England the

Shop Stewards movement may become one of the greatest factors in the revolutionary movement in England. The Shop Stewards movement, he said, is practically invisible at the present moment although there are about 40,000 members in that movement and thousands of adherents. The thesis on Trade Unionism which I enclose here and which was adopted by the Conference will show the real state of affairs and the plans laid by the Conference with reference to that matter.

Many questions which were on the order of the day, about 14 or 15 in number, were not discussed at all and the question of revolutionary propaganda generally.

The following suggestions were made and taken into consideration by the Conference, and after discussion, the Bureau was instructed to act upon them and to publish revolutionary propaganda literature in every language and to send literature to the various countries:

a) Agitators speaking Hindu and other similar languages shall be found among the revolutionary ranks in Europe and sent to India, Afghanistan and the Latin American countries, also, if possible, into Japan.

b) A sub-Bureau of the Third International shall be created in America and shall unite with itself all the revolutionary organizations standing upon the Communist platform of the Third International in America, Mexico, Cuba and all the Central and South American countries.

Another Bureau, according to WYNKOOP's statement, has been established already in Spain. This Bureau was established by several of the Russian emissaries who went to Spain a couple of months ago. Sub-Bureau are under the supervision of the Third International Bureau in Holland and act on international methods only according to instructions from the Third International, while on local matters these Bureaus are independent. Thus, for instance, in issuing proclamations and manifestos dealing with the local situation in North, Central or South America.

The Bureau of the Third International will consist of three steady members who were appointed by the Conference who will be RUTGERS, Roland HOLST and WYNKOOP. Every country which has representatives or organizations affiliated to the Third International have the right to elect a member to that Bureau. Those elected members would come, if possible, to Holland to work in the Bureau but if financial or other matters do not permit of such arrangements then, in any questions representatives of the various organizations in different countries can send their mandates to some comrades living in Holland, authorizing them to act as temporary representatives for those parties and organizations if those delegates are unable to be present in Holland, and take part in important questions under discussion. Nevertheless these representatives must attend regular meetings of the Bureau every three months.

Much time was spent in discussing theoretical questions and it is of no value, at least at the present moment, to specify in my report, all these questions because the decision made on different problems will be published very soon. What we are interested in is the inner and secret plans.

Sylvia PANKHURST, in one of her speeches at the Conference, said that, at the present moment, there is a great set-back in the feelings of the British workers and the Common Conference of Trade Unions which will be held some time in February or March, will do nothing to benefit the revolutionary movement generally and the Russian Soviet in particular.

Friction occurred at the Conference between Sylvia PANKHURST and HODGSON and WILLIS. MURPHY was more on the side of Sylvia PANKHURST than on the side of the delegates of the British Socialist Party.

The cause of the friction was Sylvia PANKHURST's condemnation of the British Socialist Party for affiliating with the Labour Party. In addition delegates to the Conference locked upon WILLIS and HODGSON as Opportunists and their presence at the Conference was of no significance at all.

It was decided that, in the near future a Communist Party must be created in England, a Communist Party which will unite the various revolutionary groups and will become the leading factor in the revolutionary movement in England. It will be the duty of the newly created Communist Party of England to guide the labour movement in this country according to the fundamental principles and tactics of Communism. The British delegates were very pessimistic, especially Sylvia PANKHURST,

about the coming unity between the British Socialist Party, the British Socialist Labour Party, the Workers Socialist Federation and the South Wales Socialist Society. WILLIS is also of opinion, which was expressed unofficially, that it is a tremendous task to bring unity between the above mentioned organizations because the British Socialist Party will hardly consent to sever relations with the British Socialist Labour Party while the Workers Socialist Federation and other revolutionary organizations are directly opposed to the Labour Party. There are other very important questions in which the above mentioned parties and organizations are not in harmony at all as, for instance, the question of Parliamentarism, while the British Socialist Party is inclined to wage the political struggle through parliamentarism, Sylvia PANKHURST's organization and also the South Wales Socialist Society are bitterly opposed to any parliamentary action. There are many other vital issues upon which there cannot be an immediate conciliation between these organizations. Nevertheless they will try to come to a mutual agreement and work hand in hand following the instructions of the Third International. The first thing that will be done is that the Conference will be called of the leaders of the various revolutionary organizations of England and the question of bringing unity and creating a Communist Party of England will be discussed as it has been several times already.

From conversations I had with Sylvia PANKHURST I learnt that she does not believe that her organizations, the South Wales Socialist Society and the British Socialist Labour Party will unite with the British Socialist Party, but the above three mentioned organizations, as much as possible, will constitute the Communist Party of England while the British Socialist Party might, by severing relations with the Labour Party, go into the Communist Party, or it is also probable the British Socialist Party will change its name to, the Communist Labour Party. Generally, no definite and immediate plans, as far as the British Labour Movement is concerned, will be put into action at once. It will take from two to five months to establish a well founded centre of revolutionary activity in England, that is, provided the organizations unify. Otherwise revolutionary propaganda will continue to be in the same state as it is now ― I mean to say ― directed independently by the various revolutionary organizations of England and those organizations which are thoroughly Communistic will receive moral and financial support from the Third International.

The Conference also decided that all the strikes occurring now in the different countries and which have economical and also a political character shall be supported morally and financially by the Third International.

The Bureau of the Third International in Holland from now onward will play the dominating part in the direction of the policies and issues of the revolutionary movements in the various countries. The Bureau is subject to control to Moscow from whence it gets all instructions and money.

I am unable at the present moment to continue the report of the proceedings by the conference because I left all the material dealing with the Conference in Holland and I expect to get all the resolutions within a short time and then I will prepare a supplementary report on the questions not dealt with in this report. The Conference started as I said, on the 3rd February and discontinued on the evening of February 8th. It was supposed to be finished completely on February 9th but circumstances with I will explain below brought the Conference to an end one day earlier.

On the 4th February, on the second day of the Conference, when leaving the hotel in company with SNYDER and Sylvia PANKHURST, I noticed that we were being followed by an unknown person. On the 5th February WYNKOOP who, in company with FRAINA and others, had dinner in some restaurant, noticed that they were being watched by two local detectives who were well-known to WYNKOOP. On the 6th February in the morning, MURPHY, WILLIS, HODGSON, and Sylvia PANKHURST reported that the police were at their hotels asking for their passports and identification cards. They had taken their names and made certain notes from their passports. In the afternoon the above-mentioned persons reported that they were being shadowed by detectives. On the 7th it was decided to transfer the meetings of the Conference to a private place. On the 8th February in the morning we met at the house of Professor MANNOURY who is a member of the Communist Party of the Netherlands and who acted as interpreter and translator for the proceedings of the Conference. On

the 9th February MURPHY and WILLIS reported that the new place of the meetings of the Conference was known to the police because two detectives followed them and they realized that they had been followed only when entered the house of MANNOURY.

Because there was only one day left until the end of the Conference it was decided to continue the Conference in Professor MANNOURY's house because it was too late to take any precautions and because the Conference was coming to and end. As the police had not interfered at the beginning there was no reason to believe that they would try to break up the Conference if it continued for one more day. While this was under discussion a new comrade arrived and presented credentials from the Communist Party of Switzerland. His name was HERTZ. Comrade HERTZ said that he had just arrived from Germany and that comrades and delegates from France, Italy, Russia and Germany were also coming to attend the Conference. He said that among the delegates were Clara ZETKIN from Germany and BRONSKE representing Russia and many other prominent comrades. On account of the new developments he said he had come into Holland illegally not being in possession of a passport and the rest of the comrades coming from Germany would be in the same position. The rest of the delegates would follow him and therefore great precautions must be taken by the organizers of the Conference to protect the coming Comrades from the police. BRONSKE was to be especially protected as he was under indictment and liable to go to jail for a long period in Germany. On account of the new developments it was decided that the Conference could not come to a finish now but must start again from the beginning in the presence of the delegates who were to arrive some time in the week. That was on Sunday and it was decided to discontinue the Conference until Wednesday evening and then meet again when the Chairman and other comrades would be present. In the meantime it was thought advisable that the comrades should not come together and that everyone should leave his or her hotel and go to private houses which would be provided by comrades from the "Tribune". Comrade WYNKOOP, in spite of the decision made not to meet until Wednesday, invited many comrades to his house for tea some evening. I and FRAINA also Sylvia PANKHURST declined to go there thinking that it would not be advisable to come to such a conspicuous person as WYNKOOP without being noticed by the police. In the evening FRAINA came to my hotel and while entering the lobby was detained for a short time by detectives, asked for his papers and questioned. Half an hour after FRAINA was able to see me and told me what had happened to him, cautioning me to get out of the hotel as quickly as possible. I left the hotel and searched for another place but was shortly arrested in the street by two detectives, taken back to my hotel where my papers had been examined and where I was put through a long questioning. I was not taken to the police station that time. Immediately afterwards I was left alone and I and SNYDER took a taxi and went at once to WYNKOOP's house in order to inform him that the police were on our track and that we must take the utmost precaution. When we arrived at WYNKOOP's house we noticed that practically on all sides the whole street where he lives was surrounded by plain clothes police and there was no escape for us. In WYNKOOP's house we found WILLIS, MURPHY, HERTZ, Dr. QUA, MANUEL representing Austria Hungary and a former official in Bela KUN's Government, a few members of the editorial staff of the "Tribune", STUKA, Von Ober-STRASSE and a few other Dutchmen unknown to me. We told WYNKOOP that we have been detained for a short time by the police and that the house was surrounded by detectives and therefore those comrades who had no passports should not leave the house and WYNKOOP agreed it was a good idea to hide them in his house because his house is immune as he is a member of Parliament.

Shortly after I and SNYDER left WYNKOOP's house and before we had time to board a street car to proceed home we were stopped and this time by two police inspectors. We were again asked for our papers and identification cards. One of the inspectors pointed out the fact that we came from WYNKOOP's house but we declined to give him any information. I asked him by what reason we were bothered so much and that if our presence in Holland is undesirable to the Authorities we are willing to leave any time. The Inspectors let us go then saying nothing. Upon my arrival at my hotel I was cordially met by a few more detectives who very politely invited me to surrender my passport and identification card. Some time later in the night my papers were returned to me and I was told that I

must send my passport to the Hague to get an extension of time because my visa, which was for one week, had expired already. On the morning of February 10th, I was arrested in the lobby of my hotel by a big army of detectives who, this time, did not care to handle me very politely but were very rough with me. They took me to the Police Headquarters where I was searched bodily and after being questioned, kept under a guard for nearly 17 hours. Seeing that if I kept silent for a longer time I might be kept in jail for an indefinite period and thus be isolated from the rest of the comrades and not be in a position to obtain information I demanded to see the Chief Alien Inspector who is also in charge of the Bureau investigating Radical activities. Late at night I was brought before that officer and after offering me a chair he prepared himself to listen to my revelations but was much surprised when instead of telling him things I demanded the reason for my arrest and asked him to release me immediately and let me go back to England. In astonishment he said to me "I thought you called me here because you wanted to tell me something otherwise I would not have had to leave my house to come here, late at night, to listen to your complaints". I told him that I had no voluntary statement to make but that I was willing to answer specific questions. "Well", he said "tell me all about it". I asked him what he meant and he said "Well all what is going on here in Amsterdam". I said "I decline to give you any statement as I do not know what you want to know and I am not inclined to volunteer any statement unless you tell me what you want and what you know about me, and unless you give me definite reasons for my being persecuted in this country". "Well, he said, I am not going to question you now — I will tell you one thing and, that is, it has been decided to have you interned because you are a Russian. We are not interested in questioning you because we know your type of man and we are convinced that we will not be able to get out of you more than we know so it is no use to waste time. I am only astonished, he said, that my men were unable to find any papers on you which might incriminate you. I suppose, he said, your notes and documents are in a secure place and therefore, he said, you will go back to your cell and prepare yourself to depart to the Internment Camp. There was nothing else left for me to do but to tell the Inspector that I am not the person he thought I was and that if he wanted any information about me he should call up Mr. Wood in Rotterdam. He sent me back to my cell and half an hour later I was brought again before him and he started to reproach me for not telling him in the beginning that I was a Scotland Yard man. He gave me a whole long lecture about the necessity of co-operation between the police of all the countries and so on and so on. I told him that as far as co-operation is concerned between the Dutch Police and Scotland Yard, I am not in a position to express my opinion or pass judgment but would advise him to apply directly to Scotland Yard for any information in which he is interested and wants to have, but as far as I personally am concerned I cannot report to him but only to my superior officers and no one else. Seeing that he could nor get anything out of me the Inspector used a very diplomatic trick which I have to confess he put over me quite cleverly. Understanding that being at the conference all the time I was in a position to know what occurred there and it might be against my plans to have the delegates arrested and deported to their respective countries the Inspector said that he was going to raid all the places where these delegates were now and have them arrested and give wide publicity to the whole matter but if I was willing to compromise with him and to co-operate he was quite willing to submit to my plans and directions and do as I wanted. Seeing no way out of all the circumstances I agreed to inform him about local matters and everything which occurred at the Conference concerning Holland if he gave his assurance that he would not arrest SNYDER. As far as the other delegates were concerned I told him that he was free to do as he pleased. After we had come to a mutual agreement the Inspector revealed to me what he knew about the Conference and it came out that he knew very little. All the information that he was able to glean was that many foreigners arrived in Amsterdam and that they were associating themselves with the leading Bolsheviks of Holland, and also that they were meeting together every day. The character of the Conference or the plans laid by the Conference were unknown to him in detail. A little later a telephone call came to the office and the Inspector told me that his men had arrested some of the delegates and the first one arrested after me was Von Ober-STRASSE. Shortly after that, while I was still in the office of the Inspector all the papers of Von Ober-STRASSE were brought to him including some of the resolutions of the Conference and all

the notes concerning the proceedings of the Conference. Being not very competent about radical matter the Inspector applied for my assistance to explain to him some of the notes and resolutions found on Von Ober-STRASSE which I did for him. From the papers of Von Ober-STRASSE the Inspector could understand that it was a Conference of the Third International. Acting on my promise I gave him information about the coming strike of the dock workers in Sienme, Holland, also who is behind that strike and who is going to support that strike financially. I was released at 1 o'clock in the morning of the 11th February, went to my hotel and from there proceeded at once to Professor MANNOURY's house to see SNYDER.

(While I was with the Inspector he mentioned to me "Who is Louis FRAINA?" because he said that judging from the notes of Von Ober-STRASSE there is a person present at the Conference of the name of Louis FRAINA. As far as he knows no such person is accounted for in his files and that the name of every delegate present was known to him. Therefore the Inspector suspected that somebody was at the Conference with a false passport. He asked me if my friend Dr. SNYDER was not FRAINA and I told him that I knew that man by the name of SNYDER and that if he is FRAINA I am not troubled and I do not intend to trouble about it. He said that the name FRAINA is familiar to him because he has kept a list of the most prominent radicals from all over Europe and America and the name Louis FRAINA occurs in that list. I pointed out to him again that it is against my plans that he should mention the name of FRAINA in any of his official papers or shall take the trouble to find out who is that person and he assured me that he was going to follow my advice.)

I told SNYDER of what had happened to me and I also told him that the Inspector was searching for him. SNYDER became very alarmed and said that it was absolutely useless now to return to England because there was no doubt that the Dutch Authorities would communicate with Scotland Yard and give them the names of all the Britishers present at the Conference, and that he would be arrested the moment he landed in England therefore, said SNYDER, his advice was not to return to England but to send all my papers to America by courier who be supplied by the Bureau and proceed with him to Germany and thence to Russia if possible. I disapproved of this plan and told him that the Dutch Police had no reason to communicate anything to Scotland Yard at the present moment but they would certainly do it later on after they are through with their further investigations and if they did that it would take some time before the papers sent from Holland would reach England then, I said, red tape will follow and before the Authorities agree to take any action you will be safe in England. I pictured to him the fate that awaited him in Germany if he were caught by [Gustav] NOSKE's men or in Poland, if he were caught by the Polish Authorities and he agreed with me that it was better to take the chance with the British Police than with NOSKE or the Polish Gendarmes and he agreed to follow my advice to surrender himself at 10 o'clock in the morning to the Inspector.

At 10 o'clock in the morning I went with SNYDER to the Inspector and the Inspector acting upon my advice which I had given him over the telephone put to SNYDER several questions and gave him three days to get an extension on his passport or to get out of Holland. He also assured me in SNYDER's presence to get out from Holland within 48 hours if I did not want to be interned.

Nothing else occurred during the day worthy of report.

After we left the Police Station I went to my hotel to have a rest because I was entirely broken up mentally and physically while SNYDER went to Amersfoort, to see RUTGERS and to get instructions from him with reference to our future communications and work, also to obtain some money from him for his return to America. In the evening when SNYDER returned from Amersfoort he told me that RUTGERS was coming to Amsterdam next day — February 11th — and would bring some money with him and also would give him definite instructions. On February 11th at 10 o'clock in the morning I went to Sylvia PANKHURST's hotel but I did not find her there. I then proceeded to the office of the TRIBUNE where I found WILLIS and some Dutch Comrades. There I learnt that a courier was sent to the German border to warn the comrades who were supposed to arrive for the Conference not to come as the police were informed of what was going on but the courier was too late and three comrades had arrived already and were in hiding in a little village not far from Amsterdam. It was indefinite yet

whether the Conference was going to continue or not. I then proceeded to Professor MANNOURY's house where I found SNYDER, Sylvia PANKHURST, De FESSA, MANNOURY and MURPHY. I was told that RUTGERS and his wife, WYNKOOP, Roland HOLST, HORTA, RAVESTEIN were in WYNKOOP's house having a meeting at which it will be decided what to do. Later on a message came from WYNKOOP's house with introduction to the delegates to leave Holland as the Conference was not going to continue for the reason that the present circumstances do not allow it and because there is no great necessity for continuing the Conference because the important points have been decided upon and the minor questions will be decided by the Bureau. The Comrades can go home assured that the Bureau will do its utmost to fulfil its duties according to the plans laid down by the Conference. All the reports of the Conference, all the resolutions and plans of the Conference are being put in shape by the Bureau and will be sent by special couriers to England to be forwarded to other countries. The messenger also informed the Comrades present in MANNOURY's house that it had been decided upon that NOSOVITSZKY, who is an old and experienced courier, shall in the future be subject to supervision directly from the Bureau of the Third International and that his duty shall not [*sic*] consist of being not only the official courier of the Communist Party but also for South and Central America and even, if possible, for Japan and other countries.

All the papers concerning the Conference which are to be delivered to the American Communist Party, American Communist Labour Party, I.W.W. and the revolutionary organizations in Mexico, Cuba and other countries will be sent to NOSOVITSZKY to London within a short time. There was nothing else left for us delegates to do but to proceed home. SNYDER who was awfully scared about coming to England asked me if I would have the courage enough to make it a test case by coming to England myself first and if everything was well and the British Authorities did not know about our activities then I was to send him a telegram to Rotterdam where he was going to be and he would follow me. I quietly agreed to his plan because to insist on his coming with me would look rather suspicious except that as a courier it is my duty to undertake the most dangerous tasks without asking any questions. So on the morning of February 12th I left Amsterdam arriving at Rotterdam early in the afternoon. I went to Mr. Wood's office but did not find him there. Being afraid of missing my train to Flushing where I was supposed to catch my boat I interviewed Mr. Harwood who is Mr. Wood's assistant and after learning from him that he knew who I was I had my passport visaed and asked him if he knew anything about SNYDER. He told me he had no communications from anybody about SNYDER but was willing to do anything with reference to that man. I asked Mr. Harwood to facilitate Dr SNYDER's coming here and left for Flushing. I left Flushing at daybreak on the 13th February arriving in London in the afternoon of the same day. In the evening I reported to Colonel Carter at his house.

While in Holland I obtained the following information:—

"When RUTGERS left Russia with the mandate to organize the Third International Bureau he was given a big amount of money in diamonds and pearls. The money was given to him by the Soviet Government for the purpose of Revolutionary propaganda and only revolutionary propaganda. Upon arrival in Germany and being afraid of carrying a large amount of diamonds and pearls with him because a personal search is usually conducted upon persons arriving from Germany, in Holland, especially such a conspicuous person as RUTGERS, he left all the valuable stones in Germany with REICH, BRONSKE and others taking with him only three of the largest diamonds in the whole collection which he sold in Holland for a large sum of money and part of which he has already spent. He expected to get the rest of the diamonds and pearls sent to him in Holland but he was greatly surprised when, after sending several letters to the German Comrades for these stones he finally received an answer to the effect that he could not have these stones because the German comrades had sold them for four million marks and the money was being used for revolutionary propaganda in Germany. The reasons given for such an act were that the revolutionary propaganda in Germany is of greater importance than in any other country. RUTGERS said that he saw several reasons for such an act.

The first reason is that they have not sent the money to him because the West European

Communist Secretariat who is now in possession of the money is opposed to the newly organized Third International Bureau which is the real Bureau authorized from Moscow and that by sending the money to that Bureau Germany would only help that Bureau to establish itself well and it would become a dominant factor in directing revolutionary propaganda in all the countries perhaps paying very little attention to Germany. Another reason for the Germans keeping the money, RUTGERS said, is because they are Germans. He thinks that the Independent Party in Germany and even the Communist Party and all the different Communist Groups of the so-called Opposition are being corrupted now by those four million marks realized by the sale of the stones. The secretariat is believed now to be getting the services of very able men from the movement who are bitterly opposed to the Secretariat and Independent Party but because of lack of financial funds for personal use these leaders and active members gather around that Secretariat simply because they are paid well for their services. RUTGERS is convinced that if these diamonds had been sold in any other country except Germany ten times as much money would have been realized for them and a greater use would have been made of the money by giving a portion of it to the revolutionary movement in England and in other countries. Nevertheless he is not much worried about the financial question. The Bureau is going to send a messenger to Moscow from whence they will get as much money as they want. It is estimated by the Bureau that 20 million roubles counting the previous value of the rouble before the war (£2,000,000) will be obtained from Moscow. It is highly probable that if I will consent to undertake the task I might be sent to Russia but there is also a possibility that a messenger will be sent from Holland through Germany perhaps from Germany through Reval and Esthonia into Russia.

A wireless station of high power is being constructed now in Holland under the supervision of RUTGERS who is one of the greatest engineers of Holland and perhaps Europe. The station will be located of course in some building for the purpose of direct communication with Moscow and if possible also with some of the Scandinavian countries. Steady couriers are in the service of the Bureau now between Germany and Holland and England also Scandinavia. No direct communication has as yet been established between any American countries and Holland. Professor MANNOURY, who often comes to England is one of the messengers while Miss Smythe who is in possession of some credentials from some firm as a representative of that firm is transmitting messages at the present time and it is highly probable that within a short time she will be taking regular trips between England and Holland. I myself give very little value to the activities of Miss Smythe and I do not think she will ever be entrusted with anything serious concerning the revolutionary movement generally and in particular.

Communication has been established between Spain and Holland. From now on literature in the Spanish language or if it is impossible to publish in the Spanish language then in any other language, will be published dealing particularly with the Spanish local situation in the revolutionary and international revolutionary movement. It will be published by the Bureau in Holland and sent to Spain. As I mentioned before the literature will be published in every language possible. I learnt that Jack Tanner who is not a courier himself was transmitting messages from Sylvia PANKHURST to Holland and other countries and later to America and that he is also in charge of the courier business for the Sinn Feiners. If this is correct I do not know — I am personally inclined to believe that the Sinn Feiners have a better system of transmitting their messages between America and Ireland than through Jack Tanner. While I was in Holland STROM [Ström], the Soviet Representative from Scandinavia sent a letter to RUTGERS in which he promised to come to attend the Conference but he did not come. Before I left Holland I learnt from SNYDER who got it from RUTGERS that on the 10th February a cable was sent by STROM to RUTGERS in which he simply said not using code “American friends advise not to admit Fraina to the Conference”. That shows that Martens had sent a communication to Strom in which he told him that he suspected Fraina of being a Government agent. RUTGERS paid no attention to that cable.

In conclusion I wish to point out the following fact that is based upon definite information I obtained that no matter what happens no matter what attitude the British Government has taken or will take in the future towards the Soviet Government the Russian Soviet Republic, as it stands now or as it will be later, will always strive to create a social revolution of the World. The Third International is a

creation of the Soviet Republic of Russia. The Third International which unites the most extreme elements of the various countries is more dangerous than the Soviet Republic itself. Despite the fact that the Third International is a creation of the Soviet Republic, the Third International will not fall if the Soviet Republic is destroyed, if the Soviet government of Russia is crushed. The Third International can only be destroyed if the revolutionary movement in England and other countries is destroyed, which is practically an impossibility at the present moment when discontent is sweeping throughout the world.

The mere fact that the Soviet Government supports the Third International morally and especially financially, the fact that the Soviet Republic appeals to the revolutionary and non-revolutionary workers of the Allied Countries through the Third International, indicates that Soviet Russia depends more on the Third International for a world revolution than on itself. The Soviet Government is most afraid of giving those countries who participate in the blockade of Russia any fundamental reason, any weapon that can be used against the Soviet régime or that can logically justify the blockade and even intervention on a big scale and therefore we have realized the fact that Soviet Russia strives to create smaller revolutions in Great Britain and other countries but we must realize also the fact now that these plans are going to be carried out by the Third International and the organizations directly affiliated with the Third International and as Soviet Russia as a republic is menaced so is the smallest little groups which is affiliated to the Third International and which receives its support morally and financially from Soviet Russia through the Third International, so by dealing with the various communist organizations we must deal with them in the same manner as we deal with Soviet Russia, I mean to say, considering them as dangerous and perhaps more so than Russia itself.

Being always posted about the plans of the Third International and breaking up these plans is the purpose we must always strive to attain. No matter how small and insignificant might be the plans of the Third International they always bear grave results in the future and taking into consideration that the Third International is gaining more and more power and that more and more not only revolutionary but even moderate, up to now, working bodies become affiliated to the Third International, it is clear that there is a strong tendency among the working classes towards the Third International.

The matter which I want to point out is the question of the Communist Party in England. I am personally convinced that if a Communist Party is created in England, more revolutionary work could be done and will be done in one month that all the revolutionary organizations at work now in England would be able to accomplish separately in a year or perhaps more.

The Third International is striving to unite all the revolutionary groups of England into one Communist Party and that means that if the British Socialist Party separates from the Labour Party and the Socialist Labour Party entered the Communist Party of England so the South Wales Socialist Society and the Workers Socialist Federation and it is highly probable and everything indicates that many revolutionary groups of miners have expressed their wish to affiliate with the Third International and it is quite noticeable now that grave revolutionary stress will be laid upon the miners of England and if great moral and financial assistance will be given to the Communists of England from outside, say from the Third International Bureau and many agitators could be employed and a lot of literature of a communist character could be oriented, then thousands of new converts to the cause of Bolshevism could be obtained in this country. Therefore our slogan must be “No unity among the various organizations of England”. If they cannot unite they will always fight, fight over principles, over tactics, over money sent by the Soviet Government to this country, over personal animosities and that is just what is necessary at the present moment to keep away the radically inclined elements among the working class from the revolutionary organizations and a lot could be prevented through the above-mentioned facts.

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(1) Correspondence of MID, 10058-342-50; Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation [1908-1922], RG 65, OG349701, NARA (hereafter cited as Records of the FBI, OG 349701).

(2) There is not a quotation mark for closing. It is possible that the next paragraph is also put in quotation, but there is no mention whatever of “the Bureau of the Third International” in the official Thesis [**Doc. 2-1-1**; cf. **3-11-1**].

3 LEAFLETS

List of the Leaflets distributed by the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Communist International

Title / Subtitle [1]	Top of title	Date	Signature	Sheet	Source [2]	Reprint [2]
3-1 GENERAL / INTERNATIONAL						
Mitteilung, No.1 [**3-1-1**]	Amsterdamer Bureau der Kommunistischen Internationale	10.01.1920	Henriette Roland Holst; [the following are crossed out: H. Gorter/A.Pannekoek / S.J. Rutgers/ D.J. Wijnkoop/ W. van Ravesteyn]	1	РГАСПИ, 497/1/11/43; cf. 581/1/95/1	*Bulletin* [German ver.], 02.1920
Avis, No.1	Bureau d'Amsterdam de l'Internationale Communiste	10.01.1920	Henriette Roland Holst/ W. van Ravesteyn [un-crossed out]	1	Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0507	*Bulletin* [French ver.], 02.1920
Announcement [**3-1-1a**]		n.d.	H. Roland Holst	1	РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/1	*Bulletin,* 02.1920
[in French/in German/in English:] **Dear Comrades/ Enclosed you will find the first copies of a series of reports on the revolutionary movement in different countries as a result from the February-Conference in Amsterdam** [**3-1-2**]		n.d.	P [=Pannekoek]	1	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0469	
Introduction		n.d.	H. Roland Holst	original un-checked		*Bulletin,* 03.1920; *Workers' Dreadnought*, 20.03.1920; *Communist*, 05.04.1920
Einleitung [**3-1-3**]	[handwriting] Bericht über die Konferenz den III. Internationale in Amsterdam	n.d.	unsigned	3	РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/61-66; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0464	
Resolution über Soviet-Russland [**3-1-3a**]				1	Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0465	
Beschlüsse über das Internationale Bureau [**3-1-3b**]				2	Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0466	
Resolution über Einheit [**3-1-3c**]				1	Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0467	
Resolution das Subbureau Amerikas betreffend [**3-1-3d**]				1	Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0468	
Introduction [French ver.]		n.d.	La Commission	6	Pap.Pankhurst;	*Bulletin*

			Exécutive		[draft] РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/36-43, 44-49, 55-60	[French ver.], 03.1920
[typed draft] **1. Communication with Moscow is possible at present via Stockholm** [**3-1-4**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Third International	n.d.	S.J. Rutgers	1	РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/5	
[typed draft] 1. Die Mitteilungen mit Moskau.....	Mitteilungen des Amsterdamer Zweigbureaus der Dritten Internationale	n.d.	S.J. Rutgers	1	РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/4	
1. La communication avec Moscou.....	Communication du Sub-Bureau d'Amsterdam de la Troisème Internationale	n.d.	S.J. Rutgers/ [sign:] S.J.R.	1	РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/2	
Appeal to the Workers of Europe and America [**3-1-5**]		n.d.	unsigned	original un-checked		*Bulletin,* 02.1920
Aufruf an die Arbeiter Europas und Amerikas		n.d.	unsigned	2	РГАСПИ, 497/1/11/55-56	
Appeal to the British[,] the French and the Belgian Proletariat [**3-1-6**]	Communication of the Provisional Bureau of the Communist International	n.d. [ca.03.1920]	D.J. Wynkoop/ Henriette Roland Holst/ G.[*sic*] J. Rutgers	3	Pap. Pankhurst	*Workers' Dreadnought*, 03.04.1920; *Communist,* 01.06.1920; [**Dutch ver.**] *Tribune*, 27.03.1920
Auf an das Englishe, Französiche und Belgische Proletariat	Mitteilung des Amsterdamer Zweigbureaus der III-ten Internationale	n.d.	D.J. Wynkoop/ H. Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	3	РГАСПИ, 497/1/6/75-77	
Appel au Prolétariat Anglais, Français et Belge	Appel du Bureau Provisoire de l'Internationale Communiste	n.d. [ca.03.1920]	D.J. Wynkoop/ Henriette Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	original un-checked		*Ouvrier communiste*, 28.03.1920
Oproep voor een Steunfonds voor de slachtoffers der Internationale Reactie [**3-1-7**]		n.d. [ca.04.1920]	H. Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers/ D.J. Wijnkoop	original un-checked		*Tribune*, 23.04.1920
3-2 GOVERNING ORGANS OF THE COMINTERN						
Rapport über die Kommunistische Jugendinternationale [**3-2-1**]	Mitteilung des Amsterdamer Zweigbureau der IIIten Internationale	03.1920	Willy Münzenberg (Berlin)	2	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0474	
3-3 SOVIET RUSSIA						
Peace with Russia/ Strike on Mayday 1920 [**3-3-1**]	Announcement of the Provisional Bureau of the Communist International	n.d. [03.1920]	H. Roland Holst	2	Pap. Pankhurst	*Voice of Labor*, 20.04.1920; *Communist*, 01.06.1920; [**Dutch ver.**] *Tribune*, 06.04.1920
Frieden mit Russland/ Streik am Maitag 1920	Mitteilung des Amsterdamer Zweigbureau der IIIten Internationale	n.d.	D.J. Wynkoop/ Henriette Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	3	Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0453	

La paix avec la Russie/ Grève pour le premier mai 1920	Communication du Bureau auxiliaire d'Amsterdam de la III[ième] Internationale	n.d. [ca.04.1920]	D.J. Wynkoop/ Henriette Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	2 or 3 [p. 2 (or pp. 2-3) is (are) missing]	Koll.Komintern	*Ouvrier communiste*, 15.04.1920
[another abridged ver.] Strike for Peace with Russia May First		n.d.	H. Roland Holst, Secretary		РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/149	
An die Arbeiter aller Länder/ Neue Offensive gegen Sowjet-Russland [**3-3-2**]	Mitteilung des Amsterdamer Zweigbureaus der III-ten Internationale	04.1920	D.J. Wynkoop/ Henriette Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	2	Arch. L. de Visser	
New Offensive Against Soviet Russia/ To the Workers of all countries [**3-3-2a**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Third International	n.d. [04.1920]	D.J. Wynkoop/ H. Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	2	[Distributed by The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of America]	*Communist*, 15.05.1920; 22.05.1920; [**Dutch ver.**] *Tribune*, 21.04.1920; 24.04.1920
Aux ouvriers et tous les pays/ Une nouvelle offensive contre la Russie des Soviets	Communication du Bureau auxiliaire d'Amsterdam de la IIIième Internationale	n.d. [04.1920]	D.J. Wynkoop/ H. Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	2	Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0456	*Ouvrier communiste*, 01.05.1920
Qui prend part à l'appareil gouvernemental de la république des Soviets? [**3-3-3**]		n.d.	unsigned [sender: S. van der Hal]	2+2 (Tableau 1, 2)	РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/90-93	
3-4 GREAT BRITAIN/ IRELAND						
Dear Comrades:/ Comrade Johson, secretary of the Independent Labour Party of Great Britain, had kindly sent us the copy of a letter addressed by the I.L.P. to the Swiss Socialist Party [**3-4-1**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Third International	n.d.	D.J. Wynkeep [*sic*] / Henriette Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	2	РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/97-98, 497/1/6/65-66	*Workers' Dreadnought*, 17.04.1920; *Communist*, 15.05.1920
Werte Genossen,/ Genosse Johnson, Schriftführer.....	Mitteilung des Amsterdamer Zweigbureaus der 3ten Internationale	n.d.	D.J. Wynkoop/ Henriette Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	2	РГАСПИ, 497/1/8/53-54	
Chers Camarades,/ Le Camarade Johnson, secrétaire.....	Communication du Bureau auxiliaire d'Amsterdam de la IIIième Internationale	03.1920	D.J. Wynkoop/ Henriette Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	2	РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/99-100; 581/1/95/8-9	
Report on the British Movement [**3-4-2**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the IIIrd International	03.1920	unsigned	13	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0459	
Report on the Industrial Aspects of the Working Class Movement in Britain [**3-4-3**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the IIIrd International	03.1920	J.T. Murphy/ on behalf of the Shop Stewards and Workers Committees of Great Britain	5	Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0470	
Report on the Movement in Great Britain (B.S.P.) [**3-4-4**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the IIIrd International	03.1920	F. Willis/ Hodgeson	2	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0458	
Report on the Present Conditions of the Political	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of	03.1920	J.T. Murphy/ S.S. Workers	4	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-	*Communist*, 01.06.1920

Movements in Britain [**3-4-5**]	the IIIrd International		Committees		Droz, 0472	
Report on the Propagandist and Educational Developments in the Working-Class Movement in Britain [**3-4-6**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the IIIrd International	03.1920	J.T. Murphy/ S.S. Workers Committees	2	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0471	
To the Communists in Great Britain [**3-4-7**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Third International	n.d.	D.J. Wynkoop/ H. Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	1	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0455	*Communist*, 01.06.1920
The Political and Working Class Organization in Ireland [**3-4-8**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the IIIrd International	n.d.	unsigned	3	РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/70-72	
3-5 USA						
Greetings to American Communists [**3-5-1**]		03.1920	D.J. Wynkoop/ S.J. Rutgers/ Henriette Roland Holst	original un-checked		*Communist*, 01.06.1920
Report on the Development of the Communist Party of America [**3-5-2**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the IIIrd International	03.1920	Louis C. Fraina/ International Secretary	10	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0476	
The American Socialist Party and the International [**3-5-3**]	Communication of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Communist International	(Berlin, 30.03.1920) n.d.	Louis C. Fraina; [postscript:] H. Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers/ D.J. Wynkoop	3	Pap. Pankhurst	
[typed draft] **The Amsterdam sub-Bureau of the Communist International supports the request for rejecting the affiliation of the Socialist Party of America.....** [**3-5-4**]	Communication of the Sub-Bureau of the Communist International	n.d.	H. Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers/ D.J. Wynkoop	1	РГАСПИ, 497/2/2/252	
3-6 GERMANY						
An alle Arbeiter Deutschlands, an die Reichszentrale der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands und an den Parteivorstand der Unabhängigen Sozial-demokratischen Partei Deutschlands [**3-6-1**]	Mitteilung des Exekutivkomitees der Kommunistischen Internationale	(Moskau, 05.02.1920) 04.1920 (Weiterge-leitet vom Amster-damer Zweig-bureau)	Das Exekutiv-komitee der Kommunistischen Internationale/ Vorsitzender: G. Sinowjew	9	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0460	
Oproep om steun aan onze Duitsche revolutionaire kameraden [**3-6-2**]		n.d. [ca.03.1920]	H. Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers/ D.J. Wijnkoop	original un-checked		*Tribune*, 29.03.1920; 03.04.1920
Das Westeuropäische Sekretariat (W.E.S.) der Kom-munistischen Internationale (K.I.) in Berlin veröffentlicht in Die Rote Fahne von 22 April 1920 eine Erklärung..... [**3-6-3**]	Mitteilung des Amsterdamer Zweigbureaus der III-ten Internationale	05.1920	D.J. Wynkoop/ H. Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers	2	РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/26-27; cf. 497/1/9/23-25	
[typed draft] Het West-Europeesche Sekretariaat, W.E.S., ...	Mededeeling van het Amsterdamsch Sub-bureau der Kommunistishe	n.d.	H. Roland Holst/ S.J. Rutgers/ D.J. Wijnkoop	2	РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/50-51	

	Internationale					
3-7 SWITZERLAND						
Die Entwicklung und der gegenwärtige Stand der Kommunistischen Partei der Schweiz [**3-7-1**]	Mitteilung des Amsterdamer Zweigbureaus der III-ten Internationale	03.1920	Im Namen des Zentralvorstandes der Kommunistischen Partei der Schweiz/ Der President/ Jak. Herzog	7	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0461	
3-8 BELGIUM						
La situation prolétarienne en Belgique [**3-8-1**]	Communication du Bureau auxiliaire d'Amsterdam de la IIIième Internationale	03.1920	unsigned	6	РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/73-78; Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0463	
3-9 SPAIN						
Les jeunesses espagnoles et le parti socialiste [**3-9-1**]	Communication du Bureau auxiliaire d'Amsterdam de la IIIième Internationale	(Madrid, 16.03.1920) 03.1920	Fulgencio Izquierdo	2	Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0475	
3-10 FINLAND						
La situation en Finlande [**3-10-1**]	Communication du Bureau auxiliaire d'Amsterdam de la IIIième Internationale	n.d.	[unascertained; p. 2 (f.) is (are) missing]	1+α	Koll.Komintern; Arch.Humbert-Droz, 0462	
3-11 VARIANT						
Trade Unionism, Industrial Unionism and Workers' Committees [**3-11-1**]		n.d.	(Issued by) the Bureau of the Third International	original un-checked		*Voice of Labor*, 20.04.1920

(1) The leaflets whose titles (and subtitles) are emphasized are compiled in this paper. The serial numbers of documents, for example, "[**3-1-1**]", are added to the end of the titles (and subtitles).

(2) The full names of the abbreviations in the columns of source and reprint are as follows:

Arch. Humbert-Droz = Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, Fondation Jules Humbert-Droz, La Chaux-de-Fonds

Arch. L. de Visser = Archief Louis de Visser, Inv. nr. 3 (Aantekeningen.....en enige brochures en circulaires van CPH; 1910-1920), Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG), Amsterdam

Koll. Komintern = Kollektion Komintern, Inv. nr. 10 (Amsterdamer Zweigbureau der IIIten Internationale), IISG

Pap. Pankhurst = The Papers of E. Sylvia Pankhurst, Inv. no. 260 (Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Communist International; Communications), IISG

РГАСПИ = Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории, Москва

Bulletin = [English ver.] *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* (Amsterdam), No. 1, II.1920; *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International*, No. 2, III.1920;
[German ver.] *Bulletin des Provisorischen Amsterdammer Bureau der Kommunistischen Internationale*, No. 1, II.1920;
[French ver.] *Bulletin du Bureau provisoire d'Amsterdam de l'Internationale Communiste*, No. 1, II.1920; *Bulletin du Bureau auxiliaire d'Amsterdam de l'Internationale Communiste*, No. 2, III.1920.

Communist = *The Communist. Official Organ of the Communist Party of America* (Chicago)

Ouvrier communiste = *L'Ouvrier communiste. Organe du Groupe Communiste de Bruxelles* (Bruxelles)

Tribune = *De Tribune* (Amsterdam)

Voice of Labor = *The Voice of Labor* (New York)

Workers' Dreadnought = (*The*) *Workers' Dreadnought* (London)

3-1 Leaflets on: General / International

3-1-1

AMSTERDAMER BUREAU DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN INTERNATINALE

(Als unsere Korrespondenz-Adresse gilt ausschliesslich die auf unserem Briefumschlag angegebene.)

No. 1. Amsterdam, den 10 Januar ’20.

MITTEILUNG [1].

Das Moskauer Exekutiv-Komitee der IIIen Internationale hat einige holländischen Genossen angewiesen, ein provisorisches Bureau zu Amsterdam zu bilden. Dieses Bureau hat zur Aufgabe, die kommunistischen Ideen unter den Arbeiter-Massen West-Europa’s und von Amerika zu verbreiten, um deren Einheit auf der Basis der Kommunistischen Internationale zu erzielen [2].

Das Bureau hat beschlossen, zweimal im Monat ein Mitteilungsblatt in französischer, englischer und deutscher Sprache zu veröffentlichen. Dieses Mitteilungsblatt wird Artikel über die internationale Lage, Presse-Uebersichten und vor allem Dokumente und Informationen mit Bezug auf die dritte Internationale bringen. Ausserdem beabsichtigt das Bureau einen Nachrichtendienst über die Bewegung in den verschiedenen Ländern zu organisieren; es wird diesen Nachrichten regelmässig allen Organen (Zeitungen) und allen kommunistischen Gruppen zugehen lassen, die sich an dasselbe wenden und den Wunsch danach äussern.

Das Bureau bereitet gleichfalls ein Archiv vor, in dem es die seit dem Anfang des Weltkriegs erschienene kommunistische Literatur versammelt. Das Bureau ersucht alle kommunistischen Parteien und Gruppen mit ihm in Verbindung treten zu wollen. Insbesondere werden die der IIIen Internationale bereits angeschlossenen Parteien und Gruppen gebeten, ihm sofort ihre Korrespondenz-Adresse mitzuteilen.

Das Bureau steht mit dem Sekretariat für West-Europa, das sich in Deutschland konstituiert hat, in regelmässiger Verbindung. Dieses Sekretariat hat vorläufig die Aufgabe, das monatlich erscheinende Organ der IIIen Internationale zu veröffentlichen, welches den Titel „Die Kommunistische Internationale“ führt und in Moskau erscheint. Dieses Organ wird von nun an in einer für West-Europa vermehrten Spezial-Aufgabe erscheinen.

Das Sekretariat und das Bureau werden gemeinschaftlich eine oder mehrere internationale Konferenzen organisieren, bis ein internationaler kommunistischer Kongress stattfinden kann, der die notwendige Autorität besitzt, um die Aktion der angeschlossenen Parteien und Gruppen zu regeln und um ein definitives Bureau einzusetzen.

(Aus dem Mitteilungsblatt des Amsterdamer Bureaus der Kommunistischen Internationale)

Für das Amsterdamer Bureau
~~H. GORTER~~
~~A. PANNEKOEK~~
HENRIETTE ROLAND HOLST
~~S.J. RUTGERS~~
~~D.J. WIJNKOOP~~
~~W. van RAVESTEYN~~

Werte Genossen, — Wir bitten Sie für unser Bureau zwei Exemplare Ihrer Zeitung (Wochenschrift,

Monatsschrift) an Genossen [a blank] [3] zu senden und ein weiteres Exemplar für unser Archiv an Genossen W.L. Brusse, Rotterdam, Bergsingel 172 [a].
Wir bitten Sie, unserem Genossen womöglich sofort nach Erscheinen jede Nummer Ihrer Zeitung zugehen zu lassen. Für das Archiv könnten Sie jede Woche ein Paket senden.

H. Roland Holst.

(1) РГАСПИ, 497/1/11/43; cf. 581/1/95/1. Reprinted in: *Bulletin des Provisorischen Amsterdammer Bureau der Kommunistischen Internationale*, No. 1, II.1920, S. 1.

(2) This sentence was revised in the reprint in *Bulletin*: “Dieses Bureau hat zur Aufgabe eine internationale Konferenz zu organisieren, um die Aktionseinheit der arbeitenden Massen auf der Basis der der kommunistischen Internationale vorzubereiten.”

(3) According to the French version (“Avis,” Archives Jules Humbert Droz, 0507): “[?]be. L. Verhoeven, Aarendstraat, den Haag.”

3-1-1a

ANNOUNCEMENT [1]

The executive committee at Moscow of the third International has appointed a few Dutch comrades in order to form a provisional bureau at Amsterdam. The duties of that bureau consist in the propagation of communist ideas among the working classes of Western Europe and America in order to establish unity among themselves based on the Communist International [2].

The Bureau has decided to publish a bi-monthly bulletin in the French, English and German languages. The bulletin will contain articles on international conditions, newspaper-reviews and above all documents and information concerning the third International. In addition the Bureau contemplates organizing a Department to collect information regarding the movement in the various countries, which will be sent regularly to any communist organ and any communist group which apply for them.

At the same time the Bureau will compile archives of all the communist literature published since the outbreak of the world-revolution.

The Bureau invites all communist parties or groups to enter into communication with it. Especially any parties or groups already affiliated to the third International are requested to forward immediately their address for correspondence.

The Bureau is in constant touch with the West-European Secretariat [of the third International] which has been founded in Germany. Provisionally this Secretariat will undertake to edit the monthly organ of the third International, which carries the title "The Communist International" and is published at Moscow. In the future a special and enlarged edition of this organ will be published for Western Europe.

For the Amsterdam Bureau

H. Roland Holst

(1) РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/1. Reprinted in: *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* (Amsterdam), No. 1, II.1920, p. 1.

(2) This sentence was revised in the reprint in *Bulletin*: "The duties of this Bureau consist in the organization of an international conference to prepare unity of action of the laboring masses based on the Communist International."

3-1-2

Chers Camarades [1]

Ci-jointe vous trouverez quelques exemplaires de rapports sur le mouvement révolutionnaire dans différents pays, que nous avons reçus lors de la conférence internationale de février à Amsterdam. Vous en recevrez d'autres pendant ce mois.

A cause des prix trop élevées d'imprimer ces rapports, nous les distributions en multiplications simples et seulement dans la langue originelle.

Werte Genossen

Anbei schicken wir ihnen die ersten Exemplare einer Reihe Rapporten über die revolutionäre Bewegung in den verschiedenen Ländern, die uns anlässlich der Februar-Konferenz in Amsterdam zugekommen sind, und von denen Sie im Laufe dieses Monats weitere Sendungen erhalten werden.

Wegen der hohen Kosten der Drucklegung mussten wir uns leider auf die Herausgabe einer kleinen Zahl einfach multiplizierte Exemplare in der originellen Sprache beschränken.

Dear Comrades

Enclosed you will find the first copies of a series of reports on the revolutionary movement in different countries as a result from the February-Conference in Amsterdam. In the course of this month further reports will reach you.

On account of the high cost of printing we had to restrict ourselves to distributing written copies in the original language only.

Pour le Bureau de Presse
du Bureau Auxiliaire d'Amsterdam de
L'Internationale Communiste.
[sign:] P [=Pannekoek]

En nous écrivant on est prié d'employer l'adresse de correspondance:

Als unsere Korrespondenz-Adresse gilt ausschliesslich:

All communications should be directed to the address:

S[alomon]. VAN DER HAL Izn. [2] KEIZERSGRACHT 409 AMSTERDAM HOLLAND

(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG), Amsterdam.
(2) Izn. = Inzender (sender)

3-1-3

EINLEITUNG [1]

Im Laufe des Monats November 1919 kehrte Genosse Rutgers aus Russland zurück mit dem Auftrag der Exekutive der dritten Internationale, um ein Subbureau in Amsterdam zu gründen, deren Mitglieder von der genannten Exekutive angewiesen wurden. Dieses Bureau sollte als Hauptaufgaben haben:

1. Die Errichtung einer Zentrale der kommunistischen Propaganada mit einem Mitteilungsblatt und Veröffentlichungen in drei Sprachen.
2. Die Anknüpfung von Verbindungen mit den verschiedenen kommunistischen Gruppen und Parteien West-Europa's und Amerika's.
3. Die Einberufung in kürzester Frist einer internationalen kommunistischen Konferenz.

Die deutsche kommunistische Partei, die gleichfalls die Absicht zur Einberufung einer internationalen kommunistischen Konferenz ausgesprochen hatte, organisierte das Sekretariat von West-Europa, indem es die kommunistischen Parteien einlud, in der zweiten Hälfte des Januars in Deutschland zusammenzukommen. Das Bureau zu Amsterdam beschloss an dieser Konferenz teilzunehmen und Resolutionen u.s.w. vorzubereiten, welche nach Berlin gesandt wurden.

Mitte Januar kamen amerikanische und englische Delegierte in Holland an und da keine einzige Nachricht aus Deutschland, wo der Belagerungszustand verhängt worden war, erhalten war, beschloss das provisorische Amsterdamer Bureau, die Anwesenheit der english und amerikanischen Genossen zu benutzen, um eine Konferenz zu Amsterdam, die schon durch Besuche von holländischen Genossen in England, in der Schweiz, Belgien und Frankreich vorbereitet worden war, zu beschleunigen.

Ein Eilbote wurde zu den deutschen Genossen gesandt, um sie zu ersuchen, so schnell wie möglich zu kommen. Nur ein Delegierter der Opposition in der deutschen kommunistischen Partei kam zu Anfang der Konferenz an, welche am 3 Febr. eröffnet wurde. Die andern deutschen Delegierten kamen erst 8 Tage später an. Ausser von den Delegierten der verschiedenen kommunistischen Gruppen in England, den Delegierten von Amerika und Holland, wurde die Konferenz von zwei Delegierten belgischer kommunistischer Gruppen besucht, von einem Genossen, der an der ungarischen Revolution teilgenommen hatte, von einem Vertreter der revolutionären Bewegung in Holländisch Indien und von einem chinesischen Kameraden, welch letztere keine Mandate hatten. Gegen Ende der Konferenz kamen Schweizer Delegierte an, die nicht mehr an den regelrechten Diskussionen teilnehmen konnten.

Die erste Sitzung fand am 3 Febr. statt. Nach einer Eröffnungsrede des Genossen Rutgers wurde ein Kongress-Bureau ernannt und die Tagesordnung festgesetzt. Am Vormittag des 4ten nahm die Konferenz ihre Arbeiten wieder auf. Der erste zur Beratung stehende Punkt war der Aufruf an die Arbeiter, um Soviet-Russland zu unterstützen. Die Diskussion war sehr lebhaft und dauerte diesen und den folgenden Tag. Zwei Haupt-Tendenzen traten auf den Vordergrund, die eine die sich bemühte darzutun; dass eine wirkliche Massenbewegung zu Gunsten Russlands nur dann entstehen werde, wenn man in jeden grossen ökonomischen Streik die revolutionäre Gärung erfolgreich hintragen, die Massen eines jeden Landes überzeugen könne; dass ihr eigenes Los unauflöslich mit dem Lose der russischen Republik verknüpft sei, die andere, die dem Wunsche Ausdruck verlieh; dass die Konferenz die Losung zu einem internationalen demonstrativen Streiks für Russland innerhalb möglichst kurzer Frist gebe solle. Diejenigen, die diesen Wusch äusserten machten sich übrigens keine Illusion in Bezug auf den

möglichen Erfolg ein solchen Appels, aber sie glaubten, es sei die erste Pflicht der kommunistischen Gruppen, die Erziehung der Arbeitermassen im Sinne der Einheit der internationalen Aktion zu erzielen.

Nach einer tiefgehenden Diskussion die u.a. von den Gefahren ausging, welche die Aufhebung der Blokade darböte, wenn diese nicht durch den Druck der Massen, aber durch die Tätigkeit der kapitalistischen Regierungen herbeigeführt wurde ─ wurde eine Kommission ernannt, um eine die verschiedenen vertretenen Tendenzen zusammenfassende Resolution zu redigieren; diese Resolution wurde einstimmig angenommen.

Unterdessen trat die Konferenz in die Diskussion zweier anderer Punkte der Tagesordnung, die Gründung eines kommunistischen Bureaus für West-Europa, die Länder Amerikas u.s.w. und die Vereinigung der verschiedenen in mehrenen Ländern bestehenden kommunistischen Gruppen. Was den Erste dieser Punkte anbetrifft, gestaltete die Abwesenheit der Genossen des Sekretariats für West-Europas, welches Sekretariats in Deutschland errichtet worden ist, die Situation ziemlich delikat. Schliesslich wurde trozdem beschlossen; dass ein Bureau zu Amsterdam errichtet werden sollte, für die Propaganda und den engeren Zusammenschluss zwischen den kommunistischen Gruppen West-Europas und den Ländern Amerikas und man einigte sich über die Organisation und die Funkutionen dieses Bureaus. Indem dem in Deutschland errichteten Bureau die Verbindungen mit den verschiedenen Ländern Mittel- und Süd-West-Europas reserviert werden, hofft man, jedem Konflikt zwischen den zwei verschiedenen Organen der dritten Internationale vorzubeugen. Der Antrag zur Gründung eines Bureaus zu Amsterdam wurde ebenfalls mit allgemeinen Stimmen angenommen.

Die war nicht der Fall mit demjenigen, der die Grundlagen zur Vereinigung der kommunistischen Gruppen in jedem Lande betraf.

Die in dieser Resolution formell vorgeschriebene Verpflichtung, jede Verbindung mit der sozialpatriotischen Internationale direkt oder indirekt angeschlossenen Parteien abzubrechen, rief ernsthafte Einwendungen seitens der Delegierten von einer der englishen Parteien hervor (Br. soc. Party). Sie drückten ihre Befürchtung aus; dass eine solche Massnahme die es der im Begriffe der Gründung sich befindenden kommunistischen Partei unmöglich mache, sich dem Verband der Labour Party anzuschliessen, sie völlig isoliere und verhindere, eine lebendige Kraft in den politischen Kämpfen des Landes zu sein. Die Delegierten der anderen englischen Organisationen teilten diese Befürchtungen keineswegs, sie erklärten im Gegenteil, dass die kommunistische Einheit sich in ihrem Lande nicht herstellen lasse, als auf der Grundlage eines vollkommenen Bruches mit der Arbeiterpartei.

Nach der Abstimmung über die Einheit trat man in die Diskussion betreffs der Grundsätze des Syndikalismus, vorgetragen und mit warmer Leibhaftigkeit von den amerikanischen Genossen L. Fraina verteidigt. Der Kamerad Bouwman, einer der Hauptführer der unabhängige Syndikate Hollands, wohnte dieser Sitzung bei und nahm an der Diskussion teil. Die grosse Amsterdamer kaptalistische Zeitung, das Handelsblatt, bediente sich später dieser Tatsache in ihren Enthüllungen über die geheime kommunistische Konferenz, um zu behaupten; dass der algemeine Transport-Streik im Amsterdamer und Rotterdamer Hafen angezettelt und das die Streikenden durch das russiche Gold unterstützt wurden. Diese dummen Beschuldigungen wurden leider vom Het Volk der Zeitung der sozialdemokratischen Partei, wiederholt, um die am Streik teilnehmenden unabhängigen Syndikate zu isolieren.

Nachdem die Konferenz während vier Tagen ruhig gearbeitet hatte, sah sie sich genötigt, das Lokal, in dem die Sitzungen abgehalten wurden, zu verlassen und seine Zuflucht bei einem die Genossen zu suchen. Mehrer Delegierte hatten bemerkt; dass ihnen regelmässig Detektive folgten und man glaubte dass die Lage der derjenigen, die keinen regelmässigen Pass hatten, diese Veränderung nötig machte, welche, wie man hoffte, die Polizei ihre Spur verlieren lassen werde. Am Sonntag den 8 Febr. kam ein Schweizer Genosse an, der die Nachricht brachte; dass mehrere deutsche Delegierte beabsichtigen in zwei oder drei Tagen nach Holland zu kommen.

Es wurde beschlossen, die Sitzung zu vertagen und am 11ten wieder zusammen zu kommen. Unglücklicher Weise hatte die ausgeführte Veränderung nicht zu erzielen vermocht, die Polizei auf eine verkehrte Spur zu bringen; mehrere Kameraden wurden arretiert, nach der Polizei geführt und einer Visitation unterzogen, andere entgingen einem noch ernstigeren Schicksal, indem sie heimlich das Land verliessen. Einbelgischer Delegierter wurde während 24 Stunden festgehalten und dann über die Grenze gesetzt. Der Mangel an Erfahrung unsrer Partei in Bezug auf die illegale Aktion und andere Umstände hatten gewiss nötige Vorsorgmassregeln verhindert, die es vielleicht ermöglicht hätten, die Konferenz in regelmässiger Weise zu Ende zu führen.

Unter den gegebenen Umständen hielt man es für möglich die Sitzungen wieder aufzunehmen. Mehrere der deutschen Delegierten wurden von dem [Gustav] Noske-Regime verfolgt und gehetzt. Delegierte von Nord-Amerika und der Schweiz wurden von Ihren demokratischen Regierungen verfolgt. Ausgeliefert an diese durch die holländische Regierung konnte ihnen dies lange Jahre Gefängnis besorgen. Man wagte nicht sie dieser Gefahr auszusetzen, indem man sie nach Amsterdam kommen liess. Den Mitgliedern der Exekutiv-Kommission des Bureaus, wie auch einem englishen und einem amerikanischen Delegierten gelang es, einige Unterredungen mit dem deutchen Delegierten zu haben, unter welch letzteren sich zwei Delegierte des Zentralausschusses der kommunistischen Partei befanden, ein Delegierter des Sekretariats für West-Europas und der kommunistischen Partei Russland, und einer der Jugend-Internationale. Die Diskussion lief ausschliesslich über die Ernennung des Amsterdamer Bureau, welche in seiner aktuellen Form von den erwähnten Genossen nicht akzeptiert werden konnte. Es wurde lange Zeit hierüber beratschlagt, ohne dass man sich einigen konnte. Schliesslich ging man unter den nachfolgenden Beschlüssen auseinander.

1. Das Sekretariat und das Bureau sollen jedes während drei Monaten ihre Propagandaarbeit ihrerseits fortsetzen, indem sie sich bestreben, Konflikte zu vermeiden.
2. In drei Monaten soll eine neue internationale kommunistische Konferenz stattfinden, die wie zu hoffen ist, über die nötige Autorität verfügt, um ein mehr definitives Internationales Bureau zu gründen.

Mit Rücksicht auf die zu geringe Allgemeinheit der Amsterdamer Konferenz und den durch die Tätigkeit der Polizei verfrühten Schluss, was den aus Deutschland gekommenen Genosssen nicht gestattete, an derselben teilzunehmen können die angenommenen Thesen und Resolutionen für die kommunistische Internationale nur eine vorläufige Bedeutung haben. Diese Thesen und Resolutionen haben nichts destoweniger einen relativen Wert, da sie die Tendenz der Evolution des kommunistischen Gedankens besonders in den angelsächsischen Ländern demonstrieren; umsomehr können und werden sie als Material für eine folgende internationale Konferenz dienen.

Unter allem Vorbehalt glauben wir doch nicht; dass die Arbeiten der Konferenz ohne Nutzen gewesen sind, im Gegenteil sind wir überzeugt; dass sie dazu beigetragen haben, die internationale Massenbewegung für Soviet-Russland zu beleben, die Bande zwischen den voranstehenden Gruppen enger zu knüpfen und ihre Vereinigung in kommunistische Parteien auf den allgemeinen von der Konferenz aufgestellten Grundlinien des Prinzips und der Taktik zu fördern. Und wir schätzen diese Resultate als sehr wertvolle.

N.B. Nach der Konferenz kamen noch die Delegierten Spaniens, einer von Mexiko, ein Delegierter von Finnland und einer von Schottland an. Mit diesen konnten die Mitglieder der Exekutive nur Privat-Unterredungen führen, die permanente Verbindungen zur Folge hatten. Die Unterredungen betreffend Spaniens und Mexiko trugen zur Erleichterung der Beziehungen mit Amerika und dem fernen Osten bei. Auch die Vermittlung einer Filiale des Bureaus in Amerika.

(1) РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/61-66; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0464, Fondation Jules Humbert-Droz, La Chaux-de-Fonds; cf. (English version) H. Roland Holst, "Documents concerning the International Conference at Amsterdam / Introduction," *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International*, No. 2, III.1920, pp. 1-3.

At the top of this document the following is handwritten: "Bericht über die Konferenz der III. Internationale in Amsterdam."

3-1-3a

RESOLUTION über SOVIET-RUSSLAND [1]

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Eine revolutionäre Aktion der Arbeiter, um das internationale Kapital zu zwingen, Frieden mit Russland zu schliessen, ist eine notwendige Vorbedingung, Soviet-Russland zu retten und die Weltrevolution zu beschleunigen.

Um diese Aktion zu fördern, müssen die Kommunisten in allen Ländern jede Streikbewegung und jede Massendemonstration benutzen, um:

1. diesen Teil ihrer Verantwortlichkeit mit Bezug auf die russische Revolution den Arbeitern deutlich zu machen,
2. dieselben davon zu überzeugen; dass ihre Interessen mit denen von Soviet-Russland zusammenfallen,
3. ein starkes Gefühl revolutionärer Solidarität und eine revolutionäre Aktion über die ganze Welt zu fördern.

Je nachdem der Druck der Arbeiter auf die Regierungen zunimmt, entsteht bei den Regierungen eine Neigung, einen Kompromiss-Frieden vorzuschlagen mit dem Zweck, Soviet-Russland von ihnen herauszuunterminieren. So bezwekt der letzte Vorschlag, Handelsbeziehungen mittels reaktionären Vertreters bei revolutionären kooperativen Vereinen, die seitdem mit den Soviet-Organisationen verschmelzen sind, die Bauern von den Arbeitern zu trennen und das Soviet-Monopol des Ausland-Handels zu vernichten. Unter dem Deckmantel solcher Manöver wird eine neue Offensive vorbereitet, welche um jeden Preis verhindert werden muss.

Es ist deshalb von grösster Bedeutung, dass dieses Bureau sofort Schritte tut, einen internationalen demonstrativen Streik gegen die Intervention in Russland vorzubereiten. Ein solcher Streik hat nicht nur die Aufhebung der Blockade und der Intervention in Russland zu fördern, sondern auch politische und ökonomische Forderungen einzuschliessen, in Übereinstimmung mit der revolutionären Entwicklung in jedem Lande.

Diese Demonstration soll durch Zwangsstreiks ergänzt werden, je nachdem die Arbeiter Kraft für eine solche Aktion sammeln, wobei der Verladung und dem Transport von Kriegsmaterial und Ausrüstungen besondere Aufmerksamkeit zu widmen, ist und zwar dadurch; dass Arbeitsverweigerung in solchen Fällen propagiert wird.

Der Aufruf zu einer internationalen Streikbewegung darf nicht nur durch Vermittlung der Gewerkschaftsbürokratie geschehen, sondern das Schwehrgewicht muss auf die Massen innerhalb der Gewerkschaften, auf Massenorganisationen ausserhalb der Gewerkschaften und nötigenfalls auf die Gründung solcher Organisationen verlegt werden.

Wenn in Deutschland oder sonstwo, wieder eine Revolution ausbricht, so müssen die Kräfte des internationalen Proletariats auf einen Generalstreik vorbereitet sein (besonders der Transportarbeiter in England, Amerika, Frankreich, Italien, Skandinavien, Holland, Belgien und der Schweiz), sofort wenn die kapitalistischen Mächte zu einer Intervention übergehen. Das Bureau soll unverzüglich Schritte tun,

diese Aktion rechtzeitig zu organisieren, damit die Arbeiter nicht nochmals überrascht werden durch die Regierungen.

(1) Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0465.

3-1-3b

BESCHLÜSSE ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE BUREAU [1]

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Ein internationales Bureau ist in Amsterdam gegründet worden als Subbureau des Exekutiv-Komitee in Moskau. Das Bureau wird gebildet von Delegierten der bei Moskau angeschlossenen Länder und zwar schickt jedes Land einen, von der dort bestehenden und bei Moskau angeschlossenen kommunistischen Partei anzuweisenden Delegierten. Wenn die verschiedenen Parteien und Gruppen eines Landes sich nicht über den Delegierten einigen können, kann jede Partei einen Delegierten anweisen und wird die Stimme dieses Landes zwischen den Delegierten eines Landes geteilt.

Die Sitzungen des Bureaus, die möglichst 1/4 jährlich abzuhalten sind, sind beschlussfähig, wenn von den vier Ländern England, Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien wenigstens drei vertreten sind, wobei jedoch an die Stelle eines dieser drei zwei der übrigen Länder treten können. Dabei werden Länder, die von Mitgliedern des Executiv-Komitees vertreten werden, nicht mitgezählt.

Das Exekutiv-Komitee besteht aus drei Mitgliedern, die ihren Wohnsitz dauernd in Holland nehmen müssen. Einer dieser drei ist der Vertreter der Holländischen Kommunistischen Partei im Bureau; als die beiden andern werden der Genosse S.J. Rutgers und die Genossin H. Roland-Holst angewiesen.

Das Exekutiv-Komitee führt die Beschlüsse der Bureausitzungen aus, sowie die Aufträge, die sie von Moskau erhält, womit sie möglichst eine direkte Verbindung unterhält. Auch werden möglichst Verbindungen mit den Mitgliedern des Bureaus mittels Briefe und Kuriere unterhalten, auf diesem Wege können, auch wenn nötig Beschlüsse gefasst werden.

Solange Frankreich und Deutschland sich noch nicht angeschlossen haben, reichen zwei der vier obengenannten Länder für eine beschlussfähige Sitzung aus. Wenn die Verhältnisse dies absolut notwendig machen oder wenn eine Zusammenkunft unmöglich ist, kann das Exekutiv-Komitee selbständig handeln, nachdem möglichst viele Delegierten befragt werden sind.

Die Kommunistische Partei Amerikas wird beauftragt, Schritte zu tun zur Bildung eines Subbureaus für Nord- und Süd-Amerika und zur Organisation einer pan-amerikanischen Konferenz, zu der die bisher stattgefundenen Vorbereitungen in Mexiko zu benutzen sind. Der Ort eines solchen Bureaus wird voraussichtlich Mexiko sein.

Das Westeuropäische Sekretariat in Berlin wird ersucht werden, sich als ein Sekretariat für Zentral-Europa zu konstituieren, bestehend aus Vertretern aus Deutschland, den Donauländern, den Balkanstaatem & Polen. Das Zentral-europäische Sekretariat wird die Verbindungen mit diesen Ländern, sowie die Verbindung mit Moskau und Amsterdam unterhalten, und eine Abteilung des Amsterdamer Bureaus bilden. Selbständig wird es nur solche Manifeste und Aufrufe erlassen, die sich auf Zentral-Europa beziehen; Für die Publikation allgemeiner Manifeste wird es sich mit Amsterdam verständigen. Auch die Vorbereitung internationaler Konferenzen wird nur unter Verständigung mit Amsterdam stattfinden.

Die Herausgabe der russischen Korrespondenz, von aus dem Russischen übersetzten Broschüren und Büchern und die Neuausgabe der kommunitischen Internationale in drei Sprachen wird soweit möglich in Berlin stattfinden, unter Verantwortung des Vertreters der dritten Internationale für Deutschland und unter Mitwirkung sowohl des Zentral-europäischen Sekretariates wie des Amsterdamer Bureaus.

Das Bureau in Amsterdam giebt ein Bulletin in drei Sprache heraus, organisiert ein Pressebureau mit Nachrichtendienst und ein Archiv, bereitet internationale Konferenzen und Kongresse vor und führt deren Beschlüsse aus. Internationale Aufrufe, Proklamationen und Aktionen gehen ausschliesslich vom Amsterdamer Bureau aus.

Diese ganze Regelung trägt einen provisorischen Charakter bis darüber auf einen internationalen Kongress näher entschieden werden kann oder bis die Verhältnisse sich durch herstellung der freien Verbindung mit Moskau ändern.

Es wird beschlossen; dass die verschiedenen Länder zu den Kosten des Bureaus beitragen sollen. Wenn ausreichende Beträge aus Moskau zur Verfügung kommen, werden über deren Anwendung und Verteilung Beschlüsse gefasst werden wozu die nötigen Daten von den Verschiedenen Delegierten erbeten werden.

Wenn nötig werden für die verschiedenen Dienste des Bureaus, wie Nachrichtendienst, Archiv u.s.w. Vergütungen erhoben werden, worüber innerhalb einiger Monate zu entscheiden sein wird. Mitwirkung wird für das Archiv erbeten und alle Delegierten werden aufgefordert, sich mit einem der Mitglieder des Exekutivkomitees in Verbindung zu setzen über Adressen, Kurierverbindung, Coden, Pässe, Spitzel u.s.w.

(1) Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0466.

3-1-3c

RESOLUTION über EINHEIT [1]

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1. Die Sozialpatrioten und Opportunisten, besonders wenn dieselben zur linken Richtung hinneigen, sind ein sehr gefährlicher Feind der proletarischen Revolution.

2. Eine Vereinigung oder ein Zusammenwirken mit diesen korupten und kontra-revolutionären Elementen bedeutet eine ernsthafte Hemmung der Entwicklung der zielbewussten kommunistischen Bewegung. Eine scharfe Trennung der Kommunisten von den Sozialpatrioten ist absolut notwendig.

3. Die Duldung opportunistischer oder sozialpatriotischer Elemente in einer kommunistischen Partei, unter dem Vorwand der Einheit, bedeutet die Schädigung der einzigen, die Revolution fördernden Einheit — die nicht nur in der Annahme allgemeiner Prinzipien, sondern in dem Einverständnis mit fundamentaler Aktion bestehende Einheit.

4. Es ist notwendig, dass kommunistische Gruppe, die sich noch in den alten reformistischen und opportunistischen Parteien befinden (selbst wenn leztere die zweite Internationale verlassen haben) sich von diesen sie kompromittierenden Banden lostrennen und sich in der kommunistischen Partei vereinigen (oder, wenn nötig, eine Kommunistische Partei bilden).

5. Einheit hängt von örtlichen Verhältnissen ab; sie darf jedoch nicht allein auf der formellen Annahme der kommunistischen Theorie begründet sein, sondern auf der revolutionären aus dieser Theorie resultierenden Praxis. Im allgemeinen sind die fundamentalen Erwägungen zur Erzielung der Einheit:

a. Der unversöhnliche Klassenkampf des Proletariats — kein Kompromiss mit den bürgerlichen oder sozialpatriotischen, bei der zweiten Internationale angeschlossenen Parteien, oder mit den Knechten des Kapitalismus in der Arbeiterbewegung.

b. Massenaktionen des Proletariats als das Mittel zur Eroberung der Macht und die kommunistische Partei als die bewusste und leitende Kraft in der Entwicklung dieser Massen-Aktion.

c. Die Diktatur des Proletariats (und konsequente Verwerfung der bürgerlichen Demokratie).

d. Das Soviet-System als die notwendige Form der proletarischen Demokratie.

(1) Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0467.

3-1-3d

RESOLUTION DAS SUBBUREAU AMERIKAS BETREFFEND [1]

Die Konferenz der kommunistischen Internaionale autorisiert die kommunistische Partei Amerikas vorläufig das Amerikanische Bureau der kommunistischen Internationale zu organisieren und dass dieses Bureau eine Pan-Amerikanische Konferenz der kommunistischen Organisationen einberufen soll, auf welcher das Bureau auf permanenter Grundlage organisiert werden soll.

Die Tätigkeit des Bureaus soll bestehen:

1. in der Führung der allgemeinen Aktion der kommunistischen Internationale auf den Amerikanischen Kontinenten, unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf die russischen Soviets.

2. in der Konzentration und dem Zusammenschluss der kommunistischen Organisationen von Nord-, Mittel- und Süd-Amerikas und um deren gehörige Vertretung auf dem nächsten Kongress der Internationale zu sichern.

3. in der Ausgabe von Proklamationen, inbezug auf die das Proletariat von Nord-, Mittel- und Süd-Amerika direkt betreffende Fragen, wie z.B. die Intervention in Mexiko.

4. in der Herstellung von Verbindungen mit den Europäischen und dem russischen Bureau — indem hierdurch zugleich der gehörige, gegenseitige Kontakt mit der revolutionären Bewegung der amerikanischen Festländer gesichert wird.

5. in der Anknüpfung einer Verbindung mit einem japanischen Genossen die Aktion in und die Verbindung mit Japan und dem äussersten Osten bezweckend.

Das amerikanische Bureau soll ein Mitteilungsblatt herausgeben, den Angelegenheiten der amerikanischen Festländer gewidmet und einen Überblick über die allgemeinen Angelegenheiten der Internationale.

(1) Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0468.

3-1-4

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL [1]

1. Communication with Moscow is possible at present via Stockholm.

For letters that are not specially important the address: Fr. Ström Torsgatan 10 Stockholm can be used. It will be preferably however to arrange for some special address.

For Newspapers, pamphlets, printed matter etc. can be addressed directly to: Red. Andrå, Finmarkens Redaktion

Vardö (Norwegen).

On a second cover to mention:

"Rosta Moscow" or "Rosta Petrograd".

It has been requested to send ten copies of each newspaper etc. in this way.

2. A congress of revol. women is to be held at Moscow in May or Jane (probably June). Comrades are invited to send delegates via Stockholm, from where they will be forwarded to M. comfortably.

3. On May 23rd and 24th is to be held the Congress of the Norwegian Party. All comrades are invited to send friendly delegates. At the time of this congress an intern. Bureau is to be founded representing the revol. Labor-Unions that accept the principles and tactics of the 3rd Int., such as the industr. workers, Shop Stewards, miners, unofficial committees, alliances, etc. This bureau is to organize an intern. congress of labor-unions most likely at the end of June in Kristiania.

4. Simultaneously with that congress a general congress of all parties and groups affiliated to the 3rd Intern. is to be held, where delegates from Russia also will participate. We will give further details, but it will be necessary to prepare already for this congress and to send to us propositions, theses, resolutions etc. We are in touch with our comrades of the W.E.S. [Westeuropäische Sekretariat] in B[erlin]. but if it should prove impossible to get to an agreement, a decision will have to be taken anyhow. If you have certain objections or propositions we beg to discretely inform both the W.E.S. and us as soon as possible.

For the Amst. Bureau

S.J.Rutgers.
van Campenstr. 9/1
AMERSFOORT.

(1) (Typed draft) РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/5.

3-1-5

Appeal to the Workers of Europe and America [1]

The capitalistic system, the system of production for the sake of profit, is hastening to its fall. The world war has destroyed the productive energies of Europe, wrecked the vital strength of the peoples, and burdened the States with enormous war debts. The world trade is hampered, the lack of raw material hinders the revival of industry, the fields yield but poor harvests. Money is depreciated, the fluctuations in the rate of exchange lame all international traffic. The exorbitant cost of living which still keeps rising reduces the middle classes to the level of the proletariat, famishes the masses, and forces the workers to defend their status of life in ever fiercer struggles against capitalism. The capitalistic class proves unable to build up again the system of production. Society sinks deeper and deeper into chaos. The continuation of the capitalistic system threatens humanity with destruction.

Hence the necessity arises for the working class to take into its own hands the management of production, and start it as production for the needs of the entire people, all capitalistic profit and all rent being abolished, as a process of labour efficiently organized and centrally regulated.

This is possible only when the proletariat first conquers the political power, and establishes its dictatorship over society, in order to break the resistance of the bourgeoisie against expropriation, the abolition of profit.

The glorious example of the Russian Soviet Republic where industrial workers and peasants have thrown off the yoke of the exploiters of all kinds, and conquered political power, shows the working masses of the other countries how the proletariat exercises its dictatorship by means of the Soviet system. The soviet system, the system of proletarian democracy consists in the representation, on the basis of their association in the work itself, of all those who work in the factory or the field.

Therefore we appeal to the workers of all countries to follow this example and with the utmost energy to wage the war for their deliverance. They must attack and undermine capitalism enfeebled already, and the bourgeois State-power by ceaseless mass-actions (demonstrations, strikes).

At the same time they must build up their own class organizations, their soviets, as organs of the coming order of society. And when then at last, the despotism of the bourgeoisie breaks down under their attacks, they must boldly seize the power and create the new world of communism.

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(1) Reprinted from: *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International*, No. 1, II.1920, p. 2.

3-1-6

COMMUNICATION OF THE PROVISIONAL BUREAU OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

APPEAL TO THE BRITISH[,] THE FRENCH AND THE BELGIAN PROLETARIAT [1]

Proletarians,

In a magnificent onrush the German proletariat has swept away the counterrevolution of the [Wolfgang] Kapps and the [Walther von] Lüttwitzes. The reaction of the Junkers has been crushed by the dauntless courage of the masses who rose like one man. These workers masses, divided against themselves, starved and miserable, trodden down by the Noske-regime, lacking arms, deprived of their ablest leaders, have united in a superb fighting movement and have displayed in the decisive instant the most splendid courage and initiative. Without an instant's hesitation the German proletariat has left the factories and stopped the means of transport and the public services; it has procured itself the arms it needed and by means of guns as by means of strikes, combining the two great methods of the class-struggle at the disposal of the working class, it has achieved victory. From the first day, in the midst of the battle against the counterrevolution of the Junkers, another battle defined itself, like a flame burning with a fiercer glare in the core of a vast blaze. This flame was the war against the bourgeois-regime served by the socialdemocratic government, the war against capitalistic tyranny and oppression, the war for the deliverance of labour from exploitation, for the Soviet-System and the dictature of the proletariat. In the Suburbs of Berlin, in Saxony, in Thuringia, in Wurtemberg, in Bavaria, in all Germany, but especially in the Rhine-district and the Westphalia, workshop-councils spring up and endeavour to seize the power. The proletarians arm, and form Red Guards. The industrial cities of the West change into as many fortresses, where the social revolution organizes and increases its forces. At the same time the revolutionary wave sweeps down upon the rural districts: agrarian disturbances break out in Pomerania and in Mecklenburg, whilst part of the army, some naval divisions and part of the police refuse to fight against the revolution.

The [Friedrich] Ebert Government mad with fear, sees the real enemy, sees Spartacus overthrown, decimated, crushed over and over again, again raising its head more terrible and threatening than ever. It sees the large masses of the independent socialist party fight on one front with the communist vanguard. It even sees in many places members of the socialpatriotic party unite with them for demonstrations, strikes and the armed struggle. And the fear of the government deepens as it sees the attitude assumed by the bureaucracy of the syndicates which, however much against their will, and only to avoid being submerged by the revolutionary tide, demand the immediate socialization of the mines, the disarming of the troops, the formation of a milice [militia], the participation in the power of the Central commission of the industrial-unions;— demands that, although in reality a manoeuvre of the trade-union bureaucracy, shows the concessions this bureaucracy is obliged to do, in order to satisfy the aspirations of the masses towards the system of soviets and, unhesitatingly, the Ebert Government decides to fight to the end for the maintenance of the capitalistic system. It gathers its forces, it makes front against the Left, to beat down Spartacus. Noske, whose dismissal was announced, is still maintained a few days longer in office by the majority of the socialdemocratic delegates to the National Assembly. He calmly allows the Counterrevolution of the Junkers take up its quarters and gather its forces in Silesia and Eastern-Prussia, the Vendée of Germany, and Noske the hangman, Noske the butcher concentrates all the faithful troops at his disposal against Westphalia and the Rhine-district, the flaming hearts of the social revolution, where, by the hour it is gaining strength and splendour. It is there that the battle between Past and Future will be decided. It is there that either German Capitalism will receive a mortal stroke, or the

grand attempt of the working classes to seize the power, will be drowned in a deluge of blood. And whilst tens of thousands of workers in those numerous cities of the Rhine-district which form the single immense industrial agglomeration already are sketching out the political forms of the new society, whilst they restore order, start anew the public services, organize the first Red Army in Western Europe, the chargé d'affaires of Britain and France congratulate the Ebert-Noske Government on its victory over the "reaction" and offer their support towards the destroying of the nascent Communist Republic, even as Bismarck, all but half an age ago, offered his support to Thiers toward the destroying of the Commune.

In face of the common enemy, the social revolution, conquerors and conquered forget their disjunctions. The antagonism of their interests disappears before the universal interest of the capitalistic class, before its instinct of self-preservation.

Already [David] Lloyd George, [Alexandre] Millerand and [Émile] Vandervelde have wiped out the score of their differences with the German bourgeoisie. Nay more: in order to save it they are prepared to shed the blood of the British the French and the Belgian people.

Already British troops at Solingen have helped to crush the Spartacist insurrections.

Already the commanders of the Entente troops, have deliberated at Mayence, [Ferdinand] Foch presiding, on the measures to be taken against the communist movement in the Ruhr-valley.

Already the British chargé d'affaires has informed the German Vice-Chancellor [Eugen] Schiffer that the Entente would not furnish any food-stuffs or raw-materials to a German Soviet-Republic.

Already the Entente has allowed the troops of the government to traverse occupied territory on their march against the communist insurrection, and to make use of this territory as a base of operations in the concentrated attack against the Red-Army.

The solidarity which unites all bourgeoisie, all militarism is proclaimed openly, cynically, without any attempt to gloss the matter over. It behoves us to proclaim as openly as energetically solidarity of the proletariat.

British, French and Belgian proletarians, will you let your ruling classes make use of you to trample to death the German revolution?

The German revolution — that is just a way of speaking of traditional expression. To speak the truth, there is no German revolution, no more than there is a Russian or a British or a French or an Italian or a Spanish revolution.

There is only one Social Revolution, as there is only one capitalistic oppression, as there is only one socialism, one hope of the oppressed and exploited of all countries.

Our rulers know that the Republic of Workers' Councils established in Germany means the accord of Germany with Soviet Russia, that is, the marvelous development of the industry and the technique of the one, and the immense resources in agrarian products, in fertile land and in raw materials of the other uniting, melting one into the other, fecundating each other. They know this accord means the proletarian Revolution, invincible henceforth by the blockade as by the steel. They know that this accord means the rapid and assured evolution of the communist production and culture, its radiance growing day by day more luminous, more serene, more irresistible, towards the countries where foul capitalism stinking with corruption and sweating blood, still struggles in a horrible agony. They know that the triumph of the Revolution in Germany will immediately start revolutionary movements in Yugo-Slavonia, in Poland, in the Balkan, in Italy, etc. They know that when Capitalism crashes in Central Europe, Capitalism in Eastern Europe is mortally wounded. They know that Social revolution is one, and that crushing it in Germany means crushing it in the germ in their own country.

French, British and Belgian proletarians, will you once more suffer yourselves to be gulled by your ruling classes? Will you be your brothers' murderers? Will you by committing the abominable deed prepare your own destruction for to morrow?

Or will you profit by the lessons of six years of unheard of sufferings of heart-rending experiences? Have you beheld the light that shines out of the East? Has the dawning of a new immense hope scattered the mists of your unconsciousness? Has it cleansed your soul, and strengthened your heart?

If so, you know what you have to do: to do immediately, to-day; to morrow might be too late.

You must, on a large scale, repeat for your German brothers and with infinitely greater firmness and vigour, what you attempted to do for your Russian brothers, and, what however is insufficient and weak still has contributed to their salvation.

British Proletarians! Remember the stormy magnificent meetings of the Hands-off-Russia Committee. They were a force for the raising of the blockade.

French proletarians and soldiers! Remember the men of the Black Sea Fleet, the dockers of Bordeaux. Their courage has contributed to the defeat of the partisans of military intervention.

Workers of the Entente! Loudly proclaim your solidarity with the German revolution!

Exact from your Governments the withdrawal of the troops from the occupied territory.

Railwaymen, refuse to effectuate the transport of any troops or any arms or munitions to Germany.

All of you answer any attempt on the part of your Governments to strangle the German revolution by extending and intensifying your own revolutionary activity. Make it plain to them, that if the international bourgeoisie is one in the defense of its ruined and rotten social order, the international proletariat is one in the heroic struggle for deliverance.

Boldly forward, Comrades!

At this instant the fate of the European Revolution depends on you, on your initiative, on your farsightedness.

Hurrah for the Communist Revolution in Germany!

Hurrah for the World Revolution, the Universal Soviet Republic!

The Executive of the Amsterdam
Sub-Bureau of the Third International.

D. J. Wynkoop.
Henriette Roland Holst.
G.[*sic*] J. Rutgers.

P.S.

We invite our comrades to give to this manifesto as wide publicity as possible.

Please publish as quickly as possible!

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(1) The Papers of E. Sylvia Pankhurst, Inventory no. 260, IISG. Reprinted in: *Workers' Dreadnought*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 3.IV.1920, p. 2; *The Communist. Official Organ of the Communist Party of America* (Chicago), Vol. 2, Supplement to No. 6, 1.VI.1920, pp. 3-4.

3-1-7

Oproep voor een Steunfonds voor de slachtoffers der Internationale Reactie [1]

De gang van zaken in het Roergebied heeft helaas gemaakt dat van den steun der Nederlandsche Communisten en revolutionairen aan hun strijdende makkers in West-Duitschland in den vorm van levensmiddelen enz. niets is gekomen.

Maar onze hulp voor de duizenden slachtoffers der grootsche poging, door een deel van het Duitsche proletariaat in de Maartdagen, gewaagd om den contra-revolutionairen staatsgreep om te zetten in een revolutionaire beweging, blijft dringend noodig. En noodig niet voor hen alleen.

De worsteling tusschen revolutie en reactie golft heen en weder over een groot deel der kapitalistische wereld en zal dit waarschijnlijk nog jarenlang doen.

Overal vervolgt de wereldreactie de strijders voor het Communisme, die haar in handen vallen, met wreede, dierlijke bloeddorstigheid. Uit tal van landen bereiken zoowel ons Bureau als het Partijbestuur der Communistische Partij, beden om hulp voor de martelaars en slachtoffers der revolutie.

Het Italiaansche Partijbestuur zond ons een oproep om steun voor de talrijke slachtoffers der Hongaarsche terreur die, op Italiaanschen bodem het woeden der contra-revolutie ontvlucht, daar ten prooi zijn aan diepe ellende.

In Hongarije zelf gaat het lijden van de tienduizenden arbeiders en arme boeren, die de gevangenissen vullen, zoowel als van de nagelaten betrekkingen van hen, die hun leven offerden, alle voorstelling te boven. De dappere Poolsche socialisten, wier revolutionaire gezindheid een der sterkste bolwerken is tegen den dreigenden aanval der Entente op Sowjet-Rusland, vroegen met aandrang steun, ten einde de honderden kameraden, die de regeering van den sociaal-patriot Pilowski [J. Pilsudski] in de gevangenis laat verhongeren, van het noodigste te voorzien. De organisaties der communisten en onafhankelijke socialisten in het Roergebied richtten zich in een oproep tot hun geestverwanten binnen en buiten de grenzen; zij vragen steun voor de gezinnen der Roode Garden, door de soldaten van generaal Von Watter, die het verdrag van Bielefeld als een vodje papier behandelde, verraderlijk vermoord, voor de duizenden vluchtelingen en voor hen, die hun woonplaatsen hadden in de gevechtszone en wier have en goed verwoest werd. De Amerikaansche Communisten houden heldhaftig stand tegen de reactie, die steeds brutaler gelegenheidswetten er door jaagt met het doel alle revolutionaire arbeidersorganisaties grondig te vernietigen; geld voor borgtochten en voor de kosten der talrijke politieke processen is dringend noodig, wil de beweging niet van al haar leiders beroofd worden.

In deze omstandigheden hebben wij gemeend te moeten overgaan tot de stichting van een permanent internationaal steunfonds voor hulpverschaffing aan de slachtoffers der internationale reactie.

Partijgenooten en geestverwanten, arbeiders en met de beweging sympathiseerende intellectueelen, op u allen doen wij een beroep, op uw klasse-solidariteit, uw gevoelens van menschelijkheid, uw rechtvaardigheidszin. Tot nu toe hebben wij in Holland nog geen persoonlijke offers van eenige beteekenis in den revolutionairen strijd behoeven te brengen; laat ons dan ten minste niet karig zijn met onzen geldelijken steun voor die deelen van het internationale proletariaat, die hun vrijheid en hun bloed gaven en elken dag opnieuw geven voor de vrijmaking van den arbeid. Help in ruime mate en spoedig; stuurt ons een gift of, wal nog beter is, verbindt u tot het storten van een maandelijksche bijdrage voor den tijd van ten minste één jaar.

Alle gelden moeten worden afgedragen aan W. van Leuven, 85 Amstel, Amsterdam, dit het hulpfonds voor de slachtoffers der internationale reactie zal administreeren. Alle ontvangen gelden zullen in de “Tribune” worden verantwoord.

Voor het Amsterdamsche sub-bureau der Communistische Internationale:

H. ROLAND HOLST.
S.J. RUTGERS.
D.J. WIJNKOOP.

Alle bladen van den linkervleugel der arbeidersbeweging en van het revolutionaire intellect worden verzocht dezen oproep te nemen.

(1) Reprinted from: *De Tribune* (Amsterdam), Jrg. 13, No. 171, 23.IV.1920, p. 3.

3-2 Leaflets on: Governing Organs of the Comintern

3-2-1

MITTEILUNG DES AMSTERDAMER ZWEIGBUREAUS DER IIIten INTERNATIONALE

RAPPORT UEBER DIE KOMMUNISTISCHE JUGENDINTERNATIONALE [1]

Im Gegensatz zu der Internationale der älteren Arbeiter, die durch die Erweiterung taktischer Differenzen zu unüberbrückbaren und grundsätzlichen Gegensätzen für immer gespaltet und zerrissen wurde, hat die Jugendinternationale ihre Einheit bewahrt. Das war dadurch möglich, dass in fast allen Ländern die sozialdemokratischen Jugendorganisationen sich während des Krieges zu revolutionären Kampfesorganisationen, und nach Ausbruch der Revolution in Russland und in den europäischen Mittelstaaten zu kommunistischen Jugendorganisationen entwickelten. Das trifft auf Finnland, Schweden, Norwegen, Italien, Spanien, Holland, die Schweiz, Rumänien und andere Länder zu.

In anderen Ländern wieder, z.B. in Deutschland, Oesterreich wo engherzige und beschränkte Instanzen und Zentralbehörden diese Entwickelung hemmen und aufhalten wollten, kam es zu Spaltungen in der Jugendorganisation, die aber bald wie in Deutschland die grosse Masse der jugendlichen und die aktivsten Elemente in die Reihen der revolutionären Gruppen führten. Dazu kam, dass in den östlichen Randstaaten und in Russland nach dem Sturz des Zarismus und dem Sieg des revolutionären Proletariats sich Jugendorganisationen mit völligem kommunistischem Programm gründeten die sich dank der ausserordentlichen günstige politische Verhältnisse im Lände bald zu der grössten und stärksten Jugendorganisationen entwickelten. Hinter der allgemeinen Entwicklung blieb nur die Zentralstelle der Arbeiterjugend Deutschlands mit Fritz Ebert an der Spitze, Teile des österreichischen Jugendverbandes und die Zentralstelle der Arbeiterjugend Hollands zurück.

Die Jugendinternationale spiegelte getreu die Entwicklung ihrer Organisationen wieder. Im Jahre 1904 anschliessend an den internationalen Sozialistenkongress gegründet, unter Leitung von Dannenberg bis 1914 nur eine lose und lockere Verbindung, wurde sie nach der Berner Konferenz in 1915 der Sammelpunkt der Opposition gegen die Sozialpatrioten und des revolutionären Kampfes gegen den Krieg. Ihre Zeitung, die „Jugendinternationale“ war während des Krieges eine der wenigen ─ oft die einzige deutsche Zeitung ─ die Karl Liebknecht, Lenin, Radek und Genossen zur Verfügung stand.

Die Entwicklung der Jugendinternationale von einer losen und lockeren Verbindung zu einer festen, straff organisierten und aktionsfähigen internationalen Verbindung wurde gekrönt und vorläufig abgeschlossen durch den Internationalen Kongress Ende November 1919 in Berlin tagte.

Trotz den Verkehrswidrigkeiten war es 24 Vertreter aus 15 Ländern gelungen, zum grössten Teil illegal, Berlin zu erreichen. Das prächtige und bedeutungsvollste Resultat der Verhandlungen war die Schaffung eines neuen politischen Programms, dass als das Aktionsprogramm der revolutionären Jugendorganisationen für die revolutionäre Epoche des proletarischen Klassenkampfes bezeichnet werden kann.

Mit aller Schärfe und Deutlichkeit wird in den ersten Teilen des Programms die Notwendigkeit der Teilnahme der proletarischen Jugend an politischem und revolutionärem Kampfe der Arbeiterklasse gezeichnet und die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes gegen das Bürgertum, die Sozialpatrioten und das unklare und schwankende Zentrum begründet. Die Solidarität mit den revolutionären und kommunistischen Parteien kam unter anderem durch den offiziellen Anschluss an die kommunistische Internationale zum Ausdruck. In den Mittelpunkt der Aufgaben und Arbeiten wurde wieder die Teilnahme der Jugendlichen an den Aktionen, die antimilitäristische und revolutionäre Propaganda gerückt. Auch die Bildungstätigkeit soll in erster Linie dazu dienen, politischen Kämpfer und Streiter zu

bilden und zu schulen.

Mit besonderem Nachdruck wurde auf die Notwendigkeit der engsten internationalen Gemeinschaft und gemeinschaftliche internationale Aktionen hingewiesen und in einer neuen Regelung des Organisationsverhältnisses das Mittel zur Verwirklichung dieser Forderungen getroffen.

Die Jugendinternationale wurde zum getreusten Spiegelbild der ihr angeschlossenen Organisationen und ihre Beschlüsse und Thesen wurde der Ausdruck des Willens zehntausender jugendlichen Arbeiter.

Das erklärt uns auch die begeisterte Aufnahme und die freudige Zustimmung, die der Berliner Kongress und seine Beschlüsse bei dem jugendlichen Arbeiter der ganzen Erde gefunden haben. Bei den kommunistischen Jugendorganisationen in Holland, Finnland, Schweden, Norwegen, Deutschland, Oesterreich, Italien, Spanien, Rumänien, Serbien und der Schweiz, Russland und den östlichen Randstaaten war die Zustimmung natürlich gegeben, aber auch grosse Massen Jugendlichen in nicht kommunistischen Jugendorganisationen haben sich für das neue Programm der kommunistische Jugendinternationale zugestimmt. In Amerika, Frankreich, Dänemark und Böhmen ist eine starke Bewegung unter den Mitgliedern der sozialdemokratischen Jugendorganisation im Fluss, die eine Umgestaltung des sozialdemokratischen Jugendklubs in kommunistische Kampfesorganisationen bezwecken. Nach dem heutigem Stand der Bewegung unterliegt es keinen Zweifel, dass in allen diesen Ländern sich die grosse Mehrheit der Jugendlichen für das Programm der kommunistischen Jugendinternationale erklären wird. Da auch gleichzeitig in England kommunistische Jugendgruppen sich gründeten und die Ausbreitung des Bolschewismus in Osten das Aufkommen kommunistischer Jugendorganisationen begleitet — in Turkestan ist in der letzten Zeit eine kommunistische Jugendorganisation erstanden — ist der Ring der kommunistische Jugendinternationale geschlossen. Es gehören ihr heute sämtliche proletarische Jugendorganisationen mit Ausnahme der sozialpatriotischen Zentralstelle der Arbeiterjugend in Berlin, der Zentralstelle der Arbeiterjugend in Holland und der alten österreichische Verband Jugendlicher Arbeiter nebst 14 kleine und unabhängigen Vereinchen in Deutschland, ins Gesamt sind heute annäherend eine halbe Million jugendliche Arbeiter in der kommunistischen Internationale organisiert. Ihre Zeitung, die „Jugendinternationale“ (zu beziehen durch den Internationalen Jugendverlag Berlin, Stralauerstr. 12) erscheint monatlich in deutscher, skandinavischer, französischer, italienischer und russischer Sprache. Ausserdem noch wöchentlich die „Jugendkorrespondenz“ und zahlreiche Schriften und Broschüren.

Ihre vornehmste Aufgabe aber erblickt die kommunistische Jugendorganisation darin, die heute noch politisch indifferenten Massen der jugendlichen Arbeiter in allen Ländern aufzuwecken, für den revolutionären Kampf zu interessieren, sie dafür zu bilden und zu schulen und in den Entscheidungskampfe des proletarischen Klassenkampes auf den Barrikaden und bei der Verteidigung errungener Positionen und errichteter proletarischen Staaten die besten, tüchtigsten, begeisterten Kämpfer in den ersten Reihen zu stellen.

Willy Münzerberg Berlin.

AMSTERDAM MÄRZ 1920.

(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0474.

3-3 Leaflets on: Soviet Russia

3-3-1

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PROVISIONAL BUREAU OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

PEACE WITH RUSSIA
Strike on Mayday 1920 (1)

What does it mean: Peace with Russia?

Is there such a thing as peace between a Soviet-Republic and worldcapital?

No, a real peace is impossible under capitalism.

A real peace for Russia means the victory of the worldrevolution and nothing less.

Therefore a revolutionary action of the Workers to force peace has to be a struggle to develop power to such a degree, that worldcapital is prevented to make war upon Russia in some form or another.

First to stop open warfare, by refusing not only to fight, but also to make or transport arms, munition, equipment, etc. for those who might use them to fight Soviet-Russia.

Second to prevent and counteract all machination, plotting and underground action against our proletarian friends by exposing those responsible for it, by preventing money to be spent in this action and by not believing any of the lies in the capitalist press. This latter is very important. If we pledge ourselves not to believe any statement of capitalist with regard to Soviet-Russia, any report about alleged barbarities, any so-called facts about internal troubles and chaos or external policy of conquest, etc. We are not likely to be fooled the same as most of us were in 1914.

Third to strife in other countries towards Soviet-republics as the organs of dictatorship of the proletariat. This inspiring aim we must always have in mind in all our deeds, all our actions. We must fill our heads with revolutionary thoughts, we must dare to hope in midst of our misery, we must understand more and more that the downbreak of capitalism is in full process, we must be willing to destroy the weapons of our enemies, we must have confidence in our constructive power. All this we can only achieve in a constant fight with our exploiters by giving this fight a general revolutionary character. It means a complete break with bourgeois civilization, bourgeois morals, bourgeois supremacy, it means labour as the basic principle of social and moral life.

What about the peace proposals of the enemies of labor?

They are now methods to destroy Soviet-Russia from within and may be supplemented at any time by methods from without, if the workers should weaken for one moment. Russia is willing to accept such a peace, knowing full well what it is meant for. But they need railway material and machines badly and are willing to take a chance upon intrigue, corruption, counter-revolutionary plots and murder, confident that the workers in Western-Europe will draw force from a closer contact with the Russian revolution, confident that capitalism will break down before it can strengthen itself by the treasures of the Russian soil.

Russia might feed Europe, might supply it with the most valuable raw materials and it will no doubt give some immediate relief to the exhausted nations of Central Europe. Even from this narrow point of view peace with Russia is in the direct interests of the workers. But if a peace of capitalism with Soviet-Russia really meant the recuperation of capitalism throughout Europe, this would be detrimental to the interests both of Soviet-Russia and the worldrevolution. We are confident that the relief will be of such a character that it will not give capitalism a new chance for temporary recovery and preparations for a new worldwar, that it will come too late anyhow. It is our duty and our only salvation to back up Russia by

our action to such an extent, that it can secure a peace that will strengthen the first proletarian state more than it will her enemies.

If a new attack is forthcoming we have to fight this new crime; if peace is on the way we have to fight even harder, for the result will depend upon the kind of peace and the willingness of the workers to use this temporary peace for their own revolutionary purposes. And remember well: What is true for Russia, today, may come true for Soviet-Germany or any other Soviet-Republics tomorrow.

Therefore under all circumstances the action to support Soviet-Russia must be uppermost in our minds, must form part of all our important proletarian action. And to make it clear to the world, that this is a paramount international issue, the idea of an international demonstrative strike must be propagated and prepared in all countries.

Such a demonstration cannot be successful unless the classstruggle intensifies and creates a feeling of international solidarity, unless in all our massmovements we include peace with Russia in our demands. But even when incomplete, a demonstration for a workers peace with Russia contributes towards strengthening the forces of internationalism.

The Amsterdam Bureau of the Communist International considers it its main task to further international unity not only of thought but of action as well. It therefore submits for consideration to all communist groups and revolutionary organizations, workers committees, etc., the possibility of a demonstrative strike in favour of peace with Soviet-Russia on an international scale.

The first of May was always intended to be a day of general strike the world over, but till now it never succeeded in realizing the general-revolutionary character that its promoters wanted it to bear. On the contrary: in the last decade before the war, the first of May more and more lost all revolutionary significance. Capital did not feel any threat to its existence in the parades and demonstrations held on that day by millions and millions of people, and the bourgeois state incorporated these demonstrations in its normal life, like it did trade-unions, the socialdemocratic parties a.s.o.

The Third International has the historical task to perform what the second International only planned, to realize the visions, that its predecessor only talked about. It is bound to realize the international internal and external unity of the world-proletariat, its unity of doctrine, of organization and of tactics. It must teach the workers to form a worldfront against the worldfront that Imperialism is already developing, despite of its internal deviations and dissensions.

In suggesting that in 1920 the first of May be used for an international strike demonstration in favour of Soviet-Russia, (no matter whether at that time the imperialists talk peace and plan war) we want to avail ourselves of the traditions of workingclass solidarity and action in favour of peace already attached to the Mayday and to use those traditions as a mean of bringing on a new vigorous effort in the directions of international unity of action. We think the times are ripe for an effort of this kind.

To a superficial observer, the revolutionary struggle in Central- and Western-Europe may seem developing with the utmost slowness or even brought to a standstill, but if we look more accurately and below the surface we cannot but wonder at the tremendous changes going on in the minds and souls of millions and millions of men and women all over the earth — changes developing with the utmost rapidity. The belief in the fatal, immutable, everlasting domination of Capital is being shattered day by day. The idea of new forms of human life, of general comradeship and culture for all and the common ownership of the means of production presents itself as an approaching reality for the first time since society was divided into a dominating and a dominated class, for the first time it takes hold of the masses. The outward facade of the bourgeois state and society still exits, but it may fall to pieces at any moment, although a long and severe struggle will doubtless still be necessary, as much to finally crush the bourgeoisie as to effectuate in the mass of the people the moral and intellectual transformation that will make them able to institute the communist commonwealth and render them fit to live in it.

All the same, we must always keep before our minds the fact of the enormous changes going on below the surface of things. We may be convinced that any little thing, any indifferent circumstance may now at any moment by causing the countless elements of the new revolutionary consciousness floating all over the world to unites into a new body and manifest themselves with unexpected force, be the

instigator of renewed strife and blessful upheaval. In the present days there no longer exist unfavourable situations for action in the old sense of the word; the times for the passing-away of Capitalism are ripe and any dead calm may be the foreboder of new social storms, unexpectedly rising.

Prompted by these considerations, we lay before all labour-unions, all extra-union mass organs, all groups and parties, this suggestion of a general strike on May first 1920 in favour of Soviet-Russia and we beg them to inform us if it will have their support.

For the Amsterdam Bureau of the
COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL
H. Roland Holst.

P.S.

We invite our comrades to give to this manifesto as wide publicity as possible.

[+Dutch version:] Amsterdam, Maart 1920.

[+German version:] Als unsere Korrespondenzadresse gilt ohne weitere Andeutung:
S[alomon]. van der Hal Keizersgracht 409.
AMSTERDAM

(1) Papers of E. Sylvia Pankhurst, 260. Reprinted in: *The Voice of Labor* (New York), Vol. 1, No. 9, 20.IV.1920, pp. 2-3; *The Communist*, Vol. 2, Supplement to No. 6, 1.VI.1920, p. 3.

3-3-2

MITTEILUNG DES AMSTERDAMER ZWEIGBUREAUS DER III-TEN INTERNATIONALE

AN DIE ARBEITER ALLER LÄNDER [1]

NEUE OFFENSIVE GEGEN SOWJET-RUSSLAND.

Die Internationale Kommunistische Konferenz in Amsterdam hat Euch schon im Februar zugerufen: „Das Weltkapital bereitet einen neuen Angriff auf Russland vor. Hinter den Friedensverhandlungen und Handelsbeziehungen lauert der verräterische Angriff". Jetzt hat diese Offensive im Osten schon angefangen. Japan hat eine grosse Armee zusammengebracht und schon eine Schlacht geliefert. Es lässt in der Presse der Welt mitteilen es sei stark genug die heranziehenden Verstärkungen der russischen Roten Armee zu vernichten.

Inzwishcen bereitet Polen sich auf einen gewaltigen Kampf vor. Scon hat es eine Bewegubg nach Osten gemacht und hat, in Einverständniss mit der Entente, Forderungen gestellt, von denen jederman weiss dass sie absolut unannehmbar sind. Noch immer wird Kriegsmaterial von Frankreich und Amerika in Polen angehauft.

Der finnische Minister des Auswärtigen hällt Besprechungen in Londen ab, und Finnland ist die Ehre zugedacht einen Angriff auf Petersburg zu machen während Polen nach Moskau und Petljura nach Kieff ziehen.

Aber auch der deutsche Staatsstreich soll in diesem Lichte gesehen werden. Noch immer ist das stille Einverständniss der englischen Diplomaten mit Kapp nicht aufgeklärt. Noch immer fordert die Entente nicht die Entwaffnung der Junkerbande, sondern unterstützt die Entwaffnung der Arbeiter. Scon wird ein neuer Staatsstreich von den deutschen militärischen Räuberbanden vorbereitet, und Oesterreich sowie Ungarn machen sich fertig die Monarchie durch einen Angriff auf Russland einzuleiten. Schon unterhandeln die Agenten der Entente über den Lohn, den Ungarn für den Angriff auf die Bolschewiki erhalten soll. Nur wer mit offenen Augen blind ist kann an den Frieden glauben.

Arbeiter, es handelt sich jetzt um das Schiksal der Welt; ob Sklaverei oder Freiheit. Das Kapital hat nicht vergebens eine vorläufige Niederlage gegen Soviet-Russland erlitten.

Dieser letzte Versuch wird alles an Schärfe und Grausamkeit übertreffen. Die schwache Stelle in diesen Plänen des Weltkapitals ist dabei die revolutionäre Stimmung unserer polnischen Kameraden. Werden sie sich für ihre Ausbeuter in den Tod treiben lassen? Nicht, wenn das deutsche Proletariat ihnen die Zuversicht einer Rückendeckung gibt, wenn die Möglichkeit offenbleibt, dass Sowjets in Westeuropa dem Osten die Hand reichen. Daher ist es nötig, dass die deutsche Reaktion fest im Sattel sitzt, unter Ebert-Noske wenn es geht, unter Kapp-Ludendorf wenn es muss, als Rückendeckung für die polnischhe Regierung, als Hintertreffen für den zweiten Angriff, wenn der erste sich bricht an den unbeugsamen Mut unserer russischen Freunde.

Daher muss Frankreich schon heute deutsche Städte mit schwarzen Truppen besetzen, denn wenn auch Deutschland seine Henkerarbeit verrichtet, lässt Frankreich seine Beute nicht los, und die Westdeutsche Arbeiterschaft bleibt eine Gefahr für das polnische Abenteuer.

Und inzwischen wird in Borisoff die Komödie der polnischen Friedensverhandlungen gespielt, lässt man die besten Leiter der russischen Wirtschaft zwecs „Handelsabkommen" nach Westen kommen, und man redet von Untersuchungs, d.h. Spionnierungskommissionen nach Russland.

Arbeiter! Dies alles ist so ungeheuerlich, dass ihr euch weigert es zu glauben. Aber die Offensive hat schon angefangen. Der Angriff musste im Osten anfangen, damit eine starke japanische Armee die

russischen Streitkräfte von der Westfront wegzieht. Und dieser Anfang ist schon gamacht.

Nun folgt bald in der ganzen bürgerlichen Presse ein allgemaines Geschrei über eine russische Offensive gegen Polen und Finnland, und England hat schon für diesen Fall den Randstaaten seine Hilfe zugesagt.

Haben wir dann in diesen fünf Jahren nichts von den eintönigen Lügennachrichten unserer Feinde gelernt? Verstehen die Arbeiter noch immer nicht dass Sowjet-Russland, das Russland der Arbeiter und der armen Bauern, in Frieden leben will, und es wollen muss, und alles tut um dies zu verwirklichen? Sollen wir denn immer unsere Feinde glauben schenken und unsere Freunden in den Stich lassen?

Das Proletariat der ganzen Welt muss jetzt antworten, damit es seinen Willen zeigt, dieses Verbrechen zu verhinderen.

Das Amsterdamer Bureau der Kommunistischen Internationale ruft alle Arbeiter, und namentlich die Transportarbeiter auf, zuallererst zu einem Boykott der Schiffe und Güter nach und von Japan, solange die Politik der Intervention in Siberien nicht eingestellt wird. Kein klassenbewusster Arbeiter soll Güter, die für Japan bestimmt sind oder aus Japan stammen berühren, herstellen, verarbeiten oder umladen.

An Euch, japanische Arbeiter, wenden wir uns in erster Linie. Aber auch die amerikanischen, die englischen, die holländischen, die nordischen, die französischen und andere Arbeiter können mit der Tat helfen.

Eine solche Aktion wird den Macgthabern zeigen, dass die Arbeiter auf ihre Hut sind und zu Taten bereit.

Aber dies ist nicht genug.

Wir haben schon zu einen elgemeinen Proteststreik am 1 Mai gegen die Intervention in Sowjet-Russland aufgerufen.

Ein Protest ist gut, aber Taten des Zwanges müssen folgen, dennn das Kapital beugt sich nur der Macht, da es sich jetzt um seine Existenz handelt, wie auch um die Existenz vieler Millionen von Arbeitern. In ihrem Hasse gegen Sowjet-Russland gehen alle kapitalistische Regierung brüderlich zusammen. Trotz der heuchlerischen Gebärden Lloyd Georges bleibt England der Führer der Weltreaktion, und namentlich den englischen Arbeitern liegt ein äusserst wichtiger Teil dieses Kampfes ob.

Haltet euch bereit für einen Generalstreik gegen den Angriff auf Sowjet-Russland. Beantwortet die polnisch-französisch-amerikanisch-finnisch-englisch-ungarisch-rumänisch-japanische u.s.w. Offensive mit einer massalen Weltaktion in allen Ländern und mit einem Ziel, die Rettung Russlands und der Welt aus der Hölle des Imperialismus, damit neues Leben durch die Arbeit und für die Arbeit aufgebaut wird.

Für das Exekutivkomitee des Amsterdammer
Zweigbureaus der 3ten Internationale.

D.J. Wynkoop
Henriette Roland Holst
S.J. Rutgers.

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WIR BITTEN UNSEREN GENOSSEN DIESE AUFRUF SO VIEL ALS MÖGLICH ZU VERBREITEN

AMSTERDAM APRIL 1920.

(1) Archief Louis de Visser, Inventaris nr. 3, IISG.

3-3-2a

New Offensive Against Soviet Russia [1]

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

TO THE WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES:

The International Conference of the Communists at Amsterdam has warned you already in February: "World Capital is preparing another attack on Soviet Russia. Behind the peace negotiations and commercial relations there lurks a treacherous aggression."

This new offensive has now begun in the Far East. Japan has concentrated a big army and has taken the offensive. It announces in the world press that its army is strong enough to annihilate also the reinforcements on their way to the Red Armies to defend the Workers' Soviets.

In the meantime, Poland is preparing for a gigantic struggle. Already it has accomplished a move eastward and has, in agreement with the Entente, advanced such demands as everybody knows to be **absolutely unacceptable**. French and American war material continues to be piled up in Poland.

The Finnish minister of foreign affairs negotiates in London, and Finland will be granted the special honor of attacking Petrograd, whilst Poland advances towards Moscow and Petlura towards Kiev.

But the German counter-revolution, too, must be considered in this light. Up to this day the secret understanding between English diplomatists and Kapp has not been explained. Even now the Entente does not demand the disarmament of the "Junkers," but supports the disarmament of the workers. Already a new "coup" is being prepared by the German military band of robbers and both Austria and Hungary are about to initiate a monarchy by an attack on Russia. Agents of the Entente have already negotiated about the compensations to be allowed to Hungary for attacking the Bolsheviki. Only the willful blind can believe in peace.

Workers! The fate of the world is now to be decided: enslavement or freedom.

Financial capital cannot forget that it had to acknowledge an initial defeat at the hands of Soviet Russia.

This new and last effort will surpass everything in ruthlessness and cruelty. In this contingency the revolutionary spirit of our Polish comrades is the vulnerable spot of world-capital. Will they allow themselves to be led into misery and death for the sake of their exploiters?

Not if German proletariat gives them hope of a support from the rear, if there is a chance left of Soviets in Western Europe of coming to the rescue of their brothers in the East. This is why the Entente must help German reaction to regain power, under Ebert-Noske, if possible, under Kapp-Ludendorff, if necessary, so as to protect Poland in the rear and to provide troops for a second attack if the first onslaught should break upon the unflinching courage of our Russian comrades.

This is why France must make haste to occupy German cities with Black troops, for though Germany will be allowed to act as executioner, France will not let go her prey and the industrial proletarians of Western Germany continue to constitute a danger for the Polish adventure.

And in the meantime the comedy of Polish negotiations continues in Borisoff; the most competent leaders of Russian economic life are invited to Western Europe for "the beginning of commercial

relations"; committees of research (or, rather for counter-revolutionary espionage) are talked about.

Workers! All this is so monstrous that you hesitate to believe it. But the offensive **has** already begun. The attack had to begin in the East in order that a strong Japanese army might be able to draw Russian troops away from the Western frontier. And this beginning **has now been made**. In due time alarm will be sounded in the capitalist press of the whole world about a Russian offensive against Poland and Finland, and England has already promised its full support to all the border states in such an event. Have we then really learnt nothing during these five years and a half from the monotonous lies of our adversaries? Do the workers not understand **even now** that Soviet Russia, the Russia of the workers and the poorer peasants, wishes to live in peace, must wish to live in peace and does, literally, everything, in order to secure peace? Must we need again and again believe our enemies and betray our friends?

The proletariat of the world over have to answer now, so as to show its determination to prevent this crime.

The Amsterdam Bureau of the Communist International appeals to all workers and to the transport workers in the very first place, **to boycott all ships and goods from and for Japan**, as long as the policy of intervention in Siberia is maintained. Class-conscious workers should not touch any goods destined for Japan, or coming from Japan, nor should manufacture or handle or transport such goods.

Workers of Japan! We address ourselves to you in the first place. But also the American, the British, the Dutch, the Norwegian, the French, etc., workers can give active support.

Such an action will show those in power that the workers are on their guard and prepared for deeds.

But this will not be enough.

We have already issued a call for a general strike of protest against intervention in Soviet Russia on MAY 1st.

Such a protest is all right, but it must be followed up by coercive deeds, for capital will give way to power only when its very existence is at stake.

In hatred against Soviet Russia all capitalist states fraternally unite. Though Lloyd George may so hypocritically play the peace-maker, Britain none the less remains the mainstay of reaction and the leader of reaction the world over. It is to the British workers, therefore that a most important part in this struggle will fall. Let us firmly resolve that we all do our duty.

Be prepared for **a general strike against the coming attack on Soviet Russia**.

Answer the Polish-French-American-Finnish-British-Hungarian-Roumanian-Japanese-etc. offensive by a mass movement the world over, in all countries and with one common purpose: the rescue of Soviet Russia and of the world out of the hell of imperialism unto the new life built up by labor, for labor.

For The Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of The Third International

D. J. Wynkoop,
H. Roland Holst,
S. J. Rutgers.

Distributed by The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of America.

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(1) Reprinted from: *The Communsit*, Vol. 2, No. 6, 15.V.1920, pp. 5, 8; No. 6 [*sic*], 22.V.1920, pp. 1, 8.

3-3-3

QUI PREND PART A L'APPAREIL GOUVERNEMENTAL DE LA REPUBLIQUE DES SOVIETS? [1]

Des millions de travailleurs participant quotidiennement et d'une façon immédiate au travail de direction, travail difficile, paraissant partfois insignifiant, faisaient sortir de leurs rangs des millièrs de constructeurs expérimentés, sacrifiant toutes leurs forces et toutes leurs lumières au travail d'organisation. Le travail du congrès des Soviets et de leurs Comités Executifs fut principalement voué à l'oeuvre de la creation soviétiste. Voyons qui prend part à ces congrès et par qui les Comités Executifs sont composés. Parlons en première linge du nombre des congrès des Soviets qui ont eu lieu. Les données concernant 1[9]19 congrès (de province et de district) ayant eu lieu en 1919 dans une troisième partie du territoire de la Russie Soviétiste, nous montrent que presque la moitié des congrès (55 congrès de district ou 46% et congrès de province ou 50%) se sont réunis déjà pour la 5-ème et pour la 6-ème fois. Près d'un quart des congrès (22 congrès de district et 2 congrès de province) se réunissent déjà pour la 7-ème et pour la 8-ème fois. Certains congrès, congrès de district principalement, se sont réunis de 9 à 14 fois. Il faut noter un groupe assez considerable de congrès (il [11] congrès ou 10%) qui se réunissaient pour la 1-ère fois; ceci eut lieu dans les endroits rapproches du front; presque la moitié en revient à la province d'Arhangelsk.

Les données concernant les partis, dont ces congrès furent composés, sont également utilisées. Tout en etant incomplètes, ces données nous font une idée générale des forces principales créatrices de la Russie Soviétiste. Tout les congrès sont divisés en trois périodes: à partir du mois d'octobre 1917 jusqu'en juillet 1918 — période primitive de l'oeuvre de la Construction Soviétiste; à partir de juillet 1918 jusqu'en janvier 1919 — quand le travail soviétiste se porsuivait, presque, exclusivement par les forces du Parti Communiste Russe, et la troisième période, à partir de janvier 1919 de l'année courante, quand de larges masses, se trouvant "hors de partis" prirent part au travail d'organisation soviétiste (voir Tableau 1).

Les membres du Parti Communiste avec les personnes sympathisants au Parti forment le groupe fondamental des membres des congrès pendant toutes les trois périodes. Dans la première période, ils forment un peu plus de la moitié des membres du congrès, la quatrième partie des membres des congrès fut représentée par d'autres partis politiques, principalement par les S.-R. de la gauche 21% de tous les membres des congrès; le nombre des S.-R. de la droite fut insignifiant (1.2%, il y eut encore moins de mencheviks (0.9%), le reste (1/5) — fut en dehors des partis. Dans la période suivante, le nombre des S.-R. de la gauche après l'entente de juillet devint presque nuit (près de 3%), et le Parti Communiste avec les sympathisants au Parti forma plus des 4/5 de tous les membres des congrès. Le Parti Communiste devint de plus en plus fort au préjudice non seulement des autre partis politiques, mais aussi au préjudice des personnes en dehors des partis; le processus du démembrement des classes marcha d'une façon accentuée et plus profonde dans les campagnes: dans les villes les personnes en dehors des partis se mettent dans les rangs du Parti Communiste. Dans la 3-ème période, l'influence d'autres partis politiques diminue encore davantage, quoique des maximalistes et des communistes révolutionnaires se montrent dans leurs rangs. Les représentants de la large masse, "hors partis" et des paysans de la classe moyenne font leur apparition aux congrès, sourtout aux congrès des districts. (Composition du personnel, des comités executifs des provinces, des villes, des districts et des soviets vers octobre 1919 — voir Tableau 2).

Ainsi l'oeuvre de construction soviétiste se poursuivait tout le temps sous la direction du Parti

Communiste Russe. Le Tableau 2 relatif à la composition des Comités Executifs nous montre la participation de ce parti au travail journalier courant des Soviets.

Les données ci-dessus se rapportant à juin — septembre 1919, en enserrant la plus grande partie des Comités Executifs — 24 comités de provinces, 211 comités de districts et 36 comités urbains. Dans les Comités des provinces, le Parti Communiste est représenté par une majorité écrasante (88%) de tous les membres, qui avec les sympathisants au parti forment 92% de la composition des Comités Executifs. Le nombre des "hors partis" est beaucoup plus grand dans les districts, ils forment 18.6% (aux derniers congrès les représentants des paysans de la classe moyenne sont entres dans les Comités Executifs. Les sympathisants au Parti sont ici comparativement aussi en plus grand nombre, mais les communistes forment le noyau principal des travailleurs). Les Comités Executifs urbains occupent une place moyenne entre ces deux groupes: 4/5 des communites avec les sympathisants et 1/5 des "hors partis".

Par qui donc le Parti Communiste dominant dans les Soviets est-il représenté? Malheureusement, l'utilisation des données sur la profession des membres n'est pas encore terminée, et nous ne pouvons en juger, en attendant, qu'en nous basant seulement sur les données concernant leur instruction. 4/5 des membres du Comité Executif, en y joignant un petit groupe (6%) qui n'a pas donné de renseignements sur son instruction, appartiennent aux travailleurs, ayant reçu une instruction bien primitive dans les écoles primaire ou s'etant instruits eux-mêmes.

Les personnes ayant une instruction supérieure, les intellectuels, sont en nombre insignifiant — 4%.

Les personnes à l'instruction secondaire forment 15%— ce sont toutes d'employés, techniciens d'usines, etc. Dans les Comités Executifs des districts le nombre des personnes à l'instruction primaire prédomine[;] on remarque au contraire dans les Comités Executifs des provinces des personnes ayant une instruction plus haute. Le tableau est clair: dans la Russie Soviétiste, ou tout le pouvoir appartient aux travailleurs, 4/5 de ces travailleurs, qui dirigent l'appareil étatique, sont composés d'ouvriers et de paysans.

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S. VAN DER HAL Izn. KEIZERSGRACHT 409 AMSTERDAM (HOLLANDE).

TABLEAU 1 [2]

Partis dont se composaient les congrès.

Dates des congrès		nombre total des congrès	nombre total des membre des congrès	communistes	sympathisants au parti communiste	hors partis	autres partis
D'octobre 1917 jusqu'au juillet 1918	de province	5	1681	722 43.0%	103 6.1%	290 17.3%	566 33.7%
	de district	20	1912	836 43.7%	309 16.2%	450 23.5%	317 16.6%
	nombre total	25	3593	1558 43.4%	412 11.5%	740 20.6%	883 24.6%
De juillet 1918 à janvier 1919	de province	10	1447	957 66.1%	353 24.4%	90 6.2%	47 3.2%
	de district	24	3960	1470 37.1%	1781 45.0%	505 12.8%	204 5.2%
	nombre total	34	5407	2427 44.9%	2134 39.5%	595 11.0%	251 4.6%
De janvier à octobre 1919	de province	12	1780	1045 58.7%	335 18.8%	378 21.2%	22 1.2%
	de district	68	8679	3447 39.7%	2276 26.2%	2732 31.5%	224 2.6%
	nombre total	80	10459	4492 42.9%	2611 25.0%	3110 29.7%	246 2.4%

TABLEAU 2 [2]

Composition du personnel des comités executifs des provinces, des villes, des districts et des Soviets, vers octobre ’19.

Type des comités executifs	Distribution du personnel des membre par partis						
	nombre total des membres	Commu-nistes	sympa-thisants	S.D.	S.R.	Anarchistes	Hors partis
Comités executifs de provinces	516	456 88.4%	20 3.9%	6 1.2%		1 [0.2%]	33 6.4%
Comités executifs de villes	404	292 72.3%	28 6.9%	3 0.7%			81 20.0%
Comités executifs de districts	4166	2879 69.1%	461 11.1%	30 0.7%	14 0.3%	6 0.1%	776 18.6%
Total général	5092 ~~5086~~	3627 71.2%	509 10.0%	39 0.8%	14 0.3%	7 0.1%	896 17.6%

(1) РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/90-93.

(2) Some numbers of percentage are slightly revised.

3-4 Leaflets on: Great Britain / Ireland

3-4-1

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE IIIRD INTERNATIONAL

Dear Comrades [1]:

Comrade [Francis] Johnson, secretary of the Independent Labour Party of Great Britain, had kindly sent us the copy of a letter addressed by the I.L.P. to the Swiss Socialist Party (P.S.S.). In this letter to the P.S.S. is invited to take the initiative for the organizing in Switzerland of a conference of the several Socialist Parties, where the basis would be laid of the so-called "reconstruction" of the International.

As the Labour Leader of March 4th observes, the majority obtained at the Strassburg Conference by the [Jean] Longuet resolution necessitates such a conference. Now that most of the parties of Central and Western Europe have left the Second International without deciding for Moscow, it seems that the formation of a new organism of a block of the parties hesitating between the old and the new tendencies, the formulas of the past and those of the future, is no longer to be avoided.

What is the character of this block likely to be? What, from a Communist point of view, is to be hoped for from the principal parties interested in its formation? The utter political weakness, the absolute lack of revolutionary firmness displayed by the majority of the leaders of the German Independent Socialist Party, Longuet's violent attacks on the Communist International at the Strassburg Congress, together with the inability or disinclination of the French Centrists to understand the world revolution as the unavoidable consequence of the World War, and at the same time as a process which may be more or less directed and hastened by the conscious will of a proletarian vanguard; these are, to mention only the three principal parties destined to form the nucleus of a "reconstructed" International, so many signs that the organism expected to be born from the conference which the I.L.P. proposes to the P.S.S., would only serve to sanction in a general way the feeble, ambiguous and vacillating policy pursued by men like [Arthur] Crispien, [Rudolf] Hilferding, [Adrien] Pressemane, [J. Ramsay] MacDonald and [Philip] Snowden, after the War as before. The attempts of these parties, either to demand from Moscow "guarantees" for the admission of compromised leaders, and of deeds essentially hostile to Communist methods, or to form a new intermediary block between the Second and Third International, can have no other result but to weaken, to clog and hinder revolutionary action in the proletarian masses, and thus to hold back the formation of the Soviet system and the establishing of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Europe and in America.

The very terms of Comrade Johnson's letter to the P.S.S. are evidence, that the bases of international socialist unity as contemplated by the I.L.P. have nothing whatever in common with the principles of unity laid down by the first Congress of the Communist International, held at Moscow in 1919.

The letter mentions the possibility of constituting anew one single International, whilst allowing the most complete autonomy in the matter of liberty of action and of tactics for every individual country. This evidently means that the double dealings which have led to the disaster in which the Second International was wrecked, will be consciously, advisedly adopted as a new starting-point, and that the terrific catastrophe of the World War would have been of no benefit whatever to the proletariat. Each and every national party would be free to wage the war against its Capitalism and its ruling class in its own way, or even to substitute to the war the collaboration of the classes; the disciplined and centralized action of the workers of all countries, the international unity of tactics absolutely necessary in the Imperialist era would, from the beginning, be repudiated by the charter of the reconstructed International, and it is supposed that the Communist Parties will fall into this trap.

Comrade Johnson's letter says, further, that the new International will be able to embrace all the parties accepting as the principal basis of Socialism the collective ownership and use of the land and of the principal instruments of labour; in such a way the exploitation of the public services, as of industry in general, and of all that concerns the public wealth, falls to the State or to the Municipality, in order to increase the prosperity and the happiness of all citizens. This definition of the basis of Socialism is, evidently, absolutely insufficient from a Communist point of view; on the other hand, not only the Reformist and Social-Patriotic Parties, but many simple bourgeois reformists can straightway accept it. It seems absolutely to ignore the fact that the Capitalist ownership of the means of production can only be abolished after the downfall of the bourgeois state, and the revolutionary organs of the proletariat will have to be the means of transforming it into collective ownership. Comrade Johnson's definition apparently is contented with a State and Municipal Socialism, which would change nothing, or very little, in the social misery, and in the degradation of the workers, and which would even aggravate their dependency.

It seems to us, that for the Communist groups and parties to participate in a conference of the kind, would be waste of energy, time and money; that it would be a real betrayal on their part of our principles and of the grand work of reconstruction pursued by Soviet Russia. The old fetish of "Socialist unity" (that worthy pendant of the equally dangerous and no less fatal class truce) will be made use of for an attempt to induce all more or less hesitating spirits to capitulate before double heartedness and lies. Phrase-mongering demagogy, the pathetic appeals of able leaders, will only serve to cover the absence of ideal, of revolutionary faith (that is, of faith in the masses), of class-consciousness and of firmness.

It seems to us that the Communist groups and parties would commit an exceedingly grave fault by taking part in the conference of the "reconstructors." They would aggravate the confusion still obtaining amongst the masses, they would render it more difficult for them to free themselves of the old formulas and the old fetishes (democracy, peaceful evolution, Socialist unity, etc.), and to consciously orientate themselves toward the Communist theory and tactics.

That is why we are of opinion that the British Socialist Party in Great Britain and the Committee for the Third International in France have done well and acted as Communists should, by absolutely refusing to participate in any conference of reconstruction, as the new International, which answers to the needs and the aspirations of the working class in the era of the world revolution, already exists. And we ardently hope that the example of these British and French comrades will be followed by all Communist groups and parties.

We in no wise wish to dictate rules of conduct to the advanced groups of countries where a Communist Party does not yet exist, or is only in a nascent state. Evidently these groups are themselves the sole judges in the question of the exact moment when they will think it necessary either to leave the old parties to which they now belong, in order to constitute a Communist Party and affiliate to Moscow, or to prevail upon the majority of these parties, the necessary process of cleaning having been effected, to follow them. But we feel we failed in the fulfilling of the mandate entrusted to us by the Amsterdam Conference, if we neglected to warn our Communist friends against the very real new-confusionist danger constituted by the founding of an International lacking a precise conception and a definite character. The attempt at re-establishing the so-called Socialist unity is a dangerous snare into which the spirit of criticism and the spirit of truth may equally be decoyed. The only real living and efficacious unity is the one which has for its base not only the formal acceptance of the Communist principles and theory, but, above all, the revolutionary practice arising out of this theory. And, in order to constitute on the national as on the international territory this real and living unity, we must as well have the courage to reject nationally the traditional plea for unity, as to refuse on the international field to lend a hand towards the formation of an organism built on the sands of lies and illusions, and fatally destined to confusion and impotency.

The Executive of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Third International:

D.J. Wynkeep [*sic*].
Henriette Roland Holst.
S.J. Rutgers.

(1) РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/97-98, 497/1/6/65-66. Reprinted in: *The Workers' Dreadnought* (London), Vol. 7, No. 4, 17.IV.1920, p. 6; *The Communist*, Vol. 2, No. 6, 15.V.1920, p. 2 (The following note is appended: "**Editor's Note**: This communication has special interest in this country in view of the attempt of the Socialist Party to 'affiliate' with the Third International and at the same time participate in the schemes of the reconstruction (!)").

3-4-2

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE IIIrd INTERNATIONAL

REPORT ON THE BRITISH MOVEMENT [1]

Probably no socialist movement in Europe was so little socialist as the British movement prior to the war and the Russian Revolution. With all their reformist opportunism the British socialist parties have always been numerically very small.

It was because the Socialist parties were extremely small that the expedient of forming the Labour Party from affiliated Trade Unions was hit upon in the I.L.P. Socialists.

The Labour Party, when first formed had no policy. The only condition its Parliamentary Candidates were expected to meet was that they should be independent to the bourgeois parties. The I.L.P. which was chiefly instrumental in creating the Labour party thought that it would be able to supply a political policy and objects to the Trade Unions alliance, the Trade Unions supplying the election expenses and the voters who would go to the ballot box in support of Labour Candidates.

The I.L.P. has failed to make even a moderate socialist party of the Labour Party and the connection with the Labour Party has tended more and more, to rob the I.L.P. of its socialism and to increase its reformist tendencies. With the outbreak of war the I.L.P. came into conflict with the Trade Union leaders, who were all thoroughly chauvinist, whilst the I.L.P. leaders adopted a bourgeois pacifist and largely religions and nonresistant attitude towards the war.

The P.S.P. leaders adopted a social-patriotic attitude, with the result that the leaders left the Party to form a National Socialist Party.

During the war the I.L.P. opposition to the war won for it and its leaders a wide popularity amongst the rank and file of what may be called the right of the left wing in the Labour movement. In the Labour Party conferences during the war the chief interest and controversy centred always around the I.L.P. opposition to the war. When news of the first Russian Revolution came to Britain, even the Government professed to welcome it. When the Bolshevik Revolution took place, it won the support of the extreme left wing alone. J.R. MacDonald had attacked Lenin and Bolshevik Party and had proclaimed his friendship for [Aleksandr] Kerensky before the Bolsheviki came into power and he and the other I.L.P. leaders still speak of “Bolshevism” as a kind of social disease.

From the moment when [Arthur] Henderson returned from Russia to advocate the Stockholm conference, because as he has explained he thought it would help Kerensky against the Bolsheviki, the I.L.P. leaders and the Trade Unions Labour Leaders drew nearer and nearer together and there has now ceased to be any vital difference in their policy.

With the end of its opposition to the Trade Union leaders who formed the right wing of the Labour Party, the I.L.P. influence has waned and it does not now affect the trend of events to the Labour Party conferences.

In the rank and file of the I.L.P. a growing section supports the Russian Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviets and the dictatorship of the proletarian, and desires to be identified with the Third International. At the Scottish conference of the I.L.P. a resolution declaring for the Third International was carried and the subject will come up again at the national conference of the Party at Easter. In preparation for the consequence a group of rebels within the party has circulated a reply to manifestoes of the Executive against the Russian communists, the dictatorship of the Proletariat, the Soviets and the Third International.

It remains to be seen whether the Revolutionaries in the I.L.P. will stand to their principles and outvote the Executive. Towards the close of the war the crisis in Labour Conferences which had centred

around the I.L.P. opposition to the Trade Union majority gave place to the crisis created by the advocates of the political strike.

The rise to prominence of this question has been accelerated by the psychological influence of the Soviet Revolution in Russia, but it is the outcome of the determination of the masses to control their own destiny which is growing slowly but irresistibly in all countries, and was already a masked tendency in Britain before the war. The shop stewards' movement and the unofficial reform movement amongst the miners also arise from the same cause. The miners' unofficial reform movement came into being in South Wales and its main force is still dentred [centred?] trust. It is the chief driving force behind the political strike demand which finds expression in the Labour Conference. Robert Smillie has become the spokesman of this demand because he is the chief official of the miners' federation, in which the Direct Actionists and industrial revolutionaries whose power is constantly growing and sometimes able to control the policy of the miners federation on questions arising in consequence. Smillie himself is an oldfashioned though sincere Parliamentarian, he expressly states that he is not a revolutionary. He believes that the threat of great strikes will strengthen the hands of Labour Members of Parliament but hitherto he has drawn back from going beyond a threat.

The official Labour Leaders gave to the first Russian Revolution the same sort of welcome it received from the British Government. The second revolution this bitterly opposed. The rank and file of the Labour movement were filled with an emotional and largely indiscriminating enthusiasm for the Revolution. In the face of this enthusiasm a demand that [M.M.] Litvinoff should address the Labour conference as the official representative of the Soviets could not be denied by the Executive; but a similar enthusiasm, from which only a small minority dissented greeted Kerensky when on Hendersons invitation he came to address a plea to the Labour Conference for armed intervention by the Allied Capitalist Government to destroy the Russian workers Soviets and overthrow the communist Government.

When the intervention started it was difficult to get hearing for any protest against it in the Labour Party conference, and at the Trade Union Congress the following September not a voice was raised in opposition to it. "Bolshevism" had been branded as anarchic Terrorism, and the greater part of the Labour as expressed in the Congress movement, had either swallowed the lie or was afraid of the brand.

Since then communists have carried on as far as their means permitted a steady propaganda on behalf of the Soviet Idea coupled with persistent teachings that communism is the coming civilization in which the working class will find emancipation and that those who have vested interests in the old worn out capitalist system will certainly attack in every way Communism and its propagandists. This propaganda and in a much greater degree the achievements and the continued existence of the Soviet Government itself have contributed to make the Russian Soviets Republic the most popular thing within the vision of British Labour and the Intervention the most unpopular.

The question of the political strike and especially of the intervention against Soviet Russia seemed to be making great headway last summer. In June the Labour Party conference passed a resolution asking for a strike to stop the Intervention to be arranged by the Labour Party Executive and the Trade Union congress Parliamentary Committee. The Triple Alliance Congress (miners, railwaymen and transportworkers) called for a ballot of the members of the Alliance to be taken on the strike question, and asked the Trade Union congress to call a special congress to discuss a strike.

In the result of the Labour Party conference resolution was set aside by the joint Executives. The Triple Alliance ballot was stopped by its executive and the Trade Union congress parliamentary committee decided not to call the special congress because the committee is opposed to political strikes.

In September the Trade Union Parliamentary Committee was censured by the congress and ordered to call a special congress on the Intervention question and the nationalization of the miners after again interviewing the Government.

The special congress was not called till December. It was summoned at short notice so that delegates came without mandates for action. The number of delegates was below the normal. The executive proposed to do nothing then but to refer the Intervention in Russia and the nationalization of

the mines to a special congress to be called in February. The Daily Herald group Robert Williams, George Lansbury and their following and to a lesser extent Robert Smillie attempt to keep the rank and file in a perpetual fervour of cheering by constant talk of action which never comes to pass. They are constantly taking up fresh questions as fit subjects for a general strike but as any one of these seems to near the point at which something definite should be done in justification of their declarations and when the rank and file have become accustomed to regard it is important, they switch off on to a new issue. At the December congress the mines question which had hitherto been placed in a secondary position was made to appear the centre of interest and the Russian question was pushed as far as possible into the background. Robert Williams who had made himself prominent in the strike demand was now speaking for the motion to defer action.

In September, when the political strike policy seemed to be winning, Henderson, [J.R.] Clynes and other reactionaries assumed that another general election would soon take place, and that the Labour Party might get into power, either new or before long; but that the political strike would destroy the prospect of an early Labour Government and would provide a precedent which might prove highly inconvenient to a Labour Government. The success of the Labour Party in the by-elections, and still more in the local Government elections seemed to have converted to Henderson's view more of the Labour leaders like Smillie and Williams who had dallied with the political strike idea. At any rate their support for it now disappeared.

The atmosphere of the Labour Conference now seemed to have fallen below zero, as far as anything approaching revolutionary or even mildly rebellious action was concerned.

The main structure of the older organization of the British working class.

The Trade Union Congress is composed of Affiliated Trade Unions; its executive is called the Parliamentary Committee.

The Labour Party was first called the Labour Representation Committee, then the Labour Party it was created by resolution of the Trade Union Congress of 1899. In 1904 Keir Hardie and Richard Bell were elected as its first members of Parliament. In 1906 29 members were returned to Parliament and in 1910 the number grew to 40; the party has grown at each election.

The Labour Party consists of affiliated Trade Unions, affiliated socialist societies; affiliated local Labour Parties; individual membership of the Party was begun in 1918.

Largely owing to the delegates from local Labour Parties through which the rank and file enthusiasts are most able to gain mandates for the Conference and in part also to the strong I.L.P. influence, which was then more progressive than it is now, the Labour Party is usually a trifle less reactionary in its decisions than the Trade Union Congress.

The general Federation of Trade Unions was established about 1900 mainly to assist Trade Unions on the financial side. It is still more reactionary than the Trade Union Congress and Labour Party and has made some attempts to compete with the latter politically in order to push a strongly imperialist policy.

The Cooperatives Societies.

The cooperative societies began as strictly non-political organizations. They have now entered the political field by running parliamentary candidates and are becoming closely allied with the Labour Party. On the whole their influence is more retrograde. The national executive on the cooperatives is composed of reactionaries. The cooperation, as practised in Britain, is capitalist trading, but the capitalists are very numerous, the amount of their share capital is not great, and is limited and the amount of the dividend on shares is also usually limited. After the limit is reached profits go to reduction of prices or to extending the business.

Any shareholders can purchase cooperative goods. The cooperative shops sell goods produced to the Cooperative Wholesale society, and also the productions of ordinary capitalism. Some of the local

societies not only sell food, clothing, etc. but also own houses. The cooperatives wholesale society itself has ships, mines, farms, flower mills boot and clothing factories, tea plantations abroad and is in fact engaged in almost every branch of production and distribution.

The cooperative wholesale and the local societies in general cannot be considered to be model employers indeed both in only productive and distributive branches, wages are often below the ordinary standard. Cases of acute sweating have been brought to light, and there have been many bitterly fought strikes of the cooperative employees.

In the Amalgamated Union of Cooperative Employees the majority of the distributive employees and some of the productive employees of the cooperative are organized. This A.U.C.E. has been hotly attacked, both by the craft unions, which desire the cooperative workers to join them instead of the A.U.C.E. and by the cooperative societies. The shop assistants and clerks unions have been specially keep in their attacks. The craft unions have an alliance with the cooperative societies who are the employers in this case against the wage demands of the A.U.C.E. These allies have tried to make membership of the craft unions and non-membership of the A.U.C.E. a condition of employment by cooperative societies. During the war the craft unions and the cooperative societies tried to secure the help of the government in this attempt to smash the A.U.C.E. Cooperative employees contend that because trade Union officials are on the executives of the cooperative societies, cooperative employees cannot secure attention to their grievances from those Trade Union officials. Hence the need of special organization. For cooperative employees it has to be recognized that within the capitalist system the cooperatives cannot raise the conditions of their employees very much above the level prevailing in capitalist establishments, because the customers of the cooperatives are working people wishing and needing to get the biggest value for the least positive expenditure. Indeed the cooperative movement tends to have a competing influence on those who serve as employers on the cooperative committees and is liable to produce in them the psychology of the capitalist.

The Cooperatives in Revolution.

There is much talk amongst some of those in Britain who are expecting revolution of the part which the cooperatives will play in it. Undoubtedly the possession by the working class of such a large machinery of production and distribution might be highly advantageous but it must be recognized that this machinery has been built up by the working class on capitalist lines and just as the Russian cooperatives took up a stand against the soviets the same thing is likely to happen in Britain.

Moreover the structure of the cooperatives could not be maintained during and after the Revolution. Miners, engineers and others who advocate working control of industry must remember that cooperative employees are entitled to precisely the same rights and privileges as themselves. The entire shareholding and dividend system would have to be swept away. There could be no sectional membership of the cooperatives if they were to continue existence under the soviets. The capitalist institutions covering the same field must also be taken over and socialized. The cooperatives may fulfil an important function at certain stages of the revolution. If a clash with capitalism should develop in which the Labour Party whilst still under influence of the Henderson type of policy were involved, the cooperatives would probably and the Labour Party. If a communist revolution arose certain local cooperatives might help the revolution, but the main body of the cooperatives would either hold aloof or become actively hostile until after the communists had gained control when the cooperatives would judgingly offer to work with the Soviets, in order to maintain their own existence.

Though the cooperatives may fulfil social functions at certain transitional stages of the revolution they must ultimately be absorbed into the general economic mechanism, all the characteristics by which we know them to-day being modified beyond recognition. It is inconceivable that the mines, farms factories or shop of cooperative societies should be working on principles differing from those which communism will apply to industries which were once under bourgeois capitalist control. It might be tried as in Russia the distributive functions of the cooperatives only would be retained all distribution of commodities for domestic use might in Britain also be done by the cooperatives but in that case the

cooperatives, must cease to maintain the specialized from that they have to-day. They must simple be the link by which commodities would reach the householders and in integral part of the economic machinery. The position of the workers engaged in distribution could not vary in principle from that of workers in other socialized industries. On the other hand, the communist revolution in Britain may find the cooperative societies so difficult to deal with, that the distributive agencies which the working class will have seized from capitalism and placed under the working control, may prove more readily available and more trustworthy than the cooperatives.

In the meantime is it the duty of communists to make plain to cooperative employees that they are suffering under the capitalist system like other workers, and to encourage the spirit of rebellion amongst them. It is also necessary to make the position clear to the general mass of the working. Whilst communists should endeavour to gain an influence in the cooperative movement, they must look, no to cooperation but to socialization and workers' control as the proper solution with a unified machinery for production, distribution and consumption.

The Parties Affiliated to the Labour Party and the Question of Affiliation with the Parties outside the Labour Party.

The three socialist parties affiliated to the Labour Party are

1. The Fabian Society numbering officially 2,000 members; its effective membership is much smaller. It is social-patriotic and dominated by the Webbs. Sidney Webb has a seat on the Labour Party Executive. He drafted the Labour Party's mild reformist propaganda, adopted in June 1918.

2. The B.S.P. left the Labour Party for a time but returned, it now declares affiliation to Third International. The Labour Party is of course a highly reactionary pillar of the Second International.

Outside the Labour Party are three other socialist bodies.

1. The Socialist Labour Party,
2. The South Wales Socialist Society,
3. The Workers Socialist Federation.

I name them in order of age.

Efforts are now being made to combine these three parties and also the B.S.P. on the following basis.

1. The Dictatorship of the proletariat,
2. The Soviets of [to] replace Parliament,
3. The Third International question if affiliation to the Labour Party, to be decided by a ballot of the United membership three months after its formation.

It was understood by the W.S.F. that the question of Parliamentarism was also to be submitted to the membership after three months, but the other societies not having also understood this did not put the question of a ballot on Parliamentarism to their members.

The Unity negotiations have been dragging on since last Whitsuntide, when the W.S.F. conference decided to adopt the title of the Communist Party and to invite the other parties to enter into the unity negotiations. The negotiations have hitherto proved abortive.

The differences between the parties are as follows:

The B.S.P. desires the new communist Party to affiliate with the Labour Party and to run a Labour candidate under its auspices for Parliamentary and Local Government elections.

The B.L.P. desires to keep outside the Labour Party and to run separate candidates.

The South Wales Socialist Society and the Workers Socialist Federation desire, neither to affiliate to the Labour Party, nor to run Parliamentary or other candidates, but to concentrate their energies on preparing for the Soviets and the revolution.

Affiliation to the Labour Party.

The chief argument used to excuse the affiliation of communists to the Labour Party is that it is not a political Party.

It is continually assuming a more political character, and may shortly form a Government of a bourgeois compromise character, I no longer consists if affiliated trade Unions and Socialist Societies, it now accepts individual members on the basis of adherence to the reformist programme drafted by Webb. Also it adheres to the Second International. Moreover it is dominated by political leaders, who, because of their official positions in the Trade Unions, are more difficult to dislodge than if their tenure were simply that of the leader of an ordinary political party.

It is urged that since trade Union members of the Labour Party have not deliberately joined it as individuals, but have been swept in en masse, because their trade or industrial union is affiliated to the Labour Party, many of them are either actually or potentially communists, and all should be brought under communist influences.

But there is another method by which the Trade Union members may be influenced. It is not necessary that the communist Party should affiliate to the Labour Party in order to have its standpoint put to the conference. This can be done by communist members of the Trade Unions acting in consultation with the Communist Party. It can be done by critical articles in the communist Press, and by communist conferences held simultaneously with the Labour Party conference and in many ways.

I have great sympathy with those who would concentrate much energy or influencing the great Labour conferences, to which between 5,000,000 and 6,000,000 workers adhere, though a large proportion do so but passively.

It seems to me that the argument that Parliamentary action is useful from the propaganda standpoint because Parliamentary doings are widely reported in the press and a large member of people watch its doings, may be used in regard to the Labour Party Conferences. But the Communist Party as I have said, need not affiliate in order to influence those who attend and those who watch the Labour Party conferences.

The B.S.P. has only been able to secure a tiny influence in the Labour Party. In the crises that have developed in the Labour Party conferences, when the will of the upward striving masses has displayed itself, surging upward through the crust of the old Trade Union officialdom, in the demand for the political strike in smouldering discontent against the Party Executive the B.S.P. has refrained from taking part no communist voice has been heard. The workers have been side-tracked by those whose main concern was for the bourgeois republics of Russia and Germany, and, who have not been willing to stand on the platform of the Third International and the communist Revolution. Those who advocate the participation of the Communist Party in the Labour Party have somehow found it necessary to leave the lead to non-communist leaders of great Trade Unions.

Another argument used by those who, favour affiliation to the Labour Party is that as yet it is merely but a loose federation. The separate party organizations are kept intact and can act independently when they choose and break off from the Federation whenever the moment seems opportune.

Parties affiliated to the Labour Party cannot act independently in regard to separate candidates. If a party were to grow up from the elements already actual in the Labour Party, a party refusing office of any kind, refusing to run candidates under the title of Labour candidates and in support of the reformist programme, a party attacking the Executive at every point, if such a party were to grow up and then break off on an important issue, its action would be of great propaganda value and it might bring away with itself a substantial faction.

This would be an excellent thing for the B.S.P. to do as a preliminary to joining in the formation of a Communist Party. It might propose that the Labour Party affiliate to the Third International, and on its refusal leave the Party.

But such a tactic is hardly a fitting one for parties which have already taken a stand of communist opposition to the Labour Party. It is not the right tactic for the New Communist Party which should not compromise itself in joining the Labour Party.

Above all it is impossible for the communist party to go in as a part of the Labour Party structure, sending its representatives before the local Labour parties to plead for adoption as Labour candidates and counteracting the reformist programme by running its members as candidates in support of it.

Parliamentary Action.

It seems to the W.S.F. that the entire trend of revolutionary working class thought is away from Parliamentarism and towards the Soviets and that this tendency is most marked in the highly industrialized western nations more marked in Germany than in Russia, more marked still in England. America is also developing this tendency, but in America there is a combination of populations newly industrialized, and of populations long industrialized, a combination of industries of comparatively old growth and of industries of a mushroom growth. Therefore the steady development of thought amongst the industrial workers may be more accurately pursued in Britain and it may here be more readily seen whether the tendency away from Parliamentarism is not something fugitive and spasmodic, but a characteristic which will leave a fundamental impress on social development.

The desire of the revolutionary workers is ever more and more to the soviets; they are turning in disgust from the old Parliamentary machine, which they recognize to be the instrument of their oppression, their eyes are averted from it before they are yet able to achieve the soviets.

In Russia the Soviets arose spontaneously in the hour of crisis. In the countries where capitalism is more highly developed, the workers feeling the strength of their antagonist, desire to meet organization with organization. Hence they are striving to re-model the structure of their unions and are making tentative attempts and experiments in workers' committees instruments which only function effectively as yet in times of industrial crisis, but are giving the workers experience and a sense of power. In the countries where the ruling class has allowed trade and industrial Unionism to flourish under capitalism the Union officialdom must also be broken down or it will serve as a bulwark to capitalism and a hindrance to the development of the Soviet Communists.

The revolutionary workers of Britain are coming more and more to look with an immense disgust on all Parliamentarism. To be in Parliament, even to make revolutionary speeches there would be doing no service to the workers in their opinion; to them the fundamental need is to prepare the workers for the great courageous effort of trying to take control of the power of state. They believe that any popularizing of the bourgeois Parliament by introducing what seems to be a real struggle there, turns the attention of the workers from a realization of the fact that they must rely on their own revolutionary mass-action to achieve the overthrow of the capitalist state.

Undoubtedly it is a fact that in Britain any Party which adopts Parliamentary action will be avoided by the most revolutionary sections of the working class.

We believe that this is a healthy tendency, a step in the evolution of the workers to fitness to participate in the Soviet State.

Only a minority of our workers has yet reached this stage, but the minority is a growing one and those who have reached this stage with never return to Parliamentarism. Even those workers who, having passed through Parliamentary Labourism to revolutionary industrialism have not yet reached a complete understanding of communism and can be more readily brought to such an understanding by communist propaganda starting from the stage at which they have reached, namely by a return to Parliamentarism.

Many communists abroad wish to use Parliamentary action for attacking Parliament and to make propaganda for the soviets. This sort of destructive Parliamentary action could only be carried on successfully by a party which was absolutely clear and coherent in its policy and in which the discipline was overwhelmingly strong, only a special type of propagandist could come out of this policy effectively. We do not believe we shall see it perfectly applied by any Party in Europe.

Britain is the most difficult country in which to apply a destructive Parliamentary policy.

Largely owing to the fighting tactics of [Charles S.] Parnell, the British Parliament has provided itself with rules to prevent its being used as a propaganda Platform by those who come not to secure reformist legislation but to attack the constitution and Parliament itself.

The British ruling class is the most subtle in the world, its insidious offers of compromise the most difficult to withstand.

In Britain we have not got a strong disciplined communist party and were a communist Party to be formed of the four parties indicated above, it would be some time before such a party could become thoroughly coherent, disciplined and able to apply communist tactics to our situation.

Communist thought and revolutionary temperament are as yet, fragile growths in our country.

Beginning 16 or 17 years ago first the S.L.P., then the Central Labour college and the Plebs League brought a new influx of revolutionary Marxist literature into the British movement and the literature of the Russian revolution (in introducing which the W.S.F. was first and most active) has had already a considerable influence and brought a sense of the actuality and immediacy of the class-struggle to sections of the movement. In the old days the B.S.F. stocked a certain amount of Marxist literature but its influence was not wide. The British movement was so long steeped in reformist Parliamentarism that the major part of those who, under the glamour of Russia's success, accept the broad principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Third International, the Soviets instead of Parliament and the overthrow of capitalism by Revolution have not grasped the idea of the destructive Parliamentary action advocated by convinced communists. To send such comrades into Parliament is to court a very serious set back for the new communist Party. But if candidates were to be chosen from amongst the four parties indicated, we are convinced that such comrades would be chosen as candidates and even during the election they would already show that they have not yet fully comprehended the communist position. I must say in all seriousness that if the running of Parliamentary candidates by newly formed communist Parties is encouraged, it will seriously retard the development of effective communist Parties in those countries where this mistake is made.

As I have observed many comrades in Britain who desire to form a communist party have not yet grasped the theory of destructive Parliamentary action. The difficulty of conveying this idea to the masses will be still greater especially during the turmoil and heated controversy of an election.

The greatest struggle before us is that of making the organized workers realize that socialism cannot be obtained by capturing a majority of seats in Parliament but the revolutionary seizure of Power and the establishment of Soviets. We believe that we shall be able to do more effective propaganda for the Revolution and the Soviets by holding aloof from Parliament.

We are faced with two opposing difficulties.

1. Large masses of the workers retain faith in Parliamentary reformism and enormous propaganda must be done to convert them to communism and the Soviets.
2. There is a tendency in the industrial revolutionary movement to believe that no political party is necessary, that nothing more is needed than for the workers to get into industrial unions, or to form workers' committees in the factories. It is alleged by members of the workers committee-movement that the revolutionary elements will be able to maintain control of the executive positions, that they will create a strike on some question of hours or wages that the strike will become general, "a revolutionary situation will be created," and with little or no communist propaganda, without any conscious mass will to revolution, the Soviets will be set up and the communist state administered by the afore mentioned revolutionaries will appear as though by accident.

In our view, however, a great communist propaganda is necessary in order to stimulate the will to revolution but still more in order that when circumstances facilitate a revolutionary crisis, communist ideas may already have a wide currency amongst the masses.

In our view a communist Party, with its representatives in every workshop in all the industrial organizations, and in the Army and Navy is essential to secure coherent Communist action when the time of crisis comes.

We believe that a communist Party which has come to the point of deciding that it will not dissipate its energies by participation in Parliamentary Town Borough, Parish, District, Council, and Board of Guardians elections, but, that it will concentrate on preparing for the revolution, will achieve the best results in our country.

Nevertheless we could not allow the question of Parliamentary action to prevent us uniting with other socialist bodies, provided we were convinced that they could be dependent upon to stand firmly for

the entire platform of Communist principles and practice and were imbued with the revolutionary spirit.

The Communist Party and the Industrial Movement.

The Second International gave to the political organizations of the workers the political fields; and to the industrial organizations the industrial field.

The division was fatal and quite incompatible with Revolutionary Communism. We believe that the most essential and difficult task before Communists is to link the Communist Party and the revolutionary industrialists and to insure that the communist Party shall declare the time and tactics of revolutionary industrial actions.

The communist Party must make any decision in regard to action because the industrial organizations being obliged to admit all workers, regardless of their politics may not always pursue a communist policy and because being engaged in the immediate struggle with the employer, their attention is not concentrated on ultimate objectives.

In Britain the struggle of the communist Party to control revolutionary industrial action will be greater than in other countries, because even more than in any other country the industrial organs of the workers have insisted that no political party has a right to declare a strike, whilst the Labour Party and the parties affiliated to it have upheld this position.

Anti-Intervention Propaganda.

In the summer of 1918 a Peoples Russian Information Bureau was set up London by a conference of socialist and Trade Union branches called in London by the W.S.F. The other national organizations at first fought shy of the Bureau, as it was anticipated that it would be suppressed, and bring danger to the organizations affiliated to it. Some hundreds of national and local organizations are now affiliated to it and delegates from these form the council which elects the Executive committee.

Organizations may affiliate for a minimum fee of 2/6 per annum. In return they receive a weekly news bulletin, samples of pamphlets and leaflets, etc. Individual associates, without votes on the council, may join for 10/- a year. Bulletins are also issued to the Press to speakers, writers and so on. Inquiries regarding Soviet Russian are answered without charge.

Hands off Russia Committee.

A national Hands off Russia “Committee” was formed in Manchester in September 1919. It accepts the affiliation of socialist and Labour Organizations and conducts propaganda against the intervention in Russia. A number of Local H.O.R. committees have been formed. These committees are an attempt to interest the non-communist Labour movement in the propaganda against intervention and its vice-presidents are non-communist Trade Union leaders.

The question whether Communist should engage in anti-intervention propaganda with social patriots and bourgeois politicians, and whether they should lend their aid to propaganda which is merely against intervention and not pro-soviet, is one which I think should be discussed. It is highly important that social-patriotic arguments should not be mixed up with the anti-intervention propaganda with any appearance of being counteracted by Communists. It is of the utmost importance that the workers should clearly understand that the struggle of capitalism against Soviet Russia is part of the international effort of the capitalist class to keep the workers in subjection and that they can best fight it by revolution in their own countries.

In Britain we always have to fight a tendency to make every agitation reformist and to strip it of anything which might seem offensive to the ruling class.

It is certain that the real determination of the workers to take action to stop the capitalist attack on Soviet Russia depends on the measure of their sense of solidarity with Soviet Russia and of their sympathy with its aims and achievements. The propaganda on behalf of Soviet Russia has been a rallying point of the revolutionary Communist tendencies of the workers. Now the Labour Party, which acquiesced in the Intervention, when it commenced, is finding anti-intervention propaganda useful as a

means of winning electoral success when modified into a sort of pacifist economy coupled with arguments regarding the markets to which British enterprise with [will?] have access when peace is made.

The present political Aspect. The strength of capitalism.

It is important to realize that the British situation is not at present by any means revolutionary and that capitalism still stand without much sign of stroking.

The cost of living still mounts and the de-control of various commodities will cause it to mount higher. The value of the £1.- has fallen, but there are no present signs of an early financial crash or of great protests by the workers against the rising prices. The workers are not in revolutionary mood; in proof of this I give the fact that the workers' Committee (or shop stewards' movement) is now functioning in only a small number of districts and that it now counts only 37,000 odd members. The workers' committees function most actively and workers flock to them in times of industrial turbulence. The acceptance by the railwaymen of the Governments' terms in the late railway crisis is another instance of the present lack of rebellious feeling amongst the workers. Waves of unrest come and go. We are in one of the deep depressions at the present time.

The cotton industry, in which the workers were on short time throughout the war, is now booming, as is the woolen industry. The unemployment question is not acute, though unemployment is fairly extensive. The plans which are on foot for raw materials to be made up in Germany and sold by British manufacturers may increase unemployment and help to depress wages in Britain, but there is no present sign of crisis. British capitalism is meanwhile concentrating with great vigour on the business of developing and maintaining the British Empire, and on exploiting the new territories and sources of raw material acquired by the war. British imperialism is giving great attention to the acquisition and development of oil sources, oil being the coming fuel for manufacturing and naval purposes, but British capitalists are eager for wealth of every kind and are consciously aiming at world dominion America comes into the scheme if possible on the same basis as one of the British Dominions. British Imperialism may overreach itself, but it is by no means so foolish as to imagine its rivalries with other capitalist states in any way so important as its struggle with the working class. Indeed it is largely because the British ruling class considers that the ruling class in other countries has not mastered the art of governing the workers that it is determined to dominate and would find the League of Nations a convenient method of imposing its ideas on the others.

Much effort is being expended on industrial development in India, the Government lends capital for this purpose on very easy terms, and gives capitalists all sorts of assistance. Indian coal, steel and cotton will shortly be serious competitors of the same commodities in Britain, and can be produced much cheaply, but the capitalists exploiting them in Britain and Indian are largely interlocked and through the Indian competition may be used to discipline British workers. British capitalism is much too far-seeing deliberately to carry this so far as to create serious conflict.

It must be remembered that there has been developed in Britain a school of Labour politicians like Clynes, Henderson, [James H.] Thomas and J.R. Macdonald, who are deliberately working with the capitalists for the maintenance of capitalism on a basis of peace between capital and labour, with a certain amount of give-and-take between the aristocracy of Labour and its employers. The Trade Union leaders, the I.L.P. leaders and Lansbury and the Herald group are all working for the maintenance of the British Empire on a reformist basis. "Big business" knows how to make use of these supporters and to learn from them anything which will be useful to it concerning the Labour movement.

From the standpoint of world revolution we have to ask ourselves how can the break up of the British Empire be accomplished, for the British Empire is the strongest force against world revolution. The unrest in India, though showing a hopeful tendency, is as yet nothing of which British Imperialism need have serious fear. The fact that general Dyer was able to carry on this campaign of atrocities without creating a revolt is sufficient proof of this.

General Dyer behavings are being inquired into, and he is being made to feel the enormity of his

offences because the British ruling class is aware that such conduct is highly provocative. The British cabinet, discussing the affair in Downing Street, probably exclaimed that the mutiny was caused by less than that.

The most hopeful sign about the Indian unrest is that the industrial workers are now beginning to organize and to act on the lines of the class struggle. This development is new. The most hopeful sign in Egypt is that the peasants and the industrial workers seem also to be acting as peasant and as industrial workers, though on the national issue.

Conscription, the standing army and the new citizen army.

All sections of British socialists attacked conscription during the war; and its effect in limiting the industrial activities of the workers was a serious one apart from the obvious liability to be called up to fight for capitalism. Nevertheless it is probable that the standing army of volunteers is more useful to capitalism than a conscript Army, because its members having chosen to enlist are less likely to be class-conscious.

At the same time economic pressure drives many young men into the volunteer army. The citizen Army, now being formed by the British Government, is likely to prove a more counter-revolutionary force that the standing army. The new citizen army is be liable for service both at home and abroad, though a special act of Parliament and proclamation will the necessary before the force can be used abroad. This provision is inserted in order that the impression may be created that the eventuality of actual service abroad is unlikely to arise. Thus it is hoped that no one will fear enlistment. But Churchill undoubtedly intends to make use of this force against Soviet Russia.

The Third International and British Opportunists.

We wish to address an urgent appeal to the Third International not to add to the prestige of the British opportunists who refuse to place themselves on the platform of the Third International, the Soviets and the Communist Revolution. Some, who in England work not to build up a communist movement, but a reformist movement in Britain, often make revolutionary speeches and thus win the adherence of the awakening masses, but they invariable lead the masses away from revolution. To aid them as to increase the difficulty of classifying the situation in Britain and to postpone the growth of a genuine revolutionary understanding.

AMSTERDAM MARCH 1920

(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0459.

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COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE IIIrd INTERNATIONAL

REPORT ON THE INDUSTRIAL ASPECTS OF THE WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT IN BRITAIN [1]

England's precedence in modern industrial development has been responsible for the production of so many phenomena, structural and tactical in the organizations of the proletariat, that without reference to the more important of these, the present situation and its potentialities cannot be understood.

Trade unionism was born early in the 18th century and largely took the form of local organization in terms of trade or craft. This form has not altogether vanished, surviving in certain small trades which have retained a peculiar local setting.

The advancement of industry made the means of communications between one centre and another easier and the bitter experiences of severe conflict with the employing class led to fusions, the creation of national and regional organizations and federations.

From simple trade forms came through amalgamations urged on by the increasing subdivision of labour and the development of machine industry, big occupational unions such as the Engineers, and Carpenters and Joiners Following rapidly in the track of these came the miners, railwaymen and the like. Later, towards the end of the 19th Century, the general Labour unions. It should be observed that by this time the big unions of skilled Labour had become fairly stabilized. Hence, while the pioneers of the General Labour unions started with the idea of one union for all; they enrolled only those external to the then existing organizations and soon came to terms with these unions re the poaching of members. They thus became simple organizations embracing largely semi-skilled and unskilled labour. The railway strike of [illegible; probably 1911] led to the fusion of several railway organizations into the national Union of Railway-men. The Engine-men and Fire-men remained outside this amalgamation, feeling that they held a strong position on their own account. The tendency between these however is towards fusion.

Meanwhile the miners had moved steadily towards a big Federation — the Miners Federation of Gt. Britain comprising some 850,000 mineworkers. The women workers began to organize separately although number of organization included them with the men.

A variety of federations exist both national and local. Trade councils composed of delegates or representatives from the trade union branches in a locality abound in hundreds.

The largest national federation is of course the T.U. congress. The membership of the trades unions is now well over 5,000,000. It will be observed therefore that we have the following distinct forms — local trade, national trades or occupational unions, unions approximating to industry unions, general labour unions, sex unions, federations such as the Building Trades Federation, Engineering and Shipbuilding federation, miners federation and transport federation, etc. Organizations having a class character as well as a trade character are the trades councils locally, the trades unions congress nationally.

In the face of this tremendous weight of organization the effort to build industrial unions external to them in the hope of smashing them has proved a hopeless struggle up to the present time. The I.W.W. has never grown to any dimensions as a fighting organization. The I.W.G.B. [Industrial Workers of Great Britain] never became anything more than a propagandist body. We have to witness the forlorn struggle of the Building Workers Industrial Union, while the remaining organizations in the building industry move towards amalgamation even though they fight the B.W.I.V[U]. intensely.

But in addition to these efforts towards industrial unionism up to the outbreak of war in 1914 there existed much industrial unionist propaganda in amalgamation committees, reform committees and the like.

The response to it has been proportional to the simplicity and homogeneity of the industry and inversely to the number of unions involved. The miners and railway-men have met with the greatest success in this direction. Big amalgamations are proceeding in the engineering and ship-building industry, the Building industry and also among the general Labour unions. Indeed the latter phenomenon is of extreme importance, for, whereas the previous amalgamations referred to tend in the direction of organization by industry the general labour unions embrace large numbers of workers in every industry. If they amalgamate and there is every prospect of them doing so, they will be nearly a million strong. Hence, while the tendency towards big powerful organizations clearly defined in spite of the continued existence of a multitude smaller unions, the form which the amalgamations are taking is producing its own problems, not the least of which is the intensification of the antagonism between skilled and unskilled labour. The remarkable movements of labour from one industry to another during the war, the withdrawal of a vast army from industrial activities to military activities, the return of millions to industry on the cessation of hostilities with a further re-shuffling of the workers and the intensification of the class struggle have compelled old issues to come to the front with increasing force and presented new issues which are giving a revolutionary impetus to the industrial organizations in spite of their reactionary clothing. Nationalization of the key industries has been a political cry of labour for many years. It has now become an actual demand on the part of the industrial organizations. Nationalization within capitalism is no solution to the workers problem, but the nature of the demand is such that all the labour organizations are involved and thus compelled to give a class expression to their activities.

The demands of labour have thus gone beyond the limits of trade and craft and forcing the pace in the direction of re-organization. Of equal, if not more importance is the dynamic value of the demand for the control of industry. Modified or toned down as it may be to “port control” or to some form of Whitleyism, in all cases are the workers brought to realize the internal defects of their organizations in relation to their demands.

These defects had been observed before the demand for the control of industry became general. For, prior to this stage many organizations had found it necessary to introduce the figure of the shop steward to assist the union machinery to perform its normal limited functions. With the vast movements in industry consequent on the entrance of Gr. Britain into the war. Involving the extensive “dilution” of labour, abrogation of trade union regulations, agreements, between officialdom and the Government the channels of trade union activity were glutted. The reaction thrust the shop stewards into the foreground, encouraged a simpler development where shop stewards had been previously non-existent, compelled the shop stewards to come together in the factories and forced the rank and file to unofficial action.

The engineering and shipbuilding industry was the principal arena wherein these struggles and developments assumed their most intense manifestations. Unemployment was practically abolished; skilled labour was at a premium; traditions were swept away by the influx of labour from other industries, and thus from a variety of directions an impetus was given to the growth of organization right at the roots of industry.

The failure of official machinery to function successfully on the Clyde in a wages struggle threw the responsibilities for the continuation of the struggle into the hands of the stewards who formed what was known as “the labour withholding committee”. This afterwards became the Clyde workers committee, composed of delegates from the factories and shipbuilding yards on the Clyde.

In Newcastle similar committees were formed in the workshops to control dilution of labour. In Sheffield the movement originated in the A.S.E. [Amalgamated Society of Engineers] district committee, spread to other organizations and was launched into an unofficial strike on the question of military service. Other committees followed as a consequence. Local strikers were frequent and followed by improvised national conferences.

In nearly all cases it was observed that the revolutionary industrial unionist bore the brunt of fights.

The propagandist amalgamation committees shifted their position and were transformed into stewards committees. The deportation of several Clyde engineers from the Clyde area simply set loose men prepared to dare to act in other districts. Hence from these various sources came these elements of

organization and they were subsequently established to some degree by the formation of a central committee in 1917. National conferences were convened for the purpose of shaping a policy and determining the kind of structure they were prepared to build. It was observed at these conferences that just as there had been a variety of origins, so were all the committees in different stages of development. Some were official, some were craft in character, some embraced a number of occupations, others were class in character, and the delegates on the committees were elected by the workers as workers irrespective of craft, grade or sex.

Summing up briefly their conclusions we find that they seemed movement towards social revolution more important than the perfection of structure prior to revolution. They therefore proclaimed they would act officially or support officials of the unions when they moved in the right direction and move independently when they did not; they would press for the fusion of the unions and internal changes of organization on the one hand and on the other build independently as near as possible the structure of industrial unionism; they would strive for the control of the workshops and factories, seize every opportunity to get class action and oppose the advocates of "industrial peace".

The rapid growth of power and repeated conflicts inevitably had its effects, not only on official unionism, but also on practically all sections of labour. The officials attempted to take the sting out of the Government movement by "recognitions" and making agreements with the employers and the government; wove the scheme of organization into its own plans, obtained the approval of officialdom and Joint Standing Industrial councils became practical politics.

The shop stewards opposed all the schemes successfully until the end of the war.

Then the commencement of normal activity on the part of the Unions and the extensive unemployment sorely depleted the movement.

Many committees went out of existence and many became simply propaganda committees comparable with the "vigilance committee reform committees" in those industries where the form of organization approximated closely to the industry form.

But the organization is now steadily reviving and reaching out to other industries in an effort to connect or co-ordinate the revolutionary and structural dynamical elements, throughout the industrial movement.

Learning from their experiences of strikes there is now propagated the formation of social committees within the wards or districts where the workers live for the purpose of facilitating food control and distribution in the case of strikes and laying the foundation of the political soviets. This development is only just in its initial stages.

In Jan. 1920 a national conference of shop stewards etc. was convened and 65 delegates attended representing some 77,000 workers.

This conference ratified the recommendation of the national administrative Council to affiliate to the Third International and to forward every possible movement to stop the Powers' intervention in the Russian Revolution. It would take too much space to enumerate all the phases in the development of the organization. But reference must be made to the varied character of the task before us. Some unions approximate closely in form particularly in relation to the unit of organization to the industrial unit. Some organizations are officially more revolutionary than others.

Hence structural changes may be demanded in one case and not in another the Committees may be encouraged by officials here and discouraged there. The conference therefore recommended the local committees to closely examine local conditions and draw together those elements of industrial organizations which would best serve the development of the industrial union structure and revolutionary action.

Sufficient has now been said to indicate the kind of movement developing within and without the British Trade Unions, producing pressure from the masses coincident with the official development of issues is greater than ordinary trade union issues.

While organization is proceeding steadily however it must be clearly understood that there is a tremendous amount of work to be put in before an effective independent striking power of good

dimensions can be regained.

It may be that officialdom will be driven into action by the great issues raised, but the best guarantee for effective movement towards conquest by the masses is the creation of organizations over which they have complete control. Revolutionary fervour within organizations headed by reactionary officials may strengthen the hands of officialdom by the vitality imparted to the organization, without there exists alongside this organization the independent organization which is the definite challenge to the bureaucracy. Two other developments must be observed in the industrial movement of Gr. Britain — the growth of professional organizations such as chemists, draughtsmen and the like — and the closer cooperation of the trade unions with the Co-operative societies.

The first possesses dangers as well as valuable potentialities which every student of the Russian revolution will appreciate.

The latter development is interesting in that in many cases this cooperation has arisen out of strike experience the cooperatives having functioned as the commissariat of the strikers.

A big campaign is afoot for the investment of Trade Union funds in the cooperative societies. It is an important development and one which must receive considerable attention by all revolutionists. With these observations we can now briefly summarize the developing situation.

The numerous organizations large and small present a multitude of channels through which the energy of the workers is dissipated, making necessary a tremendous ferment of unrest to merge these into common action. The bureaucracy of the trades unions makes imperative the improvisation of machinery through which the masses can challenge it where necessary. The tremendous issues raised [raise] in the struggle and the size of some of the large organizations compels every big move to come in conflict not only with the employers as such but the whole state apparatus

This situation forces upon the whole labour movement internal reorganization and extension. The possibility of an equilibrium between these forces and the state being maintained indefinitely is out of the question in the unstable condition of the world economy. It is imperative therefore in view of this steadily moving tide towards a climax that the revolutionists of the Third International shall not only urge forward the movement towards revolutionary action but take all practical immediate steps to harness that movement as indicated in this report.

With fraternal greetings to the third Communist International.

J.T. MURPHY
on behalf of the Shop Stewards and Workers Committees of Great Britain.

AMSTERDAM MARCH 1920

(1) Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0470.

3-4-4

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE IIIrd INTERNATIONAL

REPORT ON THE MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN (B.S.P.) [1]

The effect of the war upon the working class movement in Gt. Britain was to create a steadily and decided tendency towards the left, both in industry and politics. Already, in 1906, the advent of the Labour Party had shown that the old Liberal domination, in politics, over the minds of the workers was doomed. An independent class view, vague and indefinite, but nevertheless full of hope, was taking its place. The war which found Liberalism already sick unto death, left it a corpse. It was buried finally in the grave of the Coalition Government.

But the war also accentuated two opposing tendencies in the Labour Party itself. On the one hand the "patriots", nominally leaders of the working class, but in reality thoroughly imbued with the characteristic ideas of bourgeois capitalism, flew to the support of the Government, and sealed their own fate thereby as exponents of working class politics, although still carrying with them, or rather, being carried along by, the great mass of the workers who were all along sincerely "patriots" in thought and sentiment. On the other hand the logic of the class struggle compelled a small but growing minority, both of workers and leaders, to develop in ideas and action towards the Internationalist position. This development was all the easier because of the thirty four years of Socialist propaganda which had been carried on at street corners and in open spaces by devoted propagandists throughout the length and breadth of Great Britain.

Nevertheless the war had its effect even upon these professed Socialists; they split into two parties, pro-war patriots and anti-war Internationalists. It was not phenomenon confined to Great Britain, of course----it occurred in every belligerent country in the world. The question was fought out by the British Socialist Party at its annual conference at Easter, 1915, when the patriotic minority, numbering among them men of international repute in the Socialist movement, definitely and finally left the party on the question of the war, and the relation of the B.S.P. thereto.

From that time forward the position of the B.S.P. was clear. It established contact with the revolutionary groups which in all countries were holding aloft, often under terrible difficulties, the red flag of revolutionary socialism; declared for uncompromising internationalism as the basis of its policy; and endeavoured to rally the workers of Great Britain to the final struggle, political and industrial, for emancipation, — through social revolution.

When, in November 1917, the Bolshevik revolution startled the world, the B.S.P. instantly recognized it as the essential struggle of the working class for power, and welcomed it as such. Certainly the experience of our Russian comrades has changed in some respects the conception of tactics and policy hitherto held by the B.S.P., but that is true also of every revolutionary Socialist party in the world. At its annual conference at Sheffield in 1919 the B.S.P. declared for the soviet as the form of political and industrial organization necessary for the consummation of the victorious working class struggle. It also accepted the dictatorship of the proletariat as fundamental.

An overwhelming majority of its members declared by referendum for affiliation to the Third International. In the carrying out of this policy, however, the B.S.P. is not prepared to neglect any means or any weapon which will enable it either to propagate its views among the organized workers, or strike a blow at the capitalist system.

It engages in elections, national or local, for instance, for these ends, but only for these ends. Whenever the class struggle breaks out into open conflict it is unreservedly on the side of the workers although always endeavouring to point the revolutionary moral that only the complete abolition of

capitalist society will redeem the workers from the status of a subservient and slave class.

This tactic of using all the political and industrial organs, through which the working class movement finds expression, for revolutionary ends, differentiates the B.S.P., as a party, from all the other Socialist or so-called Socialist organizations in Great Britain. The I.L.P., for example, while claiming to be Socialist in objective is avowedly revisionist in method. It regards Parliament as something to be won for, and used by the workers, until, step by step, the means of production have become the collective property of the nation. Such a conception is entirely foreign to that of the B.S.P. which regards Parliament as a field of battle to be used by the workers during the period of revolutionary struggle, and destroyed when, in the course of time, the new order of society has developed its own appropriate political organs. This conception is also that of the S.L.P. which, however, unlike the B.S.P., is antagonistic to affiliation with the Labour Party. The reason for affiliation to the Labour Party lies in the peculiar way in which the class consciousness of the workers of Great Britain has developed, and is developing. Unlike the workers of most Continental countries the British workers have never been revolutionary in sentiment, while, as their history shows, they have often enough been revolutionary in action. The formation of a political Labour Party was characteristic of Great Britain, and was the natural expression of the trade union movement when the development of capitalism forced it into the political arena. To neglect to us such a means of moulding and influencing organized working class opinion from the inside, seems to us to be tantamount to resigning our position as missionaries of the revolution. Moreover, in some localities, the local Labour parties perform many of the function of a Trade Council. If reinforced by the addition of factory and workshops delegates, they would, in a time of crisis, become potential Soviets. For these general reasons, and for others of a more detailed character which it is not necessary to specify here, the members of the B.S.P. remain affiliated to the Labour Party.

An attempt was made in 1919 to unite the B.S.P., S.L.P., W.S.F. and South Wales Socialist Society into a united Communist Party. After several informal conferences where fundamentals were discussed exhaustively it was decided to ballot the members of the organizations on the question of uniting in a Communist party, with the proviso that three months after its formation a referendum should be taken on affiliation to the Labour Party. At the moment of writing the B.S.P. and S.L.P. have both completed their ballots, but only the result of the latter is known. It shows a large majority for a united Communist Party, but an equally large one against taking a referendum on Labour Party affiliation. The W.S.F. does not appear to have taken any further action in the matter.

Despite this apparent failure there exist good grounds for saying that a definitely avowed Communist Party will be formed in Great Britain in the near future. The B.S.P. will undoubtedly use its influence in this direction. Such a party when formed will draw to itself many hitherto unorganized elements as well as many members now unrolled in the I.L.P. or similar bodies. It is significant that the Scottish District council of the I.L.P. has already declared, by resolution, for affiliation to the Third International although the party as a whole is committed to the Second.

F. Willis.
Hodgeson.

AMSTERDAM MARCH 1920

(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0458.

3-4-5

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE IIIrd INTERNATIONAL

REPORT ON THE PRESENT CONDITIONS OF THE POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN BRITAIN [1]

Political assimilation is proceeding in Britain with rapidity most remarkable in view of the vast amount of machinery through which energy can be dissipated and crises forestalled. Social patriotism reached its climax during 1916. It had swamped almost every section of society. Even a large proportion of those who had been professedly pacifist and anti-war were in fact social patriots.

The class war was forgotten by the working class except by a few whom we shall refer later.

The political thought of the country was reflected by the following parties:

Tories or Conservatives	Tory Party	
Liberalism	Liberal Party	
Labour	Labour Party	Trade Unions
		Fabians
		I.L.P.
		B.S.P.
		Co-operative Societies
Labour	outside the Labour Party:	
		Socialist Labour Party
		South Wales Socialists
		Workers Soc. Federation
		Socialist Party G.B.
		Anarchist Groups
		Guild Socialist Groups

The two parties Tory and Liberal reflect respectively the Landed Financial and manufacturing interests. Labour and Socialist Parties reflect proletarian interests, both agrarian and industrial.

The Labour Party is yet young, the 1906 elections having marked its definite advent into British polities and indicated the proletarian drift away from the Tory and Liberal parties the latter having prided itself for many years or its capacity to express the interests of the workers as well as the capitalists. It is a peculiar conglomeration of persons and interests and parties which has led to much confusion in estimating its capacity to express proletarian interests.

Its primary action was to gather together all the elements which could lay claim to be focussing the workers interests in general order to express them in united form. Its organization was loose of necessity and its platform equally indefinite. Hence in actual experience it is dominated by the heaviest forces within it, the trade unions. Most of the important trade unions are affiliated and put forward candidates at elections under the Labour Party auspices. It has thus in spite of what may by termed the more radical elements within it, become the political reflex of trade unionism. The intense development of the last few years has compelled it to shape a policy and programme which now overshadow all the minor political party elements such as the I.L.P. and B.S.P.

Its programme is essentially a reformist programme, aiming at state control under capitalism, the development of the political democracy of capitalism, and the industrial democracy of joint control by workers and capitalists. It supports the League of Nations and is affiliated to the 2nd International. It gives lip service to the abolition of capitalism, whilst the capitalists look to its deeds to save them from their disaster. In its early days the I.L.P. leaders such as Keir Hardie, McDonald and Snowden dominated the party. As it grew in strength trade union leaders such as Henderson, Clynes, Thomas take their place. These are social patriots of the deepest dye.

The party's original looseness, nominally retained actually steadily disappears and leaves the

socialist elements to function as protesting voices.

It has not become a party which machinery equal to the traditional party machinery of Liberalism and as it is enforced by the middle class elements of the old Liberal Party the voice of revolt within it but serves to stimulate and strengthen the hands of reactionaries who lead the party. The movement of the middle class elements referred to and the adjustment of the Labour Party machinery to accept them are indicative of the reaction upon the petty bourgeoisie and labour driving them from the coalition of the principal parties which was formed for the conduct of the war.

In that Coalition all Liberalism was lost by the centralistic and oligarchical control demanded by the war. After the climax of nationalism or social patriotism had been reached in 1916, labour began to assert itself, and as the class conflict became more manifest in the internal affairs of the nation the Labour Party was compelled to move away from the coalition. It moved not with a clear class-conscious purpose, but under pressure with all the petty bourgeois thoughts of traditional trade unionism. Hence, Liberalism having been completely overwhelmed by the war the Labour Party appears to be the only refuge of the lower middle class. The cessation of hostilities with the Central Powers and the demand for economic readjustments, is driving the big interests to care for a further continuation of the coalition and the petty and free trade interests for the revival of liberalism.

The shadow of the revolution has been thrown across their paths and all of them are calling for salvation.

Meanwhile the same intensification of the class struggle has had its effects upon other parties. The I.L.P. the largest of socialist parties was largely pacifist in sentiment. Its lack of clarity in the realm of economics led it to social patriotism in practice. Traditionally reformist in character its leaders are strenuously endeavouring to lead it in the direction of the Labour Party, while the increasing intensity of the class conflict and the lessons of the revolution in Europe are driving the rank and file towards the Third International. In this there is great danger of an organized body accepting new principles whilst their leaders think in terms of the old.

The B.S.P. a much less organization, the lineal descendant of the S.D.F. has also undergone a variety of changes even though it clings to the Labour Party. The first effects of the war was to create a split between the Social Patriots, [Henry M.] Hyndman and Co., and the anti-war elements.

Its next important change occurs subsequent to the Russian revolution. Up to this time it had carried with it the traditions of parliamentarism from the S.D.F. and opposed industrial unionism. Its opposition to the latter being not so much because it possessed an alternative theory of organization, as opposition to the idea of building organization external to the trade unions. Its national conference of 1918 showed a greater sympathy to Industrial Unionism, whilst the national conference of 1919 voted in favour of the proletariat. Its steady move towards the Third International led to the resignation of two of its leaders and it stands much clearer towards a revolutionary policy both in personal and tactics than at any time in its history. Its membership is estimated to be about 6,000.

Turning to the parties external to the L.P. the most important is undoubtedly the S.L.P.

Formed in 1903 it has steadily and persistently focussed the class struggle, revolutionary parliamentarism and industrial unionism, following on the lines of De Leon of America. It has never been large in membership but its influence has been felt in every socialist party in the country. It has its own press from which has emanated much good work. Vigorous and uncompromising, a pioneer of revolutionary educational classes, its lectures and literature have penetrated I.L.P. and B.S.P. alike. It had least to adjust when actual revolution compelled all parties to review their policy and practice. Even prior to the great event of 1917 a movement had made itself manifest within the party for a new orientation of the party's policy suitable to the conditions of Britain. It ran candidates in the 1918 elections on a soviet programme. It is affiliated to the Third International. Its membership will be about 600 and its principal centre is Glasgow.

The Workers Socialist Federation is of recent growth out of the Women's Suffrage movement. It is now definitely anti-parliamentarian, proclaims the proletarian dictatorship and the Soviets as the only means of achieving the triumph of the working class. It is also affiliated to the Third International. Its

activities are principally in London.

The South Wales Socialist Society is a small party akin to the W.S.F. and accepts the same principles and policy.

The Socialist Party of Gr. Britain is an insignificant group noted for their anti-industrial policy and being the only true interpreters of Marx. There are a number of anarchist groups doing much active propaganda work in sympathy with the Russian revolution although their numbers are not large.

The Guild Socialist Groups are also doing much propaganda for industrial unionism, whilst their theories, particularly in relation to the State, are receiving much sympathetic attention in the I.L.P.

Each of the organizations enumerated with the exception of the S.W.S.S. have their own paper. The I.L.P. "The Labour Leader", the B.S.P. "The Call", The S.L.P. "The Socialist", the Workers Socialist Federation "The Workers Dreadnought", the S.P. of Gr. B. "The Socialist Standard", the Guild Socialist "The Guildsman".

Since the beginning of 1919 there have been efforts to fuse a number of these parties together into a Communist Party.

In February of March the I.L.P., B.S.P. and S.L.P. met in conference to discuss unity. On this occasion the S.L.P. alone stood on the basis of the Third International. The Conference proved abortive, the B.S.P. delegation agreeing with the S.L.P. who saw no reason to depart from the policy they had pursued for thirty years.

Later the S.L.P., B.S.P., W.S.F., & S.W.S.S. have met in conference several times and have arrived at an agreement to the Third International, dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviets. But disagree on parliamentarism and affiliation to the L.P.

The W.S.F. and S.W.S.S. are against parliamentarism and affiliation to the L.P. The S.L.P. is for revolutionary parliamentarism but against the L.P. The B.S.P. is in agreement with the S.L.P. on parliamentarism but for affiliation to the L.P.

A recommendation from a recent unity conference to the effect that there should be a communist party formed on the basis of things agreed upon and the points of difference re the L.P. submitted to a ballot three months after the party has been formed, has resulted in the S.L.P. refusing to accept the proposition of a vote on affiliation to the L.P. even after the three months referred to the B.S.P. result is not yet declared though it is anticipated the party will vote in favour.

Without the S.L.P. agree to fusion the W.S.F. and S.W.S.S. will certainly not join the B.S.P. The B.S.P. apparently will now have to choose between unity and affiliation to the L.P.

The intensification of the conflict and the extended propaganda following the Russian revolution has had its effect on the I.L.P. in spite of its official declaration at the Scottish Conference of Jan. 1920 declared in favour of the Third International. It is doubtful whether this will be ratified by the annual conference of the party. It may be that a move will be made away from the 2nd International and encouragement given to the Longuet policy.

Summing up the position therefore we find the class demarcation line becoming more clearly defined in politics as in industry even though clothed in social patriotism: the British Labour party becoming overwhelmed by the trade Unions and the petty bourgeoisie and thrusting the weight of its machinery the socialist parties into the background, while the socialist parties move steadily towards the revolutionary left. This movement with and really reflecting the same tendencies in industry as indicated in my industrial report is of the utmost importance not only to the British movement but to the international. The leftward movement is to the good but the danger of accepting it uncritically is most marked. Without the international stiffens and emphasizes the need for clarity and the acceptance of the full responsibilities of its policy. There may be witnessed the swamping of the Third International by the muddle-headed leaders of the Second International.

Probably nowhere is there greater danger of this than in Gr. Britain where social sentiment gives place so much to clear thinking. It is a welcome sign to see the Socialist movement being forced to take itself to task where it has been as sentimental as parochial.

A communist party, or two communist parties may be formed in Britain therefore at an early date.

There is a tremendous task before them even though history is urging things along at a rapid pace.

J.T. Murphy
S.S. Workers Committees.

AMSTERDAM MARCH 1920.

(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0472. Reprinted in: *The Communist*, Vol. 2, Supplement to No. 6, 1.VI.1920, pp. 2, 4.

3-4-6

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE IIIrd INTERNATIONAL

REPORT ON THE PROPAGANDIST AND EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT IN BRITAIN [1]

In addition to the papers enumerated in another report the total circulation of which will not total more than 90,000, account must be taken of a number of local papers which while trainted with a Labour Party colouring serve to break ground and call attention to much which would otherwise be neglected. Such papers exist in Woolwich, Birmingham, Sheffield Bradford, Barrow, S. Wales. In Scotland the Glasgow Forward is the organ of the I.L.P. Thousands of pamphlets and books are issued by the respective socialist parties. From the point of view of the revolutionist, the S.L. Press was the most important distributional agency for a number of years. For besides its own publications it was the principal agent for Keros [Ch.H. Kerr's] (America) sociological and social science publications. In the past few years however what are known as Reformers Bookshops have been opened in Glasgow, Bradford, Manchester and Sheffield all of which have extensive sales of all kinds of socialist literature, especially Keras [Kerr's] publications.

The demand for literature during the last two years has been enormous. It has been stimulated greatly by the "Hands off Russia" movement which has made good use of the services of [Arthur] Ransome, [William T.] Goode, [Cecil J. L'Estrange] Malone, [M.] Philips Price. Their works have been extensively circulated and were received. The services of Goode and Malone have been used also for public aims and demonstrations with good effect.

One of the most potent and effective stimulants for literature however is in the extensive and rapid development of educational classes, in few years ago little revolutionary educational work in this direction was being done. Apart from a small group of S.L.P. workers in Glasgow and some Marxians in S. Wales little could be observed. Ruskin College was the acme of education connected with trade unions and its curriculum was of an orthodox character. Some few years ago there was a strike of the students at this college which led to a split and the formation of the "Central Labour College in London for Marxian education". They published their own little magazine called the "Plebs".

From these three sources, Glasgow, Wales, London, an extensive educational work has developed. The growth of the rank and file movement gave an impetus to it, and at the special conference convened in Manchester in Jan. 1920 for the purpose of considering the coordinator of the large number of classes now spread over the country the ways and means of training teachers, the development of the curriculum, it was shown that well over a hundred of classes are held weekly, spread in all the high industrial centres and in many of the smaller towns.

In Sheffield, Manchester and Glasgow, Labour Colleges have been established. A net-work of classes exists in Lancashire which working together pays several full-time lecturers who specialize on economic and industrial history.

Glasgow Labour College has also several full-time tutors who with the assistance of many voluntary workers conduct many classes. The Central Labour College London is now the property of the S[outh]. Wales Miners Federation and the W.O.R. [H.O.R. (Hands-off-Russia Committee) ?] There are some twenty or thirty full time or resident students who after their training go back to the mines and railways and continue their activities.

It can be safely asserted that the average attendance in the classes is about 30 per class. As a revolutionary force they are invaluable, as the Industrial Commissioners on Labour Unrest did not hesitate to report in 1917.

As yet the curriculum of the colleges and classes is not an extensive the principal subjects being Marxian Economics and Industrial History. However, the note has been sounded for the extension of the subjects to study of revolutionary practice. Attention was called to the need for this development in the "Socialist" during 1919. The demand was voiced in the Jan. conference of 1920 and received with approval and there is not the least doubt that the move will be made in this direction at an early date. Of this there is great need in Britain. Volumes of revolutionary sentiment are everywhere. It needs translating into revolutionary practice. Counter forces in education exist in the W.E.A. (Workers Education Association) an orthodox body of social patriotism supplementing the activities of Ruskin College.

But there is room for satisfaction and encouragement in the development of the revolutionary educational forces during the last twelve months. The next should see a still greater development.

J. T. Murphy.
S. S. Workers Committees.

Note:

The Daily Herald, although not a pure revolutionary paper, has accomplished a great work in the way of publicity on the Russian issues. Its circulation has reached about 350,000 i.c. a circulation as great as it can reach until its printing facilities are extended. This extension it is attempting by raising the funds from the Trade Unions. Its principal propaganda is for the Labour Party and there is a definite tendency for official trade unionism to become the dominating influence.

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AMSTERDAM MARCH 1920.

(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0471.

3-4-7

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

To the Communists in Great Britain [1].

The sub-bureau of the Communist International is under the impression, that some misunderstanding prevails about the attitude of the Bureau towards affiliation of communist groups and parties to the British Labor Party.

A resolution passed at the February Conference in Amsterdam and two letters written to comrades of the I.L.P. have been interpreted differently. It is for this reason, that we wish to accentuate our opinion briefly as follows:

I. In accordance with the resolution mentioned above we are of opinion, that communists should not be affiliated either directly or indirectly to political organizations that accept the principals of the second International. For England such an organization no doubt is the Labor Party.

II. We are convinced that the policy of the Labor Party especially if this policy should be successful, will lead to a betrayal of the cause of the workers similar to the betrayal of Ebert-Noske, mutatis mutandis.

III. We have stated that affiliation with the third International of groups that participate in the Labor Party is possible, as is shown by the B.S.P., in so far as they accept communist principles and tactics, which involves a persistent struggle within the Labor Party against the policy and tactics of this body. We are convinced, that participation in the L.P. if accompanied by communist critics and action will only be temporary.

IV. Since we agree with those communists in England, that object against participation in the Labor Party, we are of opinion, that they should not give up their attitude on the plea of unity. Much as we would like to see a united communist Party in England it may be better to postpone this ideal than to compromise on important issues [2].

V. We strongly appeal to our English friends to unite on the basis of no affiliation to the Labor Party, as we clearly see the catastrophe that will follow the coming into power of a parliamentary Labor-Government. Warning in advance may help to unite the workers; after the failure will become evident, under the banner of communism. To achieve this result it is necessary however to clearly define our attitude towards the methods of the Labor Party. A compromise f.i. in such a way that local organizations are allowed a policy, that is considered objectionable as a general method, must lead to confusion when accepted be a united communist party.

For the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the
Communist International
D.J. Wynkoop
H. Roland Holst
S.J. Rutgers.

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(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0455. Reprinted in: *The Communist*, Vol. 2, Supplement to No. 6, 1.VI.1920, p. 3.

(2) When this letter was reprinted in *The Communist*, the latter sentence of this paragraph was underlined as follows: "Italics are ours.— To this particular paragraph we can special attention of all our advocates of 'unity at any price.' The general principle underlying this paragraph is, in our opinion, applicable and must be applied to the Communist movement **in any country**, including also the United States. **Ed.**"

3-4-8

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE IIIrd INTERNATIONAL

THE POLITICAL AND WORKING CLASS ORGANIZATION IN IRELAND [1]

Sinn Fein ---- : is by far the biggest organization in Ireland, it takes in all Classes of people, without regard for their religious opinions Set or Class, the immediate object of the organization, is the establishment of an Independent Irish Republic, without any clause as to what form of Republic it will be; on the establishment of the Republic "the Irish people may be referendum freely choose their own form of Government" (extract from Constitution of Sinn Fein). The Executive of Sinn Fein is composed solely of people of Bourgeois outlook and ideas, who have formulated an economic programme for the welfare of Irish people, which is modelled on the same lines, as if it had been drawn up by the present Labour Party in Britain. That programme would be supported by at least half of the members of the organization, that half, which is composed of Farmers, Clerics, Teachers and Professors, Doctors, Shopkeepers, etc., the other half, which is made up from town workers, and the land workers, have no definite ideas (generally speaking) in the matter, they want an Irish Republic, and imagine that when it is established, everything will be all right for them. A section among this half is beginning to understand that such will not be the case, and they have become suspicious owing to the action of certain Sinn Fein M. Ps. [Members of Parliament] in Industrial disputes. Now, the means relied on by Sinn Fein Party for the establishment of the Republic can be defined as direct political action, but the Party generally is not committed to a policy of Physical Force. The organization of Sinn Fein is carried out much in the same way as any other political Party Clubs are formed in various districts, and their duty is to carry on registration work, propaganda, etc. After the general election last year Sinn Fein established an Irish government "Dail Eireann", but it wields no political power, it is merely an appeal to the sentiment of the people, and a means of expressing to the world the solidarity of the Irish Nation. It is to be distinctly understood that all Irish Republicans are not in the Sinn Fein Political Party, the majority of the younger men are organized in the ranks of the "Irish Volunteers", the Irish Volunteers act as a wing of the Sinn Fein movement, but are not controlled by the Sinn Fein Executive (and are, as a matter of fact hated and feared by many of the politicians in the Sinn Fein Party). The Volunteers are organized on a military basis, in Companies, Battalions, Brigades, etc. and have a general Headquarters Staff who direct the work of the movement. A couple of the members of the Volunteers Executive are also members of the Sinn Fein Executive, and act as a connecting link between the two organizations. The Volunteers support the Sinn Fein Party in their efforts to establish a Republic, to sum up the situation:— Sinn Fein is the political party who believe in political (and if you like constitutional methods) action to realize their object, the volunteers are the physical force party, they support Sinn Fein as far Sinn Fein as an organization is prepared to go, and when they have reached their limit the fighting men step in and carry on.

The Volunteers.

As has been pointed out they work in harmony with Sinn Fein, and help them as far as possible, but primarily they are a Military organization. The general Staff are elected by ballot, at a yearly convention. The members are trained in the use of lethal weapons, and in the use of all explosives etc. They are taught engineering, signalling, drill, etc., they number from 35,000 to 40,000 (which is no exaggeration) and practically all are armed. Many of the Leaders are active in the Sinn Fein Party, and have the same political-economic outlook, others amongst the Leaders are not politicians in the ordinary sense, they are

really Revolutionaries of the Fenian type, who are prepared to fight at any time, and who have a profound contempt for ballot boxes. They attacked President Wilson as a fraud and a hypocrite, while the Sinn Fein Ambassadors in Paris were endeavouring to get the American President to listen to their claims. They also despise many of the Sinn Fein politicians, like Arthur Griffith, [Eoin] MacNeill, etc. The rank and file are for the most part proletarians, hundreds of them are Trades Unionists[,] a small percentage are Socialists or have sympathies in that direction, very few are hostile to the idea of a Workers Republic, their position is simple:— join the volunteers, help to drive out the British Army, and then we will settle the rest at home. The majority share the same contempt for Griffith and the reactionary groups in Sinn Fein, and as many of them participated in the "1913 strike" and in other strikes they are bitterly hostile to most of the employing in Sinn Fein. The volunteers will not so strong in numbers as Sinn Fein, are easily the most influential, they and they alone are the factor in Ireland. Their organization is perfect, they are armed and they are determined, they can sway Ireland as they wish, taking them as a body, they would be more favourable to the idea of a Workers Republic, and more easily won over to that idea than to the Sinn Fein organization.

Transport and General Workers' Union.

Since the death of [James] Connolly (and the departure of [James J.] Larkin) the Transport Union has grown by leaps and bounds, its membership should now be about 80,000. Apart from its work as a Labour Union, it has a political objective "To secure for the Workers of Ireland the right to the material ownership of Ireland" but the political side is not taken seriously. The men who now comprise the Executive, are for the most part under the influence of the Sinn Fein Party, and during the municipal elections, Sinn Fein voters received instructions to vote on second preference, (the election was under the proportional representation scheme) for the Liberty Hall § candidates, this was done notably in the case of Wm. O'Brien who is General Treasurer of the Union. All the actions of the Union Officials in political matters consider consciously or unconsciously with those of the Sinn Fein Representatives. The rank and file are for the most part members of the volunteers and the Sinn Fein Clubs, but in some places the men are hostile to Sinn Fein notably in Dublin. The spirit generally is good and their Class-consciousness is being awakened gradually, but it receives no fillip from the leaders, who seem content with a big membership, and a big bank balance. But in a crisis the Class spirit could easily be aroused, the majority of the rank and file would support a struggle for a Workers Republic. The general attitude of the Union is determined by the officials, and their attitude in turn is determined by the political situation, and the Executive can always be relied on not to run counter to the feeling evoked by Sinn Fein appeals.

The Socialist Party of Ireland.

This once active organization is now nearly defunct, it never survived the blow iy [it] received when O'Shannon, Huges and Johnson §§§ went to Berne to represent it at the "Yellow International"[,] it is now practically in the hands of the Office Staff of "Liberty Hall", who are anything but Socialists. An attempt was made to transform it into a Revolutionary movement some months ago, and partially succeeded, but it was finally killed by the opposition of the Press, Clergy, Sinn Fein and the Transport Union Officials led by Wm. O'Brien, who was once Chairman of the Party, but was never a Socialist, it wields no political or any other power, and is merely used as a debating Society, and will continue to be used as such while it is controlled by men who are Trades Union Officials first, anything else second,

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[original note] § Liberty Hall is the Headquarters of Irish Transport Workers Union.
§§§ [Cathal] O'Shannon — Editor "Watchword of Labour" I.T.W.[U.] official organ. [J.J.] Hughes — Secry. Information Dept. [Thomas J.] Johnson — also and official of [I.]T.W.U. Liberty Hall.

last (and very last) Socialists.

The Irish Citizen Army.

This organization still exists, but it is nearly finished. It has declined since the death of Connolly, it is hostile to Sinn Fein and to the official element in Liberty Hall, but its opposition is very weak[,] it was a genuine "Red Guard" with a Socialist Constitution, but it is now in the hands of a very few incompetent men who are very narrow and almost reactionary. Its membership has dwindled down to almost sixty, all of whom are armed, but it counts for nothing as an organization. An attempt to revive it and work it in conjunction with a Revolutionary Socialist Party failed, but the few are left would fight for the Socialist Republic.

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These are the organizations which appear on the political battlefield in Ireland. I am of course leaving out the Hibernians, U.I.L. [United Irish League] and the Orange and Loyal factions, the first three are rapidly dying out, if some are not already dead, the Loyalists are of course in a small minority, altho very well organized. There is also a section led by Delia Larkin, who have broken away from Liberty Hall, they are small in numbers but well organized and they have very little influence on the situation and are not to be seriously reckoned with, altho most of them are Socialists. The organization that counts really is the "Irish Volunteers" they are out for an Irish Republic, but if it were once established, the majority could be relied on to see that the Republic would be controlled by the Workers, their attitude towards World Revolution is, they admire the Bolsheviki for the fight they made and admire their principles, regarding British Labour, that is another matter. If they could be convinced that the Workers in Britain were in earnest, and that they really wanted a Revolution, and were prepared to fight for it, they could be induced to help, but the Volunteers have a feeling that they cannot trust the British Workers any more than the ruling Class. This feeling could easily be bridged if only the British Workers or a section of them would begin to act. There is one last organization controlled for the most part by people who are unsympathetic to the Workers:— an educational organization, the "Gaelic League", it has no political function, and need not be taken into consideration in the event crisis. The general tendency of all the organizations is towards the idea of a Republic. All the organizations will help to overthrow British power in Ireland, but when that is done the real struggle begins.

The people who are in power in the Sinn Fein movement will endeavour to establish a Republic along the "Old approved lines", with a few modifications and conscious elements in Ireland will resist, and resist successfully. A great deal of propaganda is being carried on, there are many Socialists in Ireland who are unattached, but who are working definitely towards an objective. There is another section of whom nothing has been heard yet, but who will get support later, the Workers Communist Party, they are practically unknown, but they will probably provide the rallying ground for the discontent. We will wait and see!

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(1) РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/70-72.

3-5 Leaflets on: USA

3-5-1

Greetings to American Communists[1]

FROM THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Amsterdam, March 20th.

Comrades:

We have learned with utmost indignation how ruthlessly the ruling class of America is persecuting you. The brutality with which it strikes at the best workers for the cause, flogs and tortures, imprisons and deports hundreds of brave men and women, fills our hearts with the same bitter feeling of being powerless to assist you against your cruel oppressors, as we so often experienced when, in former days, the sad stories reached us of the suffering of the Russian revolutionaries.

But at the same time, the heroic way in which you are bearing up under the blow, fills us with admiration and with confidence in the future of the American working class. We know you are as yet only a vanguard; we know how American capitalism, by combining the brutality of the former Russian autocracy with the hypocrisy that is the proper gift of the Anglo-Saxon bourgeoisie, has succeeded till now in misleading the masses of the workers.

But we also know that persecutions have always been in the great epochs of the proletarian class-struggle "the seed of the church." So it was with Chartism, so after the promulgation of the anti-socialist law in Germany under the rule of Bismarck; so in Russia after the terrible reaction of the years 1907-1910. Socialism always arose triumphant out of all persecutions. And so will Communism in our own days. Far from striking fear in the hearts of the fighters pledged to the revolution, the White Terror in America will arouse in thousands of workers a new consciousness of the realities of the class war, and the true nature of bourgeois democracy. It will turn the thought of thousands and thousands to the principles of Communism and make them realize that there is neither freedom, nor justice, nor any hope of a better life for the masses as long as the capitalist class owns and controls the machinery of production.

The Social Revolution is making great strides in Europe; the light that has arisen in Russia floods the West; the ideas of the mass-struggle, the Soviet-system, and the dictatorship of the proletariat as means of realizing the reorganization of production on Communist lines gain daily in strength and sweep onward like an irresistible flood. In the whole of Central Europe capitalism is waiting for its deathblow; in the Latin countries, — France, Italy and Spain,— it is considerably weakened, being undermined by economical and political difficulties. Till now Anglo-American Capitalism stands almost unshaken, powerful and strong. Great Britain still relies on her colonial empire; she hopes to be able to avert the revolution by affording to the masses some slight betterment of their lot by lightening their chains a little through the exploitation of hundreds of millions of their brethren of the colored races. Well, we think these hopes will soon be disappointed. Revolt already raises its head in Egypt and in the Indies. As for the United States, the employing classes hope to retain their power by widening the chasm between a small aristocracy of labor, led by treacherous leaders, and the masses of the workers. They hope to retain it by fooling and buying the minority, by coercing and victimizing the vanguard of the masses.

It is the glorious task of the American Communism to carry on, on broader lines the task that the I.W.W. first took in hand, to lead the masses to the assault of capitalism; to become the nucleus, the heart and the brain, of a strong and determined working-class movement.

The arising of such a movement is of the utmost importance for International Communism and for the cause of the Social Revolution. We all know that the world revolution cannot triumph, as long as

Anglo-American capitalism remains in power, and we have reason to believe that the decisive struggle between capitalism and Communism will be waged on the American continent. Nothing short of the fall of American capitalism will mean the end of that gigantic historical drama of which the world war seems to have been the prologue. The ruling classes of America know this, and that is why they crush Communism before it has deeply struck root into the American soil. But you, comrades, will not let them commit this crime; you will not let them destroy your organization or compel you to desert it; you will find ways and means to shift your methods of action, you will place your organization beyond the reach of your enemies and carry on, undaunted, the agitation amongst the masses. You will rally these to the flag of Communism, that is of world-wide, uncompromising class-war. And when the economic crisis that is spreading over the world, reaches your country, — when the revolutionary storm, kept back neither by mountain ranges nor broad oceans, rages over the American continent, — when millions of starving workers no longer, like in former times, cry out for bread, but fight for power, then you will lead the way to the general attack on the capitalist system. Your persecutions, your martyrdom to-day, your heroic struggle against fearful odds, all of this will design you for leaders of the masses just as the fortitude and determination of the Russian Bolsheviks designed them to take the lead in the revolutionary struggle of 1917.

Yours for the International Revolution.

The Executive Committee of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of The Communist International,

D.J. Wynkoop.
S.J. Rutgers.
Henriette Roland Holst.

(1) Reprinted from: *The Communist*, Vol. 2, Supplement to No. 6, 1.VI.1920, p. 1.

3-5-2

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE IIIrd INTERNATIONAL

REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF AMERICA [1]

The Communist Party, organized September 1, 1919 with approximately 55,000 members, issues directly out of a split in the old Socialist Party. The new party represents more than half the membership of the old party.

[1.] Socialist Party, Socialist Labor Party, I.W.W.

The Socialist Party was organized in 1901, of a mergerer of two elements: 1) seceders from the Socialist Labor Party, like Morris Hillquit, who split away in 1899 largely because of the S.L.P.'s uncompromising endeavors to revolutionize the trades unions; 2) the Social Democratic Party of Wisconsin, a purely middle-class liberal party tinged with Socialism, of which Victor L. Berger was representative.

The Socialist Labor Party, organized definitely in 1890, acted on the basis of the uncompromising proletarian class struggle. Appearing at a period when class relation were still in state of flux, when the ideology of independence, created by the free lands of the West, still persisted among the workers, the Socialist Labor Party emphasized the class struggle and the class character of the proletarian movement. Realizing the peculiar problems of the American movement, the Socialist Labor Party initiated a consistent campaign for revolutionary unionism and against the dominant craft unionism of the American Federation of Labor, which, representing the skilled workers ― "aristocracy of labor" ― sabotaged every radical impulse of the working class. The S.L.P. was then a party of revolutionary Socialism, against which opportunist elements revolted.

The Spanish-American War was an immature expression of American Imperialism, initiated by the requirements of monopolistic Capitalism. A movement of protest developed in the middle class, which, uniting with the previous impulse of petty bourgeois and agrarian radicalism, expressed itself in a campaign of anti-Imperialism. There was a general revival of the ideology of liberal democracy. The Socialist Party expressed one phase of this liberal development; it adopted fundamentally a non-class policy, directing its appeal to the middle class, to the farmers, to every temporary sentiment of discontent, for a program of government ownership of the trusts. The Socialist Party, particularly, discouraged all action for revolutionary unionism, becoming a bulwark of the Gomperized A.F. of L. and its reactionary officials, the labor lieutenants of the capitalist class. This typical party of opportunist Socialism considered strikes and unions as of minor and transitory importance, instead of developing their revolutionary implications; parliamentarism was considered the important thing[:] legislative reforms and the use of the bourgeois state, the means equally for waging the class struggle and for establishing the Socialist Republic. The Socialist Party was essentially a party of State Capitalism, and an expression of the dominant moderate Socialism of the old International.

But industrial concentration proceeded feverishly, developing monopoly and the typical conditions of Imperialism. Congress ― parliamentarism ― assumed an aspect of futility as Imperialism developed and the Federal government became a centralized autocracy. The industrial proletariat, expropriated of skill by the machine process and concentrated in the basic industry, initiated new means of struggle. The general conditions of imperialistic Capitalism developed new tactical concepts mass action in Europe and industrial unionism in the United States, the necessity for extra parliamentary means to conquer the power of the state.

The old craft unionism was more and more incapable of struggling successfully against concentrated Capitalism. Out of this general situation arose the Industrial Workers of the World, organized in 1905 ― an event of the greatest revolutionary importance. The I.W.W. indicted craft unionism as reactionary and not in accord with the concentration of industry, which wipes out differences of skill and craft. The I.W.W. urged industrial unionism, that is to say, a unionism organized according to industrial division; all workers in one industry, regardless of particular crafts, to unite in one union; and all industrial unions to unite in the general organization, thereby paralleling the industrial structure of modern Capitalism. Industrial Unionism was urged not simply for the immediate struggle of the workers, but as the revolutionary means for the workers to assume control of industry.

Previous movements of revolutionary unionism, such as the Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance and the American Labor Union, united in the I.W.W. The Socialist Labor Party was a vital factor in the organization of the I.W.W., Daniel De Leon formulating the theoretical concepts of industrial unionism. Industrial unionism and the conception of overthrowing the parliamentary state, substituting it with an industrial administration based upon the industrial unions, was related by De Leon to the general theory of Marxism.

The Socialist Party repeatedly rejected resolutions endorsing the I.W.W. and industrial unions, although supporting I.W.W. strikes by money and publicity. The Socialist Party Supported the A.F. of L. and craft unionism, rejecting the revolutionary implications of industrial unionism ― the necessity of extra-parliamentary action to conquer the power of the state.

After the panic of 1907, there was an awakening of the American proletariat. New and more proletarian elements joined the Socialist Party. Industrial unionism developed an enormous impetus, and violent tactical disputes arose in the party, particularly in the North-west where the new unionism was a vital factor. These disputes came to a climax at the Socialist Party Convention of 1912. The tactical issue of industrial unionism was comprised in the problem of whether parliamentarism alone constituted political action, whether parliamentarism alone could accomplish the revolution or whether extra-parliamentary means were indispensable for the conquest of political power. The Socialist Party Convention, by a large majority, emasculated the Marxian conception of political action, limiting it to parliamentarism; an amendment to the party constitution defined political action as “participation in elections for public office and practical legislative and administrative work along the lines of the Socialist Party platform”. That year the Socialist Party, by means of a petty bourgeois liberal campaign, polled more than 900,000 votes for its presidential candidate; but thousands of militant proletarians seceded from the party in disgust at the rejection of revolutionary industrial unionism, while William D. Haywood, representative of the industrialists in the party, was recalled on referendum vote as a member of the National Executive Committee.

The political developments of 1910-1920 made progressivism a political issue. The Socialist Party adapted itself to this progressivism, and when the Progressive Party was organized in 1912 it appropriated most of the “immediate demands” of the Socialist Party Platform. But progressivism was the last flickering expression of radical democracy; Theodore Roosevelt harnessed progressivism to Imperialism and State Capitalism. A new social alignment arose, requiring new Socialist tactics.

2. The War, the Socialist Party and the Bolshevik Revolution.

After 1912, the party officially proceeded on its peaceful petty bourgeois way. Then ― the war, and the collapse of the International. The official representatives of the Socialist Party either justified the betrayal of Socialism in Europe, or else were acquiescently silent, while issuing liberal appeals to “humanity”.

As the war continued and the betrayal of Socialism became more apparent, and particularly as the American comrades learned of the revolutionary minority elements in the European movement, there was a revolutionary awakening in the Socialist Party, strengthened by new accessions of proletarian elements to the party. The first organized expression of this awakening was the formation of the Socialist Propaganda League in Boston, in 1916, issuing a weekly organ which afterwards became “The New

International" with Louis C. Fraina as editor and S.J. Rutgers as associate. The League emphasized the necessity of new proletarian tactics in the epoch of Imperialism. In April, 1917, was started "The Class Struggle", a magazine devoted to International Socialism which Comrades Trotzky, [N.I.] Bukharin and [A.M.] Kollontay helped to start while in this country. In the State of Michigan, the anti-reformists captured the Socialist Party, and carried on a non-reformist agitation, particularly in "The Proletarian".

The enormous exports of war munitions, the development of large reserves of surplus capital, and the assumption of a position of world power financially by American Capitalism forced the United States into the war. There was an immediate revolutionary upsurge in the Socialist Party. The St. Louis convention of the Party, in April 1917, adopted a militant declaration against the war, forced upon a reluctant bureaucracy by the revolutionary membership. But this bureaucracy sabotaged the declaration. It adopted a policy of petty bourgeois pacifism, uniting with the liberal People's Council, which subsequently accepted President Wilson's "14 points" as its own program. Moreover, there was a minority on the National Executive Committee in favor of the war; in August 1918, the vote in the N.E.C. stood 4 to 4 on repudiation of the St. Louis Declaration. The Socialist Party's only representative in Congress, Meyer London openly supported the war and flouted the party's declaration against the war; but he was neither disciplined nor expelled, in fact secured a renomination in spite of bitter opposition of the revolutionary elements in the party. Morris Hillquit accepted the declaration against the war, but converted it into bourgeois pacifism, being a prominent member ― of the People's Council. In reply to a question whether, if a member of Congress, he would have voted in favor of war, Hillquit answered ("The New Republic," December 1, 1917): "If I had believe that our participation would shorten the world war and force a better, more democratic and more durable peace, I should have favored the measure, regardless of the cost and sacrifices of America. My opposition to our entry into the war was based upon the conviction that it would prolong the disastrous conflict without compensating gains to humanity." This was a complete abandonment of the class struggle and the Socialist conception of war. The war was a test of the Socialist Party and proved it officially a party of vicious centrism.

The Russian Revolution was another test of the party. Officially, the Socialist Party was for the Menshevik policy and enthusiastic about Kerensky; while the New York "Call", Socialist Party daily newspaper in New York City, editorially characterized Comrade Lenin and the Bolsheviki, in June, 1917, as "anarchists". The party officially was silent about the November Revolution; it was silent about the Soviet Government's proposal for an armistice on all fronts, although the National Executive Committee of the Party met in December and should have acted vigorously, mobilizing the party for the armistice. But the revolutionary membership responded, its enthusiasm for the Bolshevik Revolution being magnificent. This Enthusiasm forced the party representatives to speak in favor of the Bolsheviki, but always in general terms capable of "interpretation". At the time of the Brest-Litovsk peace, there was a movement among the party representatives for revision of the St. Louis resolution and war against Germany "To save the Russian Revolution".

The Socialist Party carried on an active campaign against intervention in Russia. However, this campaign did not emphasize the revolutionary implications of the situation in Russia, as making mandatory the reconstruction of Socialist movement, being scarcely distinguishable from the general liberal campaign. A campaign against intervention must proceed as a phase of the general movement to develop revolutionary proletarian action.

3. The Left Wing Develops.

During 1918 the Socialist Party was in ferment. The membership was more and more coming to think in revolutionary terms.

Then came the armistice and the German Revolution. The response was immediate. On November 7th, 1918, a Communist Propaganda League was organized in Chicago. On November 9th Local Boston, Socialist Party, started to issue an agitational paper, "The Revolutionary Age" with L.C. Fraina, Sen

Katayama, John Reed, Ludwig L. Lore, N.I. Hourwich and others as contributing editors. This paper immediately issued a call to the party for the adoption of revolutionary Communist tactics, emphasizing that the emergence of the proletariat into the epoch of the world revolution made absolutely imperative the reconstruction of Socialism. In New York City, in February 1919, there was organized the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party with which was merged the Socialist Propaganda League. The Left Wing Manifesto and Program was adopted by local after local of the Socialist Party, the Left Wing acquiring a definite expression. The Left Wing was organized with the active participation of the Lettish, Russian, Lithuanian, Polish, Ukrainian, South Slavic, Hungarian and Esthonian Federations of the party, representing about 25,000 members. The official organs of the Federations did splendid work for the Left Wing.

In January, 1919, the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party decided to send delegates to Berne Congress of the great Betrayal.

This action was characteristic of the social-patriot and centrist bent of the party administration. There was an immediate protest from the membership, the Left Wing using the Berne Congress as again emphasizing the necessity for the revolutionary reconstruction of Socialism. In March was received a copy of the call issued by the Communist Party of Russia for an international congress to organize a new International.

"The Revolutionary Age" was the first to print the call, yielding it immediate adhesion: while the Left Wing Section of New York City transmitted credentials to S.J. Rutgers to represent it at the congress. Local Boston initiated a motion for a referendum to affiliate the party with the Third International: this was thrown out by the National administration of the party on a technicality; but after much delay another local succeeded in securing a referendum. (The vote was overwhelmingly in favor of the Third International.)

The Left Wing was now, although still without a definite organization, a formidable power in the Socialist Party. Previously all revolts in the party were isolated or consisted purely of theoretical criticism: now there was this theoretical criticism united with a developing organization expression. There was not, as yet, any general conception of the organization of a new party: it was a struggle for power within the Social Party.

About this time the call for the new Socialist Party elections was issued. The Left Wing decided upon its own candidates. The elections constituted an overwhelming victory for the Left Wing. The National administration of the Socialist Party, realizing the impending disaster, decided upon desperate measures. Branch after branch and local after local of the party, which had adopted the Left Wing Manifesto and Program was expelled. Morris Hillquit issued a declaration that the breach in the party had become irreconcilable, that the only solution was to split, each faction organizing its own party. At first the expulsions were on a small scale: then, the danger becoming more acute, the national administration of the party acted. The National Executive Committee met in May determined to "purge" the party of the Left Wing. The National Executive Committee was brutal and direct in its means: it refused to recognize the results of the elections, declaring them illegal because of "frauds". It issued a call for an emergency national convention on August 30, which was to decide the validity of the elections, meanwhile appointing an "investigating committee". But in order to insure that the convention would "act right" the N.E.C. suspended from the party the Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, Hungarian, South Slavic, Lettish, and Lithuanian Federations and the Socialist Party of Michigan State. In all, the N.E.C. suspended or expelled 40,000 members from the party, a deliberate, brazen move to control the election of delegates to the convention.

The charge of "fraud" was an easily detected camouflage. The elections were so overwhelmingly in favor of the Left Wing as to prove the charge of fraud itself a fraud. For international delegates the vote was (excluding three states, where the returns were suppressed, but which would not alter the results) Left Wing Candidates John Reed, 17,235; Louis C. Fraina 14,124; C.E. Ruthenberg, 10,773; A. Wagenknecht, 10,650, I.E. Ferguson, 6,490, Right Wing candidates; Victor L. Berger 4,871: Seymour

Stedman, 4,729; Adolph Germer 4,622; Oscar Ameringer 3,184; J.L. Engdahl, 3,510; John M. Work, 2,664; A.I. Chiplacoff, 2,346; James Oneal, 1,895; Algernon Lee, 1,858; Louis B. Boudin, who was pro-war against the Bolshevik Revolution secured 1,537 votes. The Left Wing elected 12 out of 15 members of the N.E.C. The moderates who had been dominant in the Socialist Party were overwhelmingly defeated for the N.E.C. Kate Richard O'Hare (supported by the Left Wing, although not its candidate) defeated Hillquit for International Secretary, 13,262 to 4,775.

The N.E.C. after these desperate acts and after refusing to make public the vote on the referendum to affiliate with the Communist International, decided to retain office until the convention of August 30th, although constitutionally it should have retired on June 30th.

The issue was now definite. Now compromise was conceivable. Events were directly making for a split and the organization of a new party. The Old Guard was concerned with retaining control of the Socialist Party organization, even if minus the bulk of the membership; the Left Wing was concerned with the principles and tactics.

4. THE NATIONAL LEFT WING CONFERENCE AND AFTER.

Just prior to the session of the National Executive Committee, Local Boston, Local Cleveland and the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party of New York City, issued a call for a National Left Wing Conference, which met in New York City on June 21st. The conference was composed of 94 delegates representing 20 states, and coming overwhelmingly from the large industrial centers, the heart of the militant proletarian movement.

There was a difference of opinion in the Conference as to whether a Communist Party should be organized immediately, or whether the struggle should be carried on within the Socialist Party until the emergency convention on August 30th. The proposal to organize a new party immediately was defeated 55 to 38. Thereupon 31 delegates, consisting mostly of the Federation comrades and the delegates of the Socialist Party of Michigan determined to withdraw from the Conference. The Majority in the Conference decided to participate in the Socialist Party emergency convention, all expelled and suspended locals to send contesting delegates; but issued a call for a convention September 1st, "of all revolutionary elements" to organize a Communist Party together with delegates seceding from the Socialist Party convention.

One important thing was accomplished by the Left Wing Conference — it made definite the issue of a new party which until that moment was very indefinite. The minority in the Conference emphasized the inexorable necessity for the organization of a new party. This was on the minds of practically all, but it now became a definite conviction. There were centrists in the Conference who still felt that the old party could be captured who recoiled from the split; and these voted with the majority to go to the Socialist Party convention; but the majority in the majority was convinced of the necessity for a new party, differing with the minority of 31 simply on the procedure to pursue.

After the conference the minority of 31 issued a call for a convention on September 1 to organize a Communist Party, repudiating all participation in the Socialist Party convention.

In the course of its development the Left Wing while Communist in its impulse; had attracted elements not at all Communist. There were conscious centrists; comrades who had for years been waging a struggle for administration control of the party; and comrades who were disgusted with the gangster tactics pursued by the Old Guard in control of the party administration. The situation now began to clarify itself — Right Wing, Centre, Left Wing.

The important factor in this situation was the division in the organized Left Wing — the National Council elected by the Left Wing Conference, and the minority which had organized a National Organization committee and issued its own call for a Communist Party convention. This constituted more than a split in the Left Wing; it was a split of the conscious Communist elements in the Left Wing. If it had been a split definitely between the Centre and the Left it would not have endangered the Communist movement; but both groups of the Left Wing possessed Centrist and non-Communist elements. Under these conditions division, if persisted in, meant disaster. Unity was necessary — not

simply organization unity, which at particular moments must be dispensed with, but revolutionary unity was accomplished by agreements for the merger of the two factions on the basis of a Joint Call for a Communist Party convention on September 1st.

The overwhelming majority of the organizations and delegates represented at the Left Wing conference accepted the Joint Call. Such prominent members of the Left Wing as John Reed and James Larkin who opposed the Joint Call and participation in the Communist Party convention were expelled from the Left Wing.

The Left Wing had found itself, unified itself, determined the organization of a Community Party.

5. The Conventions and Revolutionary Reconstruction.

The Socialist Party Convention met on August 30th. The repudiated National Executive Committee manipulated the roster of delegates to insure Right Wing control, dozens of delegates suspected of sympathy for the Left Wing being contested and refused admission to the convention.

The police was used against these delegates an indication of the potential Noske-[Philipp] Scheideman character of the Old Guard of the Socialist Party. The Left Wing was stigmatized as anarchistic, as consisting of foreigners, as an expression of emotional hysteria. The Socialist Party Convention was ruthlessly dominated by the Right Wing, which used the camouflage of greetings to Soviet Russia and words about the "Revolution". It did not adopt a new program in accord with the new tactical requirements of Socialism, avoiding all fundamental problems. The Socialist Party Convention adopted a resolution calling for an "international congress" to organize the "Third International", to include the Communist Party of Russia and Germany, but ignoring the existing Communist International! A minority resolution to affiliate with the Communist International was decisively defeated. The two resolutions are submitted to referendum vote. There is a group still in the Party styling itself "Left Wing" which is unscrupulously trying to garner sentiment for Communist International to revitalize the old party. The Socialist Party is now a unified party of petty bourgeois Socialism of Laborism with a natural tendency toward unity with the Labor Party. The Socialist Party now represents about 25,000 members.

The delegates refused admission to the Socialist Party Convention who in their first caucus declined to declare their purpose to join the Communist Party Convention now proceeded to organize their own convention, the first act of which was to proclaim itself the "legal convention" of the Socialist Party a beautiful centrist twist! These delegates organized themselves as the Communist Labor Party.

On Monday, the Communist Party convention met with 140 delegates representing approximately 58,000 members.

A committee of five from the "Left Wing" convention met with a committee of the Communist Party to discuss unity. The C.L.P. offered unity, "on a basic of equality", that is, to combine the two conventions as units delegate for delegate. This the Communist Party rejected. The delegates in the Communist Labor Party convention were a peculiar mixture, some of them openly repudiating the Left Wing principles and tactics, others notorious Centrists. The Communist Party committee proposed that all delegates at the Communist Labor convention having instructions to participate in the Communist Party convention (about 20) should come in as regular delegates: while delegates whose organizations had adopted the Left Wing Manifesto and Program but who were not instructed to organize a Communist Party (about 20) would be admitted as fraternal delegates. The other delegates representing an unknown constituency, or no membership at all, who were simply disgruntled at the Old Guard for its gangster tactics, could not be allowed to participate in the organization of a Communist Party. Not numbers but revolutionary integrity was the vital consideration.

The Communist Labor Party convention refused this offer and proceeded to organize a permanent party. The delegates organizing the C.L.P. represented not more than 10,000 members, many of whom are now joining the Communist Party.

The lack of Communist understanding at the Communist Labor Party Convention is apparent in its program, which is a mixture of syndicalism, Centrism, Communism, Menshevism and ordinary parliamentary Socialism. The C.L.P. Program is an adaptation of the Manifesto and Program adopted by the National Left Wing Conference, repeating the phrases but not applying them correctly. The Communist Labor Party repeats that parliamentarism is of secondary importance, but confuses the revolutionary use of parliamentarism with the use of "the machinery of the bourgeois state", at the same time considering that the use of this machinery is a factor in destroying the bourgeois state power. The C.L.P. also provides for participating in elections to all public offices, including executive offices (whereas the Communist Party limits elections to legislative bodies only). The C.L.P. does not relate industrial unionism to mass action, and verges on Syndicalism in its conception of the functions of economic organization. In one place the C.L.P. speaks of the "action of the masses" as the fundamental means of proletarian struggle, in another place of the "exercise of a united economic power" — jumbling concepts of industrial unionism and mass action instead of co-ordinating them. The C.L.P. Program further declares: "Moreover, in America there is a highly developed labor movement, and this makes it impossible to accomplish the overthrow of Capitalism except through the agency of the organized workers". This either means the reactionary American Federation of Labor (which it is impossible to believe) or it means the Syndicalist conception of organizing all the workers into industrial unions as the means for the overthrow of Capitalism. In any event, it is a repudiation of revolutionary political action as the dynamic process of the proletarian conquest of power. Thus the C.L.P. Program expresses the confusion and Centrism of its leaders and the mixed character of its membership.

Having consciously organized a third party, the Communist Labor Party is now making "unity" its major campaign. The former Left Wing organizations are almost entirely accepting the Communist Party, achieving unity through membership action. One word more: the C.L.P. speaks much of "an American Communist movement" and fights our party on the issue of "Federation control". This is malicious. There has been one disagreement with the Federation comrades; concerning this, it might be said that the Federation comrades may have been too precipitate and the American comrades too hesitant. But the Federation comrades have worked earnestly for an uncompromising Communist Party. The American and the Russian Comrades in the Communist Party are united on fundamentals. In any event, if the Federations offer any problem, it is a problem of internal party struggle and action. The sincerity of the Federation comrades, all other considerations aside, is attested by their yielding administrative power to the non-Federation comrades.

The Communist Party Manifesto is a consistent formulation of Communist fundamentals: its program a realistic application of these fundamentals to the immediate problems of the proletarian struggle; its constitution based upon rigorous party centralization and discipline, without which a Communist Party builds upon sand.

The Communist Party Convention elected the following officials. International Secretary, Louis C. Fraina; Executive Secretary, C.E. Ruthenberg; International Delegates, I.E. Ferguson, N.I. Hourwich, C.E. Ruthenberg, A. Stoklitsky; L.C. Fraina Editor and I.E. Ferguson Associate Editor of the Central organs of the Party, and a Central Executive Committee of fifteen. The central organs of the party are "The Communist" issued weekly, and "The Communist International" a theoretical monthly magazine.

6. The General Situation.

The Communist Party appears at a moment of profound proletarian unrest. There has been strike after strike, growing out of the increasingly high cost of living, and developing larger and more aggressive character. Recently, there was a strike of 300,000 steel workers and of 500,000 coal miners. These strikes are defeated piecemeal, since the old unions cannot unify the strikes and the state intervenes to break the strikes. As the struggle proceeds, strikes are bound to become more bitter and protracted and, because of the intervention of the state, are bound to assume a political character, actually if not consciously. The strike situation comprises the objective conditions out of which the Communist Party endeavors to develop mass action and the general political strike.

A vital feature of these strikes is the conservatism of the trades union officials; of 70 strikers declared during the past two months, 66 were not authorized by the union officials and were declared against their opposition. There is a revolutionary upsurge in the old unions, a movement toward adopting larger means and purposes in their struggle, movement for industrial unionism and indefinite recognition of the necessity of political action developing concretely, if as yet incomplete. There is moreover, among the rank and file of the old unions a strong sentiment in favor of Soviet Russia.

But the American Federation of Labor, as a whole, is hopelessly reactionary. At its recent convention the A.F. of L. approved the Versailles peace treaty and the League of Nations, and refused to declare its solidarity with Soviet Russia. It did not even protest the blockade of Russia and Hungary. This convention, moreover, did all in its power to break radical unions. The A.F. of L. bureaucracy discourages strikes and uses its power to prevent strike from assuming a revolutionary character. The A.F. of L. is united with the government, securing a privileged status in the governing system of State Capitalism. A Labor Party is being organized by the trades unions, much more conservative than the British Labor Party.

The Industrial Workers of the World is waging an aggressive campaign of organization. It has decided to affiliate with the Communist International; but its press and spokesmen continually attack Communist tactics. The I.W.W. still clings to its old concepts of organization all the workers industrially, and gradually and peacefully "growing into" the new society as the only means of accomplishing the revolution: a conception as utopian as that of the moderate Socialist, who proposes to "grow into" Socialism by peacefully transforming the bourgeois state. The Communist Party recognizes the I.W.W. as a revolutionary industrial movement, while criticizing its theoretical short-comings and rejecting its tactical proposals. The I.W.W. maintains that the revolution consists of an immediate and direct seizure of industry, rejecting the necessity of revolutionary political action to conquer the power of the state and establish a proletarian dictatorship after which and by means of which may be constructed the industrial and social structure proposed by industrial unionism. The I.W.W. images that its theoretical concepts are its contribution to the movement; but, in fact the significance of the I.W.W. is in its being an expression of the awaking of the unskilled workers.

The Socialist Labor Party as events are now developing, has become completely reactionary in its relation to Communism. The S.L.P. also, like the I.W.W., clings to the old concepts: it also wishes to wait until all the workers are organized into industrial unions and it repudiates the use of the strikes as a revolutionary weapon sneering at mass action and proletarian dictatorship as "anarchistic". The S.L.P. has decided to affiliate with the Communist International, but it carries on a bitter campaign against Communism and Communist fundamentals. It viciously attacks the Communist Party as "anarchistic", maintaining that our advocacy of mass action means riots and mob violence. The S.L.P. is no longer a factor in the American movement, and has not been for years. The contribution of the S.L.P. to revolutionary Socialism in the past is now stultified, by the S.L.P. refusing to adapt itself to new revolutionary conditions, to Communist fundamentals and life itself.

Imperialism is now consciously dominant in the United States. In his recent tour for the League of Nations, President Wilson three of the mask and spoke in plain imperialistic terms, emphasizing the absolute necessity of crushing Soviet Russia. Congress drifts and is impotent. The government, federal and local, is adopting the most repressive measures against the proletariat. Injunctions, armed force and military invasion are used to break strikes. State after state has adopted "Criminal Syndicalism" measures, making almost any advocacy of militant proletarian action a crime. Congress is considering measures to make strikes illegal. On the least pretext agitators are arrested, and if of alien birth are deported. The government at this moment is concentration its attack upon the Communist Party, its meeting places being raided and members arrested by scores. Judges declare that a membership card in the Communist Party is in itself a crime, and the purpose of the government clearing is to make the

Communist Party illegal as the Socialist movement was in Revolutionary Russia.

The liberal bourgeoisie, moreover, is hopelessly reactionary, except for a small fringe of radicals of no real political importance. The middle class has been seduced by dreams of world power and the profits accruing from the spoils of Imperialism. Opposition to the peace treaty and the League of Nations is determined largely by imperialistic fear of aggrandizing Japan and Great Britain. Progressivism except for what might be designated its "Left Wing" — a pitiable minority has merged in Imperialism and is directly counter-revolutionary.

American Imperialism is usurping world power constituting the very heart of international reaction. Reaction in Europe and the campaign against Soviet Russia are supported morally and financially by the American government. An enormous agitation is being waged for military intervention in Mexico. The American capitalist class is brutal, unscrupulous, powerful; it controls enormous reserves of financial, industrial and military power; it is determined to use power to conquer world supremacy and to crush the revolutionary proletariat.

The Communist Party realizes the immensity of its task; it realizes that the final struggle of the Communist Proletariat will be waged in the United States, our conquest of power alone assuring the world Soviet Republic. Realizing all this, the Communist Party prepares for the struggle.

Long Live the Communist International! Long Live the World Revolution!

Louis C. Fraina
International Secretary.

AMSTERDAM MARCH 1920.

(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0476.

3-5-3

COMMUNICATION OF THE AMSTERDAM SUB-BUREAU OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL [1]

To
The Executive Committee of the sub-Bureau
of the Communist International.

Comrades:

The Socialist Party of the United States has decided to affiliate with the Communist International, and has made application accordingly to G. Zinoviev. In considering this application, the following points should be borne in mind:

1 — The mere decision to affiliate with the Communist International is in itself of small value: the decisive factor is acceptance, in theory and practice, of Communist fundamentals.

2 — The resolution of the American Socialist Party in favor of affiliating with the Communist International is silent concerning acceptance of the principles and tactics of the International. At the last National Convention of the Party, August 30, 1919 (at which, incidentally, the expulsion of 40.000 Communists from the Party was overwhelmingly approved) mass action, Soviets and proletarian dictatorship as means of Revolution were rejected, the Socialist Party evading every actual problem of revolutionary theory and practice.

3 — The policy of the Socialist Party is completely dominated by the conception of parliamentary conquest of Capitalism. The party is not revolutionary; on the contrary, it is shamelessly opportunist; its tactics are comprised in dependence upon petty bourgeois democracy, parliamentarism, reformism, and co-operation with the liberals and the reactionary trades unions.

4 — The revolutionary elements in the Socialist Party have either been expelled or have seceded — of the former Party membership, approximately 50.000 are now in the Communist Party, 8.000 in the Communist Labor Party, and only 30.000 are still in the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party now consists wholly of the Right and the Centre: opportunist and reformists, all. The dominant personages in the Socialist Party are: Morris Hillquit, an unprincipled, refined opportunist of the Longuet type; Victor L. Berger, a social patriot who, in 1913, urged that the United States should conquer and annex Mexico; Seymour Stedman, a typical petty bourgeois radical, who, upon the expulsion of 40.000 Communists from the Party, declared in a capitalist newspaper: “The Socialist Party has been purged of the Bolsheviks”; Meyer London, who, as a member of Congress, supported the war and was not expelled from the Party; Algernon Lee, who, while a member of the New York City Board of Aldermen, voted to promote the sale of Liberty (war) Bonds and urged war against Germany “in order to save the Russian Revolution”! All the leaders who represented the Socialist Party as a typical party of the old International are still dominant: there has been a purge of the Communists, but not of the opportunists, of the Right and the Centre.

5 — The Socialist Party prides itself upon having declared against the war. a) The revolutionists largely responsible for the anti-war declaration are now out of the Party. b) The Party’s official policy, as expressed by the leaders who are now still dominant in the Socialist Party, was one of petty bourgeois pacifism and miserable opportunism.

6 — The Socialist Party wages a strong campaign against intervention in Russia and for recognition

of the Russian Soviet Government; but this campaign is scarcely distinguishable from the campaign of the petty bourgeois radicals. Moreover, the Socialist Party neither emphasizes nor appreciates that aspect of the Russian proletarian revolution which makes mandatory the revolutionary reconstruction of Socialism.

7 — Five Socialist Party representatives elected to the Legislature of the State of New York have been denied their seats by the Legislature. The Socialists' defense at their trial had three aspects: a) that constitutional government and democracy are menaced by the act of the Legislature; b) that the Communist Party has no connection with the Communists; c) that it is not true that the Socialist Party aims to establish a Soviet Republic in the United States, since favoring the Russian Soviet Republic "does not mean proposing, or even dreaming, that a system which develops naturally from Russia's material conditions is adaptable to a highly complex economic system such as that of the United States."

8 — The Government's savage campaign of repression against the Communist does not involve the Socialist Party. In a declaration issued January 23, 1920, justifying the repressive campaign of the Department of Justice, Attorney General Palmer said: "Certainly such an organization as the Communist Party of America and the Communist Labor Party cannot be construed to fall within the same category as the Social Party of America, which latter organization is pledged to the accomplishment of changes in the Government by lawful and rightful means."

9 — The National Executive Committee of Socialist Party, in session March 8, 1920 (two months after the decision to affiliate with the Communist International) revealed three significant facts:

a) That a number of trades unions had been invited to send delegates to the Party Convention of May 8 — indicating that the Socialist Party is merging more completely in reactionary craft unionism.

b) That a demonstration for political prisoners was being arranged together with the Freedom Foundation and the National Civil Liberties Bureau — indicating the Socialist Party's co-operation and affiliation with petty bourgeois radicals.

c) That Jean Longuet was to speak in the United States under the auspices of the Party — indicating the opportunist and centrist character of the Socialist Party's international affiliations.

10 — Historically, the Socialist Party developed as the American expression of the opportunism and reformism which became dominant in the Second International at the close of the 19th Century; the Party represented and still represents moderate petty bourgeois Socialism. The decision of the Party to affiliate with the Communist International is the product of two factors: a) Undefined sympathy of the Party membership with the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Republic; the Communist International being identified with the Soviet Republic and a means of assisting this Republic, instead of as a means of revolutionary struggle and the reconstruction of Socialism. b) The "diplomacy" of a miserable Left Centre in the Socialist Party, which considers it a "clever stroke" to affiliate with the Communist International, imagining that this might impair the power of the Communist Party of America.

The admission of the American Socialist Party to the Communist International would be a serious blow to the American Communist movement, and to the International itself.

A serious and menacing situation now prevails in the Communist International. The old International is broken in pieces: in this, the Communist International has performed a magnificent task of destruction; but the Communist International has not yet performed the constructive task of organizing itself on a definite basis. All sorts of parties and groups formerly affiliated with the old International, and which have not purged themselves of the Centre and the Right, are asking admission to the Communist International; for our International to admit these undesirable elements would mean re-constructing the Second International under the name of Communist International. The situation is dangerous and requires immediate and uncompromising action: the Communist International must double-bolt its door against

undesirable elements, it must do nothing to impair its own revolutionary integrity or to hamper the conscious Communist movement in any particular country.

In the name of the Communist Party of America, accordingly, I call for the rejection of application of the American Socialist Party for admission to the Communist International; and that, pending final action by the Executive Committee in Moscow (or a Congress of the International), the Sub-Bureau of the International shall not enter into any relations with American Socialist Party.

Berlin, March 30, 1920.

Louis C. Fraina
International Secretary, C.P.A.

The Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Communist International supports the request for rejecting the affiliation of the Socialist Party of America (S.P.A.) to the 3rd International.

Although appreciating, that among the rank and file of the S.P.A. a feeling prevails of sympathy towards Soviet Russia and the methods of the Communist International, it is necessary to express clearly, that workers, who cannot get away from old leaders and organizations, when such leaders and organizations stand in the way of further development and therefore have become counterrevolutionary, are not yet ripe to be admitted in the vanguard of the proletarian army.

Now that the Second International is decomposing and a place for treaters only, there is a tendency to seek refuge in the 3rd International, in the hope of reconstructing communism into something acceptable to compromisers and those who enjoy revolutionary principles but hate revolutionary practice. We are of the opinion, that it is necessary to close our doors to all to be rather careful in not admitting parties and groups of the right and the centre.

However, it is not up to our Bureau to decide and the request will be put before the Executive in Moscow and finally before an International Congress. In the meanwhile we lay before our affiliated parties and groups the objections of our friends of the Communist Party of America (C.P.A.).

For the Amsterdam Bureau

H. Roland Holst
S.J. Rutgers
D.J. Wynkoop.

(1) Papers of E. Sylvia Pankhurst, 260.

3-5-4

COMMUNICATION OF THE SUB-BUREAU OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL [1]

The Amsterdam sub-Bureau of the Communist International supports the request for rejecting the affiliation of the Socialist Party of America (S.P.A.) to the 3-rd International.

Although appreciating, that among the rank and file of the S.P.A. a feeling prevails of sympathy towards Soviet-Russia and the methods of the Communist International, it is necessary to express clearly, that workers, who cannot get away from old leaders and organizations, when such leaders and organizations stand in the way of further development and therefore have become counterrevolutionary, are not yet ripe to be admitted in the vanguard of the proletarian army.

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For the Amsterd. Bureau

H. ROLAND HOLST.
S.J. RUTGERS.
D.J. WYNKOOP.

(1) (Typed draft) РГАСПИ, 497/2/2/252.

3-6 Leaflets on: Germany

3-6-1

Mitteilung des Exekutivkomitees
der Kommunistischen Internationale

AN ALLE ARBEITER DEUTSCHLANDS, AN DIE REICHSZENTRALE DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS UND AN DEN PARTEIVORSTAND DER UNABHÄNGIGEN SOZIALDEMOKRATISCHEN PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS [1]

(Anlässlich des Beschlusses des Leipziger Kongresses der Unabhängigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands über die Kommunistischen Internationale.)

Der letzte Kongress der U.S.P.[D.] fasste den Beschluss, sich an die Kommunistische Internationale und andere „sozialrevolutionäre Organisationen“ mit dem Vorschlag zu wenden, sich zu einer gemeinsamen internationalen Organisation zu vereinigen. Das Exekutivkomitee der Kommunistischen Internationale halt es für seine Pflicht, diese Frage vor das Forum aller revolutionären Arbeiter zu bringen. Das Exekutivkomitee nimmt an, dass nur eine offene Erörterung dieser Frage vor den breiten Arbeitermassen aller wirklicher revolutionären Elementen der internationalen Armee des Proletariats möglich ist, und nicht eine hinter den Kulissen abgeschlossene Vereinbarung. Die folgenden Ausführungen sind somit die Antwort auf den Briefe Crispiens von 15 Dezember 1919, der dem Exekutivkomitee der dritten Internationale zugestellt, und in der „Freiheit“ von 2 Januar 1920 abgedruckt wurde.

1. Die der U.S.P. angehörenden Arbeiter und ihre Führer in der Revolution.

Die Kommunistische Internationale ist sich dessen bewusst, dass die Arbeiter, die der U.S.P. angehören, ganz anders gestimmt sind als der rechte Teil ihrer Führer. Dies ist der Ausgangspunkt unserer Beurteilung der Lage in der U.S.P. Die Kommunistische Internationale betrachtet den Leipziger Beschluss der U.S.P. als einen Umschwung in der politischen Richtung der Partei, der sich unter dem Drucke desjenigen Teiles der Arbeiterklasse Deutschlands vollzogen hat, der in dieser Partei organisiert ist. Dieser Teil der Arbeiterklasse stellt sich auf Grund der ganzen Erfahrung der Revolution immer mehr und mehr auf den Standpunkt der proletarischen Diktatur und des Massenkampfes um diese Diktatur, unter der gemeinsamen Fahne der Kommunistischen Internationale. Dieses verhindern in hohem Grade die opportunistischen Parteielementen der Rechten, die geneigt sind, alles mögliche mit Worten anzuerkennen, die aber die tatsächliche Entwicklung der Revolution auf jede Weise hemmen. Die opportunistische „Zentrumsleute“ haben während des imperialistischen Krieges das Proletariat von allen Massenaktionen zurückgehalten, haben die verräterische Linie der Verteidigung des bürgerlichen „Vaterlandes“ unterstützt, haben die Notwendigkeit einer illegalen Organisation verneint, und sie schrecken vor den Gedanken an den Bürgerkrieg zurück. Am Beginn der Revolution sind sie mit den offenem Verrätern der Arbeiterklasse ─ den Scheidemannern ─ in eine gemeinsamen Regierung eingetreten, haben die schändliche Ausweisung der Berliner Botschaft des Proletarischen Russlands sanktioniert und haben die Politik des Abbruches der diplomatischen Beziehungen zur Sovietmacht unterstützt. Die rechten Führer der „Unabhängigen“ haben seit Beginn der deutschen Revolution die Entente-Orientierung gepredigt und sich mit allen Kräften dem Bunde Deutschlands mit Sowjetrussland widersetzt. Die rechten Führer der „Unabhängigen“ haben unter Deutschlands Proletariern systematisch kleinbürgerliche Illusionen über das Wesen des „Wilsonismus“ gesagt. Die rechten Führer der

„Unabhängigen“ haben Wilson gepriesen und ihm als Verteidiger eines gerechten Friedens, als Vertreter der „Demokratie“ u.s.w. hingestellt. Dank der Taktik dieser rechten Führer blieb die Staatsmaschine des Wilhelmschen Kaiserreiches, das sich nur mit der republikanischen Flagge verhüllte, vollständig unberührt. In entscheidenden Augenblicken (Januar 1919) des Kampfes mit den Henkern der Arbeiterklasse ─ Noske & Co.─ schlugen die rechten Führer der „Unabhängigen“ eine „versöhnende“ Richtung unehrlicher Makler ein, schwächten den revolutionären Willen der Arbeiter, zerfetzten die Einigkeit des Proletariats im Kampfe und förderten dadurch seine Niederlage.

Erst verneinten sie die Diktatur der Räte überhaupt und standen vollständig auf dem Standpunkt der bürgerlichen Demokratie. Dann fingen sie an ein Gemisch aus den Räten und der konstituierenden Versammlung zu propagieren (der Plan Hilferdings). Bis jetzt schwanken sie zwischen diesem und jenem, wenn es sich um die Tat handelt. Ihre literarischen Vertreter (Kautsky), die sich in ein und dem selben Verlage mit den bürgerlichen Pazifisten, „Demokraten“ und aufrichtige Dienern der Börse und der Bank vereinigen, finden keine bessere Beschäftigung, als den schmutzigen Klatsch der russischen und anderen Gegenrevolutionären über die russische Revolution zu verbreiten. Eine derartige, alles übertreffende sinnlose und unehrliche Verleumdung, wie die angebliche „Sozialisierung der Frauen“ in Russland, die von den Generalen und Spionen der Entente erfunden ist, findet im Buche Kautskys Platz. Das letzte Werk dieses Schriftstellers, „Terrorismus und Kommunismu“s, erscheint in demselben Verlage, wie das Sammelwerk gefälschter, in Amerika erfundener Dokumenten über die „Bestechung” der Bolschewiki durch den deutschen Generalstab.

Diese Beispiele genügen, um die wahre Physiognomie einer Reihe der rechten Führer der U.S.P. zu kennzeichnen. Die zu dieser Partei gehörenden Arbeiter müssen verstehen, dass die Arbeiterpartei, ohne den vollständigen Bruch mit solchen rechten Führern zu vollziehen, die Entwicklung der proletarischen Revolution nicht erleichtern kann. Es ist jetzt vollständig klar, dass die Revolution in Deutschland einen solchen qualvollen Verlauf nimmt, weil es den Scheidemannern gelungen ist, das Volk zu entwaffnen, weil der Ausbruch der Revolution nicht zur Verbindung Deutschlands mit Sowjetrussland führte, weil der alte Machtapparat im Gang geblieben ist. Ein ungeheurer Teil der Schuld und der Verantwortung hierfür fallt auf die rechten Führer der U.S.P. Um die Linie gerade zu biegen, müssen die Fehler verstanden und korrigiert werden, und darin in erster Linie besteht die Aufgabe der zur Partei der Unabhängigen gehörenden Arbeiter, die Parteilinie, wenn auch über den Kopf einiger Führer hinweg, gerade zu biegen.

II. Die Hauptfehler der U.S.P. und der „Zentrumsparteien“ überhaupt.

Die Ideologie der Führer der U.S.P. ist keine spezifisch deutsche Erscheinung. Auf demselben Standpunkte stehen die Longuetisten in Frankreich, die I.L.P. in England, die A.S.P. in Amerika und noch andere. Ihre Eigentümlichkeit ist das beständige Schwanken zwischen dem offenen Sozialverrat vom Typus Noske und der Linie des revolutinären Proletariats, d.h. dem Kommunismus. Diese Fehler fassen wir in folgenden Punkten zusammen:

I. Die Diktatur bedeutet den Sturz der Bourgeoisie durch eine Klasse, das Proletariat, und zwar durch seine revolutionäre Avantgarde. Es heisst in Wirklichkeit, den Gesichtspunkt der Diktatur des Proletariats zu verlassen und tatsächlich auf dem Standpunkt der bürgerlichen Demokratie überzugehen, wenn man verlangt, dass die Avantgarde sich erst die Mehrheit des Volkes durch Wahlen in die bürgerlichen Parlamente, in bürgerlichen Konstituanten, u.s.w. erwerben müsse, d.h. durch Abstimmungen bei Vorhandensein von Lohnsklaverei, bei Vorhandensein von Ausbeutern, unter deren Joch, bei Vorhandensein von Privateigentum an Produktionsmitteln.

So handeln die rechten Führer der deutschen Unabhängigen und der französischen Longuetisten. Diese Parteien wiederholen die Phrasen der bürgerlichen Demokraten über die Mehrheit des „Volkes“ (das von der Bourgeoisie betrogen und von Kapital niedergehalten wird) und stehen objektiv noch auf der Seite der Bourgeoisie.

II. Die Diktatur des Proletariats bedeutet die Erkenntnis der Notwendigkeit den Widerstand der Ausbeuter mit Gewalt zu brechen, bedeutet die Bereitschaft das Vermögen, die Entschlossenheit, dies zu

tun. Die Bourgeoisie, sogar die republikanische und demokratische (z.B. in Deutschland, in der Schweiz, in Amerika) greift systematisch zu Programmen, zur Lynchjustiz, zu Morden, zu militärische Gewalttaten, zum Terror gegen die Kommunisten und in Wirklichkeit gegen alle revolutionären Schritte des Proletariats. Unter diesen Bedingungen auf die Anwendung von Gewalt, auf den Terror verzichten, heisst reaktionäre, kleinbürgerliche Illusionen über den sozialen Frieden säen, heisst sich in einen weinerlichen Kleinbürger verwandeln, heisst konkret gesprochen, Angst vor dem Haudegen des Offiziers haben.

Denn der verbrecherichsten und reaktionärste imperialistische Krieg von 1914-1918 hat in allen Ländern, in allen, sogar in den demokratischen Republiken, Zehntausende des reaktionären Offiziers erzogen und in den Vordergrund der Politik gestellt, die den Terror verbreiten und ihm zum besten der Bourgeoisie, zum besten des Kapitals, gegen das Proletariat verwirklichen. Die Reden einiger Führer der Unabhängigen auf den Leipziger Kongress über die Frage der „moralischen Unzulässigkeit“ des Terrors seitens der Arbeiter in Bezug auf die weissgardistischen Henker des Proletariats beweisen, dass diese Führer durch und durch mit kleinbürgerlichen Ansichten durchtrank sind.

Das Verhalten zum Terror, das die rechten Führer der deutschen Unabhängigen und der französischen Longuetisten in Parlament-Reden, Zeitungsartikel in der Agitation und Propaganda offenbaren, ist daher tatsächlich ein vollständiges Lossagen von dem Wege der Diktatur des Proletariats, ein tatsächlicher Uebergang der Position der kleinbürgerlichen Demokratie, ist die Demoralisierung des revolutionären Bewusstseins der Arbeiter.

III. Dasselbe bezieht sich auf den Bürgerkrieg. Nach dem imperialistischen Kriegen, angesichts der reaktionären Generale und Offiziere, die den Terror gegen das Proletariat anwenden, angesichts der Tatsache dass schon neue imperialistische Kriege durch die gegenwärtige Politik aller bürgerlichen Staaten vorbereitet werden und nicht nur bewusst vorbereitet werden, sondern mit objektiver Unvermeidlichkeit aus ihrer ganzen Politik folgen, unter diesen Bedingungen, bei dieser Situation den Bürgerkrieg gegen die Ausbeuter verurteilen, ihm fürchten, heisst in Wirklichkeit, zum Reaktion werden. Das heisst sich vor dem Sieg der Arbeiter, das Zehntausende Opfer kosten kann fürchten, und ganz sicher ein neues imperialistisches Blutbad zulassen, das gestern Millionen Opfer kostete und morgen ebensoviel Opfer kosten wird. Das heisst, den reaktionären und gewaltigen Gepflogenheiten und Absichten und der Vorbereitungen der bürgerlichen Generale und der bürgerlichen Offiziere tatsächlichen Vorschub leisten.

Derartig reaktionär ist in der Tat die süssliche, kleinbürgerliche, sentimentale Position der deutschen Führer der Rechten Unabhängigen wie auch der französischen Longuetisten in der Frage des Bürgerkrieges. Man schliesst die Augen angesichts der weissen Garde, ihrer Vorbereitung und Schaffung durch die Bourgeoisie und wendet sich heuchlerisch, parasitisch (oder feige) ab von der Bildung einer Roten Garde, einer Roten Armee der Proletarier, die fähig wäre den Widerstand der Ausbeuter zu unterdrücken.

IV. Die Diktatur des Proletariats und die Rätemacht bedeuten die klare Erkenntnis der Notwendigkeit den bürgerlichen (wenn auch republikanische, demokratische) Staatsapparat, die Gerichte, die Bürokratie, die zivile wie die militärische, zu zerbrechen, in Stücke zu schlagen. Die rechten Führer der deutschen Unabhängigen und der französische Longuetisten zeigen weder Erkentnis dieser Wahrheit, noch alltägliche Agitation in dieser Richtung. Viel schlimmer; sie führen die ganze Agitation in entgegengesetztem Geiste.

V. Jede Revolution bedeutet, zum Unterschied von der Reform, eine Krise und zwar eine an und für sich überaus tiefe politische und ökonomische, unabhängig von der durch dem Krieg hervorgerufenen Krise. Die Aufgabe der revolutionären Partei des Proletariats ist es, den Arbeitern und Bauern klarzumachen, dass man den Mut haben muss, dieser Krise tapfer zu begegnen und in den revolutionären Massnahmen die Kraftquelle zu ihrer Ueberwindung zu finden. Nur durch Ueberwindung dieser Krise durch revolutionären Enthusiasmus, durch revolutionäre Energie, durch revolutionäre Bereitschaft zu den schwersten Opfern kann das Proletariat die Ausbeuter besiegen und die Menschheit endgültig vom Kriege, vom Joch des Kapitals, von der Lohnsklaverei befreien.

Einen anderen Ausweg gibt es nicht; denn das reformistische Verhalten zum Kapitalismus hat gestern das imperialistische Schlachten von Millionen Menschen, und Krisen ohne Ende erzeugt und wird sie unausbleiblich morgen erzeugen. Diesen Grundgedanken, ohne den die Diktatur des Proletariats eine leere Phrase ist, verstehen die Unabhängigen und die Longuetisten nicht, offenbaren in ihrer Propaganda und Agitation nicht und machen ihn den Massen nicht klar.

Im Gegenteil, sie schüchtern das Proletariat auf jegliche Art und Weise ein durch Hinweis auf die Schwierigkeiten, die die Proletarische Revolution nach sich zieht. Objektiv ist jedoch die Wiedergeburt der Wirtschaft nur auf Grund der proletarischen Diktatur denkbar, denn auf kapitalistischer Basis ist nur eine beständige und immer tiefer gehende Auflösung möglich. Durch ihre kleinbürgerliche Feigheit ziehen die Führer der U.S.P. den ohnehin qualvollen Prozess nur in die Lange und vergrössern dadurch die Leiden des Proletariats.

VI. Das Sowjetsystem ist die Zerstörung der bürgerlichen Lüge. Die Freiheit die Presse zu bestechen, die Freiheit der Reichen und Kapitalisten Zeitungen zu kaufen, Hunderte von Zeitungen aufzukaufen und dadurch die sogenannte „öffentliche Meinung“ zu falschen, die man Pressefreiheit nennt. Diese Wahrheit erkennen die deutschen Unabhängigen wie ihre ausländischen Kollegen nicht an; sie handeln nicht nach ihr, sie agitieren nicht täglich für die revolutionäre Vernichtung jener Unterjochung der Presse durch das Kapital, die die bürgerliche Demokratie fälschlicherweise Pressefreiheit nennt. Da sie eine solche Agitation unterlassen erkennen die Unabhängigen nur durch Lippenbekenntnis die Sowjetmacht an; in Wirklichkeit sind sie von dem Vorurteil der bürgerlichen Demokratie vollständig beherrscht.

Die Expropriation der Druckereien und der Papiervorräte ─ diese Hauptsache verstehen sie nicht zu erklären; denn sie begreifen sie selbst nicht. Dasselbe bezieht sich auf die Versammlungsfreiheit ─ diese Freiheit ist eine Lüge solange die Reichen die besten Gebauden besitzen oder öffentliche Gebäude kaufen ─ auf die Bewaffnung des Volkes, die Gewissensfreiheit ─ die Freiheit des Kapitals, ganze Kirchenorganisationen zwecks Betäubung der Massen mit religiösen Opium zu kaufen und zu bestechen ─ und auf alle übrigen bürgerlich-demokratische Freiheiten.

VII. Die Diktatur des Proletariats bedeutet das Vermögen, die Bereitschaft und die Entschlossenheit, die ganze Masse der Werktätigen und Ausgebeuteten durch revolutionäre Massnahmen, durch Expropriation der Ausbeuter auf ihre Seite, auf die Seite der revolutionären Avantgarde des Proletariats zu ziehen. Diese sind in der täglichen Agitation der deutschen Unabhängigen z.B. in der „Freiheit“, nicht zu finden. Auch bei den Longuetisten sind sie nicht zu finden. Im Besondern ist diese Agitation unter den ländlichen Proletariern notwendig, unter den Kleinbauern (Bauern, die keine Lohnarbeit ausbeuten, Bauern, die wenig oder gar kein Getreide verkaufen). Diesen Schichten der Bevölkerung muss täglich, einfach, populär, auf die konkreteste Weise klar gemacht worden, dass das Proletariat nach der Eroberung der Staatsmacht unverzüglich auf Kosten der expropriierten Grundbesitzer ihre Lage verbessern, sie vom Joch der Grossgrundbesitzer befreien, ihnen als einer Klasse grosse Güter geben, sie von den Schulden befeien wird, u.s.w. Dasselbe muss der städtischen nichtproletarischen oder nicht ganz proletarischen Werktätigen Massen erklärt worden. Eine solche Agitation wird von den Unabhängigen nicht geführt.

VIII. Die Diktatur des Proletariats bedeutet und setzt die klare Erkenntnis der Wahrheit voraus, dass das Proletariat kraft seiner objektiven ökonomischen Lage in jeder kapitalistischen Gesellschaft die Interessen der ganzen Masse der Werktätigen und Ausgebeuteten, aller [Halb]Proletarier (d.h. der vom teilweisen Verkauf ihrer Arbeitskraft Lebenden), aller Kleinbauern u. dgl. richtig vertritt.

Diese Schichten der Bevölkerung folgen den bürgerlichen und kleinbürgerlichen Parteien (darunter auch den sozialistischen Parteien der 2 Internationale) nicht kraft ihrer freien Willensäusserungen, wie die kleinbürgerliche Demokratie annimmt, sondern kraft des direkten Betruges durch die Bourgeoisie kraft ihrer Unterjochung durch das Kapital, kraft des Selbstbetruges der kleinbürgerlichen Führer.

Diese Schichten der Bevölkerung (die Halbproletarier und die Kleinbauern) wird und kann das Proletariat nur nach seinem Siege, nur nach der Eroberung der Staatsmacht, auf seiner Seite ziehen, d.h. nachdem es die Bourgeoisie gestürzt, dadurch alle diese Werktätigen vom Joch des Kapitals befreit und

ihnen in der Praxis gezeigt hat, welchen Nutzen (Befreiung von den Ausbeutern) die proletarische Staatsmacht gewährt.

Diesen Gedanken, der die Grundlage und die wesentliche Idee der Diktatur des Proletariats ausmacht, verstehen die deutschen Unabhängigen und die französische Longuetisten nicht, tragen ihn nicht in die Massen, propagieren ihn nicht täglich.

IX. Die Unabhängigen (der rechte Flügel) und die Longuetisten betreiben keine Agitation im Heere (Eintritt ins Heer zwecks Vorbereitung seines Ueberganges auf die Seite der Arbeiter gegen die Bourgeoisie). Sie schaffen keine Organisationen zu diesem Zwecke.

Sie antworten nicht auf die Gewalttaten der Bourgeoisie, auf deren endlosen Uebertretungen der „Gesetzlichkeit“ (wie während des imperialistischen Krieges, so auch nach dessen Beendigung) durch systematische Propaganda illegaler Organisationen und Schaffung derselben.

Ohne Verbindung von legaler Arbeit mit illegaler, von legalen Organisationen mit illegalen, kann von einer wirklichen revolutionären Partei des Proletariats weder in Deutschland, noch in Schweden, noch in England, noch in Frankreich die Rede sein.

X. Die Grundfrage der sozialistischen Revolution, die Expropriation der Ausbeuter stellen die rechten Führer unter die Benennung „Sozialisierung“ und sie stellen ihn reformistisch und nicht revolutionär. Das Wort „Sozialisierung“ vertuscht die Notwendigkeit der Konfiskation, die durch das unerträgliche Joch der imperialistischen Schulden und der Verarmung der Arbeiter hervorgerufen wird, vertuscht den Widerstand der Ausbeuter und die Notwendigkeit revolutionärer Massnahmen des Proletariats zu seiner Unterdrückung. Diese Fragestellung erzeugt notwendigerweise reformistische Illusionen, die der Diktatur des Proletariats durchaus nicht entsprechen.

XI. Die Kommunistische Internationale halt nicht für ungerecht, sondern auch prinzipiell für unzulässig, dass die U.S.P. Deutschlands, die tatsächlich die Grundideen der deutschen Spartakisten übernimmt, wobei sie diese Ideen zu langsam, inkonsequent und unvollständig aneignet, in den Beschlüssen ihres Kongresses kein Wort über die Vereinigung mit der Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (mit dem Spartakusbund) sagt. Die Einheit des revolutionären Proletariats erfordert eine solche Verbindung. Mann kann jedoch die Diktatur des Proletariats und die Sowjetmacht in Wirklichkeit nicht anerkennen, ohne tatsächliche, ernste, gewissenhafte Schritte dazu zu unternehmen dass die Avantgarde des Proletariats des gegebenen Landes, die durch langen und schweren Kampf (wie gegen die Opportunisten, so auch gegen die Syndikalisten und gegen die angeblich linken Halbanarchisten) ihre Fähigkeit, die Arbeiterklasse zu einer solchen Diktatur zu führen bewiesen hat, von allen bewussten Arbeitern unterstützt, ihre Autorität gefestigt, ihre errungene Tradition sorgfältig behütet und entwickelt werden. Der Spartakusbund in Deutschland, der von solchen Führern, wie Rosa Luxemburg und Karl Liebknecht gegründet worden ist, ist gerade ein solcher, der die internationale Bedeutung seiner Avantgarde erhalten hat, und der Versuch ihn zu umgehen, wie dies die Unabhängigen in Deutschland tun, ist unmöglich.

Das hängt zusammen mit der Tatsache, dass die Führer der U.S.P. Deutschlands wissenschaftlich nicht die Meinung der Arbeitermassen dieser Partei ausdrücken, da sie viel mehr rechts stehen als diese. Mit diesem Uebel, das dem Proletariat in der Epoche von 1889-1919 unerhörte Leiden verursacht hat, kann man sich nicht aussöhnen, denn dieses Uebel wird durch das Auseinandergehen von Wort und Tat verhüllt.

Auf solche Weise ist die ganze Propaganda, die ganze Agitation, die ganze Organisation der Unabhängigen und der Longuetisten im grossen und ganzen mehr eine kleinbürgerlich-demokratische als eine revolutionär-proletarische, sie ist pazifistisch und nicht sozial-revolutionär.

Infolgedessen die „Anerkennung“ der Diktatur des Proletariats und der Sowjetmacht nur in Worten.

III. Die U.S.P. und die Internationale.

Dieselben kleinbürgerliche feige Politik betreiben die rechten Führer der U.S.P. auch in Bezug auf die Frage der Internationalen Vereinigung des Proletariats.

I. Die rechten Unabhängigen und die Longuetisten vortiefen und entwickeln in den Massen nicht das Bewusstsein der Fäulnis, der Verderblichkeit, jenes Reformismus, der tatsächlich in der IIten Internationale vorherrschte (1889-1914) und sie zugrunde richtete, sondern sie vordunkeln dieses Bewusstsein, verhüllen die Krankheit, anstatt sie aufzudecken. Die Frage des Zusammenbruches der IIten Internationale, eine Frage von grösster welthistorischer Bedeutung, die Ursachen dieses Zusammenbrechens, die Hauptfehler und die Verbrechen der IIten Internationale ihre Rolle in der Eigenschaft eines Hilfskontors beim „Völkerbunde“ ─ alle diese Fragen wurden von der U.S.P. gar nicht aufgeworfen. Dadurch vorhüllt sie diese Verbrechen und verdunkelt das Klassenbewusstsein der proletarischen Massen.

II. Die Unabhängigen und die Longuetisten verstehen nicht und klaren die Massen nicht darüber auf, dass die imperialistischen Mehrgewinne der vorgeschrittene Länder diesen erlauben (und gegenwärtig erlauben) die Oberschichten des Proletariats zu bestechen, ihnen Brocken des Mehrgewinns (den sie aus den Kolonien und der finanziellen Ausbeutung der schwachen Völker ziehen) zuzuwerfen, eine privilegierte Schicht geschulter Arbeiter zu schaffen u.s.w.

Ohne Enthüllung dieses Uebels, ohne Kampf nicht nur gegen die Aristokratie der Trade-Unions, sondern auch gegen alle Aeusserungen des Kleinbürgertums der Zünfte, der Arbeiteraristokratie, der Privilegierten der Oberschicht der Arbeiter, ohne schonungslose Vertreibung der Vertreter dieses Geistes aus der revolutionären Partei, ohne Appellation an die Unterschichten, an die immer breiteren Massen, an die wirkliche Mehrheit der Ausgebeuteten kann von einer Diktatur des Proletariats keine Rede sein.

III. Die Unlust oder Unvermögen, mit den vom Imperialismus angesteckten Oberschichten der Arbeiter zu brechen, offenbart sich bei den rechten Unabhängigen und den Longuetisten ebenfalls darin, dass sie nicht für die direkte und bedingungslose Unterstützung aller Aufstande und revolutionären Bewegungen der Kolonialvölker agitieren. Unter diesen Bedingungen wird die Verurteilung der Kolonialpolitik und des Imperialismus zur Heuchlerei oder zum einfachen Seufzer eines stumpfsinnigen Kleinbürgers.

IV. Während sie aus der IIten Internationale heraustreten und sie in Worten verurteilen (z.B. Crispien in seiner Schrift), strecken die Unabhängigen in Wirklichkeit einem Friedrich Adler, dem Mitglied der österreichischen Partei, der Herren Noske und Scheidemann, die Hand hin. Die Unabhängigen dulden in ihrer Mitte Literaten, die alle Grundbegriffe der Diktatur des Proletariats verneinen (Kautsky & Co.).

Die Unabhängigen haben an der Berner und der Luzerner gelben Konferenz teilgenommen. Die Unabhängigen haben auch nach Leipziger Kongress ihr Zentralorgan die „Freiheit“ in den Handen des Erzrechten Hilferding, eines Anhängers der gelben IIten Internationale gelassen. Dieses Auseinandergehen von Wort und Tat charakterisiert die ganze Politik der Führer der Partei der Unabhängigen in Deutschland und der Longuetisten in Frankreich. Eben die Führer teilen die Vorurteile der kleinbürgerlichen Demokratie und der reformistisch demoralisierten Oberschichten des Proletariats, entgegen den revolutionären Sympathien der Arbeitermassen, die zum Sowjetsystem neigen.

V. Während die Führer der U.S.P. unter den Druck der Arbeitermassen mit der kommunistischen Internationale in Verhandlung treten, wenden Sie sich gleichzeitig an die Parteien der IIten Internationale (darunter die weisse Mannerheimsche Sozialdemokratie Finnlands). Diese Parteien nennen sie sozial-revolutionär, und sie schlagen der Kommunistischen Internationale vor, sich mit diesen Parteien zu vereinen.

Diese hilflose Versuch, noch eine vierte, eine Bastardinternationale zu gründen, ohne klares Programm, ohne feste Taktik, ohne Aussicht auf eine Zukunft, ohne Perspektiven ist dem Untergange geweiht. Er beweist aber, dass die rechten Führer der Unabhängigen den Beschluss des Leipziger Parteitages ihrer eigenen Partei sabotieren und an eine aufrichtige Vereinigung mit der Avantgarde des ringenden internationalen Proletariats nicht denken.

In Zusammenhang mit allem Vorhergehenden erklärt das Exekutivkomitee der Kommunistischen Internationale:

a) Die Kommunistische Internationale stellt gegenwärtig die grösste Kraft vor, die schon die

wichtigsten, wirklich revolutionären Elemente der internationalen proletarischen Bewegung vereint hat.

An dem ersten konstituierenden Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationalen in Moskau (März 1919) nahmen folgende Parteien und Organisationen teil:

1. Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands.
2. Kommunistische Partei Russlands.
3. Kommunistische Partei Oesterreichs.
4. Kommunistische Partei Ungarns.
5. Linke der Schwedische Sozialdemokratische Partei.
6. Sozialdemokratische Partei Norwegens.
7. Sozialdemokratische Partei (Opposition) der Schweiz.
8. Amerikanische I.L.P.
9. Revolutionäre Balkanfederation. (Bulgarische „Tessenjaki“) und die Kommunistische Partei Rumäniens.
10. Kommunistische Partei Polens.
11. Kommunistische Partei Finnlands.
12. Kommunistische Partei der Ukraine.
13. Kommunistische Partei Lettlands.
14. Kommunistische Partei Litauens und Weissrusslands.
15. Kommunistische Partei Armeniens.
16. Kommunistische Partei Estlands.
17. Kommunistische Partei der deutschen Kolonien in Russland.
18. Kommunistische Partei Englands.
19. Vereinigte Gruppe der Ostvölker Russlands.
20. Zimmerwalder französische Linke.
21. Tschechische Kommunistische Gruppe.
22. Bulgarische Kommunistische Gruppe.
23. Südslavische Kommunistische Gruppe.
24. Englische Kommunistische Gruppe.
25. Französische Kommunistische Gruppe.
26. Sozialdemokratische Partei Hollands.
27. Amerikanische Liga der sozialistischen Propaganda.
28. Schweizer Kommunistische Gruppe.
29. Turkestaner Sektion des Zentralbüros der Ostvölker.
30. Türkische 〃 〃 〃 〃 〃 .
31. Georgische 〃 〃 〃 〃 〃 .
32. Aserbeidjanische 〃 〃 〃 〃 .
33. Persische 〃 〃 〃 〃 〃 .
34. Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Finnlands.
35. Zimmerwalder Kommission.
36. Arbeiterverband Koreas.

In den zehn Monaten, die seit den konstituierenden Kongress vergangen sind folgende Berichte über die Solidarisierung mit der Kommunistische Internationale eingelaufen (Wir bemerken dass die unten angeführte Angaben sehr unvollständig sind; in Wirklichkeit sind der IIIten Internationale viel mehr Parteien und Organisationen beigetreten).

Am 19 März 1919 wurde der Beschluss des Komitees der Italienischen Sozialistischen Partei in Mailand über den Beitritt in die Kommunistische Internationale gefasst.

Am 8 April wurde der Beschluss des Kongresses der Norwegischen Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei über ihren Beitritt zur Kommunistischen Internationale gefasst.

Am 10 Mai erhielten wir die Mitteilung von dem Beitritt des Schwedischen Sozialdemokratischen Jugendverbandes zur IIIten Internationale.

Am 14 Juni wurde der Beschluss der Konferenz des linken Flügels der Schwedischen Sozialdemokratischen Partei über den Beitritt zur IIIten Internationale gefasst.

Am 22 Juni erhielten wir die Mitteilung des Beschlusses des Kongresses der Bulgarischen Sozialdemokratischen Partei der Tessenjaki über ihren Beitritt.

Am 20 Juli erhielten wir die Mitteilung des Beschlusses des Zentralkomitees der Polnischen Kommunistischen Partei über den vollzogenen Beitritt zur Kommunistischen Internationale.

Im Juli 1919 beschloss der Kongress der Schweizerischen Sozialdemokratischen Partei der IIIten Internationale beizutreten. Bei dem Referendum sprach sich dafür nur die Minderheit, aber eine sehr bedeutende Minderheit aus.

Im August 1919 fasste der Kongress der Sozialisten der Vereinigten Staaten den Beschluss der Kommunistischen Internationale beizutreten. In Amerika bestehen gegenwärtig zwei Kommunistische Parteien. Beide gehören der IIIten Internationale an.

Im August 1919 haben wir ebenfalls die Mitteilung von dem Beitritt der Kommunistischen Partei Ostgaliziens zur IIIten Internationale erhalten.

Im September 1919 liefen Nachrichten über die Vereinigung der Sozialistischen Partei Elsass-Lothringens mit der Kommunistischen Internationale ein. Dieselben Nachrichten erhielten wir in diesem Monat von der Ukrainischen Föderation der Sozialistischen Parteien in Amerika und über eine Reihe Finnische Arbeiterorganisationen.

Im Oktober 1919 bestätigte der Kongress der Italienischen Sozialistischen Partei in Bologna mit ungeheuerer Mehrheit den Beitritt der italienischen Partei zur Kommunistischen Internationale.

Am 23 Oktober lief der Bericht ein über den Beschluss der Britischen Sozialistischen Partei, der IIIten Internationale beizutreten.

Am 20 November erhielten wir die Nachricht von Beitritt eines Teiles der Dänischen Sozialistischen Partei zur IIIten Internationale.

Im Dezember 1919 lief die Nachricht ein über den Beitritt der Böhmischen, der Lothringer und der Mexikanischen Sozialistischen Parteien zur IIIten Internationale. In selben Monat erhielten wir die Mitteilung, dass in einer der europäischen Städte ein internationaler Kongress der Arbeiterjugend stattfand, an dem die Delegierten von 220 000 Mitgliedern der Partei teilgenommen haben, und der einstimmig beschloss der Kommunistischen Internationale beizutreten.

Im Dezember 1919 wurden auf dem Kongress der spanischen Sozialisten für die IIIte Internationale 12 500 Stimmen, gegen dieselben 14 000 Stimmen abgegeben.

Auf den Skandinavischen Arbeiterkongress (Dezember 1919) waren 268 Delegierten von 300 000 Arbeitern anwesend. Die kommunistische Resolutionen wurden einstimmig angenommen.

Im Januar 1920 erhielten wir den Bericht über den Beitritt der Arbeiterpartei Schottlands zur Kommunistischen Internationale.

Diese Aufzählung genügt, um zu sehen dass in den Reihen der Kommunistischen Internationale schon jetzt die ganze Avantgarde des kämpfenden internationalen Proletariats vereinigt ist. Die Arbeiterparteien, die aufrichtig für die Diktatur des Proletariats und die Rätemacht kämpfen wollen, können und müssen sich mit dem Kern vereinigen, den die IIIte, Kommunistische Internationale darstellt.

b) Das Exekutivkomitee der Kommunistischen Internationale ist der Meinung dass es im Interesse des Erfolges des internationalen proletarischen Kampfes nicht zulässig sei, unter irgend einem Vorwande ─ und wo es auch sei ─ noch eine neue Zwischenvereinigung der Arbeiter zu schaffen, die in Wirklichkeit keinesfalls revolutionär sein kann. Die Zersplitterung der Kräfte des internationalen Proletariats würde nur im Interesse des Kapitals und seiner Diener, der gewesenen Sozialisten, liegen.

c) Das Exekutivkomitee der Kommunistischen Internationale halt es für äusserst wünschenswert, mit den Parteien, die sich zum endgültigen Bruch mit der IIten Internationale bereit erklären, in Verhandlung zu treten. Zu diesem Zwecke fordert das Exekutivkomitee die Vertreter dieser Parteien auf, nach Russland zu kommen, wo das Vollzugsorgan der Kommunistischen Internationale seinen Aufenthalt hat. Wie gross auch die technischen Schwierigkeiten beim Passieren der Grenzen sind, so ist doch die Reise der Delegierten der angeführten Parteien, wie dies die Erfahrung gezeigt hat, möglich.

d) Das Exekutivkomitee der Kommunistischen Internationale ist sich dessen bewusst, dass infolge der Kompliziertheit der Beziehungen und der spezifische Eigentümlichkeiten in der Entwicklung der Revolution mit diesen Eigentümlichkeiten streng gerechnet werden muss, und wir sind durchaus bereit, die IIIte Internationale zu erweitern, die Erfahrung der proletarischen Bewegung in allen Ländern in Betracht zu ziehen, das Programm der IIIten Internationale auf Grund der Theorie des Marxismus und der Erfahrung des revolutionären Kampfes in der ganzen Welt zu korrigieren und zu ergänzen. Wir lehnen aber entschieden jede Mitarbeiterschaft mit den rechten Führern der Unabhängigen und der Longuetisten ab, die die Bewegung zurück in den bürgerlichen Sumpf der gelben IIten Internationale ziehen.

Indem das Exekutivkomitee den Beschluss des Leipziger Kongresses in dem Teile, der von dem Bruch mit der IIten Internationale spricht begrüsst, und die Delegation der U.S.P. zu Verhandlung auffordert, drückt es die feste Ueberzeugung aus, dass durch die revolutionäre Erkenntnisfähigkeit der proletarischen Massen die Reihen der Führer der U.S.P. gesäubert werden, die Partei zur Vereinigung mit der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands gebracht wird und schliesslich sich ihre besten Elemente unter dem gemeinsamen Banner der Kommunistischen Internationale organisieren werden.

Das Exekutivkomitee der Kommunistischen Internationale schlagt den aufgeklärten Arbeitern Deutschlands vor, diese Antwort in öffentlichen proletarischen Versammlungen zu erörtern und genaue und klare Antworten auf die berührten Fragen von den Führern der U.S.P. zu verlangen.

Das Exekutivkomitee der Kommunistischen Internationale sendet dem heldenhaften Proletariat Deutschlands brüderliche Grüsse.

Moskau den 5 Februar 1920.

Das Exekutivkomitee
der
Kommunistischen Internationale.

Vorsitzender: G. S i n o w j e w.

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Weitergeleitet vom Amsterdamer Zweigbureau
APRIL 1920.

(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0460. Reprinted in: *Die Kommunistische Internationale*, 2. Jg. (1920), No. 9, S. 152-165.

3-6-2

Oproep om steun aan onze Duitsche revolutionaire kameraden [1]

Het denkbeeld om levensmiddelen te zenden naar onze strijdende makkers in het Roergebied vindt van verschillende kanten toejuiching.

De Minister van Buitenlandsche Zaken heeft Donderdag in de Kamer verklaard: "*De uitvoer van levensmiddelen is vrij*."

Onze kameraden over de grenzen geven hun bloed en hongeren; wij hebben betrekkelijk overvloed en missen nog de kracht daadwerkelijk in verzet te komen.

Laten we dan tenminste het uiterste doen om den honger te verminderen en den strijd mogelijk te maken.

Laten we nu tiendubbel bijdragen nu we èn onze makkers èn de revolutie voor ondergang kunnen bewaren.

In afwachting van een onderzoek in hoeverre de spoorwegen voor dit doel beschikbaar zijn; in afwachting ook van het oogenblik dat geen Noske-handlangers tusschen ons en de Roode zullen staan, zal reeds dadelijk het noodige worden gedaan om een vrachtauto met verduurzaamde melk of andere geconserveerde voedingsmiddelen uit te rusten om door meerdere te worden gevolgd.

We zullen onze Duitsche vrienden vragen op deze vrachtauto's kinderen terug te zenden en aan onze zorgen toe te vertrouwen.

Er moet snel gehandeld worden.

Er is veel geld noodig en vooral spoedig, al mag de steun van de transportarbeiders er in geen geval onder lijden.

Zendt nog heden bijdragen en toezeggingen aan Ceton, Amstel 85; geeft uw naam en adres voor het opnemen van een of meer kinderen.

Het Amsterdamsch Bureau van de Communistische Internationale te Moskou:
H. ROLAND HOLST.
S.J. RUTGERS.
D.J. WIJNKOOP.

(1) Reprinted from: *De Tribune*, Jrg. 13, No. 151, 29.III.1920, p. 1; No. 155, 3.IV.1920, p. 3.

3-6-3

MITTEILUNG DES AMSTERDAMER ZWEIGBUREAUS DER III-TEN INTERNATIONALE [1]

Das Westeuropäische Sekretariat (W.E.S.) der Kommunistischen Internationale (K.I.) in Berlin veröffentlicht in Die Rote Fahne von 22 April 1920 eine Erklärung über den Anschluss der neu gebildeten Kommunistischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (K.A.P.D.; die frühere Opposition der K.P.D.) an die IIIte Internationale. Das W.E.S. teilt darin mit, dass es als selbstverständlich annimmt, dass das Exekutivkomitee der K.I. in Moskau die Anmeldung des Anschlusses zurückweisen wird, und zwar auf Grund des Moskauer Schreibens vom 5 Februar betreffend den Anschluss der U.S.P., dass unser Bureau auch verbreitet hat.

Namentlich wird dabei auf einen Satz hingewiesen, in welchem unsere Moskauer Freunde zum Ausdruck bringen, dass es für die Einheit des Kampfes notwendig sei, dass die U.S.P. ernsthafte Versuche anstellt sich mit dem in der K.P.D. (Spartakusbund) verkörperten revolutionären Vorhut zu vereinigen.

In diesem Schreiben wird aber die U.S.P. nur eingeladen, mit Moskau zu unterhandeln und dabei wird ─ dies war auch namentlich immer der Standpunkt des W.E.S.─ von der U.S.P. nur gefordert, dass die rechtsstehenden Führer ausgestossen werden sollen. Wenn man nun weiss dass dieses W.E.S. mit der Ausnahme eines Mitgliedes und des Vertreters der Jugendzentrale ─ der scharf gegen dieses auftreten protestierte ─ bloss aus Mitgliedern der K.P.D. besteht, so bekommt diese Haltung des W.E.S. eine sehr bedenkliche Seite.

Noch bedenklicher wird sie, wenn man sich erinnert, dass die „Zentrale“ der K.P.D. die Opposition systematisch aus der K.P.D. hinausgetrieben hat, und eine Politik treibt, die zu einer Stärkung der U.S.P. führen muss, trotzdem diese schon wieder auf den neuen Verrat an das Proletariat übte.

Das W.E.S. beschuldigt weiter die K.A.P.D. der Verbindung mit Kapp-Offizieren und dem nationalen Bolschewismus. Wir glauben dagegen feststellen zu dürfen, dass die K.A.P.D. sich gar nicht für diese Methoden ausgesprochen hat und für die Taten und Auffassungen einzelner Personen nicht verantwortlich zu halten ist. Zweifellos lehnen wir den National-Bolschewismus entschieden ab, auch in der Form wie er in dem bekannten Manifest Laufenberg-Wolfheim dargelegt wurde und neuerdings in anderen Formen sich offenbarte, wie wir gleichfalls die „loyale Opposition“ ablehnen, die von der Zentrale der K.P.D. zur Ermutigung einer „rein-sozialistischen Regierung“ d.h. einer konterrevolutionären Regierung, angekündigt war; in beiden Fällen steht aber die Mehrheit der Mitglieder den reaktionären Manövern der einzelnen Führer ablehnend gegenüber.

Der Kampf der Gruppen und Tendenzen in Deutschland hat äusserst scharfe Formen angenommen, und eine sachliche Besprechung der Differenzen erscheint vorläufig ziemlich ausgeschlossen. Aber gerade für diesen Zustand der Desorganisation des unsachlichen Kampfes, der Demoralisation im Parteileben erachten wir die Zentrale der K.P.D. nicht in letzter Linie verantwortlich. Wenn diese Zentrale jetzt unter dem Namen des W.E.S. der K.I. als Richter in eigener Sache auftritt, so übersteigt das alle Grenzen.

Es ist höchste Zeit, dass die Westeuropäische Arbeiter ein von Allen anerkanntes Organ schaffen, das in Zusammenarbeit mit Moskau die Einheit des Weltproletariats zu fördern sucht. Inzwischen wird das Amsterdamer Zweigbureau kraft des von der Amsterdamer Konferenz gegebenen Mandats, es als ihre Aufgabe betrachten, die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Teilen der Internationale zu fördern und dagegen auftreten, dass, man Minderheiten von Links in ihrem Aufkommen zu hindern sucht.

Die neue K.A.P.D. hat auch uns gegenüber ihrem Beschluss mitgeteilt der K.I. beizutreten. Bis der nächste internationale Kongress darüber endgültig entscheidet, betrachten wir die K.A.P.D. als der

IIItenInternationalen angehörend und werden wir mit ihr Verbindungen unterhalten und ihr alle Mitteilungen und Einladungen zu Konferenzen und Kongressen zuschicken.

Für das Amsterdamer Zweigbureau
der IIIten Internationalen.

D.J. Wynkoop

H. Roland Holst

S.J. Rutgers

AMSTERDAM MAI 1920

(1) РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/26-27; cf. 497/1/9/23-24. There is the Dutch typed draft in: РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/50-51.

3-7 Leaflets on: Switzerland

3-7-1

MITTEILUNG DES AMSTERDAMER ZWEIGBUREAUS DER III-TEN INTERNATIONALE

DIE ENTWICKLUNG UND DER GEGENWÄRTIGE STAND DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN PARTEI DER SCHWEIZ [1]

1917 – 1918

Unsere Bewegung fasste erstmals organisatorisch Fuss im Frühling und Sommer 1917 und betätigte sich damals als links-stehende Opposition in der sozialdemokratischen Partei, in den Gewerkschaften und in der soz. Jugendorganisation.

Der Kampf galt der politischen Inkonsequenz und den diktatorischen Allüren der obern Funktionäre der schweizerischen Arbeiter- und Jugendbewegung. Die Kämpfe in der Jugend spielten sich noch zu der Zeit ab, als Genosse Bronski in Zürich war. Der Kampf entwickelte sich dann zu einem Ringen um den Platzvorstand der Zürcher Jugendorganisation, wobei es der Opposition eine Zeitlang gelang, den Platzvorstand in seine Hände zu bringen. In den Gewerkschaften und der Zürcher Arbeiterunion stellten wir Anträge, dass der Pariser Beschluss der Internationale endlich eingehalten würde und der 1. Mai zu einem Generalstreiktag proklamiert würde. Die Opposition gab damals eine Broschüre „Die Selbständigkeit der Jugendorganisation und der Zentralvorstand“ und eine satyrische Zeitung gegen das Zentrum und die Opportunitätspolitik, „Der Waibelianer“ heraus.

Die Opposition sah aber bald ein, dass der Kampf gegen den Opportunismus mehr in die Breite und Tiefe gehen müsse. Zu dem Zwecke war ein regelmässig erscheinendes Organ notwendig. Eine sozial. Pressgenossenschaft wurde gegründet, die die Aufgabe hatte, die finanziellen Mittel dazu aufzubringen. Präsident der soz. Pressgenossenschaft Zürich war Jak. Herzog, die Redaktion der Zeitung lag in den Händen der Genossen [Hans H.] Itschner und [Anton] Waibel. Das Organ erhielt den Namen „Die Forderung“ und erschien zum ersten Mal in der zweiten Hälfte des Monats September 1917. Sein Programm war für soz. Massenaktionen Propaganda zu machen, soz. Soldatenorganisationen und Räte in der Armee zu schaffen, das soz. Endziel zur Forderung des Tages zu machen und das Volk zum Endkampf, zur Revolution aufzurufen.

Anfange November kam der Umsturz in Russland: das brachte das schweizerische Proletariat gewaltig in Wallung. Die Redaktion der „Forderung“ gab sofort eine Propagandabeilage der Zeitung heraus, die in mehreren tausend Exemplaren unter der Arbeiterschaft verteilt wurde und welche das schweizerische Proletariat aufforderte, dem Beispiel der Russen zu folgen. In der Arbeiterunion Zürich stellten wir Anträge, dass die Union sofort eine grosse öffentliche Versammlung einberufe und zur russischen Revolution Stellung nehme. Wie gewohnt hatten es die Instanzen der Arbeiterunion wieder einmal nicht eilig. Die Versammlung sollte einige Tage später abgehalten werden. Nun liefen die Massen in eine Versammlung, die von den Pazifisten einberufen worden war. Dort drang der von unsrer Seite gestellte Antrag durch, zur Unterstützung der russischen Revolution die Munitionsfabriken zu schliessen. [„]Keine Munition mehr den kriegführenden Mächten[“], mit dieser Losung schlossen die Massen gleichen Abends zwei grosse Munitionsfabriken im Kreis 3 und 4. Die Arbeiter forderte man auf, am andern Tag die Arbeit nicht wieder aufzunehmen. Tags darauf wollte die Masse wieder zusammenkommen und die Aktion weiterführen. Jedoch wurde die Versammlung von der Polizei gesprengt. Die Demonstration dehnte sich dann zu Krawallen aus, in denen viele Demonstranten verhaftet wurden, viele verwundet oder getötet. Eine Barrikade wurde gebaut, und zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der schweizerischen Arbeiterbewegung wurde mit Maschinengewehren auf das Volk

geschossen. Unsere Gruppe suchte die Stimmung zur Bildung von Arbeiterräten auszunützen und gab ein Flugblatt an die Soldaten heraus, in dem diese aufgefordert wurden, nicht auf die Arbeiter zu schiessen. In diesen Kämpfen wurden die meisten Mitglieder der Administration und der Redaktionskommission der „Forderung“ verhaftet und die tätigsten Genossen unserer Bewegung auf viele Monate eingesperrt. Wegen Aufreizung zu Meuterei und Aufruhr sassen die Genossen Herzog, Kascher, E. Acklin und Frau Bartel, Itschner und Waibel entzogen sich der Verhaftung durch die Flucht. Auf ihren Kopf wurde eine Prämie van 1000 Fr. ausgeschrieben.

Dadurch wurde, bis sich neue Kräfte um die „Forderung“ konzentrierten, die Herausgabe der Zeitung etwas verzögert. Am 21. Dezember erschien sie dann wieder in kleinerem Format. Die Redaktion lag in den Händen des Genossen Karl Graf. Nach der 9. Nummer verbot der schweizerische Bundesrat ihr Wiedererscheinen. Die Gesamtauflage der 9. Nummer der „Forderung“ war 30 000 Stück; in allen grössern Orten der Schweiz wurde sie hauptsächlich in den Gewerkschafts- und Parteiversammlungen kolportiert.

Nach dem Verbot der „Forderung“ März 1918 versuchten wir, diese unter einem anderen Namen herauszugeben. Wir knüpften vorerst Verbindungen mit dem Bieler Arbeiterblatt an und gaben von demselben eine Generalstreiknummer heraus. Dann gelang dem Genossen Waibel in Genf die Herausgabe der gewünschten Zeitung, jedoch unter dem Namen „Genfer Volkszeituhg“. Die Admistration und Redaktion wurde von unserer Genfer Gruppe übernommen. Jedoch sperrte die Post schon nach der dritten Nummer die Spedition der „Genfer Volkszeitung“, und das schweizerische Volkswirtschaftsdepartement gab dem Drucker die Weisung, dass, wenn er die Zeitung weiter drucke, ihm das rationierte Papier entzogen werde. Die Herausgeber der „Genfer Volkszeitung“, kamen wegen Uebertretung des bundesrätlichen Verbotes der „Forderung“ vor Kriegsgericht, und die Genossen Waibel, Herzog, Meier erhielten Gefängnisstrafen. Von der „Genfer Volkszeitung“ erschien 9000 Stück.

Aber wir fanden doch noch einen Ausweg. Wir setzten uns mit der deutschsprechenden Tribünegruppe in Amsterdam in Verbindung, um in ihr Organ „Der Kampf“ Artikel und Beilagen über Fragen der schweizerischen Arbeiterbewegung zu bringen, worauf wir diese Holländische Wochenzeitung in der Schweiz vertrieben. Vom „Kampf“ kolportierten wir PG Nummern, die viele Artikel aus unseren Federn enthielten.

Mittlerweile hatte sich die Opposition zu einer über das ganze Land ausgedehnten Organisation entwickelt, deren Leitung in den Händen eines Zentralvorstandes in Zürich lag. Die Organisation nannte sich „Internationale Revolutionäre Sozialisten der Schweiz“. Zentralpräsident war Genosse Bruggmann. Der Zentralvorstand hatte die Aufgabe, alle revolutionären oppositionellen Kräfte in örtliche Gruppe zu vereinigen, den Kampf gegen den Opportunismus in den Gewerkschaften und der Soz. Partei systematisch zu organisieren, dazu Literatur und Flugblätter herauszugeben.

So war es uns möglich, auf dem Verbandstag des schweizerischen Holzarbeiterverbandes die Diskussion über das Rätesystem in die Debatte zu ziehen, Anträge durchzudrücken, dass die rev. Propaganda in der Armee finanziell unterstützt wurde und die Bildungsarbeit dahin ausgebaut werden sollte, dass die Arbeiter sich die Kenntnisse zur Leitung der Betriebe aneignen könnten. Der Zentralvorstand der I.R.S.S. gab in einer Auflage von 2000 Exemplaren eine Broschüre heraus „Es lebe die soziale Revolution“, ein Flugblatt „An die organisierte Arbeiterschaft“, 10 000 Stück und ein „Warum und wozu müssen Arbeiterräte gegründet werden?“, Auflage 20 000 Stück. Die Propaganda in den Fabriken für die Gründung von Arbeiterräten steigerte sich aufs intensivste.

Diese Tätigkeit und die Kolportage der Literatur geschah an allen grösseren Ortschaften der Schweiz durch Gruppen, die der Zentrale angeschlossen waren. Ueber das Wirken dieser Gruppen geben die zwei beiliegenden Flugblätter, die die Gruppe in Zürich herausgab, Auskunft.

Am 14. Juli 1918 fand in Olten eine [Partei]Konferenz statt, die beiliegende Traktanden behandelte. Vertreten waren 16 Orte der Schweiz mit 25 Delegierten. Beschlossen wurde die intensivste Propaganda

dafür, dass das Oltener Aktionskomitee durch einen schweizerischer Arbeiter-, Bauern- und Soldatenrat ersetzt würde, kräftige Unterstützung der Armeepropaganda, Ausbau der Presse. Von einer Parteispaltung sei vorläufig noch Umgang zu nehmen. Karl Graf referierte über das Programm der internat. rev. Sozialisten, deren hauptsächlichste Punkte sind: Schaffung und Propaganda des Rätensystems, Führung der Massenaktionen durch die Arbeiterräte, Erziehung und Vorbereitung der Massen zur Uebernahme der Produktion.

Hand in Hand mit der Zusammenfassung der Oppositionellen Kräfte und der Propaganda des Rätesystems ging die Revolutionierung der Armee. Auf Initiative der Gruppe „Forderung“ entstand die erste soz. Soldatenorganisation auf den Platz Luzern und im Infanterieregiment 20 im September 1917. Ende April 1918 stellte Herzog in der Arbeiterunion Zürich den Antrag, dass die soz. Partei Zürich sofort eine Versammlung der militärpflichtigen Arbeiter zusammenrufen sollte mit dem Zweck, in Zürich eine soz. Soldatenorganisation zu schaffen. Da die militärdienstpflichtigen Schweizerbürger ihre Waffen zu Hause haben, ist es möglich, durch diese Organisationsform eine bewaffnete militärische Einheit der Arbeiterklasse zu schaffen. Nach längerem Zögern des Vorstandes der soz. Partei Zürich kam endlich die Versammlung zustande. Genosse Platten hielt das Referat. Er stellte sich auf den Boden, dass es Aufgabe der Soldatenvereine sei, Fürsorge- und Verbesserungspolitik in der Armee zu treiben. Dagegen machten wir Opposition, indem wir erklärten, mit dieser Gewerkschaftspolitik nicht einverstanden zu sein, das können die Bürgerlich-Grütlianerischen Soldatenbünde machen. Aufgabe der soz. Soldatenorganisationen könne nur sein, die Armee zu revolutionieren. Fast einstimmig stellte sich die nun konstituierte Soldatenorganisation auf unsern Standpunkt, worauf die Mitglieder des sozialdemokratischen Parteivorstandes erklärten, bei einer solchen Politik nicht mitzumachen. Unsere Gruppe übernahm nun die Leitung der soz. Soldatenorganisation Zürich, die nach kurzer Zeit schon über 200 Mitglieder zählte. Die sozialdemokratischen Zentrümler, welche doch den Berner Parteitagsbeschluss betr. Ablehnung der Landesverteidigung und Revolutionierung der Armee zustande gebracht hatten, sabotierten nun bezeichnenderweise auf jede Art die Förderung der soz. Soldatenbewegung. Auf unser wiederholtes Ansuchen haben wir von der soz. Partei Zürich nie eine finanzielle Unterstützung für die Armeepropaganda erhalten. Nur von den Gewerkschaften [(]Holzarbeiter, Metallarbeiter, etc.[)] erhielten wir einige hundert Franken. Der Vorstand der Zürcher Soldatenorganisation arbeitete nun beiliegendes Statut aus, dem die Soldatenorganisation zustimmte. Er ging sofort daran, dieses Programm durchzuführen.

Am 14. Juli 1918 kamen dann auf Initiative des Zentralvorstandes der Int. Rev. Soz. und der Soldatenorganisation Zürich in Olten Soldaten verschiedener schweizerischen Truppenkörper zusammen und gaben sich ihr Organisationsstatut und Tätigkeitsprogramm. Den Zentralvorstand hatte die Sektion Zürich zu bestimmen. Zum Präsidenten wurde Genosse Fritz Sommerhalder gewählt. Sofort setzte eine intensive Arbeit ein. An alle soz. Parteivereine und Jugendorganisationen wurden Zirkulare verschickt mit dem Ersuchen an ihrem Orte soz. Soldatenvereine zu gründen. Ebenso wurde Literatur geschaffen, die in den Truppenkörpern zu verteilen war. So kamen zur Ausgabe zwei Brochüren in der Auflage von 20 000 Exemplaren und ein Flugblatt, Auflage 20 000.

Die Zürcher Soldatenorganisation gab 2 Flugblätter heraus, das eine gemeinsam mit der int. rev. soz. Gruppe Zürich, die sich mittlerweile zur kommunistischen Partei Zürich konstituiert hatte (Oktober 1918). Das letztere Flugblatt wurde an die Soldaten verteilt, die vor dem Generalstreik 1918 in Zürich einmarschierten. Die Folge war ein Prozess, wobei die Genossen Müller, Bertschi, Volk, Herzog, Heuberger und Frau zu 44 Monaten Gefängnis verurteilt wurden.

Der Arbeit des Zentralvorstandes der schweizerischen soz. Soldatenorganisation gelang es in kurzer Zeit, neben den Organisationen in Luzern solche in Reinach, Tahlwil, Horgen Richterswil, Lausanne, Genf, Grenchen und Bern zu gründen. Vorbereitungen waren getroffen für La Chaux-de-Fonds, Basel, Biel und Frauenfeld. Dieser Tätigkeit konnte die Bourgeoisie nicht ruhig zusehen. 63 Nationalräte stellten in der Bundesversammlung eine Motion (Grünefelder) in welcher der Bundesrat aufgefordert

wurde, die soz. Soldatenorganisationen und die Soldatenräte zu verbieten. Am 4 März 1919 kam dieses Verbot zustande. Trotzdem ging die Bewegung weiter, was natürlich die Militärjustiz wieder auf den Plan rief. So wurden im Mai weitere 5 Genossen zu 17 Monaten Gefängnis verurteilt, weil sie an einer Bewegung zur Errichtung von Soldatenräten in einem Waadtländerregiment tätig waren. Heute ist fast die ganze schweizerische Armee demobilisiert, so dass die Tätigkeit der soz. Soldatenorganisation vorläufig unmöglich ist.

Die Int. rev. soz. Gruppe in Zürich konstituierte sich im Oktober 1918 zu einer kommunistischen Partei Zürich. Den Anstoss dazu gab der Oktober-Generalstreik, nach welchem mehrere elitende Genossen dieser Gruppe aus der soz. dem. Partei ausgeschlossen wurden. Dieser Parteiverein beantragte den Zentralvorstand der int. rev. soz. Gruppe der Schweiz, dahin zu wirken, dass in der ganzen Schweiz selbständige kommunistische Parteisektionen gegründet würden.

1918 — 1919

Im Anfang des Monats November PKPJ stand die Bewegung organisatorisch gut da, die Zentrale der int. rev. soz. Gruppen tat alles, um dieselbe rasch vorwärtszubringen. Eine Presse sollte trotz dem Verbot wieder herausgegeben und ein Kongress aller Gruppen einberufen werden, der definitiv zur Parteispaltung Stellung zu nehmen hatte. Die kommunistische Partei Zürich gab gemeinsam mit der Zürcher Soldatenorganisation auf den 7 November, dem Jahrestag der russischen Revolution, und zur Erinnerung an die vorjährigen Novemberunruhen ein Flugblatt (Auflage 6000), an die Arbeiter und Soldaten heraus.

Die ausgebrochene Revolution in Deutschland und Oesterreich hob wieder stark die revolutionäre Stimmung im schweizerischen Proletariat. Der Bundesrat belegte die Städte mit Truppen, was den Anstoss zum Novembergeneralstreik gab, der jedoch nach wenigen Tagen durch das ängstliche und feige Oltener Aktions-komitee abgebrochen wurde.

Unsere propagandistische Tätigkeit während dem Generalstreik war die Verteilung von vielen tausend Soldatenbroschüren und Flugblättern „An die militärdienstpflichtigen Arbeiter“ und „Warum müssen Arbeiterräte gegründet werden?“ Das brachte die letzten Genossen ins Gefängnis.

Nach dem Streik war die schweizerische Arbeiterbewegung in ein Ruhestadium getreten. Grosse Teile der Massen grollten den verräterischen Führern. Unsere Bewegung war desorganisiert, die meisten Genossen in den Gefängnissen, so dass vorerst die Stimmung der Massen nicht ausgenutzt werden konnte.

Mitte Dezember kamen Genossen [Fritz] Loritz und [Hans] Weidmann frei. Sie knüpften sofort wieder allerorts Verbindungen an und warfen das „Manifest der kommunistischen Partei der Schweiz“ in 10 000 Exemplaren unter die Massen. Das Manifest fand noch durch die Presse die weitere Verbreitung und sorgte aber auch dafür, dass die Verfasserin desselben, die Genossin Leonie Kascher, und die Genossen Loritz und Weidmann „wegen bolschewistischer Umtriebe“ ins Gefängnis wanderten. Die Genossin Leonie Kascher wurde dann ausgewiesen und mit ihr ging eine unserer besten Kräfte verloren.

Am 10. Januar 1919 kamen die Genossen Pfister und Dübendorfer frei, und diese Genossen sorgten dafür, dass die Bewegung wieder in Fluss kam. Am 10. Februar erschien die erste Nummer des „Kommunist“ (Auflage 2500). Sofort stürzte sich die Justiz auf die Herausgeber und steckte diese zwei Genossen wieder ein. Trotzdem erschien No. 2 (Auflage 4000). Andere Genossen waren in die Bresche gesprungen. Gleichzeitig gab man „Die neue Internationale“ (Auflage 2000) heraus als Ersatz bei eventuellem Verbot des „Kommunist“. Die Bewegung verstärkte sich wieder. Oeffentliche Versammlungen wurden einberufen. Mittlerweile kam auch Genosse Bruggmann frei. No. 3 des „Kommunist“ erschien (Auflage 5000). Der erste Parteitag konnte endlich einberufen werden. Er fand an 15. & 16. März 1919 in Zürich statt. Anwesend waren 60 Delegierte, die 15 Orte der Schweiz vertraten. Die an diesem Parteitag gefassten Beschlüsse gaben der kommunistischen Partei der Schweiz ein

einheitliches Gepräge. Bericht über den Parteitag gibt der „Kommunsit“ No. 6 (Auflage 5000).

Wir setzten mit der Propaganda unter den Bauern ein und verbreiteten das Flugblatt „An die Arbeiter und Bauern“ auf dem Land. Die bürgerliche und die sozialdemokratische Presse regten sich sehr ob dieser eigenartigen Propaganda auf, die Arbeiter und Bauern zusammenführen sollte. Der „Kommunist“ No. 6 (Auflage 7000) erschien als Mainummer.

Ein zweiter Landeskongress fand am 24. & 25. Mai in Biel statt. Dort waren 62 Vertreter aus allem grössern Orten der Schweiz anwesend. Auf diesem Kongress gab sich die kommunistische Partei der Schweiz ihr Programm. Der „Kommunist“ No. [7] bringt uns den Kongressbericht und das Programm.

Eine Milchpreiskampagne zwang uns nochmals Stellung zu nehmen zum Verhältnis zwischen Industriearbeiter und Bauer. Nachdem die sozialdemokratische Presse wieder einmal so allgemein auf die Bauern lostobte, haben wir in einem Flugblatt „An die Bauern und Arbeiter“ den Zweck dieser Hetzereien und Treibereien dargestellt.

Mehr und mehr machten sich finanzielle Schwierigkeiten geltend, was uns sehr hinderte, die Zeitung regelmässig herauszugeben. Selbstverständlich fällt es einer numerisch noch schwachen Organisation, wie wir es sind schwer, die vielen Geldmittel aufzubringen, die für eine notwendige Propaganda da sein müssen. Sie würden die revolutionäre Bewegung in der Schweiz sehr fördern, wenn Sie uns einige Tausend Franken zur Verfügung stellen könnten.

Der 31. August vereinigte die Delegierte unserer Partei in Zürich, wo beschlossen wurde, die Nationalratswahlen zur Propaganda des Rätesystems auszunützen. Unsere Parole „Wählt Arbeiterräte und keine Nationalräte“ hat der Sozialdemokratie bei den Wahlen sehr Abbruch getan. Auf die Wähler gaben wir einen „Kommunist“ und einen Aufruf heraus.

Damit die Propaganda intensiver in allen Landestellen betrieben werden kann, schritten wir zur Schaffung von Kreisverbänden. Die Tätigkeit und Aufgabe der Kreisverbände sind in beiliegendem Reglement zusammengestellt. Heute zählt unsere Partei 4 Ortsektionen, Zürich, Biel, Luzern und Winterthur, wo die organisatorische Trennung zwischen der Sozialdemokratie und den Kommunisten durchgeführt ist. Diese 4 Orte haben zusammen eine Mitgliederzahl von 1200. In den Orten Basel, Bern, Genf, La Chaux-de-Fonds, Aarau, Baden, Brugg, Schlieren, Thalwil, Horgen, Richterswil, St. Gallen, Schaffhausen, Utzwil, Reinach, Töss, besitzen wir starke kommunistische Gruppen, die unserer Zentrale angehören, aber noch nicht vollständig organisatorisch von der soz. Partei getrennt sind. Die Trennung und Gründung von kommunistischen Parteisektionen steht in den nächsten Tagen in Bern und Basel bevor. In fast allen weitern grössern Orten besitzen wir Kolporteure, die unsere Literatur vertreiben. Mit der soz. Jugendorganisation haben wir gute Beziehungen. Ihr letzter Kongress hat eine Resolution abgenommen, die der Jugendbewegung Richtlinien gab, welche sie auf unsern Boden stellt. Der Zentralausschuss wurde zur Mehrzahl aus Anhängern unserer Partei gewählt. Ebenso ist es unseren Genossen nach einem hartnäckigen Kampf gelungen, die Rechtssozialisten aus der Leitung und dem Sekretariat des Züricher Metallarbeiterverbandes hinauszuwerfen und diese Positionen mit unsern Leuten zu besetzen. Am letzten Metallarbeiterkongress vereinigte unsere Opposition gegen die Zentralleitung 80 Delegierte.

Wenn in nächster Zeit nicht Ereignisse in den uns umgebenden Ländern eintreten, die das schweizerische Proletariat wieder vorwärts und zu Aktionen bringen, wird die Spaltung in der sozialdemokratischen Partei kaum grössere Formen annehmen. Die konsequensten Kommunisten werden wohl überall einzeln und in Gruppen austreten und selbständige Sektionen gründen, die vorerst noch klein sein werden. Die schwankenden Elemente vom Zentrum: [Robert] Grimm, [Friedrich] Schneider, [Jacques] Schmid (Olten und Winterthur), [Ernst] Nobs, haben ihre Stellen und Futterkrippen von der sozialdemokratischen Partei und lassen diese nicht so ohne weiteres fahren. Die Gruppe Platten ist auch aus Leuten zusammengesetzt, die sich nicht scheuen, irgendein Regierungspöstchen anzunehmen (siehe

Traber). Uebrigens hört man von dieser Gruppe heute nichts mehr, sie scheint eingeschlafen zu sein. Auch arbeiteten diese Leute immer lieber mit den Rechtssozialisten als mit uns zusammen. Eine konsequente Stellungnahme mit dementsprechend praktischen Handlungen war nie ihre starke Seite, das sah man ja in der Frage der Ablehnung der Landesverteidigung und in der Stellungnahme zum Oltener Aktionskomitee.

Wir Schweizer haben nicht die viele Leiden und Entbehrungen durchgemacht, wie die Genossen in den vielen kriegführenden Ländern, deshalb geht die Radikalisierung des schweizerischen Proletariats viel langsamer vonstatten. Schwere Hemmnisse sind die starke bürgerliche Presse, die nebenbei täglich hunderttausende von Flugblättern gegen Sowjet-Russland gratis verteilt. Uns mangelt das Geld, um eine wirkungsvolle Gegenpropaganda zu entfalten, die imstande wäre, die reaktionäre Schlammflut zurückzudämmen.

Grössere Massenaktionen stehen in der nächsten Zeit bei uns nicht bevor. Die letzten zwei Generalstreiks, die zusammengebrochen sind, haben dem schweizerischen Proletariat viel Wasser in den feurigen Wein geworfen.

Wir werden diesen Winter darauf hinarbeiten dass in allen grösseren Orten Arbeiterräte zustande kommen und die Propaganda des Kommunismus in die Betriebe und auf das Land noch intensiver hineingeworfen wird, um so das Industrie- und Landproletariat fähig zu machen, sobald das österreichische und deutsche und italienische Proletariat die wirtschaftliche Macht übernimmt, ihm sofort folgen zu können.

Weil wir wirtschaftlich, sowohl in dem Rohstoff wie in der Lebensmittelversorgung gänzlich von den uns umgebenden Staaten abhängig sind, wird sich die Revolution in der Schweiz erst dann vollziehen, wenn die besagten Länder daran gehen, die kommunistische Wirtschaftsordnung einzuführen.

Im Namen des Zentralvorstandes der Kommunistischen Partei der Schweiz

Der President
Jak. Herzog.

AMSTERDAM MÄRZ / 1920.

(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0461. Reprinted in: *Die Kommunistische Internationale*, 2. Jg. (1920), No. 11, S. 160-167 (with considerable deletions and modifications).

3-8 Leaflets on: Belgium

3-8-1

COMMUNICATION DU BUREAU AUXILIAIRE D'AMSTERDAM DE LA IIIième INTERNATIONALE

LA SITUATION PROLÉTARIENNE EN BELGIQUE [1]

ASPECT ECONOMIQUE.

La Belgique est, depuis des siècles, le champ de bataille où les grands états qui l'entourassent viennent chercher une solution militaire à leurs antagonismes économiques. Il était prévu que la grande guerre qui menaçait le monde, ravagerait ce pays plus que tout autre. Une documentation permettrait d'établir que les grands initiés de la haute politique internationale envisageaient froidement cette éventualité. Les politiciens Belges, d'ailleurs, cette initiation et ces prévisions. Il était tout simplement dans l'ordre des manœuvres diplomatiques d'affecter la surprise et l'indignation forcenée quand le militarisme prussien marchait, a travers la Belgique, à l'encontre de ses frères français, anglais et américain.

Néanmoins, depuis 1830, la Belgique avait échappé a toute invasion.

C'est pendant cette période de domination bourgeoise qu'elle mérita le nom de paradis de capitalisme. Ce petit pays, d'une richesse naturelle, exceptionnelle, connut, en effet, un développement industriel et commercial prodigieux (hauts fourneaux, fabriques de fer, aciéries, zinc, mines de houille). Aussi ne fait ce pas le hasard qui guide le capitalisme français en 1830, quand il défendait l'état belge contre l'influence hollandaise. Mais ce fut pour la Flandre un malheur immense d'être détachée de l'influence culturelle des Pays Bas du Nord.

Si le capitalisme accumulait en Belgique des richesses inouïes, le prolétariat y fut assujetti à un pauperisme qui n'a pas d'égal. Nous ne pouvons songer à donner ici, ne fut ce qu'un résumé très succinct de la terrible tragédie prolétarienne qui se déroule sur cette "terre d'expérience" pendant plus de quatre-vingts années. Lors de la célébration du 75 anniversaire de l'indépendence belge, trois de nos social-patriotes d'aujourd'hui assumèrent la tache de résumer l'horreur de cette désolante domination bourgeoise [1)]. Des pages sont à l'heure actuelle le réquisitoire le plus cinglant contre leur propre attitude. Ils portent le rémords de leur propre témoignage quand ils se soumettent aux ordres de la démocratie bourgeoise.

Des salaires effroyablement bas, une nourriture excessivement maigre, une hygiène désolante, finirent par avachir les travailleurs d'une manière abominable. Leur intelligence resta trouble, vague et basse et rarement une jaillissait de cet agglomérat de misère.

Le prolétariat agraire, de son côté, conserva jusqu'à présent une mentalité, par beaucoup d'aspects, quasi médiévals. Ecrasé sous les exigences de la grande propriété et fournissant un travail épuisant et opiniâtre, il fut rarement animé, jusqu'à présent, par le moindre esprit de lutte.

Sans doute, la Belgique connut les moyens de la coopération intense. Mais précisément, la coopération avec toute la démagogie, qui souvent s'est attachée à son exaltation, fut la conquête du prolétariat par l'esprit petit-bourgeois le plus dangereux, le plus anti-révolutionnaire. Ce fut encore un ex-révolutionnaire, Henri de Man, qui montra, il y a quelques années, la néfaste influence de certaines institutions coopératives. Il choisit l'exemple d'un prolétariat de tempérament combatif, le prolétariat

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[original note] 1) 75 Années de domination bourgeoise, par C. Huysmans, L. de Brouckère et L. Bertrand.

gantois, qui fut endormi, aveuglé et trompé par la direction petit-bourgeoise de son chef Anseele. De Ran se trouver immédiatement devant une proposition d'exclusion, et les influences les plus adroites durent agir pour le soustraire à la vengeance de Anseele.

Par tout cela, il pourrait être montré facilement que le prolétariat belge, soumis au régime démocratique de l'occident, fut infiniment plus malheureux, connut un traitement plus abject que le prolétariat de l'ancienne Russie tsariste.

ASPECT POLITIQUE.

La prodigieuse prospérité des classes possédantes, assurée sans qu'elles dussent se mêler aux nécessités de la grande expansion moderne, les avait soustrait presque entièrement aux grandes inquiétudes qui se manifestaient dans l'esprit européen pendant le XIXe siècle.

Le clergé repus, grassement entretenu dans les villes et les campagnes, soupçonna à peine le sens de la transformation technique de nos temps. Enlisé dáns les marais théologiques, sans pénétration et sans et sans faveur, il a assisté à la révolution économique sans la moindre compréhension.

La politique cléricale compléta dignement l'ignorance et la bassesse eclésiastique. Elle se résume, évidemment, par une défense brutale et âpre les intérêts de classe, sous le couvert d'une répugnante phraséologie métaphysique. Sous ce rapport, les annales parlementaires de la Belgique laisseront un incomparable monument de ridicule et d'hilarantes sottises.

Les frères de classe des cléricaux, les libéraux, ont vécu, intellectuellement, jusqu'à présent, des miettes de l'humanitarisme français. Ces "libres-penseurs" sont les plus misérables esclaves des plus bas préjugés anticléricaux, et restèrent presque complètement étrangers au labeur prodigieux de la science moderne. Leur anti-cléricalisme les attacha à la routine des polémiques vaniteuses et mesquines. Ils ignoraient eux-mêmes la nature réelle des forces qui entraînaient leur classe vers l'abîme.

C'est devant ces deux partis, séparés apparemment par une idéologie veine, mais au fond unis par des intérêts prépondérants, que se développaient les organismes prolétariens.

Les débuts de la lutte socialiste furent conduits, en Belgique, par de hauts et probes caractères, César De Paipe, Volders, plus tard Hector Denis et d'autres.

Et certes, aux origines des grandes organisations, nous trouvons des énergies puissantes, comme Anseele et Bertrand, dont les grands services, pour cette époque, ne pourraient être contestés.

Mais avec l'absorption de leur personnalité par les influences bourgeoises l'histoire du socialisme belge se confond aussi avec les contradictions mortelles; avec l'impuissance finale de la IIième Internationale.

Les organisations ouvrières, par une adaptation toujours plus opportuniste et exclusive aux conditions nationales et locales, laissèrent échapper graduellement toute préoccupation, toute aspiration révolutionnaire. Progressivement, à mesure que les organisations croissaient, à mesure que la puissance quantitative du socialisme belge multipliait ses décors extérieurs, le sentiment internationaliste s'éteignait.

Et quand la grande guerre éclata, nos réformistes s'étaient tellement identifiés avec les classes possédantes qu'ils n'hésitèrent pas un seul instant entre les résolutions contradictoires dont, souvent au sein de la IIième Internationale, ils avaient été les promoteurs. Ministres d'Etat et champions violents du jusqu'auboutisme, ils devnaient les adorateurs soumis du capitalisme croulant.

Il semble que les chefs socialistes belges étaient vraiment prédestinés à la formation du bureau de cette IIième Internationale, dont l'apparat internationaliste contrastait tout avec le lourd et aveugle réalisme nationaliste.

L'énergie brutale et aveugle de Anseele, sa lourde et insolente démagogie, son mépris de la culture prolétarienne et son attachement borné et bruyant aux conquêtes immédiates, y étaient à leur place.

La nature complexe, hautaine et sceptique de Huysmans était un antidote nécessaire. Ce Machiavel de la IIième Internationale avait tout le cynisme, toute la subtilité nécessaire pour manier avec maîtrise les antagonismes, les motions hybrides et équivoques dont la IIième Internationale avait enfanté. Etant l'ennemi né des situations, claires et tranchantes, il n'a qu'une passion: entourer toutes les questions

d'une fin tissu de sous-entendus, d'apparentes énigmes adroitement posées, d'affirmations contradictoires. Avec cela un mépris mordant et incisif qui souvent trouble, déconcerte, neutralise et domine l'adversaire.

Huysmans reste, peut-être; à l'heure actuelle, l'antagoniste le plus redoutable de ceux qui cherchent la victoire rapide des principes clairs de la IIIième Internationale. Son influence occulte transparaît dans les hésitations, les tractations, révirements déconcertants des Longuetistes français. Et il est visible, pour quelques-uns, que les compromissions, les sophismes les centristes seraient au sein d'une nouvelle Internationale, l'introduction du caractère négatif la IIième Internationale.

Vandervelde lui, incarnait, d'une autre manière, cette Internationale dont il fut le président. Il en donna, pendant la guerre, la preuve la plus éclatante par la publication simultanée de deux ouvrages. Dans l'un, le "Socialisme contre l'Etat", tout en faisant le procès des grandes démocraties modernes, tout en montrant clairement la faillite du parlementarisme, il cherche à atténuer, à obscurcir la signification du principe centrale du marxisme, le principe de la dictature prolétarienne. Mais l'ouvrage dénote une grande puissance cérébrale, une grande connaissance, une intelligence claire et souple, autant qu'une ferme talent d'écrivain. Avec l'autre livre, (réunion de discours prononcées et d'articles écrits au cours de la guerre) "La Belgique envahie et le socialisme internationale", apparaît toute la dualité d'un caractère faible, d'une nature de bourgeois humanitariste, éclectique et raffiné. On voit là, combien pou ce chef social-démocrate avait senti, de manière vivante, la morale et la justice prolétariennes. La dialectique marxiste, pour lui, n'éclairait qu'un aspect particulier du monde; un idéalisme tout métaphisique l'assujettissait entièrement aux préjuges moreaux et juridiques des classes possédantes. Vandervelde fut internationaliste par le cerveau, il resta nationaliste de cœur. L'on mesure ici toute la distance qui séparait, au sein de la IIième Internationale, une Rosa Luxemburg, incarnation de la pensée, du sentiment et de l'action prolétarienne, de Vandervelde, le cérébral soumis par sa nature intime à l'emprise de la classe possédante. Rosa Luxemburg martyrisée par la réaction et Vandervelde au ministère d'union démocratique, expriment mieux que tous les commentaires, les adversités irréductibles qu'enfermaient le mouvement socialiste d'avantguerre.

Les trahisons que multipliaient de tels chefs, pendant la guerre, étaient dans la norme de leur évolution. Leur impuissance et leur soumission à la volonté de l'impérialisme mondial n'étaient que la consommation de la soumission de la IIième Internationale à toutes les formes du capitalisme mondial. Aussi la grande catastrophe les retrancha brusquement de tout mouvement vraiment socialiste, désormais fermement établé sur les principes communistes attaché avec intransigeance aux méthodes du marxisme révolutionnaire. Les caractères essentiels et profonds de la révolution mondiale commençante leur échappaient. Et tout, dans leur formation intellectuelle, dans leurs précédents politiques, dans leurs habitudes de diplomatie secrète et roublarde les empêchait de comprendre la nécessité et le sens de l'action spontanée et générale des masses. L'histoire les avait laissés en général et ils titulaient lamentablement dans les vois du passé.

LA MISERE INTELLECTUELLE DU PROLETARIAT BELGE.

A la faillite intellectuelle des meneurs répond une grande misère intellectuelle des masses. Dans l'ouvrage que je citais au commencement de ce rapport, Louis de Brouckère signalait, en 1905, "tous les attentats de la classe dominante contre l'intellectualité ouvrière". Ces attentats n'étaient tellement grossiers, que parce que cette classe n'avait elle même qu'un développement intellectuel excessivement restreint. A côte d'une bourgeoisie très bornée, vantrée dans une brumeuse et épaisse quiétude, sans culture personnelle, singeant malhabilement les productions étrangères, plagiaire et ridiculement vaniteuse dans son ignorance, le prolétariat végétait dans une insouciance intellectuelle quasi complète. S'ajoute le paupérisme effrayant, déterminant les facultés inférieures de tous les générations prolétariennes du siècle, toutes les faiblesses héréditaires physiologiques, l'épuisement de chaque jour. De Brouckère, dans un chapitre douloureux dans sa démonstration mathématique, montra comment la misère physiologique empêche les enfants pauvres de lire.

Le P.O.B. [Parti Ouvrier Belge] a à son actif des efforts louables qui combattirent cette désolante

infériorité intellectuelle du prolétariat.

Peu d'années avant la guerre fut organisée à Bruxelles une Centrale d'Education (sous direction d'Henri de Man) dont les méthodes marxistes formèrent quelques militants éclairés. Mais les plus stables, ceux qui avaient le plus profondément pénétré âme du marxisme révolutionnaire, eurent la douleur, pendant la guerre, de voir leurs professeurs devenir les négateurs les plus acharnés de leur enseignement.

PENDANT LA GUERRE.

I. Le premier signe vivant du réveil de l'esprit révolutionnaire en Belgique, pendant la guerre, fut le résultat de cet effort d'éducation. Quelques militants dispersés bataillaient avec obstination et courage contre la folie nationaliste qui avait ravagé la raison des marxistes électiques et des révolutionnaristes. Et à Gand, au cœur même du fief d'Anseele, un noyau de jeunes, sortis de la Centrale d'Education, publièrent "ROODE JEUGD", petite revue courageuse et nette. Ils se montraient internationalistes n'ayant jamais abandonné leurs principes. Ils motivèrent leur pacifisme par l'esprit des résolutions de Zimmerwald et de Kienthal. Leur sagacité et leur fermeté dans ce pays bouleversé par la psychose fut trop peu compris, mais leur attitude fut une belle action.

II. La bureaucratie des organisations économiques et politiques; elle, avait pitoyablement sombré dans le social-patriotisme le plus étroit. L'éxpression de sa haine pour l'envahisseur prit le meilleur de son temps. Les causes profondes de la guerre lui semblaient cachées, la démagogie devint plus superficielle que jamais. A côté de la bêtise et de l'extrême faiblesse des chefs, les déportations des ouvriers par l'envahisseur, les mesures draconiennes et violentes qu'il près souvent, développèrent la haine des masses. Elles détestaient l'envahisseur en général, comme peuple, comme nationalité, bien plus qu'elle ne put une haine générale du militarisme et de l'impérialisme.

Les masses furent, d'ailleurs, plus que jamais épuisées par les privations. Et d'autre part, un besoin général de trafic, de petites spéculations, de tromperies mutuelles, les mina moralement. Le sentiment de classe fut troublé infiniment, encore obscurée par la philanthropie et les sacrifices apparents des classes possédants.

Il n'y eut guère que les formidables accumulations de guerre, les grands capitaux subitement agglomérés qui soulevèrent la haine et l'envie de tous ceux dont les entreprises avaient été moins fructueuses.

APRES L'ARMISTICE.

I. Aux premières désillusions des jusqu'auboutistes et des social-patriotes de guerre, quelque clarté se fit dans certains cerveaux. Quelques-uns, ployés jusque là sous la folie collective, rejetterent certaines erreurs et se dressèrent contre la réaction. Ils perçurent par moment la lumière de l'orient et commencèrent à discerner les manœuvres secrètes des démocraties occidentales. La brutalité réactionnaire pendant la Révolution allemande de novembre, leur montra quelques-uns des dangers qu'enfermaient les anciens partis social-démocrates. Le martyre de Liebknecht et de Rosa Luxemburg leur montra, de manière tragique, toutes les hideurs du social-patriotisme.

II. La Révolution russe rallia des sympathies sentimentales et confuses; il y eut peu d'adhésion compréhensive, la signification profonde, essentielle, des organes nouveaux créés par cette révolution fut à peine saisie. Et par suite les raisons réelles de la baqueroute totale de la IIième Internationale furent généralement ignorées.

Néanmoins, la volonté de revenir aux méthodes de classe, de briser l'influence des ministres socialistes et des ministérialistes, se manifesta à certains endroits, et notamment dans la Fédération bruxelloise.

Mais cette opposition fut trop faible et les social-patriotes purent constituer avec les autres partis politiques un ministère "d'union démocratique". Ils purent orner le triomphe du S.U. selon la traditionnelle démagogie, sans rencontrer une critique nette et vigoureuse. Souvent, les partisans les mieux intentionnés de la lutte de classe, n'envisagèrent que le renforcement de l'action parlementaire par

la puissance d'action des travailleurs.

L'ACTION ECONOMIQUE.

I. Jusqu'ici, elle ne transforma pas ses méthodes. L'organisation mécanique et quantitative des syndicats fut poursuivie. On essaya de régulariser le fonctionnement disciplinaire, les tractations diplomatiques et traditionnelles entre les meneurs et les patrons. La souveraineté du contrat collectif resta incontestée et les délégués belges avec les autres nationalistes, à Washington, tentèrent de lui accorder une suprématie mondiale.

Le réformisme syndical, continuant sa lutte de forme étroitement nationale, fut maintenu et souvent renforcé.

Un travail plus profond ne fut point entamé. Le développement de l'esprit de sacrifice au sein des masses, l'attachement aux intérêts généraux de la classe, l'amour de la mission humaine du prolétariat ne furent point cultivés. Rien encore n'a été fait pour élever à âme collective, pour la pénétrer de cette abnégation consciente dont la révolution mondiale aura besoin pour étendre l'ordre nouveau.

II. Et pourtant les facteurs sociaux et économiques sont propices. Les mêmes difficultés de vie chère, les mêmes troubles et les mêmes besoins assaillent tous les organismes. Les aspirations sont générales, unifiées. Partout éclatent des grèves qui détiennent potentiellement les impulsions élémentaires, les volontés rudimentaires de combat. Il appartient à une propagande plus intense de hausser ses dernières à une conscience plus profonde, à la perception de la nécessité de l'unité d'action par l'unité de besoins.

III. L'énergie des grandes organisations, comme celle des mineurs, est détournée d'un but prolétarien général par la question de la "nationalisation des mines". Et ces géantes organisations, au lieu d'augmenter la puissance de leur conscience de classe, la conscience de leur propre pouvoir, versent dans le plus dangereux socialisme d'état, et reconnaissent l'autorité de l'adversaire.

EVEIL COMMUNISTE.

Malgré ces conditions intellectuelles toutes inférieures, malgré l'influence encore prépondérante du social-patriotisme, le mouvement communiste mondial a exercé son influence on Belgique.

En Flandre quelques petits groupes, formés d'éléments hétéroclites essayèrent, il y a quelques semaines, une fédération communiste. Mais la confusion de principes qui y règne, le manque de connaissances scientifiques, le mépris souvent ignorant des méthodes du marxisme révolutionnaire enlisent ces groupes dans des polémiques mesquines et ridicules. Jusqu'ici, les éléments plus avertis qu'ils enferment n'ont pas assez d'énergie pour affirmer leur position et pour rompre avec le poids lourd d'un anarchisme obscurantiste, sans attaches avec les réalités.

Cette fédération flamande publique un journal "De Internationale" dont quelques articles des premiers numéros ont essayé de réagir, mais vainement, contre la confusion intérieure des groupes.

Quelques autres feuilles comme "Le Communiste" et "Haro" n'ont exprimé que leur incompréhension des principes communistes.

Quant à "L'Art Libre", dirigé par Paul Colin, secrétaire du groupe Clarté, il est ici le représentant de ce révolutionnarisme vaniteux et bruyant par lequel quelques décadents impuissants et sots essaient de cacher la misère de leur âme et de leur esprit. La grandeur morale d'un Romain Rolland n'est pour eux qu'un objet d'exploitation, il sera plus difficile, un jour de défendre ce grand caractère général contre ses "amis" que contre ses ennemis. "L'Art Libre" a néanmoins, grâce à la collaboration d'otranges [*sic*] comme Jaques Mesnil et M. Martinet publié, parfois, de bonnes pages vigoureuses.

A Bruxelles, les Jeunes Gardes socialistes, à la suite d'une lutte de quelques mois dirigée contre la direction du P.O.B., se sont désaffiliés de celui-ci. Ils ont pris l'initiative de la formation d'un groupe communiste. Ils ne se font aucune illusion concernant les difficultés que les attendent. Ils savent que la pénétration dans les masses sera chose ardue. Ils ne surévaluent point le niveau intellectuel des différents milieux et essaient de ne pas se méprendre sur l'état réel des choses.

Mais, ils ont décidé de combattre, par le journal qu'ils feront paraître et tous les autres moyens de

propagande orale, de combattre toute confusion, de maintenir l'intransigeance du marxisme révolutionnaire. Ils attaquèrent avec la même netteté les social-patriotes et les anarchistes, pour que la grande action des Soviets puisse apparaître clairement, sans atténuations, aux yeux des masses.

Les forces de ces jeunes sont momentanément très restreintes. Mais leur conscience de se rattacher par leurs vues, leurs principes et leur action aux groupes communistes plus puissants de l'occident, décuple leur confiance et soutient leur ardeur.

Ici également la grande mission communiste a trouvé quelques adhésions. Puissent-elles rapidement se multiplier.

AMSTERDAM MARS 1920.

(1) РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/73-78; Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0463.

3-9 Leaflets on: Spain

3-9-1

COMMUNICATION DU BUREAU AUXILIAIRE D'AMSTERDAM DE LA IIIième INTERNATIONALE

LES JEUNESSES ESPAGNOLES ET LE PARTI SOCIALISTE [1]

On remarque une profonde inquiétude idéologique dans le Parti Socialiste espagnol.

Les graves questions de la révolution russe, de la Troisième Internationale et de la lutte révolutionnaire, toujours plus nécessaire à l'époque actuelle, ont fini pour agiter aussi le Part espagnol, qui jusqu'ici s'était borné à une actuation [actualisation?] démocratique, très utile avant la guerre européenne, mais qui ne peut servir aujourd'hui ni satisfaire les désirs révolutionnaires de la classe ouvrière, laquelle ne peut détourner sa vue du grandiose exemple de la Russie.

Les leaders du Parti espagnol n'ont jamais eu beaucoup d'intérêt pour les questions de lutte internationale des classes ouvrières. Leur procédure favorité a été toujours la politique démocratique nationale. Il est triste de le reconnaître; pas meme pendant la guerre n'eclata dans le sein du Parti une forte opinion de socialisme révolutionnaire capable de s'opposer aux vieux leaders et de leur enlever les places directives.

Mais la révolution russe et très particulièrement la Troisième Internationale ont été la cause de que le Parti ne puisse plus conserver son ancienne unité. Le dernier congrès, tenue au décembre 1919, allait se déclarer résolument pour l'adhésion à l'Internationale Communiste; mais une intrigue de la Commission exécutive obtint l'ajournement de cette décision jusqu'à la réunion du Congrès de la Deuxième Internationale au Genève pour en attendre les résultats. De tous les membres de la Commission exécutive seulement Anguiniano, secrétaire du Parti, se prononça pour une immédiate adhésion à l'Internationale de Moscou.

Cette décision du Congrès de décembre produisit un grand mécontentement dans les masses ouvrières, mais spécialement les jeunesses socialistes ne cachèrent pas leur divergence profonde et opposition au Parti dans cette question. Nous devons aussi dire que la tactique opportuniste et de démocratie bourgeois développée par les vieux leaders n'obtint jamais l'approbation des jeunesses.

Quelques jours après le Congrès du Parti, les jeunesses ont tenu le leur à la Maison du Peuple de Madrid, du 14 au 18 décembre; on y constata tout de suite que les jeunesses n'étaient pas disposés à suivre les leaders contre-révolutionnaires du Parti, Besteiro, Largo Caballero, Fabra Ribas, etc.

La décision d'adhérer immédiatement et sans conditions ni réserves à la Troisième Internationale fut prise à l'unanimité par les jeunes socialistes. On décida aussi s'attacher à l'Internationale Communiste de Jeunesse. Dans ce Congrès luttèrent avec énergie pour séparer les jeunesses de la discipline du Parti les jeunes madrilènes Ugarte, qui représentait les étudiants socialistes, et Merino Gracia, qui représentait avec d'autres camarades la section madrilène. Cette séparation est déjà faite et c'est pour cela qu'on a modifié l'article premier des statuts.

A l'élection du nouveau Comité national furent élus Ugarte, Merino Gracia, Sui Portela, Illescas, Pico, Rito Esteban, etc., c'est à dire, les délégués de la Jeunesse madrilène, qui avaient défendu les plus extrêmes mesures révolutionnaires, et qui sont tous des admirateurs dévoués de la Révolution et du Parti Communiste russes, de leurs procédés et tactique.

Mais le Parti espagnol ne change pas sa vieille idéologie et son opportunisme possibiliste, voilà pourquoi on peut soupçonner que la scission qu'on attend depuis longtemps, n'éclatera pas dans le sein du Parti, mais il est fort probable que la Fédération des Jeunesses, qui groupe 150 sections avec 8000 membres se change en Parti Communiste. Le journal "Renovación", organe des Jeunes, s'exprime

chaque fois avec plus violence et énergie contre les leaders du Parti qui jusqu'ici on avait respecté et suivi sans discussion.

Or nous assistons à une phase de la plus haute importance dans le mouvement socialiste et ouvrier espagnol. On ne peut pas nier que les masses admirent et désirent suivre l'exemple de la Russie Communiste. Les vieux dirigeants n'osent pas s'opposer franchement à cet élan vers la Troisième Internationale mais ils tâchent de retarder avec des intrigues et des habiletés, en ajournant une décision sérieuse qui pourrait être l'adhésion enthousiaste à la nouvelle Internationale, ce qui va contre leurs sentiments et leurs vœux.

Si les Jeunesses quittent définitivement leur espoir d'imprimer au Parti une vraie orientation révolutionnaire, nous ne tarderons pas beaucoup à voir cette transformation de Jeunesses en Parti Communiste, et nous croyons que la décomposition des forces socialistes serait inévitable. Les unes iraient augmenter le nouveau Parti, les autres accentueraient plus encore leur opportunisme.

Il y a un détail qui nous montre jusqu'à quel point est latente la division. Le secrétaire du Parti, Anguiano, a déclaré ses sympathies pour un Parti Communiste et on peut croire qu'il n'attend que les résultats pour l'Espagne de la Conférence de Rotterdam, où il représente l'Espagne avec Basteiro, pour adopter une attitude résolue et définitive. Comme on voit déjà, on a fait de voyage pour s'informer des questions plus intéressantes pour le Socialisme, et pour faire en Espagne un référendum pour décider ou non l'adhésion à la Troisième Internationale.

Néanmoins les Jeunesses sont décidées à agir de leur propre compte sans attendre les résultats de Rotterdam ni ceux du référendum. Ils sont convaincus que le Parti espagnol avec ses vieux leaders ne sera jamais un Parti de la Troisième Internationale, quoiqu'il déclarât dans ce sens. On tromperait la classe ouvrière à ne pas l'avertir de ce danger. Donc les Jeunes peuvent lutter énergiquement avec les socialistes de droite.

Il ne faudra pas attendre longtemps pour voir en Espagne un jeune et vigoureux Parti Communiste, frère du russe et de l'allemand, dévoué au service de la révolution communiste et de la dictature ouvrière et qui sûrement suivrait sans hésitations la tactique, procédés et même les suggestions de Moscou.

Madrid le 16 mars 1920. Fulgencio Izquierdo.

AMSTERDAM MARS 1920.

(1) Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0475. There is a handwritten English version (draft) in: Papers of E. Sylvia Pankhurst, 260: "Spanish Young Socialists and the Socialist Party."

3-10 Leaflets on: Finland

3-10-1

COMMUNICATION DU BUREAU AUXILIAIRE D'AMSTERDAM DE LA IIIième INTERNATIONALE

LA SITUATION EN FINLANDE [1]

Depuis que la révolution de 1918 fut ecrassée dans le sang, que des milliers d'ouvriers furent tués ou moururent de faim, le mouvement ouvrier finlandais qui était entièrement ruiné, a recommencé son travail de reconstruction. Ce fut naturellement tout d'abord la social démocratie officielle qui put agir, mais lentement les communistes aussi purent se faire valoir. Depuis ce temps l'influence rouge pénétrait plus profondément la pensée des travailleurs finlandais.

Formellement, la social démocratie conserve toujours la direction du mouvement, mais sous l'action des communistes, une aile gauche s'est formée. Les différents entre la gauche et la droite sont fortement marquées, et l'on doit se demander si elles conduirent à une scission dans le parti; L'aile gauche a assez bien le caractère général de tous les socialistes de gauche, mais ceux qui les suivent parmi les travailleurs ont une tendance communiste de telle manière que cela ne produirait aucun étonnement, si tout le mouvement de gauche se plaçait sous la banière communiste.

L'agitation dans le parti a décidé plusieurs sections ouvières à se séparer du parti, notamment celle de Helsingfors, et à adhérer à la 3 Internationale. Il faut mettre en rapport cette décision avec la terreur blanche en Finlande, qui frappe criminellement tout ce qui est communiste.

L'organe principal de la social démocratie perdit plusieurs abonnés, tandis que l'organe communiste à Kaopis, Savom, Kansa, gagne dans une large mesure la Conférence des travailleurs.

Parmi les travailleurs, il s'est formé de plus un parti communiste secret dans lequel la formation militaire de chaque membre est soigneusement poursuivre. En général ce mouvement donne un résultat très satisfaisant.

Dans l'armée de l'état on fit de la propagande parmi les miliciens. Dès maintenant la bourgeoisie ne pourrait avoir aucune confiance dans l'armée de l'état. Au moins la moitié de celle-ci sympathise avec les communistes et seule une partie des autres résisterait aux travailleurs.

Mais le plus grand danger pour la révolution finlandaise provient de l'armée blanche, de la garde civique. Là, il y a peu à faire pour une agitation directe, bien qu'elle y fût menée, même sans succès, honnis que quelques volontaires et même parfois toute la division d'un endroit déterminé, furent gagnés à la cause. Mais ici la besogne principale est faite en vue de la désorganisation, pour démasquer les meneurs les commandants et les officiers aux ceux des simples volontaires. Ce travail n'a pas eu, visiblement, un grand succès, mais il n'est pas supprimé. En Finlande la garde civique comprend maintenant 100,000 hommes bien armées et bien disciplinés. Les petits paysans, les éléments de la classe moyenne ont montré qu'ils sont accessibles à une propagande qui poursuit de les rendre indifférents, aux efforts de la garde civique.

La garde civique rend une révolution impossible en ce moment, en Finlande. Elle est si forte que la bourgeoisie se repose entièrement sur elle et qu'elle ne peut être écrasée sans une aide de l'extérieur.

Les rapports entre les travailleurs finlandais et russes ont toujours été et restent excellents, et aussi existe-t-il en Russie un groupe finlandais, bien organisé, de travailleurs communistes.

Dernièrement une grande perte doit être marquée, la mort du meilleur leader et théoricien, Otto Wilhelm Kuusinen, qui fut arrêté en Finlande où il travailla secrètement pendant plusieurs mois. Les bourreaux blancs l'abattirent à la manière des assassins, dans des circonstances qui rappellent la mort de Liebknecht. Mais comme le souvenir de Liebknecht reste vivant pour le prolétariat mondial on

encourage à la lutte, ainsi la mort de Kuusinen soutiendra les travailleurs finlandais dans une lutte inlassable jusqu'au triomphe final du communisme.

[The following sheet(s) is (are) missing.]

(1) Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0462.

3-11 Variant

3-11-1

Trade Unionism, Industrial Unionism and Workers' Committees
(Issued by the Bureau of the Third International) [1]

1.— Unions are necessary organizations in the economic struggle of the workers against their employers, since, in spite of their limitations, the unions are means for resisting and often improving the most inhuman conditions of labor. Nor are the unions transitory in character, since they can particularly as industrial unions become active means of revolutionary struggle, and a factor in the Communist reconstruction of society.

2.— The Trades Unions persisting in the defensive struggle against Capitalism do not materially improve conditions. The rise of wages is, in general, exceeded by the rise of prices, while the policy of compromise, wage agreements and industrial peace weakens the fighting spirit of the workers.

3.— The Trades Unions arose during the epoch of small industry, with its consequent division of the workers into crafts or trades. The artisan conception prevailed that a worker's craft or skill was a form of property, developing a property and petty bourgeois ideology; and this, together with the circumstance that Trades Unions acquired power during a period of intense national economic development (1870-1900), produced the concept of limiting the proletarian struggle within the limits of Capitalism and the nation.

4.— Trades Unionism represented (and still represents) the upper layers of the working class excluding the bulk of the unskilled workers; and where these workers are organized in Trades Unions, they are dominated by the concepts and practice of the upper layers — the "aristocracy of labor."

5.— The development of Imperialism merges the Trades Unions definitely in Capitalism, the upper layers of the working class being bribed with a share in the profits of Imperialism by means of slightly higher wages, steady employment, and labor legislation. The "aristocracy of labor" dominant in Trades Unionism accepts Imperialism, uses the unions to assist Capitalism in "stabilizing" labor in industry, and becomes the source of the corrupt ideology of social Imperialism. The decisive factor in the collapse of the old International was the immersion of Socialism in Trades Unionism, with its practice of social Imperialism petty bourgeois democracy, and its fundamental counter-revolutionary tendency.

6.— Trades Unionism (as typically expressed in the American Federation of Labor) is impotent to improve materially conditions of labor or to conquer power, since the division of the workers into craft or trade organizations splits them into innumerable unions, each antagonistic to the other, making hopeless the struggle against concentrated Capitalism, which largely expropriates the worker of his skill, eliminates the craft divisions of small industry, and brings masses of the proletariat together regardless of particular occupational functions. The general mass strike alone is capable of decisive action against concentrated Capitalism: but Trades Unionism in form and spirit is antagonistic to the mass strike.

7.— Trade Unionism comes to realize its economic impotence, and proceeds to Parliamentary action, which, represented by Laborism (as typically expressed in the British Labor Party) is as impotent as Trade Unionism to accomplish fundamental conquests, since Laborism necessarily accepts the dominant union concepts and practice. Laborism unites with petty bourgeois democracy against the proletarian revolution — that petty bourgeois democracy which is seduced by Imperialism.

8.— The governmental form of expression of Laborism is State Capitalism, the merger in the state of the capitalists, the small bourgeois, and the upper layers of the working class dominant in the Trades Unions; the state is used to regulate equally industry and labor for purposes of Imperialism, the proletarian masses being compelled to accept this arrangement by means of deception and force.

9.— The tendency is for Laborism and Socialism to unite (either formally or by means of Trades

Union domination of the Socialist Party) each necessarily accepting social Imperialism, since their activity is limited within the limits of Capitalism and the nation: and under the ascendency of monopoly and finance capital, the "prosperity" of a nation depends on Imperialism.

10.— Laborism becomes the final bulwark of defence of Capitalism against the oncoming proletarian revolution: accordingly, a merciless struggle against Laborism is imperative. But while politically Laborism expresses itself as State Capitalism and petty bourgeois democracy, its animating impulse and force is in Trade Unionism. The struggle against this form of unionism accordingly is an inseparable phase of the struggle against Laborism, proceeding —

(a) In general by the Communist parties agitating to drive the unions to more revolutionary action.

(b) Encouraging every movement in the unions that tends to break the permanency of the bureaucracy, and placing control in the masses by means of delegates being subject directly to instructions and recall.

(c) By the formation of organizations such as the Shop Stewards, Workers' Committees, economic Workers' Councils, and direct branches of the Communist parties in the shops, mills, and mines, which are not alone means for moving the masses and the unions to more revolutionary action, but which at the moment of the crisis may develop the Soviets.

(d) By endeavoring to transform the Trades Unions into industrial unions, that is, a unionism in form paralleling the economic integrities of modern capitalism, and in spirit animated by the struggle for political power and economic mastery.

11.— The agitation for and construction of industrial unions provides, in an immediate and practical way, the opportunity to articulate and mobilize the militant spirit of discontent developing in the old unions, to carry on the struggle against the corrupt bureaucracy and the "aristocracy of labor." Industrial Unionism, moreover, provides the opportunity of calling to action the unorganized, unskilled workers, and to release the unskilled organized in the Trades Unions from their bondage to the reactionary upper layers of the working class. The struggle for revolutionary Industrial Unionism is a factor for the development of Communist clearing and for the grasping of the might.

12.— Unionism, trades and industrial, must not limit itself to economic strikes, but must acquire the concept and practice of the general political strike — co-operate with the Communist parties to develop the general mass struggle of the proletarian against the bourgeois state.

13.— The concept that Industrial Unionism alone is necessary for the conquest of Capitalism must be decisively rejected. It is sheer Utopia to imagine that all the workers, or an overwhelming majority, can be organized in industrial unions under Capitalist economic conditions. The upper layers of the working classes, being the impulse of Laborism, will necessarily reject revolutionary industrial unionism: while the lower layers will not move very rapidly until thrown into action by the impact of revolution itself. Moreover, the concept that the workers under Capitalism must in their industrial unions acquires the experience and technical management of industry, "growing into" the new society by the industrial unions' gradual acquisition of industrial control is identical (although inverted in form) with the proposals of parliamentary Socialism — that the working class must gradually "grow into" Socialism by acquiring experience of state affairs and "absorbing" control of the bourgeois state. Each concept, in its own way, rejects the **fundamental problem of the revolutionary conquest of state power**.

14. — The conquest of the power of the state is the objective of the revolutionary proletariat. Neither the parliaments nor the industrial unions are the means for this conquest of power, but mass action and the Soviets — mass action to rally the workers, organized and unorganized, in the open revolutionary struggle for power, the Soviets to constitute the mechanism of the revolutionary proletarian state, the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the moment of active revolution the struggle becomes not a struggle for industrial unions, but for the construction of Soviets.

15.— After the conquest of political power and under the protection of the Soviet Dictatorship, Industrial Unionism comes actually to function in the economic reconstruction of society on a Communist basis and the stronger the industrial unions the easier the process of reconstruction. The government of Soviets, of proletarian dictatorship, is political and transitory in character, the necessary agency of repression to expropriate and crush Capitalism. While industrial in its constituents and

representation, the government of Soviets functions geographically and politically; but alongside of itself it constructs a central administration of industry, wholly economic in character, equality in representation and functions, perfecting the organism of proletarian control and management of industry on the basis of the industrially organized producers.

(1) Reprinted from: *The Voice of Labor*, Vol. 1, No. 9, 20.IV.1920, p. 12. This is the "Thesis on Unionism" which was read by Fraina and adopted with unanimity at the "Conference of the 3d International" on 6 February 1920 (**Doc. 2-1-1**).

Part 2

Supplementary Research Results

The Early Comintern in Amsterdam, New York and Mexico City

Akito YAMANOUCHI

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List of Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern

Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

After the collapse of the communist regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe, most of the historical documents of the Comintern (1919-1943) were publicly released. As a result, new and comprehensive studies on the Comintern have been commenced on a global scale and, as a first step, documents concerning relations between the Comintern and the communist party in each country have been compiled, edited and published. In the case of Japan, a collection of historical documents entitled *VKP(b), the Comintern and Japan* was published in 2001, but this collection consists of one volume and that is only available in Russian. In addition, historical documents concerning the early Comintern remain largely uncompiled [(1)].

My second book, *The Early Comintern and Japanese Socialists Residing Abroad: A Transnational Network* (in Japanese) has been published in Kyoto, 2009. Its study seeks to understand the early Japanese communist movement in an international context, to be exact, in the context of "the international history of socialism" (G. Haupt's term) [(2)]. This research, through the use of documents collected independently in Russia, the USA, and Western nations, aims to elucidate how the newly established Comintern tried to make contact with Japanese socialists by establishing a transnational network through two routes: "a western route" (Amsterdam — New York — Mexico City) and "an eastern route" (Siberia — Shanghai) beginning from Moscow. This book details the movements by the "western route" in the first half and those by the "eastern route" in the latter half, each of which is focused, in order, on the top and the rank-and-file of the movements. This research seeks to provide a full understanding of the organizational structure leading from Comintern headquarters in Moscow to lower branches, with a special emphasis on the important role played by Japanese socialists residing abroad and, in particular, Sen Katayama's leadership (cf. "A transnational network" at the next page).

The "western route" was opened up by taking advantage of a comradely relationship between Katayama and Sebald J. Rutgers at the end of 1916 (Louis C. Fraina was added to it soon). The Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern was in existence in Amsterdam during the period from November 1919 till May 1920 on the one hand. Rutgers was given full authority to its activities by the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), and worked its secretary. At that time he established contact with Katayama in the USA and Shozo Sugiyama in Yokohama. On the other hand, the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern was organized in New York in the first half of January 1921 and Katayama was appointed as its chairman. Katayama arrived at Mexico City on 31 March 1921 and started its activities (Fraina joined again with Katayama at the beginning of July). While Katayama kept contact with the members of the Japanese Socialist Group remaining in New York, he was also carrying out the preparation of other members for

(1) *ВКП(б), Коминтерн и Япония. 1917-1941 гг.* (Москва, 2001). In 2014 the Japanese version was selectively translated, independently enlarged and published by T. Tomita and H. Wada (*Documents. The Comintern and the Japanese Communist Party* [Tokyo, 2014]). Nevertheless, the conditions which are short of early Comintern documents are not improved.

(2) Cf. G. Haupt, "Histoire de l'Internationale socialiste ou Histoire internationale du Socialisme? Sur quelques controverses à propos de problèmes de recherche et de méthode," *Le Mouvement social*, No. 41, X.-XII.1962, 13-34.

A Transnational Network

【A Western Route】

JAPAN ←←←←←←← MEXICO ←←←←←←←←←←←←←← U S A ←←←←←←←←←← AMSTERDAM ←←←←←←← MOSCOW

JAPAN	MEXICO	U S A	AMSTERDAM	MOSCOW
	• (Latin American Bureau)	• (American Sub-Bureau) (Agencia Verdad, Servicio Internacional de Noticias) MADRID	• **Amsterdam Sub-Bureau**	• **ECCI** • Small Bureau of ECCI
	• **Pan-American Agency** • Latin American Section	• (Pan-American Bureau) • **Pan-American Agency**		
	• Provisional Mexican [Labor] Bureau of International Trade Union Council/Profintern	• Pan-American Council of International Trade Union Council/Profintern • American Bureau of International Trade Union Council/Profintern		• International Trade Union Council • Profintern
	• (Latin American Bureau of Young Communist International)			• Young Communist International
	• CP of Mexico [Gale's] • Mexican CP [Roy's] • Mexican Federation of Communist Youth • Organization Committee [for founding CP of Mexico]	• CPA • CLPA • UCPA • CPA	• CP in the Netherlands	• Central Committee of RCP(b)
• Provisional CEC of Japanese CP		• [Committee for the] Japanese Socialist Group in America • Japanese Communist Group, a Branch of UCPA		

【An Eastern Route】

MOSCOW →→→→→→→→→→→→→ SIBERIA・REPUBLIC of FAR EAST →→→→→→→→→→→→→ SHANGHAI →→→→→→→→→ JAPAN

MOSCOW	SIBERIA・REPUBLIC of FAR EAST	SHANGHAI	JAPAN
• Central Committee of RCP(b) • Central Federation of Foreign Groups attached to CC of RCP(b)	• **Siberian Bureau** attached to CC of RCP(b) • [Korean] Irkutsk Group, backed by Siberian Bureau • **Section of Eastern Peoples**, as a subordinate of Siberian Bureau • Far Eastern Oblast Bureau of RCP(b) • **Far Eastern Bureau/Dalburo** attached directly to CC of RCP(b)	• Korean Socialist Party/Korean CP • [Korean] Shanghai Group, backed by Far Eastern Bureau/Dalburo • Datong Party • (Far Eastern League of the Communist Parties) • (General Office of the East) • (Eastern CP)	• Provisional CEC of Japanese CP
• Commissariat for Foreign Affairs • Eastern Department of Commissariat for Foreign Affairs	• **Siberian Mission** of Commissariat for Foreign Affairs • (Eastern Bureau attached to Siberian Mission)		
• **ECCI** • Small Bureau of ECCI • **Eastern Department** of ECCI	• **Far Eastern Secretariat** of ECCI	• (East-Asian Secretariat of the III Comintern) • Foreign Agent of ECCI [Maring]	
• International Trade Union Council • Profintern	• (Eastern Section of International Trade Union Council/Profintern)		
• Young Communist International	• (Far Eastern Secretariat/Eastern Secretariat of Young Communist International)		

Note 1) The image of "a transnational network" is given for convenience' sake by a variety of organizations.
2) The organizations in round brackets are supposed to have been no more than a plan or hardly practicable.

going to Japan or Russia [3]. Finally, at the end of October 1921 Katayama himself left for Russia for a new mission, that is, the preparation for calling the Congress of the Peoples of the Far East, in the very midst of the secret plan of the ECCI to dissolve the Pan-American Agency.

It was through its two Foreign Bureaus, that is, the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the Pan-American Agency, that the early Comintern made the initial contact through the "western route" with the Japanese socialists.

This Part 2 is research results on the two Foreign Bureaus which were deeply concerned with the "western route." Its attention is focused more on the matters concerned with the elucidation of problems and the evaluation of activities than on the detailed explanation of facts.

(3) Among them Taro Yoshihara and Unzo Taguchi were to leave for Russia, where they were to take an active part on the "eastern route," and Eizo Kondo and others were to go home.

1 Planning and Establishing the Foreign Bureaus of the Comintern

In the early autumn of 1919 the chairman of the ECCI, G.E. Zinoviev, drew up a plan. In accordance with his plan, the Foreign Bureaus of the West were established as the initial base from which the newly founded Comintern would attempt to coordinate and achieve the so-called "World Revolution." The Bureaus were expected to function as a means to come into contact with the external world under difficult circumstances of the military interventions inside, and the absence of the Communist Parties outside, Soviet Russia. The following is extracts from the German translation by A. Kan of the plan which was written down in the undated draft [(1)].

> I. Zur Entwicklung der kommunistischen Bewegung in Westeuropa und Amerika und besonders zwecks der Koordinierung der praktischen Arbeit verschiedener nationaler Komparteien beschloß das EKKI folgende Büros im Westen zu schaffen: In Stockholm ...../ In Berlin (Westeuropäisches Sekretariat) ...../ In Holland - für Holland, England, Amerika, Australien und andere außereuropäische Länder,/ In Wien ...../ In Sofia .....
>
> II. Die ausländischen Büros sind Hilfsorgane des EKKI und erfüllen eine Vermittlerrolle in den Beziehungen zwischen den einzelnen Parteien und des EKKI.
>
> III. Den ausländischen Büros des EKKI werden folgende Aufgaben auferlegt:
>
> [1] Mitwirken an der organisatorischen, propagandistischen, speziell literarischen und gegenseitig informierenden Arbeit der entsprechenden Parteien, [2] Beseitigung der Meinungsverschiedenheiten und Konflikte zwischen den verschiedenen Strömungen innerhalb einzelner KP, .../ [4] Vereinbarung einzelner Aktionen des Klassenkampfes, Vorbereitung und Organisierung des gemeinsamen Auftretens des Proletariats der verschiedenen Länder, zu diesen Zwecken Einberufung besonderer Beratungen und Konferenzen von Vertretern der entsprechenden KP - gemäß der Übereinkünfte mit den ZK der Parteien dieser Länder./ ...../ [6] Aufbewahrung und Verteilung der Geldmittel./ ...../ [8] .....
>
> IV. Im weiteren wird das EKKI den kommunistischen Organisationen verschiedener Länder materielle Hilfe lediglich durch seine ausländischen Büros leisten. Für diesen Zweck wird bei jedem Büro ein besonderer Fonds gebildet. Ausgehend davon, daß KP sämtlicher Länder das Ziel verfolgen müssen, materielle Unterstützung von außen her zu entbehren, läßt das EKKI seine Vertreter - die ausländischen Büros - am Anfang für folgende Bedürfnisse Geldhilfe erweisen:
>
> [1] Für die Herausgabe der kommunistischen Literatur; [2] für die Subventionierung illegaler Parteizeitungen, Zeitschriften und Broschüren; [3] für die Gründung von neuen legalen Organen, insoweit ihre Notwendigkeit vom entsprechenden ausländischen Büro anerkannt wird; ..... [6] .....
>
> Die ausländischen Büros des EKKI sind verpflichtet, eine möglichst enge gegenseitige Verbindung untereinander und mit dem EKKI zu unterhalten, regelmäßig, mindestens

(1) РГАСПИ, 495/18/33/20-21; German translation in: A. Kan, "Die Skandinavische Kommission der Komintern 1919-1921," *JahrBuch für Forschungen zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, 2004, H. 3, 68-69.

einmal im Monat, ausführliche Rechenschaften über ihre Wirksamkeit und Vorträge samt allen Materialien bezüglich der Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung und der kommunistischen Arbeit in verschiedenen Ländern an das EKKI zu senden.

The plan of the Foreign Bureaus was elaborated exhaustively in that draft. To take an example of the issue of financial support from the outside (the ECCI) which has been debated intensively and almost negatively in a lot of historical studies up to the present, the plan had a convincing argument as follows: "the CP of all countries must pursue the aim of doing without the material support [i.e., funds] from the outside." The Bureaus, however, did not work as initially planned, and suffered some changes due to both internal and external causes. Although the plan called for, for example, the following: "The Foreign Bureaus of the ECCI are engaged in maintaining a connection as closely and mutually as possible with *each other* and with the ECCI" (my *italics*), the "connection as closely and mutually as possible with *each other*" was broken in most cases due to not only external hindrance, but also the arbitrary manipulation of the ECCI. To begin with, the tasks assigned by the ECCI at the establishment of each Bureau were not understood each other. In addition, the unfair discrimination was developed among the Foreign Bureaus according to the strength of the ECCI's backing up and its change. I have surveyed in *The Early Comintern and Japanese Socialists Residing Abroad* how the Foreign Bureaus were established with the approval of the Bureau conference of the ECCI on and after 14 April 1919, discussed those problems, and argued that the Bureaus were planned primarily to tackle the preparations for the "World Revolution." Here I make a short mention of each Foreign Bureau chronologically.

(1) The Bureau of Hungary: decision on founding on 14 April 1919 — the Soviet Republic itself collapsed on 1 August 1919.

(2) The Bureau of Bavaria: decision on founding on 14 April 1919; the founding unconfirmed — the Soviet Republic itself collapsed on 3 May 1919.

(3) The Bureau of Kiev (the Southern Department): decision on founding on 14 April 1919 — decision on reorganizing on 21 January 1920 — decision on dissolving on 11 August 1920.

(4) The Scandinavian Bureau (Commission): prehistory; decision on founding on 14 April 1919 — decision on dissolving on 8 August 1920; but continued by limited powers until August 1921.

(5) The Vienna Bureau (the Southeastern Bureau): decision on founding in March 1919 — founding in January 1920 — decision on dissolving on 8 March 1922.

(6) The West-European Secretariat (WES): decision on founding on 8 September 1919 — decision on dissolving on 8 August 1920, but continuance approved for the time being — disorganized in 1925.

(7) The Balkan Bureau: prehistory; decision on founding on 2 February 1920 — continued as the Balkan Communist Federation.

(8) The Dutch Branch (the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau): decision on founding on 8 September 1919 — the first meeting on 22 November 1919 in Amsterdam — decision on diminishing powers on 2 February 1920 — decision on dissolving on 25 April 1920.

2 The Transformation and the Dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

In this chapter some important documents concerning the history of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau from its establishment to its dissolution are introduced and its transformation on the way is made clear. And in Chapter 3 some important problems (excluding financial problems which are treated in Chapter 4) with the activities of the Sub-Bureau are tackled straight and its activities are aimed at evaluating properly.

The Sub-Bureau was, to be blunt, burdened with impractical expectations. Plenary powers were given to the Sub-Bureau at the outset by the following decision on the third agenda item ("On the organization of the Section of the ECCI in Holland and the directions to it") of the Small Bureau conference of the ECCI on 28 September 1919 (1):

> 1) To organize the Dutch Section out of comrades Rutgers, [Henriette] Roland Holst, [Antonie] Pannekoek, [Herman] Gorter, [David J.] Wijnkoop and [Willem van] Ravesteyn. The reward for them is determined at the Dutch Branch's discretion. For comrades Gorter and Pannekoek, moreover, a specified sum is allocated with a special fund./ 2) .....
>
> 3) To commission the Section to call a conference of the Communist International as soon as possible, in January 1920, and, for that, to have preliminary relations with the Section of the ECCI in Stockholm./ 4) ...../ 5) .....
>
> 6) To commission [the Section] to establish connections with all the countries.
>
> 7) To empower the Section in Holland in exceptional cases, without giving time, to come out independently by the name of the Third International.
>
> 8) To empower comrade Rutgers to be a plenipotentiary representative of the ECCI at the conference of the Communist International in case for the ECCI an opportunity does not arise to dispatch there its own representative./ 9) .....

Thus all the Dutch members were nominated directly by the ECCI, which was quite different from the nomination of members to other Foreign Bureaus. Especially, expectations for Gorter and Pannekoek were extravagant and optimistic. Furthermore, the "calling of a conference of the Communist International" was commissioned and, as is clearly shown in Clauses 6, 7 and 8, the plenipotentiary power empowered by the ECCI was predominant.

The Comintern switched policies abruptly to the "right" at the Bureau conferences of the ECCI on 30 January and 1 February 1920 where intense discussions followed the report from Karl Radek who had been just released from the German Government and returned home (2). Then Sub-Bureau's powers were weakened one-sidedly by the following decision on the second agenda item ("On the organization of the foreign Bureaus of the ECCI. Heard letters of comrades Rutgers and [A.E.] Abramovich and a report of comrade Radek") of the ECCI conference on 2 February 1920: "3) The Dutch Bureau must serve Holland, England and America. To oblige the Holland Bureau to detach from its own staffs two or three members, who must devote themselves exclusively to the work of the ECCI ....." (3)

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(1) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79 (**Doc. 1-1-1** in Part 1).

(2) РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/17, 19.

(3) РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/21.

On 25 April 1920 the conference of the ECCI decided the dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau [4]. On the same day a certified copy of the decision was sent by the ECCI to Stockholm. On 12 May it reached Fritz [Ström] of the Scandinavian Bureau, who sent it to T[rotter = Rutgers] on the same day. At last it reached the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau on 15 May [5]:

> Das Holländische Bureau hat in einer Anzahl wichtiger Fragen eine Stellung eingenommen (Gewerkschaftsfrage, Parlamentarismus), die gegen die Stellung der Exekutive der 3-ten Komm. Intern. ausläuft. Das Holländische Bureau hat die Exekutive von seiner entgegengesetzten Stellung nicht in Kenntnis gesetzt, bevor es die Intern. Konferenz in Amsterdam einberief. Auf Grund dessen erklärt die Exekutive das Mandat des Holländischen Bureaus als erloschen und zieht dieses Mandat zurück.
>
> Die Exekutive beauftragt ihrem engeren Bureau einen ausführlichen Brief darüber den Holländischen Genossen zu senden. Die Funktionen des Holländischen Bureaus werden dem West-Europäischen Sekretariat übertragen. Das Skandinavische Bureau in Stockholm wird beauftragt den Rechenschaftsbericht und den Rest des Geldes, wie auch der Wertsachen in Empfang zu nehmen.
>
> Für die Exekutive der Komm. Int. Sekretär
>
> K. Radek
>
> Petrograd 25/4-20.

Although it was three weeks since Radek had sent it, the decision reached the Sub-Bureau by radiotelegraph (Radio-Rosta) a little earlier on 4 May [6]. At once the Sub-Bureau began arguing against the ECCI's decision (To be continued in the next chapter).

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(4) РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/66 (**Doc. 1-1-5**).

(5) РГАСПИ, 497/1/9/2; 581/1/95/18 (**Doc. 1-4-3**). When the decision was printed in *The Communist International*, the last sentence on the transfer of control was deleted because of a confidential matter. *Коммунистический Интернационал* (*КИ*) (Петроград), No. 10, 1920, 1659-1660.

(6) РГАСПИ, 497/1/9/1.

3 The Points at Issue of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

1) Problems on Parliamentarism and Trade Unions

a) Switching Policies and Deciding Dissolution by the ECCI

On 25 April 1920 the conference of the ECCI decided the dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau, mainly because the Sub-Bureau took a position against that of the ECCI in a number of important questions (Trade Union issue, Parliamentarism). The Sub-Bureau argued firmly against the reasons furnished by the ECCI. I examine here which argument is appropriate.

The Founding Congress of the Comintern in March 1919 was rejective against participation in Parliament (Parliamentarism). In "Parliamentarism and the struggle for Soviets (ECCI's circular)" which was issued by the president, Zinoviev, of the ECCI on 1 September 1919, Parliamentarism was only conditionally recognized on the presupposition that the Soviet power was originally incompatible with Parliament (1).

As mentioned above, at the Bureau conferences of the ECCI on 30 January and 1 February 1920 the ECCI switched policies abruptly to the "right," that is, receded the line inclining to the "radical left" and was to open up the way for forming a united front of workers after a year. Consequently the Comintern adopted the tactics rather to form a majority of the left in the existing trade union than to establish a new trade union of the left.

As mentioned below, the Trade Union issue was not taken in the platform of the Founding Congress of the Comintern (to be exact, the International Communist Conference yet) because of the difficulty of drawing together various opinions. Making allowance for the reasons, the issue would belong to the case that the ECCI ought not to have directed the policy one-sidedly, before holding the following Congress of the Comintern, fully discussing the issue, and passing something like a resolution.

b) The Consistency in Policies of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

The provisional executive of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau made preparations for a full discussion on both problems at the international conference on 3-8 February 1920 (hereafter cited as the "Conference of the 3d International"). "Theses on Trade = Unionism" and "Comment on the Theses concerning Trade = Unions," which had been drafted by Pannekoek and published in No. 1 of *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* just before the opening of the Conference, were proposed and defeated at the Conference. Next, an amendment by Fraina was proposed and adopted.

The following sentence of the "Comment" would have been regarded as too passive by Fraina and John T. Murphy who was leading the Shop Stewards movement: "..... when considerable masses of workers have already turned their back on the old unions ..... new organizations must be built up, in new forms ....." In the amendment the new industrial unionism was advanced more concretely and more positively. But its 15 (last) clause went ahead rashly and said: "After the

(1) "Парламентаризм и борьба за Советы (Циркулярное письмо И.К. Коммун. Интернационала)," *КИ*, No. 5, IX.1919, 703-708; cf. РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/48.

conquest of political power ....., industrial unionism comes actually to function in the economic reconstruction of society on a Communist basis; ....." [(2)]

Although "Theses" drafted by Pannekoek were substantially modified by Fraina's amendment, we should keep a firm grasp here on the following sentence in the "Comment": "According to the degree of maturity of the revolution, and to the conditions obtaining in various countries these forms will differ, and the decisions on this point, will, of course, have to be left to the workers of these countries."

In the same way, "Theses concerning Parliamentarism" and "Comment on the Theses concerning Parliamentarism" were drafted and published in No. 1 of *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam*. The opening sentence of the latter said: "The attitude adopted by the Communists towards Parliament and its utilization by the proletariat has been set forth at length in a circular emanating from the Secretariat of the Third International, dated September 1st [1919] and signed by Zinovieff" [(3)]. In the 5 (last) clause of the former the following was also declared: "As in various countries, this process of social revolution does not develop at the same instant, at the same rate and under the same conditions, the decision as to whether, when, and in what way parliamentarism is to be made use of in the class-struggle, must be left to the working class of every single country." At the end of "Comment" the following similar to "Theses on Trade = Unionism" was repeated: "An international Congress can only lay down general principles for the tactics of the class war. The application to the special conditions of any single country must be left to the Communists of that country."

Respecting the workers of the countries concerned for their independence and self-reliance which was also clearly stated in both "Comments" was the consistent policy of the Sub-Bureau [(4)].

When a notification of the ECCI's decision (on 25 April) on dissolving the Sub-Bureau reached the Sub-Bureau by radiotelegraph on 4 May 1920, that was a complete surprise to the Sub-Bureau which had clearly defined its position on Parliamentarism and the Trade Union issue. On 10 May the Sub-Bureau under the joint signature of Roland Holst, Rutgers and Wijnkoop issued a declaration (Erklärung) against the decision [(5)]. Following the letter of G.L. Trotter [Rutgers] to Winter [J. Berzin] dated 12 May [(6)], Trotter refuted concretely the decision in his letter dated 14 May addressed directly to the ECCI as follows [(7)]:

> 1) "In der Frage des Parlamentarismus haben wir uns ganz gestellt auf dem Boden des Rundschreibens wie es bei meiner Abreise vorlag. Dass wir keineswegs gegen die Teilnahme an parlamentarische Tätigkeit sind, geht schon hervor aus dem Umstande, dass zwei der Mitglieder die von Ihnen in dem Amsterd. Bureau angewiesen sind, selber in Holländischen Parlament sitzen —/ Es wurde aber immer in Moskau anerkennt, dass es Situationen geben

(2) *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* (Amsterdam), No. 1, II.1920, 3-4.

(3) *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam*, No. 1, 3-4.

(4) According to the report of Fraina to the Communist Party of America (CPA), that agenda item (Parliamentarism) could not be discussed because the Conference was broken up by the police. L.C. Fraina, "The International Communist Conference," *The Communist. Official Organ of the Communist Party of America* (Chicago), Vol. 2, No. 4, 25.IV.1920, 7-8.

(5) РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/22-24; 497/1/9/7-9 (**Doc. 1-4-2**).

(6) РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/15-17; 497/2/8/8-10 (**Doc. 1-2-3**).

(7) РГАСПИ, 495/172/60/21-23; 497/1/9/10-12; 581/1/95/26-28 (**Doc. 1-4-4**); cf. G. Voerman, *De meridiaan van Moskou. De CPN en de Communistische Internationale, 1919-1930* (Amsterdam/ Antwerpen, 2001), 91, 500.

kann, die eine Beteiligung am Parlament unratsam machen und weiter, dass Verschiedenheit der Meinung in dieser Angelegenheit nicht ein Hindernis zu Zugehörigkeit der dritten Intern. bilden sollte. Damit ist unsre Haltung durchwegs in Uebereinstimmung. Es scheint, dass man jetzt in Moskau der Beteiligungen an den Wahlen einen grösseren Wert beilegt, da man eine Ablehnung in „flagrante“ Widerstreit zu den proletarischen Interessen, und als „leere Phrase“ andeutet, ohne jede weitere Ausnahme./ Das bedeutet jedenfalls eine Aenderung im Standpunkt des Exektivkomitees, die uns niemals zur Kenntnis gebracht wurde und die ohne weitere Begründung nur noch grössere Verwirrung bringen kann.”

2) “Ein zweiter Punkt bildet die Gewerkschaften./ Wir haben uns niemals dagegen erklärt, dass man unter Umständen in den Gewerkschaften den Kampf von innen ausführt. Nur ist es eine lebendige Tatsache, dass neben den alten Gewerkschaften auch neuere revolutionäre ökonomische Organisationen sich bilden und es war doch gewiss immer die Ansicht auch in Moskau, die revolutionären Gewerkschaften nach Kräften zu unterstützen — Haben nicht gerade unsre russischen Gewerkschaftsfreunde die revolutionären Gewerkschaften der Welt, die sich zur 3-ten Intern.-bekennen zu einem Kongress aufgerufen! Wo reaktionäre und revolutionäre Gewerkschaften nebeneinander bestehen, wird man doch wohl die letztere bevorzugen dürfen? Aber auch wo diese noch nicht bestehen, kann es doch gewiss eine Situation geben, die zur Schaffung solcher Organismen günstig ist.”

To that question Rutgers might have inclined to say “Yes” indeed. But he would have thought that the response “must be left to the working class of every single country.”

Here I would like to examine the Trade Union issue supplementarily from the side of the Comintern’s move to founding an International Labor Union. At the Founding Congress of the Comintern that issue was taken up only by Boris Reinstein on the agenda item 3 (Platform) as follows: “The other idea that in my view is not correctly presented is the role of the economic organizations, the trade union movement.” “The Gomperses and Hendersons are already hard at work founding a Yellow international union movement whose task will be to function as an international lightning rod. We must work against them” [(8)]. After all, that issue was not incorporated in the Platform [(9)].

One of the drafters, Max Albert (Hugo Eberlein) told frankly in concluding remarks of the agenda: “I now come to a very important question that the platform does not deal with, that of the trade union movement. We spent a lot of time on this question. We interviewed delegates from each country about their trade union movement, and concluded that since the proletariat’s situation in each country is completely different, it is impossible at this time to include in the platform an international position on this question” [(10)].

It was urgently necessity to enact the platform, so it would not have time to spare for going deeply into that separate issue. In addition, there were few delegates who were versed in the issue. Originally, there was a low level of interest in the labor movement among Bolshevik leaders

(8) W. Hedeler / A. Vatlin (Hg.), *Die Weltpartei aus Moskau. Der Gründungskongress der Kommunistischen Internationale 1919. Protokoll und neue Dokumente* (Berlin, 2008), 129-130; J. Riddell (ed.), *Founding the Communist International. Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress, March 1919* (New York, 1987), 140-141.

(9) The following remark of Leonie Kascher (Communist Group of Switzerland) was not taken up even for discussion: “It seems strange that these workers’ councils, which are forming everywhere, are not mentioned in the platform.” Hedeler / Vatlin, 131; Riddell, *Founding the Communist International,* 142.

(10) Hedeler/Vatlin, 133; Riddell, *Founding the Communist International*, 144.

including V.I. Lenin, for they concentrated their energy on the Soviet movement and inclined to pay little attention to traditional mass organizations of the working class like trade unions. Nevertheless, as the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU; Amsterdam International) was restored at the Congress held first after the World War in July-August 1919, the Comintern was obliged to aim at founding a Red Labor Union International in rivalry with the IFTU [(11)].

At the Bureau conference of the ECCI on 27 September 1919 (which Rutgers attended at) the resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on summoning an International Congress of Trade Unions was reported by Zinoviev and the resolution for summoning "an International Congress of Trades Unions on behalf of the Third International" was adopted [(12)]. At the following Bureau conference on 28 September a detailed and concrete resolution "on the organization of the Branch of the ECCI in Holland and directions to it" was carried. The resolution included "to entrust the Branch with summoning, as far as possible, in January 1920 a conference of the Comintern," on the agenda item of which "the formation of a professional International" was expressly placed [(13)]. It would mean that at the start the ECCI expected that conference [which was to be held in February] in order to look for a clue to that formation.

At the Second Congress of the Comintern in July-August 1920 the International Council of Trades and Industrial Unions was provisionally organized. The Congress, however, adopted "Theses on the Trade Union Movement, Factory Committees, and the Communist International" without overcoming the differences of opinion as to the Trade Union issue. Among others, the deep-rootedness of differences was evident in the following remark of Zinoviev: "[Jack] Tanner [Shop Stewards leader] believes it is a contradiction to say we must remain in the unions at the national level, while internationally we want a separate body. We want to remain in the unions nationally in order to bring people over to our side. Rather than abandon the unions to the Amsterdam International, we want to unite them and place them under the leadership of the Communist International. We want to win the unions in every way possible, at the national level if necessary" [(14)]. Zinoviev did not dare to grapple squarely with that problem which was difficult to practice.

That "contradiction" was taken up in the memoir of Alfred Rosmer, who was to take an active role in founding the Profintern after a year, as follows: "La tactique défendue énergiquement par Lénin contre les «gauches» dans la *Maladie infantile* [cf. the next paragraph] et approuvée par la majorité du [2ème] congrès pouvait paraître contradictoire; on demandait aux communistes, aux ouvriers révolutionnaires, de rester dans les syndicats réformistes, et, d'autre part, on s'acheminait ouvertement vers une Internationale syndicale rouge. Les leaders réformistes de la Fédération syndicale internationale d'Amsterdam ne manquaient pas de le dire ni même de la crier, et avec eux la presse bourgeoise; nous étions dénoncés comme des scissionnistes" [(15)]. Rosmer continued writing thus: "Mais la contradiction n'était qu'apparente; les scissionnistes n'étaient pas de notre côté ainsi ....." But it would be undeniable that the very dual policy of the Comintern introduced

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(11) Cf. A. Resis, "Comintern Policy toward the World Trade-Union Movement: The First Year," J.S. Curtis (ed.), *Essays in Russian and Soviet History. In Honor of Geroid Tanquary Robinson* (New York, 1963), 238-240.

(12) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/77.

(13) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79 (**Doc. 1-1-1**).

(14) *Der zweite Kongreß der Kommunistischen Internationale. Protokoll der Verhandlungen vom 19. Juli in Petrograd und vom 23. Juli bis 7. August 1920 in Moskau* (Hamburg, 1921), 638-639, cf. 508; J. Riddell (ed.), *Workers of the World and Oppressed Peoples, Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress, 1920*, Vol. 2 (New York et al., 1991), 936-937, cf. 789.

(15) A. Rosmer, *Moscou sous Lénine*, Tome 1 (Paris, 1970), 134-135.

confusion (e.g., on how to square the policy with the rising radical trade unions) into its own camp and gave momentum for the leaders of "reformist trade unions" to exclude "revolutionary workers" who were trying to form communist cells within reformist unions.

c) A Counterargument to *"Left-Wing" Communism — an Infantile Disorder*

In the minutes of the Bureau conferences of the ECCI at the beginning of 1920 where the ECCI decided to switch the policies, the details were not recorded. The Comintern's positions on the issues concerned after the sudden turnabout are defined in *"Left-Wing" Communism — an Infantile Disorder* in which Lenin harshly criticized the "leftism." I examine the book and try to make a counterargument over it.

In its seventh chapter (Should we participate in bourgeois parliaments?) Lenin said as follows: "Parliamentarianism is of course "political obsolete" to the Communists in Germany; but — and that is the whole point — we must *not* regard what is obsolete *to us* as something obsolete *to a class, to the masses*. Here again we find that the "Lefts" do not know how to reason, do not know to act as the party of a *class*, as the party of the *masses*" (16).

In the "ECCI's circular" of September 1919 five necessary conditions were attached to the utilization of Parliament which was originally incompatible with Soviets. But Lenin did not come out with the participation in Parliament by checking it against those conditions, but by adopting utterly different criteria for it which were too ill-defined, that is, "something obsolete *to a class, to the masses*" [in contradistinction to "what is obsolete *to us*"]. He said that in the spring of 1920 Parliament system did not yet come to "something obsolete *to a class, to the masses*." If so, neither in March 1919 (when the Founding Congress of the Comintern was rejective against that participation) nor in September 1919 (when the "ECCI's circular" was still cautious about that participation) that system would naturally come to something obsolete *to a class, to the masses*." In that case, why the participation in Parliament had been come out with in March or September 1919 earlier than the spring of 1920? Lenin passed the question by in silence in the book, still more the reason of the sudden turnabout at the beginning of 1920. To begin with, it is unreasonable to regard the tactical policy as a principle. There is no sense generalizing (or compelling) the tactical policy, which is required to change in the wake of changes in situations, as a principle. Because, whenever the tactical policy changes, one principle after another could be generalized (or compelled). The ECCI and Lenin should not have regarded the issues concerned as matters of principle which were so fundamental and divisive that they could not but split with the Left Communists, but as matters of tactics.

In order to appeal for the participation in Parliament Lenin took two examples of Karl Liebknecht and Zeth Höglund in the book. Indeed, those examples had already be taken in the "ECCI's circular," but the reasons why those examples were taken were different each other. That is, the reason for the latter is "the usefulness of utilizing Parliament" but that for the former is altered into "the ability to *forge* a communist group in the worst of parliaments." Lenin altered the reason on the assumption that "a *revolutionary mass* party" (my *italics*) was "rapidly growing." Was there really such a *revolutionary mass* party in those days? As for that party, Lenin probably kept the USPD in mind. Indeed the USPD was "massive," but it would be too tactical to call it "revolutionary." His explaining the reason why Parliamentarism has to be adopted positively in the very spring of 1920 would not be persuasive.

Just as the Sub-Bureau argued that "the decisions on this point, will, of course, have to be left

(16) V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31 (Moscow, 1966), 58.

to the workers of these countries," so this Trade Union issue would not have been such a case that Lenin regarded the tactical policy on one side as a principle and did not take the least notice of the tactical policy on the other side. After all, the strong action taken by Lenin and other Bolsheviks raised the above-mentioned problem with the dual policy. History reveals that the dual policy of the Comintern resulted in a failure. Therefore, it is highly questionable that Lenin and others disregarded the tactical policy on the other side, that is, that of the Left Communists.

2) Counterarguments to the Decision on Dissolution and the Internal Split

At the beginning of May 1920 the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau received the ECCI's decision on dissolving the Sub-Bureau and immediately began arguing back the decision. In this paragraph I make clear how the Sub-Bureau argued back and examine its internal split and the sudden "conversion" of Rutgers just after the dissolution.

a) Counterarguments to the Decision on Dissolution

On 10 May 1920 the Sub-Bureau under the joint signature of Roland Holst, Rutgers and Wijnkoop issued a declaration (Erklärung) against the decision [(17)]. In it the Sub-Bureau focused its criticism of the WES (Westeuropäisches Sekretariat) as follows: "Indessen ist in West Europa der Unwillen gegen das W.E.S. schnell gewachsen und haben sich die Verbindungen von unsrem Bureau mit den verschiedenen Parteien und Gruppen ausgedehnt." "Wir erachten es aber bedauerlich dass man in Moskau nach einseitigen Mitteilungen sich dazu entschliesst das W.E.S. eine offizielle Sanktion zu geben." In his letter to Winter dated 12 May 1920 Trotter also concentrated upon criticism of the WES as follows [(18)]: "Erstens hat sich das Berliner W.E.S. nach unsrer Meinung immer mehr als Hemmnis für die Einheit und Aktionsfähigkeit in West-Europa erwiesen ....."

Furthermore, Trotter refuted concretely the decision in the above-mentioned letter to the ECCI (**Doc. 1-4-4**). The points of the counterargument are four, out of which the first and the second have been cited in Paragraph 1-b, so the third and the fourth are cited here:

> 3) "Was die Einheit der Parteien und Gruppen in den verschiedenen Ländern anbetrifft, so scheint uns jetzt, dass Moskau überall eine straffe Zentralisation und Disziplin durchführen will. Bis jetzt war das nicht die Ansicht, da man alle mögliche linksstehende Gruppe immer aufgefordert hat auf verschiedenen Wege nach Moskau zu kommen. Man hat die Syndikalisten, Sozial-Anarchisten etc. immer aufgefordert, ... Wir haben gemeint die linken Gruppen nicht unnötig abstossen zu müssen, dagegen dem immer wankelmütigen Zentrum gegenüber der revolutionären Tat als das entscheidende entgegenführen zu müssen."
>
> 4) "Zuletzt oder besser als erste und wichtigste Aufgabe, haben wir uns über das Verhalten West-Europas zu Russland ausgesprochen und zu Taten aufgefordert. Dabei stellten wir uns auf den Standpunkt, dass nur eine Erhebung in West-Europa, oder wenigstens nur revolutionäre Aktionen im Stande sein können die Russischen Revolution zu Hilfe zu kommen. Wir haben von Anfang bestritten, dass ein wirklicher Frieden von den Kapitalisten mit Soviet-Russland möglich sei, ohne einen starken Druck von den Arbeitern in West-Europa."

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(17) РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/22-24; 497/1/9/7-9 (**Doc. 1-4-2**).

(18) РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/15-17; 497/2/8/8-10 (**Doc. 1-2-3**).

When the Sub-Bureau received the ECCI's decision, the Sub-Bureau was about to tackle two international tasks: One is to make a preparation for an international conference about May jointly with the WES. It aimed to resolve the strife between the Sub-Bureau and the WES, which had been caused by the resolutions adopted at the "Conference of the 3d International" in February 1920, and to hold "another international communist Conference" "within three months" "which it is hoped will possess the necessary authority to institute a more definitive international Bureau." Indeed there were some conflicts between them over Parliamentarism, the division of their roles as Foreign Bureaus, etc., but the WES did not yet act in concert with the ECCI's harsh criticism of the Sub-Bureau [19].

The other is to take part in the Scandinavian Bureau's undertaking for an international conference. It aimed to found "an international Bureau" "representing the revolutionary Labor-Unions" by taking advantage of the opportunity of the scheduled Congress of the Norwegian [Labor] Party on 23-24 May 1920 and, furthermore, to "organize an international congress of labor-unions most likely at the end of June in Kristiania" [20].

In the midst of such Sub-Bureau's tacklings the ECCI's decision was notified abruptly and one-sidedly.

b) The Internal Split and Rutgers' "Conversion"

In an article printed in *De Tribune* on 16-17 August 1920 v. R. [van Ravesteyn] took up an article of K. Horner [Pannekoek] as "a misleading article" and criticized it on the strength of Lenin's *"Left-Wing" Communism — an Infantile Disorder* [21]. As v. R.'s attack led to the Sub-Bureau's members, Pannekoek and Herman Gorter, at once Rutgers sent his counterargument to the editor, Jan C. Ceton and its copy to van Ravesteyn, respectively [22]. It was printed in a readers' column of *De Tribune* on 26 August. Rutgers pointed out some mistakes of fact in v. R.'s article as follows:

1) It is incorrect that v. R. would have refused to cooperate with Pannekoek. On the contrary, it is not objectionable that v. R. refused exclusively to cooperate with Gorter on grounds of Gorter's personal action in party affairs.

2) It is incorrect that the Sub-Bureau would not have functioned and v. R. did not participate in its activities.

3) It is incorrect that Pannekoek and Gorter participated in the Conference without any right of representation. On the contrary, they were nominated by the ECCI as members of the Sub-Bureau which was to arrange the Conference. V. R. himself attended it one day. There was a consensus of opinion among members (Roland Holst, Wijnkoop and Rutgers) of the new Sub-Bureau approved by the Conference and no criticism of it in the Dutch communist press.

4) It is incorrect to evoke an impression as if Horner were placed on the same level with Heinrich Laufenberg. It is well known that Horner has always fought against "National

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(19) *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* (Amsterdam), No. 2, III.1920, 1-3; **Doc. 3-1-3**, **1-3-4**; *Bericht über den 3. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (Spartakusbund) am 25. und 26. Februar 1920* (Berlin, n.d.), 69-84; cf. **Doc. 1-3-2**, **1-3-3**.

(20) **Doc. 3-1-4**, cf. **1-4-1**; [Fredrik Ström] an Trotter, 6.IV.1920, РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/10-11; 497/2/5/19, 20, 21. This undertaking was to be abandoned due to the early notification of convening the Second Congress of the Comintern on 15 July 1920.

(21) v. R., "Een misleidend artikel (I/II)," *De Tribune*, Jrg. 13, No. 267-268, 16-17.VIII.1920, elk 1.

(22) Archief W. van Ravesteyn, Map 17, IISG; *De Tribune*, Jrg. 13, No. 276, 26.VIII.1920, 4; cf. РГАСПИ, 495/172/6/15.

Bolshevism" of Laufenberg [and Fritz Wolffheim].

The editor's postscript was added as follows: At the contributor's request we printed this short article immediately. But we never meddle in the matter itself only in a miscellaneous column of minor importance [(23)]. It was underlined in it that the ECCI in Moscow decided in advance the organization of the Sub-Bureau (especially the appointment of six members) and the Dutch Communist Party itself did not take part in it.

Indeed, the problem with the appointment of members had overshadowed discussions among six members since the first meeting of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam on 22 November 1919 and intensified the strife between Gorter and van Ravesteyn / Wijnkoop. But the Sub-Bureau of six members did start as a technical bureau and continued to the opening of the "Conference of the 3d International" [(24)]. At the "Conference" on 8 February 1920 Wijnkoop suggested the new executive of the Sub-Bureau to be formed by Rutgers and Roland Holst, together with a delegate of the Dutch Communist Party. It was agreed and soon the last was filled up by Wijnkoop [(25)]. Furthermore, Wijnkoop did sign with Roland Holst and Rutgers the above-mentioned "Erklärung" on 10 May 1920. It turns out that the editor's postscript made desperate efforts to leave no trace behind of the Party's participation in the Sub-Bureau.

It is well known that the desperate efforts bore fruit in part. That is, Wijnkoop's letter to Lenin dated 30 June 1920 was printed at the end of appendix of the translation of Lenin's *"Left-Wing" Communism — an Infantile Disorder*, saying that only "some members of the Communist Party of Holland" who "took little or not point in the Party's current activities" participated in the Sub-Bureau [(26)]. And Lenin's foreword, where he had corrected the words concerned in the text on the basis of Wijnkoop's letter, was attached to it. It should be paid attention to, however, that Lenin seems to have not considered the internal strife within the Dutch Party as a vital matter to himself, because during the discussion on "Conditions for admission" at the Second Congress of the Comintern Lenin said as follows: "In every speech he delivers, Comrade Wijnkoop reveals that he shares almost all the errors of Comrade Pannekoek. Wijnkoop has started that he does not share Pannekoek's views, but his speech prove the reverse" [(27)]. As a matter of fact, Wijnkoop said as follows: 1) The ECCI should not negotiate with leaders of parliamentary parties [like the USPD] but "speak directly to the masses." 2) [The delegates of the KAPD broke off preliminary negotiations with the ECCI and left just before the opening of the Congress.] "By concentrating all criticism on the USPD, on a reformist party, we failed to listen to the KAPD's criticism of the German Communist Party, which, though not friendly, is useful" [(28)]. To be sure, Lenin's grasp was scarcely off point.

The origin of an affair is that Wijnkoop who arrived in Moscow on 19 June 1920 in order to attend the Second Congress of the Comintern began consulting with Lenin, Karl Radek and others on that day. Wijnkoop kept insisting that from the start there had been the internal strife of

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(23) Although Ceton did not answer Rutgers' criticism point by point, on 24 August Ceton sent a reply as follows: Although you [Rutgers] write "the greatest nonsense" relentlessly, I will never embarrass you and print your article in the newspaper tomorrow. Your contribution is so "in contradiction to alll experiences in our party" that it will be of no avail to refute it. РГАСПИ, 495/172/6/16.

(24) РГАСПИ, 497/1/10/8a, 9-11, 17-20; cf. Trotter to Winter, 9.III.1920, РГАСПИ, 497/2/8/1-7; 581/1/95/33-39.

(25) *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam*, No. 2, 8.

(26) Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 65.

(27) *Der zweite Kongreß*, 351; Riddell, *Workers of the World*, Vol. 1, 486; cf. B. Lazitch / M.M. Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern*, Vol. 1 (Stanford, 1972), 254.

(28) *Der zweite Kongreß*, 298-303; Riddell, *Workers of the World*, Vol. 1, 432-437.

opinion among six Dutch members of the Sub-Bureau and the ECCI which had been ignorant of it appointed them one-sidedly and forced Dutch communists to accept the "strange combination" [(29)].

It is said that Rutgers had stayed in foreign countries since January 1911 and just after coming home he perceived that he had been little informed on the internal party strife in the SDP/CP [(30)]. But revelations about the strife surfaced fairly in *De Tribune* and *De Nieuwe Tijd*. Rutgers rather kept up correspondence with comrades of both groups and tried to advocate the thought and political stance of the Dutch Left in one body in the USA and Soviet Russia, without turning his attention to the rift within the Party. Such Rutgers' intermediary role was highly characteristic at the period of the Sub-Bureau.

Rather than an emphasis on the strife, why only Dutch comrades were appointed directly by the ECCI as members for one of Foreign Bureaus should be questioned. They were treated well as follows: "The reward for them is determined at the Dutch Branch's discretion. For comrades Gorter and Pannekoek, moreover, a specified sum is allocated with a special fund" [(31)]. It is hardly possible that Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders were ignorant of the internal strife within Dutch Party, because they had witnessed indirectly an internal strife over their participation in the Zimmerwald movement [(32)]. Furthermore, in Gorter's letter to Lenin dated 22 September 1918 Lenin could know anew the following strife: The SDP had done well in general during the War, but only its diplomatic policy — pro-Entente and anti-German — had been too bad. "[A]ls sie [Wijnkoop und van Ravesteyn] sich freuten über Kerensky's und Brussiloff's Offensive [gegen Deutschland] ..... Jetzt aber, da sie immer die Entente noch nicht bekämpfen, sondern über sie schweigen, habe ich [Gorter] einen scharfen Kampf gegen sie angefangen" [(33)]. Although Lenin was informed of the strife, he did not pay attention to it, but still kept backing Gorter and Pannekoek up and expecting the cooperation between the two groups till the decision on dissolving the Sub-Bureau.

The following instances were in the background of Lenin's backing them up: Pannekoek revived anti-statism which Marx and Engels had advocated, next Bukharin developed it into a theory of the imperialistic State, and finally Lenin turned his attention to its importance and wrote *State and Revolution* by way of the so-called "April theses." It followed that Gorter translated *State and Revolution* into Dutch in Autumn 1918, which was published at the beginning of 1919 [(34)].

One more problem is the so-called "conversion" of Rutgers: he suddenly published an article in which he showed some sympathy for the ECCI's decision on dissolving the Sub-Bureau. G. Voerman have taken up the matter: "Of all people, it was Rutgers himself, the initiator of the Amsterdam Bureau, who was the first to buckle under in the face of this intervention from

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(29) Cf. Wp. [Wijnkoop], "Een onderhoud met Radek," *De Tribune*, Jrg. 13, No. 300, 23.IX.1920, 1.

(30) H. de Liagre Böhl, *Herman Gorter. Zijn politieke aktiviteiten van 1909 tot 1920 in de opkomende kommunistische beweging in Nederland* (Nijmegen, 1973), 227; Voerman, *De meridiaan*, 79.

(31) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79 (**Doc.1-1-1**).

(32) Cf. H. Roland Holst, "Der Kampf um Zimmerwald in Holland," *Vorbote. Internationale Marxistische Rundschau* (Bern), No. 1, I.1916, 64-68; D.J. Wijnkoop, "De geest van Zimmerwald," *De Nieuwe Tijd*, Jrg. 21, No. 2, II.1916, 54-62; H. Roland Holst, "De eenheid in zicht," *De Internationale* (Amsterdam), Jrg. 1, No.12, IV.1916, 260-265.

(33) G. Stuiveling, "Gorters brieven aan Lenin," id., *Willens en Wetens. Twaalf Essays* (Amsterdm, 1967), 133.

(34) "Из материалов Института Маркса-Энгельса-Ленина," *Большевик* (Москва), 1932, No. 22, 87; Stuiveling, 137-138; de Liagre Böhl, 221.

Moscow. ..... After the Bureau was closed, Rutgers continued to strongly oppose the Comintern's tendency towards centralization. »Eine einheitliche, straff disziplinierte internationale Organisation herbeizuführen ist heute noch unmöglich«, he informed the ECCI [in "Erklärung"]. Once Lenin ..... condemned leftist communist views, Rutgers adopted the new line without protest. He was suddenly praising the benefits of »strict discipline« and »as great as possible a subjection of national organs to international leadership from Moscow«"[35].

At the beginning of that article[36] Rutgers gained a new understanding of the conditions that the Comintern had swiftly developed during the Founding Congress till the Second Congress. Based on that understanding, he did write that "a mighty counterrevolutionary power can be overcome only by the well organized, centralized and disciplined proletariat."

But it does not seem to me that Rutgers gave his full consent to Lenin's criticism of the leftism. The fact is that Rutgers set the following conditions in accepting "centralization and strict discipline in all functions and in the international struggle": "so great possible freedom of criticism and control from the bottom up" is an absolutely indispensable supplement to it. Indeed, there would have been no possibility of Lenin's accepting the conditions, but could it be distinguished from the complete "conversion" that Rutgers set such conditions? After Rutgers came back in Moscow in May 1921 through his recuperation in Italy in the winter of 1920-21, he was to become an originator and prompter of the project for the Autonomous Industrial Colony Kuzbas. At that time his "leftist" stance was maintained in a sense[37].

As is noticeable in his articles, "Uit Sowjet-Rusland" and "De Intellectueelen en de Russische Revolutie"[38], his high appraisal and expectation (including alarm occasionally) for the national construction of Soviet Russia after the October Revolution would be added to his above-mentioned new understanding. Rutgers possessed the "two-sidedness," that is, a socialist and civil engineer[39]. It is supposed that the latter side also operated on his "conversion." During his stay in the USA Rutgers worked as a director and chief engineer for the Netherlands East Indies and expended a part of his funds upon the socialist movement. There were practical and utilitarian sides to his character, which were to lead him to be one of the founders of the AIC Kuzbas and then its manager. They would be the factors which contributed to his survival in the era of the Stalinism. He did not possess only the side of "dying a martyr to his cause."

Rutgers who had published that article split with Pannekoek, Gorter and Roland-Holst concerning the dissolution problem. The latter of three sent again the following undated statement (handwritten by Gorter) to the ECCI after the Second Congress of the Comintern: "Die Unterzeichneten, die Marxistischen Mitglieder des ehemaligen von der dritten Internationale ernannten Amsterdamer Büro's, protestieren hiermit gegen die Taktik, die vom 2 en Kongresse der dritten Internationale in den Fragen der Gewerkschaften und des Parlamentarismus angenommen wurde." And they rejected every responsibility for the tactics which would bring disaster in

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(35) G. Voerman, "Proletarian Competition. The Amsterdam Bureau and its German Counterpart, 1919-1920," *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung 2007* (Berlin, 2007), 217-218; Voerman, *De meridiaan*, 95, 501.

(36) S.J. Rutgers, "Het Congres te Moskou," *De Nieuwe Tijd*, Jrg. 25, No. 18, 15.IX.1920, 577-582.

(37) Cf. Second Kuzbas Paper-Prepared by S.J. Rutgers with the collaboration of H.S. Calver and Ludwig A.C. Martens, Moscow, June 1921, РГАСПИ, 5/3/246/8-18; 515/1/4306/58-62.

(38) S.J. Rutgers, "Uit Sowjet-Rusland. 25 September 1918 — 15 October 1919," *De Tribune* (Amsterdam), Jrg. 13, No. 75, 30.XII.1919, 2 ～ No. 93, 21.I.1920, 2; id., "De Intellectueelen en de Russische Revolutie," *De Nieuwe Tijd*, Jrg. 26, No. 5, 1.III.1921, 129-140; No. 7/8, 5.IV.1921, 196-212 [originally written in April 1920].

(39) Cf. G.C. Trincher Rutgers/K. Trincher, *Rutgers. Zijn leven en streven in Holland, Indonesië, Amerika en Rusland* (Moskou, 1974), 42; Г. Тринчер/К. Тринчер, *Рутгерс* (Москва, 1967), 44.

admitting many unrevolutionary elements [40].

3) The Potential of Wide-ranging Activities

The Amsterdam Sub-Bureau could establish its contact and correspondence with countries and regions on the largest possible scale among the Foreign Bureaus. The very scope of contact and correspondence was the chief advantage of the Sub-Bureau. To the best of my knowledge, the countries with which the Sub-Bureau had contact and correspondence are listed below: (1) Soviet Russia, (2) Germany, (3) Sweden, (4) Norway, (5) Denmark, (6) Finland, (7) Great Britain, (8) USA, (9) Japan, (10) Mexico, (11) Spain, (12) France, (13) Belgium, (14) Luxemburg, (15) the Netherlands, (16) Switzerland, (17) Austria, (18) Italy, (19) South Africa, (20) Australia, (21) Poland (through Austria), (22) Slovakia, (23) Bulgaria, (24) Dutch Indies [41].

Compared with the Sub-Bureau, that scope in case of the Scandinavian Bureau was more limited. According to a letter of its president, Ström, to M.M. Litvinov, as of February 1920 Ström made connections with the following countries: (1) Germany, (2) the Netherlands, (3) Great Britain, (4) Belgium, (5) France, (6) Switzerland, (7) Austria, (8) Italy, (9) USA, (10) Canada, (11) Mexico [including Indian refugees], (12) Finland, (13) Estonia [42].

As for the WES, according to Lazitch/Drachkovitch, "[Jacob] Reich ..... had the mission covering the largest geographical area and longest span of time" [43]. According to the decision on the agenda item 2 ("On organizing Foreign Bureaus of the ECCI") of the Bureau conference on 2 February 1920, "The West-European Secretariat in Berlin must take charge of Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Poland" [44]. But the scope of its activities was supposed to be chiefly limited to the Central Europe, though I cannot affirm it because the Comintern Archive scarcely holds letters and others concerned with the WES. Moreover, both the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the Scandinavian Bureau often complained in their letters that they had no communication from the WES (cf. Paragraph 4).

The Sub-Bureau also issued extensively the leaflets in English, German, French and Dutch during the period from January to May 1920, most of which were written in the style of the Communication (Mitteilung) of the Sub-Bureau. I could check 55 items, 37 of which I have reprinted in Part 1-3 of the present work. They can be broadly classified into three groups: 1) the Sub-Bureau's appeals to the general or several countries; 2) a report on the Communist Young International; 3) reports on each of eight countries, that is, to use the above-mentioned numbers, (1), (2), (6), (7) (including Ireland), (8), (11), (13) and (16).

The Sub-Bureau also exchanged letters far away with Johannesburg, South Africa. William H. Andrews, Secretary Organizer of the International Socialist League (South Africa), wrote in a letter to Rutgers on 29 June 1920 that in spite of the ECCI's denial to the Sub-Bureau, "we shall be glad to keep in touch with you and receive any information you may be able to give us from time to time" [45]. This is enough to give us at least some idea of the important role which the

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(40) РГАСПИ, 495/172/61/17 (**Doc. 1-4-5**).

(41) In the following lists the letters and the material from/to the Sub-Bureau are classified into 13 countries and regions. "Liste von Materialien von Hutgers [*sic*]," РГАСПИ, 497/2/8/13-18.

(42) A. Kan, "Der bolschewistische 'Revolutionsexport' im Jahre 1920 und die schwedischen Linkssozialisten," *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung 1994* (Berlin, 1993), 98.

(43) Lazitch/Drachkovitch, 149.

(44) РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/21 (**Doc. 1-1-4**).

(45) РГАСПИ, 497/2/2/214.

Sub-Bureau fulfilled as communications media. On Rutgers' advice the League came to send the Second Congress of the Comintern its application for entry into the Comintern by telegram[46].

According to Rutgers' handwritten memorandum for the advance of proceedings of the first meeting in Amsterdam on 22 November 1919, the Sub-Bureau aimed to throw its energy into collecting the foreign press, which was to be finally held in the International Historical Archive (mentioned below), and to assign its members for the task arranging and analyzing, by regional groups, information derived from the foreign press as follows: (1) Germany, Austria (and Border States), the Balkans and Switzerland: Gorter and Pannekoek; (2) France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Russia and Scandinavian States: Roland Holst; (3) British Empire with India, Dutch Indies, USA, Japan and the Far East: Rutgers and Asser Baars[47].

On 1 January 1920 the Sub-Bureau established the International Historical Archive at Willem L. Burusse's home in Rotterdam. He called out for comrades' sending their organs, pamphlets, documents, etc. from abroad[48]. The Japanese Socialist Group in America led by Katayama also sent their printed matters to Brusse's address (Bergsingel 172a)[49].

Thus the Sub-Bureau had the potential of activities for taking deeper in the worldwide socialist / communist movement in its own way. But that was stifled too early in the process of Bolshevisation (cf. Paragraph 7).

By the way, Rutgers and Katayama had built up quite a comradeship since December 1916. By Rutgers (the Netherlands)－Katayama (USA, later Mexico) route, the Sub-Bureau could establish contact with the Japanese Socialists in the USA, next in Japan. In addition to that, the newly established Comintern could have initial relations with Japanese socialists by establishing a transnational network through two routes: "a western route" (Amsterdam － New York － Mexico City) and "an eastern route" (Siberia － Shanghai) beginning from Moscow (cf. Introduction).

4) An Issue on Transferring Sub-Bureau's Powers to the WES

The ECCI ordered the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau to transfer its powers to the WES in Berlin, but the capability of the WES was highly questionable. As mentioned above, Rutgers ctiticized the WES in the letter of Trotter to Winter dated 12 May 1920 (**Doc. 1-2-3**). I quote one more from it: "..... Dann bleibt vorläufig nur die Möglichkeit einer Zentralleitung in Moskau und Ausbildung der Verbindungen mit Moskau. Wäre es möglich in Berlin ein Organ zu schaffen, das wirklich eine Internationale Zusammensetzung hat, so könnten wir das selbstverständlich anerkennen; wir erachten die Möglichkeit dazu aber gering und fürchten, dass die Vorgeschichte der W.E.S. die Chancen vorläufig verdorben hat."

The ECCI's order was ignored by the Scandinavian Bureau, which declared as follows: "Mit dem holländischen Büro haben wir gute Verbindungen gehabt"[50]. In his letter dated 9 May 1920 to T[rotter], Fritz [Ström] also criticized unfavorably the ECCI's preferential treatment to the WES: "Unsre Erfahrungen über die Tätigkeit des W.E.S. ist leider nicht gut. Wir bedauern dass die Exekutive einen solchen Schritt genommen hat, glauben aber dass alles noch gut geordnet

(46) *Der zweite Kongreß*, 102; Riddell, *Workers of the World and Oppressed Peoples*, Vol. 1, 236.
(47) РГАСПИ, 497/1/10/12-13a.
(48) РГАСПИ, 497/1/2/12; cf. *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam*, No. 1, 1.
(49) Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 4. 3. 2. 1-1 (14), Tokyo [in Japanese].
(50) Kan, "Die Skandinavische Kommission," 62.

wird” [(51)]. Almost at the same time, Ström sent the similar letter to the WES with the aid of Willi Münzenberg, secretary of the Communist Youth International in Berlin: “wir haben von J[ames]. seit Januar kein Wort gehört und auch keine Post bekommen ..... [*sic*] auch von Holland sagt man uns, dass sie keine Antwort aus Berlin bekommem ..... [*sic*] wenn Berlin nicht unsere guten Verbindungen mit Russland und anderen Ländern benutzen will, so können wir nur dieses beklagen ..... [*sic*]” [(52)]

Compared with the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau, a weak point of the WES was pointed out in the following comment of M.M. Borodin. After his attending the “Conference of the 3d International,” Borodin moved to Berlin, where he held talks with the members of the KPD, the WES and others for a month from 3 March. On all such occasions he wrote the records down in his “Diary” and sent them to the Sub-Bureau [(53)]. In a report probably delivered to Comintern headquarters he wrote from his experience there as follows: “The Secretariat consists of one person ― James [Reich]. Others only take part in meetings of the Secretariat, but almost no one carries out practical works. The Secretariat, in James’ opinion (and I fully agree with this), is in need of an ideological leaders, a person with an international reputation” [(54)].

5) Problems with “Leftism”

At the beginning of 1920 when the possibility of the revolution remained in Central and Western Europe, the ECCI and Lenin abruptly chose to break away from the “leftism” and came to criticize the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau, while lumping it and the groups of the “leftism” together. Taking a few examples, I will argue back against the criticism.

As for the Trade Union issue, I have already described how the proposal of “Theses on Trade = Unionism” by the Sub-Bureau was defeated and an amendment by Fraina was adopted. The ECCI considered that the Sub-Bureau, whose “Conference of 3d International” had adopted the latter, was accelerating a trend toward the “leftism” and criticized it. It may be undeniable that the Sub-Bureau was responsible for part of the result as a host organization. But speaking of Left Communists and Left Radicals, they have different varieties of ideas and doings. The members of the Sub-Bureau, such as Pannekoek and Rutgers, could be sharply distinguished from the groups which were extremely radicalizing, such as Fraina and Murphy in those days.

Moreover, what was important for Sub-Bureau is, as mentioned above, its policy that the vital problems, such as Parliamentarism and Trade Union issue, must be resolver by the working class itself of every single country (As for the theory of the so-called “Revolutionsexport,” I will deal with it in the next Paragraph 6).

Indeed, it is undeniable that the “leftism” in Left Communists and Left Radicals had a tendency that was apt on occasion to carry the movement too radically and roughly forward, that is, a tendency of slapdash radicalization and further split. But the following interpretation of H.M. Bock should be taken into consideration: “Während die aus der radikalen Weltkriegs-Linken entstandene und die Gründungsphase der KPD prägende linkskommunitische Opposition 1919/1920 *noch in gewissem Umfang lernfähig war*, setzte mit der von fortgesetzten Spaltungen begleiteten sektiererischen Entwicklung der KAPD seit 1921 eine dogmatische Erstarung ihrer

(51) РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/14; 497/2/5/18.

(52) РГАСПИ, 499/1/5/28a.

(53) “Diary from March 3rd, 1920,” “Interview with Paul L[evi].― April 1,” etc., РГАСПИ, 497/2/7/1-92.

(54) [Бородин-Грузенберг,] “Западный Европейский Секретариат” (n.d.), РГАСПИ, 499/1/3/93-96.

organisationspolitischen und taktischen Grundsätze ein" [55]. It is an important problem that they who "had still the learning ability to a certain extent" were broken one-sidedly from the Comintern through the spring of 1920 into summer of 1921.

Lazitch / Drachkovitch argued: "In most of the countries of Central and Western Europe the same leftist ideas surfaced almost simultaneously around the start of 1920"; "In the first half of 1920 left-wing Communism seemed, if not stronger, at least noisier than the Communism of strict Leninist obedience" [56]. Although that interpretation is opposite that of my inclination to evaluate the "left-wing Communism," it raises a significant question: Why were the left wing forces on the rise and crossing national borders around the start of 1920 [or earlier]? The following is my attempt to resolve this question with the help of A. Agosti's views.

The forces that founded the international communist movement immediately after the October Revolution accented the focus on the international nature of the revolutionary process. It is this original international dimension that guarantees the homogeneity, the consistency of the product of this history of the communist movement. This essentially international vision of the revolutionary process had two roots, of originally equal importance. On the one hand, there was the analysis of imperialism, which despite important differences was common to the entire radical left of the Second International. In opposition to the internationalization of capitalism, the working class was also required to be internationalized beyond nation states which had been obstacles for the socialization process of the productive capacity ― proletarian internationalism. On the other, the Bolsheviks ― and all the currents within the Comintern ― shared the conviction that the Russian revolution was a prologue to a European social revolution and that its only guarantee of safety lay in receiving help from the victorious revolutionary proletariat in some, at least, of the biggest Western capitalist countries [57].

Based on these two roots, as I have already examined in my articles in 1989 [58] and 2005 [59], "Internationalized Bolshevism" (L.D. Trotsky's term) [60] was formed on the Western European and American scale among the anti-war socialist left wings. The concentrated and interrelated series of events on Russia's western borders at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, on the eve of the founding of the Comintern, should be treated as "an integral whole" (J.D. White's term) [61]. And the very idea of the "World Revolution" underlies the integral whole. It is no mere

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(55) "Bericht über den Gründungs-Parteitag der Kommunistischen Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands am 4. und 5. April 1920 in Berlin," Eingeleitet und kommentiert von H.M. Bock, *Jahrbuch Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 5 (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), 199 (my *italics*).

(56) Lazitch/Drachkovitch, 253, 256.

(57) A. Agosti, "The Concept of World Revolution and the 'World Party for the Revolution' (1919-1943)," *The International Newsletter of Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism*, No. 9-13, 1997/98, 73-75.

(58) A. Yamanouchi, "'Internationalized Bolshevism': The Bolsheviks and the International, 1914-1917," *Acta Slavica Iaponica. A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* (Sapporo), Vol. 7, III.1989, 17-32; cf. id., *S.J. Rutgers and a Case Study of the International History of Socialism: Association with Sen Katayama, the Bolsheviks and the American Left Wing* (Kyoto, 1996), 117-133 [in Japanese].

(59) A. Yamanouchi, "The Latvian Soviet Power and the 'World Revolution' from the Autumn of 1918 through the Spring of 1919: S.J. Rutgers and the International (One of the Second Series)," *The Shien* or *the Journal of History*, No. 142, III.2005, 122 [in Japanese].

(60) *Ленинский сборник*, Т. 4 (Москва/Ленинград, 1925), 303.

(61) J.D. White, "National Communism and World Revolution: The Political Consequences of German Military Withdrawal from the Baltic Area in 1918-19," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 8, 1994, 1367-1368.

coincidence that the radical left thought and movement was developed in the West by using the Hungarian and Bavarian Revolutions as a further springboard on the one hand, and that Soviet Russia was unable to render active help to the left due to the circumstances surrounding Civil War and the Intervention on the other, just after the founding of the Comintern.

This radical thought and movement, however, was in part premised on wishful thinking, carried along as part of the larger anti-imperialistic war and anti-capitalist sentiment of the time. As Agosti has pointed out, the conviction there frequently induced the communist movement to confuse its desire with reality, overestimating the maturity of the potential revolution in the West, while underestimating both the solidity of the bourgeois regimes and the specificity of the workers' traditions in Europe and in America. As the developments subsequent to [the latter half of 1920 and] 1921 gave support to an increasingly unconditional confidence concerning the first Socialist State's capability of independent survival, the voluntaristic element which had given life to the conception that the revolutionary process was necessarily an international one gradually faded. The Foreign Bureaus examined in this paper were, needless to say, active in the era of a still-unshaken conviction of the international dimension of the revolutionary process, that is, the "World Revolution"[(62)].

6) Theory of the "Revolutionsexport"

During the discussion on another agenda item ("Acting against intervention in Soviet-Russia") of the "Conference of 3d International," Murphy read the resolution prepared by the Committee appointed the previous day [5 February] and Fraina moved two minor addition and one added clause. Only Fraina's added clause was withdrawn. In the latter part of the clause the theory of the so-called "Revolutionsexport" was advocated as follows: "This war will cease the moment the imperialist governments accept peace on the terms repeatedly made public by S.R. Should however the imperialist's opposition compel S.R. to transform her defensive war into a military offensive either in the East or in the West, then this becomes a phase in the international class struggle, and we call upon the workers in the nations involved not to resist the Soviet army, but to rise in revolt against their bourgeoisie and establish their own Soviet Republic."

As for the added clause, only the two remarks are recorded in the minutes: "He [Wijnkoop] has serious objections against it./ Comrade Rutgers also opposes the add. Fraina: Soviet Russia will never march into a country where there has not already a revolution developed. Our Russian friends want peace not only for their own reconstruction, but also because they do not believe in bringing about revolutions by outside interference"[(63)]. And the clause is withdrawn.

In the following secret reports there are relevant remarks of Rutgers which are different from the above-mentioned official remark. Here I examine their reliability.

(1) Secret Police Report dated 6 February 1920, Intelligence Service, Ministry of Justice[(64)]:

"Rutgers says that the Russians reject an aggressive policy, because they think that it is impossible to spread a revolution by means of force of arms." "Rutgers thinks that Soviet Russia would consider this resolution little esteemed. He thinks this resolution untimely. The situation so grave that Soviet troops may take several months beginning to undertake an offensive outside

(62) Agosti, 75.

(63) *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam*, No. 2, 5-6; **Doc. 2-1-1**, 52.

(64) Verbaalarchief en Kabinetsarchief van het Ministerie van Justitie 1915-1955, Geheime verbalen 1915-1931, Inventaris nr. 16453 (hereafter cited as Verbaalarchief ..... Ministerie van Justitie, 16453), Nationaal Archief, Den Haag; **Doc. 2-2-1**, 60, 62.

Russia."

In the first half of quotation Rutgers categorically denied the "Revolutionsexport," but in the latter half he only denied it conditionally. Although this report is the most detailed report of the session [6 February], these two remarks of Rutgers are contradictory each other, so they are not reliable.

(2) Secret Police Report dated 11 February 1920, Intelligence Service, Ministry of Justice [65]:

"Rutgers stated that in the spring the Russian Soviet Republic will undertake an offensive towards the West with the purpose of bringing about the Soviet form of Government in the other countries of Europe. The task of the bureau in Holland is to work the countries in Western Europe in such a manner that on the arrival of the Soviet Armies no opposition shall be offered (See the relevant resolution.) and that in these countries themselves the Soviet Republic shall be proclaimed as the consequence of measures taken by the bureau."

A. Kan took this quotation at face value and quoted it in his article [66]. I have to attempt a refutation of it.

The remark is not opposed to Fraina's added clause. On the contrary, this can be interpreted to mean that Rutgers seems to agree to it. Indeed, after a half year, that is, in the summer of 1920, the Lenin Government switched its policy temporarily for the "Revolutionsexport" in the Soviet-Poland War. But viewed in a historical light, it is unthinkable that the Government had already planned to undertake an offensive towards the West in that spring. In addition to that, there would be no possibility that such a top secret Government plan was conveyed to Rutgers by a secret messenger. As a matter of fact, according to the above-mentioned letter of Trotter to Winter (**Doc. 1-2-3**), ".....", habe ich [Rutgers] seit meiner Abreise (15 Oktober 1919) bis 9 May 1920, also in einem halben Jahre keinerlei Berichte erhalten."

(3) [Report of "Doctor," Nosovitszky to Scotland Yard] dated 14 February 1920 [67]:

"RUTGERS opposed that clause giving as reason that such a clause adopted by this Conference will give the capitalists a good weapon against Soviet Russia, confirming the capitalists statements which have appeared in the press that Soviet Russia has aggressive plans and imperialistic intentions and therefore, said RUTGERS, we know very well that there is a revolutionary movement in Poland, Germany, Austria, Hungary, France, England or any other country, and if the Soviet Army is in a position to help these countries, undoubtedly they will proceed to those countries and will help the proletariat to establish a Soviet Republic. Therefore, said RUTGERS, I insist that the clause shall not be inserted in the Resolution."

In the first half of the quotation the opposition for the purpose of a precaution against capitalist reproach is underlined. But according to Report (1), Wijnkoop made the same kind of remark just before Rutgers' one [68]. So Jakob H. Nosovitsky seems to have confused the latter with the former. In the latter half the remark is not clear whether it is for or against. Furthermore, the Report (1) says that Nosovitsky remarked in favor of Fraina's addendum on the point of the "Revolutionsexport" [69].

Originally, Nosovitsky was very cautious about the threat of "enemy" as shown in "Report of 'Doctor,' Nosovitszky": "The Bureau of the Third International in Holland from now onward will play the dominating part in the direction of the policies and issues of the revolutionary movements in the various countries. The Bureau is subject to control to Moscow from whence it gets all

(65) Verbaalarchief ..... Ministerie van Justitie, 16453; **Doc. 2-2-4**, 71; cf. Correspondence of MID, 10058-342-50; Records of FBI, OG349701.

(66) Kan, "Die Skandinavische Kommission," 58.

(67) Correspondence of MID, 10058-342-50; Records of FBI, OG349701; **Doc. 2-2-8**, 90.

(68) **Doc. 2-2-1**, 62.

(69) **Doc. 2-2-1**, 60.

instructions and money" [70]. It should be carefully noted that his Report was based on such a tendency.

7) Over Interpretations and Evaluations

I begin by examining some precedent interpretations and evaluations of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau.

According to a report of Zinoviev to the Second Congress of the Comintern, the reason why the Sub-Bureau was dissolved is that it was originally limited as "a technical auxiliary bureau," but it exceeded its powers and convened at its own initiative the international conference at Amsterdam ["Conference of the 3d International"] which only served to increase the general confusion [71].

That explanation, however, disregards the fact that the ECCI did grant extensive autonomous authority to the Sub-Bureau at the beginning stage (**Doc. 1-1-1**).

F. Svátek's pioneering evaluation was as follows: "The efforts to stimulate the organizational separation of the revolutionary Left in the Western countries from the Social-democratic parties led the Bolshevik leaders of the Comintern to the foundation of a number of 'foreign bureaus' of ECCI ..... The contacts between Russia and foreign agencies of the Comintern were however weak. This led to the contest between the bureaus and generally to a great confusion in organizational matters./ At that time the organization of the Comintern was still very indefinite, still in the stage of its birth" [72].

The real situation that the Foreign Bureaus did not remain only a technical organ and the point that the Comintern was in the midst of the formative period of organization are well grasped by him. It is, however, needless to say that the elucidation based on primary sources of "a great confusion" had to wait for the disclosure of archival materials in recent years.

In his latest study Voerman has made the following clear-cut argument: "With the end of Allied siege of Russia, a key raison d'être for the network of foreign Comintern bureaus no longer applied"; the ECCI radically changed its course for the Communist Parties in the West because the circumstances had altered for the better around the start of 1920, in stark contrast to the autumn of 1919 when the ECCI had granted a plenary power of attorney to S.J. Rutgers. The ECCI's decision to liquidate the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau was inevitable on the grounds that the Sub-Bureau had failed to understand, and to adapt itself to, the ECCI's policy shifts, due in part to imperfect communication networks [73].

But I do not agree with this interpretations, because, as mentioned above, I regard it as serious that the ECCI did not inform the Sub-Bureau of its sudden switching of policies.

Lazitch / Drachkovitch devoted 22 pages of their book to the activities outside Russia of the first Comintern emissaries such as A.E. Abramovich, N.M. Liubarskii, Reich (Thomas; James Gordon), Borodin and others. It is in order to try to regard their activities critically as former examples of the Comintern's dominance "from above" that Lazitch / Drachkovitch took a serious

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(70) Correspondence of MID, 10058-342-50; Records of FBI, OG349701; **Doc. 2-2-8**, 93.

(71) G. Zinoviev, *Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the Second World Congress of the Communist International* (Petrograd, 1920), 19-20.

(72) F. Svátek, "The Governing Organs of the Communist International: their growth and composition, 1919-1943," *History of Socialism. Year Book 1968* (Prague, 1969), 185.

(73) G. Voerman, "Proletarian Competition. The Amsterdam Bureau and its German Counterpart, 1919-1920," *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung 2007* (Berlin, 2007), 218; cf. Voerman, *De meridiaan*, 90-92, 95-97.

view of them. In their interpretation, however, lie the following problems concerned with the so-called "eye of Moscow": (1) the emissaries were in contact with only a small numbers of the country's communist leaders and always conscious of Moscow; (2) the emissaries had none of direct responsibilities to the communist party in the country concerned and often sent to Moscow the reports whose contents the national leaders were not permitted to know [(74)]. In that meaning, emissaries' influence on the spot was temporary and limited. Lazitch/Drachkovitch were inclined to regard the Foreign Bureaus as those controlled by the centralized Russian organization from the beginning and consequently assumed that the liquidation of the Amsterdam Sub-bureau, which had been out of control, was inevitable.

But the beginning of the centralization of powers by Comintern headquarters (the Bolshevisation) vis-à-vis the Foreign Branches only occurred with a change for the better of the situation involving foreign military intervention inside Russia in 1920. Drastic policy changes occurred in the summer of 1920, after the decision to dissolve the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau had already been made, when most of the remaining Foreign Bureaus were dissolved and replaced by "individual personal agents" through whom the Comintern could more easily carry out its intentions. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on 6 August 1920 made a decision, "To abolish all the bureaus. To permit only individual personal agents exclusively for technical purposes" [(75)].

Two days later, on 8 August, the matter on the Foreign Bureaus was also discussed at the second conference of the ECCI [(76)]. Zinoviev first introduced a motion to disband all the Bureaus and organize all the business based on direct, independent relationships with individual agents. Next, H. Maring (Hendricus J.F.M. Sneevliet) made a remark that, taking into consideration Shanghai, Tashkent, etc. as candidate areas, it was imperative for the ECCI to establish such centers both in the Far East and in the Middle East. Fraina also argued that, taking into account the fact that American imperialism was extending over the Far East, an American Bureau should be established in Mexico.

Following these multiple assertions, Zinoviev drew the conclusion that following the liquidation of the Bureaus in Europe it was imperative to have similar centers in America and the Far East. And he proposed to the ECCI that the following motion should be passed:

> Interests of the Third International demand that in the row of the Executive Committee should not exist other bureaus with political tasks. By this decision the West-European bureau [*sic*] and also other similar bureaus are abolished. The Small Bureau nominates its own trusted persons and assigns them fully definite tasks with their personal responsibility. The Small Bureau must further attend to regularly organizing the services of couriers. Couriers are divided into 3 categories: (1) those who hand over literature, etc.; (2) those who hand over and accept various kinds of information as well; (3) those who execute political tasks [(77)].

The proposal was accepted, but as the "executing political tasks" was contained in the third category, the lack of clear distinction between political and non-political tasks was inevitable.

Based on that conclusion, the ECCI decided to liquidate the Bureaus in Europe and, at the same time, to establish new bureaus, with more limited tasks, in America and the Far East. It may

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(74) Lazitch/Drachkovitch, 143-164.

(75) РГАСПИ, 17/3/100/1; cf. 495/2/1/22-23; Г.М. Адибеков/Э.Н. Шахназарова/К.К. Ширинья, *Организационная структура Коминтерна. 1919-1943* (Москва, 1997), 34.

(76) РГАСПИ, 495/1/8/64-65.

(77) РГАСПИ, 495/1/8/65.

safely be said that Fraina's convincing logic created an opportunity both for establishing the Pan-American Agency and for nominating his sworn friend, Katayama, as its chairman. Nevertheless, the Agency was also regarded as an organ composed of "individual personal agents," which implied that the ECCI could have easily liquidated it according to circumstance and in accord with its own judgment.

As I have made my interpretation and evaluation in other paragraphs, I make general ones here.

It may safely be said that the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau's criticism of the ECCI was appropriate. To tell the truth, the ECCI's decision on dissolution was made in the political background that the ECCI, which was deeply cautious of the rise of the left radicalism / left communism, broke away from the "leftism" and, on the contrary, aimed to promote a cooperation, or to form a coalition, with socialist mass parties which consisted of the Left and the rank and file without conservative leaders to be excluded. Far from taking consideration of conditions of every country and region (the so-called "periphery"), the intention of the "center" had priority and began to be imposed one-sidedly (occasionally hinting at the stop or reduction of providing funds for activities [cf. the next chapter) on the "periphery." It was the beginning of the Bolshevisation. The following ultimate conclusion has been drawn: These problems which have been examined in this chapter provide ample reasons to anticipate the difficulties present in the Comintern's direction of transnational activities. The history of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau from foundation to dissolution was the first antecedent example.

4 Problems with Early Comintern Subsidies to the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

I have already published an article in Japanese, "An Essay on Early Comintern Subsidies to Foreign Communist Organizations" (2018) and put its revised version in my fourth book in Japanese, *The Way to the Third International: S.J. Rutgers and the Founding of the Comintern* (Fukuoka, 2021). Under the present conditions that the materials on early Comintern financial aid to foreign communist organizations, held in the RGASPI, have been closed again, this "essay" (in Japanese) on the theme for a limited period from 1919 to 1920 has aimed to define an attainable goal at the present time. First, this has aimed to make clear the process from decisions of the ECCI on providing funds to their receipts of intermediaries (or local members) by way of changes of amounts, items, etc. in raising funds. Next, it has aimed to grasp how the early Comintern provided subsidies to foreign organizations through its Foreign Bureaus and, above all, to clear up the problem with WES's embezzling the funds from the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau.

And the principal research results have been gained as follows:

(1) Not only the Russian Communist Party and the ECCI, but also the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People's Bank worked together to provide subsidies to foreign organizations. The ECCI did not have full control over providing subsidies and had a fierce dispute with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs over it.

(2) In the process from the ECCI's decisions to its providing subsidies there were often changes of breakdown, among which large reductions and stops were not exceptional.

(3) When a Dutch civil engineer and socialist, Rutgers returned from Moscow to his country in the autumn 1919, he recorded the exchange rates of 5 major currencies in his account lists. Depending on the rates I have been able to calculate for the first time how much the funds provided for the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau were embezzled by the WES. Consequently, how the shortage of funds was grave for the Sub-Bureau has become clear.

(4) In the background that the ECCI did not provide additional funds, the ECCI made a political judgement on the recipient organization and decided to add, reduce, or stop subsidies. That is to say that the ECCI regarded the Sub-Bureau as disloyal follower of its policy at that time.

This work has also required the following further examination:

(5) that the process leading from decision, raising and intermediation to receipt had each story at every stage.

(6) that how the received funds were expended efficiently was deeply concerned with both elucidation and evaluation of the movement.

(7) that the ECCI's political control over foreign organizations was inseparable from its financial aid to them.

This present work as a supplement of *Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern* aims to prove (3) and (4) concerning the Sub-Bureau and, at the same time, to add provisional research results of (5) and (6).

1) The List of Soviet Subsidies to Foreign Communists

Before taking up the main subject, out of historical documents introduced by a small number of historians who could get a chance to examine financial documents which the RGASPI opened

Soviet Subsidies to Foreign Communists, ca. May 1919-June 1920

	Pour qui	Par qui	Released to		Date	Doc. No.	Jewelry	D. M.	Swed. Kr.	Finn. M.	Russ. Rub.	$	£	Morphine	[others]
1	PC hongrois	[E.]Rudnyánszky pour Ditche.	Hungarian Comm. Govt.	Rudnianok for Dige	19190901	1/7	250,000								
2	PC hongrois	Dverley	Hungarian Comm. Govt.	D. Zerlei	19191206	2	207,000								
3	PC hongrois	Brasler Kalusc	Hungarian Comm. Govt.	Brasler Kalush	19191215	3	194,000								
4	Tchéquie	Iv. Simski pour [J.] Handlír et Mus	Bohemia	Iv. Sinekom for Genglerzh and Mush	~~19201224~~ 1920??~~24~~	4	288,000								
5	Tchéquie	(Nom illisible)	Bohemia	(illeg.)	19191119	5	215,000								
6	Allemagne	[J.]Reich pour Thomas	Germany	Reich for Thomas	19190530	1/2	300,500	100,000	~~100,000~~ 3,000	~~4,500~~	~~6,500~~ [65,000]			7,500	
7	Allemagne	Promtofer-Thomas	Germany	Proletariat	19190909	1/8a	250,000								
8	Allemagne	Rudolph Rothegel	Germany	Rudolf Roth[k]egel	19190928	6	639,000								
9	Allemagne	Rozovski pour Reich	Germany	Rozovski for Reich (all 3) for Thomas	19200220	7	275,000								
10	Italie	Liubarski-Carlo	Italy	[N.M.]Liubarskii-Carlo	19190530 ~~19190520~~	1/2		15,200	13,000	331,800	300,000				
11	Italie	par Berzine	Italy	via [J.]Berzin (illeg.)	19190921	8	487,000								
12	Amérique	Kotliarovitch	America	Kotliarov [Котляров]	19190716	1/4	209,000								
13	Amérique	Khavkine	America	Khavkin [Хавкин]	19190930	1/9	500,000								
14	Amérique	[J.P.]Anderson [K. Beika]	America	Anderson	19200131	9	1,011,000								
15	Amérique	John Reed	America	John Reed	19200122	10	1,008,000								
16	Angleterre	Levine	England	Levin	19190705	1/3	500,000								
17	Angleterre	Levine	England	Levin via [B.I.]Kantorovich (undecipherable to whom)	19190705 ~~19190715~~	11	1,039,000								
18	Angleterre	Krassine	[England]	See what is for Engl. [L.B.] Krasin	19190829 19190929	12	7,040,000								
19	Pays des Balkans		Balkan countries		19190730	1/5	1,000,000								
20	Yougoslavie	Belosevic	Yugoslav.	Beloshevich [Белошевич]	19191229	13	300,000								
21	PC Autrichien	Mikhaïl	(?) Comm. Part.	(Shchao?) Mikhail	19191226	14	503,000								
22	PC Autrichien	Ogourski	unknown to which country	Sgurski	19190813	1/6	298,000 ~~297,000~~								
23	PC Autrichien	Balabanova	unknown to which country	Inoderev gr. Balabanov	19191001 19190901	1/8		[Austr.]Kr.? 83,300							
24	PC Autrichien	(illisible)	unknown to which country	Leo (illeg.) (undecipherable)	19191028	15	2,020,000								
25	PC Autrichien	(Sans mention)	unknown to which country	unknown to whom	19200505	16	5,239,000								
26	[S.J.]Rutgers		Roiters		~~19190914~~ ~~19191019~~ [19191014]	17	4,050,000	5,000	10,000				~~50,000~~ 50		
27	Bureau suédois	A. Ioffe	Swedish Office	A. Ioffe	19191202 ~~19191??~~	18		25,000	52,000			4,000	4,000		
28	Pologne	(on dirait des joyaux mais pas de reçu)	Poland	looks as if values no receipts	~~?~~ [192003??]	19	10,000,000								
29	Groupe [F.]Loriot		Group Loriot Kost	(both) to A. Groshov	19191227	20	2,500,000 280,000								
30	Thomas		Thomas	to him also	19200618	21	1,000,000	~~1,606,000~~ 1,600,000						(illisible) 150,000 roman. 150,000	
〃	〃		〃	〃	〃	〃		35,600							
							41,322,500 39,102,500	~~1,786,800~~ 1,780,800	~~175,000~~ 78,000	331,800 ~~336,300~~	~~306,500~~ [365,000]	4,000	~~54,000~~ 4,050	7,500	150,000 150,000

[Austr.]Kr.? 83,300

to the public only temporarily, I introduce here the list of Soviet subsidies to foreign communists, "corresponding with Krumina's Receipts ....." and present an overall picture early Comintern subsidies to foreign communist organizations.

The originals in Russian documents belonged to the Budget Commission of the ECCI [(1)]. They have been published in the French and English versions and, moreover, reproduced in facsimile in the former [(2)]. However, the originals are very illegible due to handwriting and friction loss and, moreover, there are a considerable number of differences between two translations. In order to point out them both are put side by side. In case of the differences in figure between them, French translations are placed on the upper row and English translations on the lower. In case errors are ascertained in facsimile, they are crossed out with a line. Phrases in square brackets are annotations by the author of the present work.

In the list for a little over a year, financial aids by means of jewelries are of overwhelming majority and amount to a total value of about 40 million Rub. Out of instances I could carry out a follow-up survey on Nos. 6, 7, 10, 16, 17, 20, 26, 27 and 28 (30%) on the basis of almost all minutes of the ECCI conferences and its Bureau (later Small Bureau) conferences, a part of minutes of the Central Committee conferences of the Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks) and two published collections of documents [(3)]. I also tried to make clear the above-mentioned (2) and (5) in my fourth book in Japanese. No. 26 which is concerned with the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau is examined in the next paragraph.

2) The ECCI's Financial Aid to the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

In the Bureau conference of the ECCI on 16 September 1919 it was decided to allow Rutgers 40,000 Rub. as travelling expenses to his country and 500,000 Rub. for party works [(4)]. In the following conference on 28 September it was also decided to organize the Holland Branch and allocate 20 million Rub [(5)]. The decided amount was the highest in those days of the Foreign Bureaus. It shows how great the ECCI's expectation was for the Sub-Bureau. According to a secret report of the Intelligence Service of the Dutch Ministry of Justice, however, Rutgers said at the "Conference of the 3d International" that he had not yet received any jewelries to a value of 20 million Rub. [(6)] Even if the report should be not reliable, that subsidy would not be provided, judging from the following indirect evidence.

The breakdown of the funds (No. 26 in the above-mentioned list) which Rutgers actually received on 14 October 1919 (i.e., the day before his departure from Moscow) was drastically changed as follows: 10,000 Swedish Kr./5,000 Germany M./jewelries to a value of 4,050,000

(1) РГАСПИ, 495/82/1/?.

(2) V. Loupan/P. Lorrain, *L'argent de Moscou. L'histoire la plus secrete du PCF* (Paris, [1994]), 46-48, 254-255; H. Klehr/J.E. Haynes/K.M. Anderson, *The Soviet World of American Communism* (New Haven/London, 1998), 22-24.

(3) *Коминтерн и идея мировой революции. Документы* (Москва, 1998); *Политбюро ЦК РКП(б)-ВКП(б) и Коминтерн. 1919-1943. Документы* (Москва, 2004).

(4) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/52.

(5) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79 (**Doc. 1-1-1**).

(6) Inlichtingendienst, A No 41 Geheim (11.II.1920), Verbaalarchief ..... Ministerie van Justitie, 16453 (**Doc. 2-2-4**, 71; **2-2-7**, 79).

Rub./£50[7].

Rutgers recorded the exchange rates of these currencies to Dutch guilder (f.) in his account lists dated 15 December 1919[8]:

1 Swedish krona (Kr.) = **f. 0.5615**
1 German Mark (M.) = **f. 0.084**
1 ruble (Rub.) = **f. 0.0696**[9]
1 Pound (£) = **f. 10.06**

Depending on these rates those provided funds are converted to guilder as follows:

10,000 Kr. = f. 5,615; 5,000 M. = f. 420; (jewelries to a value of) 4,050,000 Rub. = f. 281,880; £50 = f. 503; in total **f. 288,418**.

The above-mentioned decided amount, that is, 20,500,000 Rub. [f. 1,426,800 at the guilder rate] (except travelling expenses) would be reduced to f. 288,418 (**20.2%**). It would be the very amount at the guilder rate of the funds which the ECCI actually provided for the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau.

To tell the truth, a considerable amount of the funds which Rutgers received was embezzled by the WES, when he stopped in Berlin on his way home. The details are described in the two letters of G.L. Trotter (Rutgers) to Winter (Berzin) dated 20 December 1919 and 9 March 1920[10]. Let us examine them in the next paragraph.

3) Problems with WES's Embezzlement of Funds

First I summarize relevant parts in those letters:

I [Rutgers] arrived in Berlin at the end of October 1919 and first met Eduard Fuchs and next Paul Levi. As I thought that at least in the KPD financial affairs I could trust comrades like Fuchs and Levi and use money for international purposes, I decided to leave 400,000 Mark at once. For that purpose I had to convert my baggage [jewelries] into money. The remainder was arranged to be transmitted to Holland by our completely trustworthy courier in order to reduce the risk. In the beginning, two pieces [diamonds] (a bigger and a middler yellow) were transmitted to Holland by a courier who happened to be in Berlin and sold for f. 25,975. To my regret, I met James later and he thought at once that I was taken in [by Fuchs and Levi] and the sum handed over by me would turn exclusively the KPD for the better. [After we received two diamonds] we sent our absolutely trustworthy courier to Berlin and he came back with the report that Fuchs (in collusion with Levi) rejected to hand in gold or goods. James also does not take kindly to this misdeed and

(7) Loupan/Lorrain, 47-48, 254-255; Klehr/Haynes/Anderson, 22-24. The original written expression of £50 is "£50,~~000~~." The reason why I adopt not "50,000" but "50" will be mentioned later.

(8) "Meegenomen op reis 15 Oct. 1919.," Archief S.J. Rutgers, Map I-1, IISG.

(9) According to Rutgers' record concerning that rate, the ruble-guilder exchange rate as of 15 February 1919: 1 ruble = f. 0.25. It means that during less than year and a half the rate fell suddenly by one quarter. Although the ruble exchange rate got worse and worse, the value of jewelries from Soviet Russia would not have fallen sharply. So I would like to handle this rate only as a rough estimate.

(10) РГАСПИ, 495/18/3/50-53, 495/172/59/6-9 (**Doc. 1-2-1**); 497/2/8/1-7, 581/1/95/33-39 (**Doc. 1-2-2**). No testimony from persons concerned on the other side was given and the receiver of those letters, the secretary of the ECCI, posed that problem at neither its conference nor the conference of its Bureau.

even he seems to have been obliged to pay a part of the cost of the [international] conference, for which I had already left 80,000 Mark.

Judging from the text, Rutgers placed great reliance on Reich, alias James. But Fuchs was also concerned in the WES as "cashier" [11] and Reich was to secede with the Comintern afterward. I wonder whether Reich was involved in the embezzlement.

How much amount did they embezzle? According to Trotter's letter to "Doktor" [perhaps M. Bronski, the ECCI representative in Germany] dated 14 February 1920, they were supposed to get "at least 5 million marks" [12]. One more report of a secret agent (Nosovitsky) said that "the German comrades has sold them [stones] for four million M. and the money was being used for revolutionary propaganda in Germany" [13].

Did it really amount to 5 million M. or 4 million? As mentioned above, out of the jewelries to a value of 4,050,000 Rub. (f. 281,880 at the guilder rate) which Rutgers carried with him in Berlin, only 2 diamonds, which reached to Holland and were converted to f. 25,975, were deducted and the balance, that is, the remainder in Berlin was supposed to be the jewelries to a value of **f. 255,905** (including jewelries to a value of 400,000 M. [f. 33,600] which Rutgers first offered Fuchs and Levi). In case only figures at the exchange rate are handled, it follows:

f. 255,905 × x ≒ (5 million M.) f. 420,000
x ≒ **1.64** (times)
f. 255,905 × x ≒ (4 million M.) f. 336,000
x ≒ **1.31** (times)

Considering that the value of jewelries from Soviet Russia would not have fallen so sharply as the ruble exchange rate, 5 million M. or 4 million which Rutgers wrote or said would be no exaggeration.

Here I will decide an unsettled question whether the pounds which the ECCI provided for the Sub-Bureau were 50,000 or 50 [14]. In case of £50,000 (f. 503,000 at the above-mentioned guilder rate), total amount is f. 790,915 and in case of £50 (f. 503), it is f. 28,418. In case of the former, even if the diamonds to a value of f. 255,905 were embezzled by the WES, £50,000 (f. 790,915) would have been approximately treble as much as f. 255,905. So the Sub-Bureau would have funds enough and to spare. Considering that the Sub-Bureau was for lack of funds from the start, the pounds provided by the ECCI would have been **£50.**

Accordingly, the ratio of f. 255,905 embezzled by the WES among f. 288,418 at the guilder rate of total amount provided by the ECCI would be **about 88.7%**. The remainder of the funds is **f. 32,513**. Judging from the actual expenditure and Rutgers' testimony (**Doc. 1-2-2**), the amount was only for three months' activities.

What is worse, as soon as the strife between the ECCI and the Sub-Bureau on Parliamentarism and the Trade Union issue became apparent, the ECCI cut off additional funds for the Sub-Bureau. There was a striking contrast in the way in which the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the WES were treated by the ECCI, respectively. Only the WES continued working and being subsidized by the ECCI in spite of the decision of all Foreign Bureaus' dissolution. In effect, the WES was treated in a still more sympathetic way and its embezzling the funds from the Sub-Bureau was passed over, because the ECCI regarded the WES as loyal follower of its policy at that time. Addition, reduction or stop of the funds was influenced by the ECCI's political judgment on each occasion.

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(11) РГАСПИ, 499/1/3/93.

(12) РГАСПИ, 497/2/4/29-31.

(13) Correspondence of MID, 10058-342-50; Records of FBI, OG349701; **Doc. 2-2-8**, 97.

(14) In the French version "50,000" and in the English version "50" are respectively adopted. Voerman writes down both amounts. Voerman, *De meridiaan*, 493.

4) Great Disparity of Funds between the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the WES

As compared with the Sub-Bureau, I refer to the funds which the ECCI provided the WES [15]:

(1) Funds which were provided on 9 September 1919 for setting up are jewelries to a value of 250,000 Rub. (**f. 17,400** at the guilder rate).

(2) Additional funds on 29 October 1919 are jewelries to a value of 2,022,400 Rub. (**f. 140,759**).

(3) Funds on 30 May 1919 which were provided before the setting up the WES are jewelries to a value of 300,500 Rub. (f. 20,915), 100,000 M. (f. 8,400), 3,000 Kr. (f. 1,685), morphine to a value of 7,500 Rub. (f. 522) and 65,000 Rub. (f. 4,524) [in subtotal **f. 36,046**].

(4) Funds which the WES embezzled from the Sub-Bureau are diamonds to a value of **f. 255,905**.

In case they are added up one by one [16], it follows:

(1) + (2) = f. 158,159

(1) + (2) + (3) = f. 194,205

(1) + (2) + (3) + (4) = f. 450,110

Funds which the Sub-Bureau received at the beginning were **about f. 288,00** and those of the WES (including those before its setting up) were **about f. 194,000**. All the funds available of the former were **about f. 33,000** and those of the latter were **about f. 450,000**.

Consequently, it has been ascertained for the first time how much the Sub-Bureau's funds was embezzled and how serious the embezzlement was for the Sub-Bureau.

(15) Nos. 6 and 7 in the above-mentioned list; РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/25; 495/1/1/31-32; 495/1/1/81; Loupan / Lorrain, 258; Ф. Фирсов, *Секреты Коммунистического Интернационала. Шифропереписка* (Москва, 2011), 118.

(16) Although Rutgers wrote that members of the KPD embezzled the Sub-Bureau's funds, Reich cooperated closely with the KPD before the setting up of the WES. So both funds are put all together here.

5 The Pre-history of the Establishment of the Pan-American Agency

At the end of November 1919, when the Mexican Communist Party (MCP) was founded under the leadership of Manabendra N. Roy, the Latin American Bureau of the Third International was also established provisionally at the suggestion of Borodin, who had just arrived in Mexico [(1)]. Following the Bureau's founding, Borodin immediately set out for home, accompanied by Jesús Ramírez [(2)], and at the beginning of January 1920 he reported from Madrid to the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau (Rutgers) about not only the establishment of the Latin American Bureau but also plans to establish an Information Bureau and Press Service of the Third International (Agencia Verdad, Servicio Internacional de Noticias) in Madrid [(3)], both of which were to be supported by the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau [(4)]. Thus a far-reaching plan was devised to create a transnational network from Moscow to Madrid via Amsterdam and, even further afield, across the Atlantic Ocean by using the cultural and linguistic ties between Spain and Mexico with the rest of the Spanish-speaking Americas [(5)].

At the "Conference of the 3d International" decisions were made to establish the American Sub-Bureau of the Comintern for the two Americas and to call the Pan-American Conference of Communist Organizations [(6)]. Shortly after that decision, through a go-between, Fraina who had played a active role in that Conference, the Pan-American Bureau was provisionally organized in New York by the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the CPA on 25 March 1920. Joseph Andrew(s) (Nicholas I. Hourwich), David Damon (Charles E. Ruthenberg) and A. Raphael (Alexander Bittelman) of the CPA were appointed members of the provisional Bureau and the following decision was added: "There will be added to the membership of the Bureau a representative of the South American parties as soon as connections are established to call a conference at which the permanent bureau will be established" [(7)].

On the other hand, at the beginning of August 1920, the Latin American Bureau in Mexico started the first issue of its organ, *Boletín Comunista*, in which it proclaimed that it had received authority to call the Pan-American Communist Conference in Mexico with the support of the CPA and, moreover, sought to take over the task of making connections with Japan and the Far East. The task in question had, in fact, been inserted in the above-mentioned decision on establishing

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(1) L. Kheyfetz/V. Kheyfetz, "Michael Borodin. The First Comintern-emissary to Latin America (Part One)," *The International Newsletter of Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism*, Vol. 2, No. 5/6, 1994/95, 148; cf. Л.С. Хейфец/В.Л. Хейфец, *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка. Люди, структуры, решения* (Москва, 2019), 85-86.

(2) Born Ch.F. Phillips, attended the Second Congress of the Comintern as delegate of the MCP and, after coming back, was to join the Agency.

(3) M. Borodin to [Rutgers], 4.I.1919[1920], РГАСПИ, 497/2/1/1-4; cf. 495/120/250/5-6.

(4) G.L. Trotter[=] S.J.R[utgers]. (Amsterdam) to Borodin, 15.II.1920, РГАСПИ, 497/2/1/12-12 об.

(5) Cf. Л.С. Хейфец, *Коминтерн в Латинской Америке: формирование и эволюция организационных связей III Интернационала и его национальных секций (от зарождения коммунистического движения до создания Южноамериканского секретариата ИККИ)* (Санкт-Петербург, 2004), 35; Л.С. и В.Л. Хейфец, *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка*, 94.

(6) *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam*, No. 2, 8-9.

(7) "American Bureau of the International," *The Communist*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 5.IV.1920, 1.

the American Sub-Bureau as follows: “To obtain the cooperation of the Japanese companions with the object of extending and connecting propaganda in Japan and the Far East” [8].

Both Bureaus came to work separately without establishing a close connection with each other. In addition to that, the establishment of the Pan-American Agency of the ECCI was decided in Moscow in August-September 1920. That decision of the ECCI was necessarily superior to that of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau which had been dissolved several months before. Both Bureaus, which were far from calling the Pan-American Communist Conference on account of financial difficulty, were to be superseded by the Pan-American Agency which was amply funded.

(8) “La Conferencia Comunista Pan-Americana,” *Boletín Comunista. Organo del Bureau Latino Americano de la Tercera Internacional* (México), Año 1, No. 1, 8.VIII.1920, 7.

6 The Points at Issue of the Pan-American Agency

Following the decision on establishing again two Bureaus in America and the Far East respectively at the above-mentioned conference of the ECCI on 8 August 1920, the Small Bureau confirmed the former staffs, that is, "comrades Katayama, Fraina and Janson [Karlis Jansons]" in "4) On the bureau in Mexico" of the fifth agenda item ("Problems of the American movement") at the conference of 29 September 1920 [(1)].

The whole picture of the Pan-American Agency, from its establishment to its dissolution by way of its activities in New York, and then in Mexico City (including those in Canada and South America), is not presented here. I have presented, however, that picture in my books, articles and other publications (cf. Preface), in which some points at issue of the Agency have been revealed. In this chapter I examine them by tackling each problem separately.

1) Problems with a Decision on Dissolving the Newly-established Agency

No sooner had the ECCI dissolved the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau than it accepted the proposal to establish the Foreign Bureaus only in America and the Far East as an exceptional matter. Nevertheless, the authority of the Foreign Bureaus was more restricted, and the ambiguity on "executing political tasks" was present from the start, as mentioned above. The Pan-American Agency was to be summarily dissolved by the ECCI in order to resolve the ensuing confusion.

On 28 September 1921 Katayama with Fraina made a report to the Small Bureau of the ECCI: "Rumors have reached us from New York that the Comintern contemplates liquidating the American Agency. We do not know the source of these rumors, or how true they are. But if true, then we suggest that you send to Mexico a competent Communist comrade as your representative, to work here, with support; otherwise the whole movement will go to pieces" [(2)]. Far from accommodating Katayama's strong request to ensure functional continuity even after that dissolution, the Secretariat of the ECCI had already, in fact, started planning the establishment of a new, similar organization before ordering the liquidation: "Aufgaben u. Organisationsplan d. Lateinisch-amerikanischen Section im Secretariat d. Komintern" was drafted by "M. Jaroschevski/ Leiter d. Section" and accepted on that same day [(3)]. According to the plan, Latin American countries were to be classified into three types (Argentina and Mexico whose communist parties had participated in the Comintern; Uruguay and Chile whose communist parties or groups did not yet; Brazil and most countries on the Pacific coast of South America where capitalism was

(1) РГАСПИ, 495/2/1/99-99 об.; 495/2/3/97-97 об.; cf. Адибеков/Шахназарова/Ширинья, 30.

(2) **P-Doc. 1-12**. Under the present conditions that almost all archives which held financial materials of the Comintern are closed in the RGASPI (РГАСПИ), we can make the best use of the financial materials on the Agency. For Katayama and Fraina made out some detailed financial statements, etc. and the related archives which held them are still open for us. Out of them I have compiled, edited and printed 51 documents in Part 1 (Doc. 1-1 ～ 10-9) of *Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern*.

(3) РГАСПИ, 495/79/1/1-2; *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка. Сборник документов* (Москва, 1998), 30-31.

underdeveloped and the labor movement was hardly differentiated) and to be assigned to the task which corresponded to each type. Shortly after that, at the Presidium conference of the ECCI on 10 October 1921 the following was decided: "To dissolve Pan-american bureau [*sic*]" [(4)].

In the end, Katayama and Fraina were never informed of the decision on dissolving the Agency directly by the ECCI. Katayama, who had been summoned from Mexico City to Moscow, took it up as "a matter of Communist discipline" that only rumors of abolishing the Agency had reached his ears: "'I am informed by the returning men, that in the Main Office [ECCI] sentiment prevails, that the Agency will be abolished.' These rumors reflected in the attitude of the American Communist Party Executives, who treated the Agency with the most insulting tone. To the earnest and sincere requests sent by the Agency to the C.E.C. of C.P.A., were dealt with by them coldest and utterly uncomradely manner." "It is grave matter of discipline in the Communist Party that it should stop the circulating rumors [including the rumors of suspicions against Fraina] by investigation and proper communication with the responsible authorities" (**P-Doc. 9-1**).

In the background of this problem stayed not only the above-mentioned problem of the Foreign Bureaus' position initially given by the ECCI, but also problems with two chains of instructions from the ECCI.

2) Problems with Two Chains of Instructions from the ECCI

Although the Foreign Bureaus were in charge of playing the role of mediator between the ECCI and the communist organizations in the countries concerned, there were in fact two chains of instructions from the ECCI, that is, not only through the Pan-American Agency but also through the representatives in Moscow of the CPA and the United Communist Party of America (UCPA).

Soon after the decision on establishing the Agency in Moscow, for example, on 1 November 1920 a representative of the ECCI, "C" [John Carr = Ludwig E. Katterfeld], gave instructions on the issues of the trade union and so on to the CEC of the UCPA as follows: "they are to be carried out in conjunction with comrades Katayama and Jansen [Jansons]" [(5)]. The instructions were issued on the basis of the existence of the Agency and, at that time, the chain of instructions was not yet confused. But, just after Katayama's arrival in Mexico City, the second important instruction of the ECCI reached Charles E. Scott [Jansons] in New York. Without consulting Katayama, on 4 April 1921 Scott sent both the CPA and the UCPA the notification requiring the agreement about the conditions for the unification of two parties without giving them any choice (**P-Doc. 2-4**). On 16 April the CPA formed its judgement that "Comrade Scott is overstepping the [unity] ultimatum of the Agency itself" [(6)], furthermore, "the Am. Agency has overstepped its powers" and sent Comintern headquarters a statement, protesting against the change from proportional representation to equal representation to be based upon the number of delegates to the upcoming convention and so on [(7)]. The CPA's reply was sent by telegram to Katayama by way of Scott on 26 April 1921: "Received following from main office; *authorized by board of*

(4) РГАСПИ, 495/2/5/84; *Die Tätigkeit der Exekutive und des Präsidium des E.K. der Kommunistischen Internationale vom 13. Juli 1921 bis 1. Februar 1922* (Petrograd, 1922), 240.

(5) РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/2; 515/1/20/44; another document confiscated by the USA government on 29 April 1921, in: Records of FBI, BS202600-1775-368.

(6) РГАСПИ, 515/1/45/24.

(7) РГАСПИ, 515/1/45/25; cf. 515/1/46/29-29a.

directors [the ECCI] to state Agency has no authority to press five conditions. Equal basis and chairman joint stock meeting with voice but no vote enough and all is necessary. Other conditions are not pertaining to preliminary arrangements and are subject to the decision of joint stock meeting. Josef Andrews and Marshall [Max Bedacht] Co." (**P-Doc. 1-4 [**my *italics*]).

Receiving that reply, Katayama sent Rutgers a letter saying, "Thus you see again Agency dominated by somewhat partisan attitude was fortunately defeated by the second mandate, although it too shows a trace of partisan attitude bias in the hand of Andrews! Yet I am glad that this will shift entirely the responsibility of the coming convention on the shoulders of both parties, while the Agency's responsibility is greatly lightened, being taken away the chairman's casting or controlling power" (**P-Doc. 4-2**; cf. **P-Doc. 4-1**). In fact, the attendance of the chairman of the Agency, Katayama, which had been expected, was not required and on 15-28 May 1921 thirty delegates from each party assembled and held the joint unity convention at Woodstock, New York [(8)].

Indeed, the unification was achieved, incomplete as it was. ECCI's instructions, however, were not given directly to the Agency, but first to the CPA (Andrews and Marshall Co.). It meant that the channels of instructions from the ECCI got crossed. In addition, the Agency's authority over the party unification issue was weakened, though Katayama was pleased at the lightened responsibility. Those facts were to bring further troubles over the future activities of the Agency.

In case of Canada, those instructions were given by the Agency, to be exact, Scott alone. Indeed Marshall, who was a CPA delegate in the ECCI and served concurrently as Communist Party of Canada (CPC) delegate, returned home and visited Canada, carrying instructions from the Third Congress of the Comintern to organize a legal political party [(9)]. But Scott worked in concert with Marshall, so the channel of instructions was not disordered.

3) An Influence of the Strife between American Communist Parties on the Agency

The strife between the two parties was bitter and, above all, the CPA led by the Russian Federation, which had not been merged into the UCPA, took a resolute stance which left no room for mutual concessions [(10)]. This ongoing strife had not only a negative impact on the communist movement in the USA, but also became a major factor that was to make the Agency's attempts to unite the two parties difficult.

It had already been expressed clearly in a document of the President of the ECCI, Zinoviev, to the Committees of the CPA and the CLPA dated 12 January 1920 that "a united party is not only possible but is absolutely necessary" in the USA: "The American Communist Party is principally

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(8) *Official Bulletin of the Communist Party of America (Section of the Communist International) formed at the Joint Unity Convention of the UCP and CP* (n.p.), No. 1, V.1921, 1-4; cf. Correspondence of MID, 10110-1581-103.

(9) "C.E.C. Minutes. Special Meeting Sept. 22 [1921]," РГАСПИ, 495/98/4/34; cf. 495/98/4/30-31.

(10) When the UCPA was organized at a joint convention of the CPA and the Communist Labor Party of America (CLPA), held in Bridgman, Michigan on 26-31 May 1920, a fairly large member of the Slavic Federations (Russian, Ukrainian, Lettish, Polish and Lithuanian) did not participate in it and remained in the former CPA. cf. Greetings to the Communist International/Comrades of the ECCI, РГАСПИ, 515/1/25/1-2; 497/2/2/190-191. This document, which had been adopted at the joint convention, with a letter signed by Issac E. Ferguson reached Rutgers on 3 July 1920 after the dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and was forwarded to M[oscow]. by Rutgers.

a foreign party embracing so-called 'national' federations. The American Communist Labour Party chiefly represents American or English-speaking elements. If the first is more developed theoretically and is more closely connected with the traditions of the revolutionary struggle of the Russian working class, it is on the other hand more isolated from the mass movement and mass organisations of the American workers who are gradually entering the broad path of the struggle between the classes. ..... Thus both parties naturally supplement each other, and only by their unification is it possible to create in America an efficient Communist Party which must take the lead in the mass movement; and in the oncoming communist revolution" (11).

When Maximilian Cohen (alias Henry Allen), who had been expelled from the CPA in January 1921, became a member of the Agency, the Agency was obliged to handle not only the vital issue of unification, but also the so-called Cohen case. Here I drop the explanation of the course of events (12), but take up only "an Appeal to the ECCI" which he drafted on 16 January 1921 for his expulsion from the CPA arising out of the problem with the unification of the Communist Parties (13). He grasped in it the focal point at issue as follows: "Behind the question of unity ..... lies the fundamental question of the future form of organization which the united party shall take,— i.e., the old question of foreign language federations"; "And, unfortunately, 'federation control' is and has been inevitably accompanied by an instinctively 'left Communist' policy upon the American movement."

Harsh criticism of the CPA leaders was given by Katayama just before departing for Mexico: "They are, indeed, a good communist in so far as they understand the literal meaning of the documents given by the Third International. Their understanding and interpretation are often negative and passive and lack positive and active, hence miserably fail in practical world. ..... The present leaders' mind is stiff somewhat fossilized and so no flexibility at all. Look at the unity question. The C.P. stand is right and logical through and through. ..... so far so good but they forget the spirit of the mandate and entirely ignore the very urgency of the unity itself. ..... The C.P. maintains its integrity and compactness by an extreme centralization, by expulsion and intimidation and by keeping members in dark ignorance. There is no free discussion, development and initiative in thought and action among the rank and file" (14). The hardening of the CPA's stance on the issue caused Scott to make the above-mentioned notification. It also led to double-tracking the channel of instructions from the ECCI.

But the strife between UCPA and CPA did not exert a deep influence on each section in Canada. Through leading members of both sections the CPC was founded in May 1921 and the founding of the Workers' Party of Canada (WPC) followed in February 1922 (cf. Paragraph 6).

4) The Strife between Katayama and Scott

The strife between the two parties significantly influenced on one member the Agency, Scott: He was backing up the UCPA to which he belonged.

On 1 March 1921 a meeting of the Pan-American Council of the Red Labor Union International (RLUI) was held and the motion that "$500.00 be turned over to U.C.P. to be

(11) РГАСПИ, 515/1/17/1-3; cf. *КИ*, No. 11, n.d. [1920], 1887-1892.

(12) Cf. РГАСПИ, 515/1/45/1-4.

(13) РГАСПИ, 515/1/61/21-23.

(14) **P-Doc. 1-1**. By the way, Katayama's evaluation of the UCPA was more critical: "As to the U.C.P. I have very little to say./ The U.C.P. needs the strong leadership in men of principle and integrity to check and safeguard the party from going to [be] opportunistic."

applied for Defense [of comrades in prison]" was carried [15]. But at the meeting of the Pan-American Agency of 5 March that motion was withdrawn and it was decided again that "the C.E.C. of the U.C.P.[A.] be called upon immediately to refund the $500 advanced to it for 'defense'" [16].

The other members, Fraina and Katayama, however, were not so sympathetic to the CPA to which they belonged, because they were outside of its mainstream. Moreover, there was a contrast between Katayama and Scott, which can also be related to a difference between their temperaments: one was a thorough correspondent and was disciplined in financial matters, while the other wrote little and did not make out the financial report one by one; one tended to be optimistic about the outcome of their activities, while the other, who had been in the left position in the centrist group of Latvian socialists in the USA [17], was more of a realist.

Their antagonism weakened the authority of the Agency. After the unification of the American Communist Parties, especially the CPA took advantage of it: "Comrade[s] Yavki [Katayama] and Carter [Fraina], speaking in the name of the Pan-American Bureau [*sic*], complain about the poor connections between the Agency and the Party. This comes to us as a surprise. We are in direct and continuous touch with the Agency through its representative in the United States, Comrade Charles E. Scott" [18]. Thus the CPA asserted that it continued contact with the Agency through its American member, Scott, while distancing itself from Katayama in Mexico and disavowing any responsibility for the Agency's malfunctions [19].

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(15) Here I add a supplementary explanation of the Pan-American Council. Although the RLUI (Profintern) was founded at the same time of the Third Congress of the Comintern in June-July 1921, its provisional organization, the International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions, had already been organized at the same time of the Second Congress of the Comintern in July-August 1920. In parallel with the Comintern's establishing the Agency, the RLUI aimed at establishing the Pan-American Council and, furthermore, its subordinate organization, that is, the American Bureau in the USA, the Provisional Mexican Bureau in Mexico and the Canadian Bureau in Canada, respectively. A small numbers of members did not escape holding two posts concurrently and the chairmen of the Agency held that of the Council. They used different names for different purposes, so occasionally misusing names occurred. cf. The Chairman of the American Agency to [Mexican] Comrades, 15.VI.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/16-17. The sphere of activity of both organizations, however, was originally different each other. Therefore, on 3 March 1921 the chairman of the Agency appealed in a "confidential" letter to each CEC of the CPA and the UCPA as follows: "It is imperative that no references be made in the Communist organs which you publish linking up the American Bureau of the R.L.U.I. with either of the two Communist Parties in this country, as the Bureau is acting legally. Such references may fall into the hands of the authorities and thus lay the Bureau open to the charge that it is a Communist 'affair.'" РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/45.

(16) **P-Doc. 2-2**. That funding in advance was an idea of Scott and J. Harper (Julius Heiman [Hyman]) who attended the meeting falsely as agent of Thompson (Fraina) in charge of financial affairs. On Katayama's criticism of this advance, see Chapter 7-5.

(17) Cf. Yamanouchi, *S.J. Rutgers*, 138-139; *The New York Call*, Vol. 10, No. 105, Section II, 15.IV.1917, 4; Records of FBI, OG343419.

(18) Carr, Executive Secretary, CPA to Scott (Forwarded to Yavki by A. Bray [Scott], 8.IX.1921), РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/109-110.

(19) This CPA's stance was partly derived from Scott's behavior: Katayama wrote to Bray on 16 September [1921] saying that "Your latest letter makes it quite clear that you recognize neither the authority of the Agency over you, nor its functions./ General authority is vested collectively in the Agency, and more in myself as its chairman. You are completely ignoring this authority" [**P-Doc. 5-4**].

The strife between Katayama and Scott was also the same in case of Canada: In contrast with Katayama's manner Scott told very little except the first report to Katayama on 19 April 1921 (**P-Doc. 5-1**). In spite of Scott's weakness, he could achieve more desirable results of his activities in Canada than in the USA (cf. Paragraph 6).

In the meantime Fraina was no longer a vital figure as when he had played an active role in the American Left Wing movement [20]. At the beginning of his activities in the Agency, his two stays in Berlin (mid-October 1920 — 18 January 1921; 1 April — 5 June 1921 (cf. **P-Doc. 10-7**) as courier of funds for activities were considered to have been exceedingly long (This will be examined in detail in Chapter 7). Even Katayama felt uneasy for a moment about when Fraina would come to Mexico: "I can't understand the movement of our Littlebit [Fraina]. What has he doing [*sic*] all those three months? I wonder!" [21]

Moreover, it is difficult to find any positive attitudes in his activities after his late arrival in Mexico City. He may have begun thinking about leaving the communist movement, or (in accord with my previous analysis) Fraina, who had been a leader of the theoretical radicalization, may have been impractical in reality. This point needs further examination (cf. Chapter 7).

5) A Conflict over Funds of Activities

Although the Agency was most concerned about the relations with the two American Communist Parties, its authority was largely ignored. The only reliance that the two parties placed on the Agency was, in fact, for its financial aid. This was owing to the decision by the ECCI not to give any financial aid directly to communist organizations in each country but rather to give aid indirectly through the Foreign Bureaus of the ECCI. Financial troubles, however, often occurred through that process. They were also never stopped either inside or outside the Agency.

The financial troubles would have a decisive impact on the evaluation of the world movement of the Comintern. It is important to make clear the financial conditions of the Agency in order to examine its activities as a whole. I handle that key issue in the following Chapter 7.

6) Results of the Agency's Activities?

What were the results of the Pan-American Agency's activities?

In the USA, conditions conducive to good results were hard from the very beginning. As mentioned above, the strife between American Communist Parties significantly influenced the Agency's activities. Scott reported positive results of his activities in the USA and Canada in his letter to Zinoviev dated 15 October 1921 (**P-Doc. 8-1**). I will examine in Chapter 7 such a self-praise for his activities together with the question of suspicion about his dubious accounting.

In Mexico, the Agency attempted to make contacts with the local organizations and published organs, statements, etc. not only in English, but also in Spanish. On 21 April 1921 "Chairman of the Pan-American Council of the International Council of the Trade and Industrial Union" (New York) officially nominated José Rubio (a member of the Executive Committee of Confederación General de Trabajadores [CGT]), M. Paley (Herman M. Levin(e); the editor of the organ of the

(20) Cf. Yamanouchi, *S.J. Rutgers*, 237-238; B.D. Wolfe, *A Life in Two Centuries. An Autobiography* (New York, 1981), 230; Th. Draper, "Communists and Their History," *Political Affairs*, 1959, No. 5, 58-61.

(21) [Katayama] to Bray, 19.VI.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/21-22.

Mexican Executive of the IWW), José C. Valadés (a member of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth) and Félix Leija Paz (a member of Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana [CROM]) as the members of the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the RLUI [22]. On the next day, 22 April, a weekly, *El Trabajador; Organo del Bureau Provisional Mexicano del Consejo Internacional de Sindicatos y Uniones de Trabajadores (Internacional Roja)* was founded (cf. **P-Doc. 3-2**).

Under difficult circumstances that one and another radical foreign activists were arrested and deported from Mexico, Katayama himself was obliged to go underground temporarily in May 1921. Nevertheless he kept on sending local activists messages and proposals from June through August 1921 [23]. How much influence did the Agency's participation in local movement exert upon them? Although a comprehensive evaluation should be done only after examining all the historical materials on the Mexican side, these materials seem to be still limited in number under current circumstances.

The founding of a new Communist Party of Mexico was a vital mission of the Agency. Here I briefly explain how the work made only slow progress. Judging from the fact that each leader of both Mexican Communist Parties, Linn A.E. Gale and Roy, was outside Mexico together and both Parties were in name only, Katayama requested on 25 May 1921 the members of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth to appoint a convention committee in order to organize a Communist Party of Mexico [24]. After Fraina arrived in Mexico City at the beginning of July 1921, Katayama with Fraina sent fraternal greetings dated 18 July to the Congress of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth and proposed "that your Congress elect a Committee of Three to start the work of organizing a Communist Party" [25]. As a matter of fact, the [Organizing] Committee took much time to call and hold the Congress itself. It was held on 25-30 December 1921, that is, two months after Katayama's leaving for Moscow. For Katayama and Fraina began writing with the following opening paragraph on 19 September 1921, gave detailed directions to the Organization Committee, and argued that "the actual work of organizing a Communist Party must be carried out" by the Organization Committee. "For the past six months, up until now, the Communist work has been agitational only. It is now necessary that agitation be combined with definite organization activity./ We want to make clear to the Organization Committee its functions. ..... the Agency has general direction of the work of organizing a Mexican Communist Party, ... this direction is general and advisory" (**P-Doc. 3-3**). In short, the Agency regarded the tactics employed by the Spanish comrades as prohibited ones and took pains not to repeat "the mistake made in Spain, where the Youth Federation automatically transformed itself into a Communist Party" [26]. At the same time Agency proposed the Organization Committee that it should take over a part of the tasks of the Provisional Mexican (Labor) Bureau, because he had received instructions from the Executive Committee of the Profintern, newly elected at the Founding Congress of July 1921, that all the Bureaus of the Profintern in Germany,

(22) РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/133; cf. 495/18/65/86.

(23) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/2-4, 25-29, 39, 41-42, 53, 57-58, 83; 521/1/17/54-58, 87, 91-92, 112-115; cf. **P-Doc. 1-9**.

(24) РГАСПИ, 495/108/10/1-3.

(25) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/41-42; 495/108/10/12-13; cf. **P-Doc. 1-15**.

(26) **P-Doc. 1-10**. On the way back from Mexico Borodin left Spain early in 1920 and Ramírez remained alone. One of the lines of action about which Rmírez came to an agreement with the local comrades was "the transformation of the Executive Committee of the 'Federación de Juventudes Socialistas' into the Provisional Executive Committee of the 'Partido Comunista Espanol'" without calling the Founding Congress of the Communist Party. РГАСПИ, 495/120/250/53-56.

England, the USA, Mexico, etc. should be abolished [27]. Such "general and advisory" activities of the Agency, however, came to an end due to Katayama's summons to Moscow, and the decision on dissolving the Agency, by the ECCI.

As for the case of South America, Mr. & Mrs. Allen, who had been dispatched to South American countries by the Agency, were not appropriate for fulfilling their mission. That is made clear in his financial statement and report (mentioned in Chapter 7).

In Canada, Scott demonstrated his initiative in founding the CPC. On Scott's instructions Caleb Harrison (alias Henry Atwood) was dispatched to Canada and took the lead as chairman during the founding convention of the CPC [28]. The CPC and the Agency jointly sent the ECCI a letter for affiliation with the Comintern, which had a handwritten postscript as follows: "P.S. I am preparing draft for Legal Mass Party. This Legal Party will be launched within a month and of course, fully controlled by the underground Party./ Fraternally yours/ Scott" (**P-Doc. 7-5**). It may safely be said that the creation of the CPC was the most notable achievement of the Agency.

However, it should not escape our attention that there were favorable conditions in Canada, in contrast with troubles and delays, involved in the unification of both American Communist Parties and in the founding of the Communist Party of Mexico, respectively:

a) Canada and the USA are contiguous to each other and their common language is English. Both American Communist Parties had each section in Canada, which could take the lead together in founding the CPC. At that time the attitude of each section of them was not of antagonism as in the USA [29].

b) "Foreigners" who had the great majority of the members of the CPC, i.e. Ukrainians, Finns, etc., did not play such an important role in the CPC as "pressure group" like the Russian Federation of the CPA. Criticism by the Ukrainian leadership was rarely heard prior 1924. This formed a suitable background that the early party leadership was largely fixed on recruiting members from English speaking comrades [30].

Consequently, according to Atwood (and Scott), it was already conceivable as of the middle of April 1921 that a united party was "just as much as accomplished" (**P-Doc. 5-1**).

7) Difficulties in Setting Up a Network of the American Continents

The relations between the two communist parties in the USA and other parties in the American Continents were far from well-established, in spite of the Agency's efforts. There were a variety of obstacles to setting up a network of American Continents. The communists in the USA, for example, often referred to the Pan-American Agency as the "American" Agency, because they sometimes did not pay attention to their "Pan-American," that is, Central and South American comrades.

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(27) **P-Doc. 3-3**; cf. РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/113.

(28) Cf. **P-Doc. 7-4**; "Minutes of the First Convention of the CPC," РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/200-203.

(29) J. Mochoruk, "'Pop & Co' versus Buck and the 'Lenin School Boys': Ukrainian Canadians and the Communist Party of Canada, 1921-1931," R.L. Hinther/J. Mochoruk (eds.), *Re-imagining Ukrainian Canadians. History, Politics, and Identity* (Toronto et al., 2012), 338-339.

(30) Although among the WPC membership "foreign elements" (Finns, Ukrainians, etc.) were still much more than "English-speaking elements," the former had only one fourth among its Executive Committee members. Scott's Report from 15 Nov. 1921 to 5 Feb. 1922 to the Presidium of the ECCI, "Краткий отчет о Канаде," РГАСПИ, 495/98/1/16-21; cf. CPC's "Report to Presidium of Comintern," VIII.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/98/3/15-24; 495/72/3/88-95.

To tell the truth, a contempt for Central and South America was within the members of the Agency. In case at the above-mentioned meeting of the American Council on 1 March 1921 Scott and Harper proposed the stop of both trips of Yavki to Mexico and Allen to Argentina (South America) on account of financial difficulty, Katayama wrote in the "Note" as follows: "The Proposal of Scott and Harper that Yavki and Allen not [*sic*] start on their trip shows a complete misunderstanding of the work of the Agency. Our work is Pan-American and only incidentally U.S.A." (**P-Doc. 2-2**; cf. **P-Doc. 2-3**).

On 24 September 1921 in a letter to Zinoviev, Katayama reexamined the whole activities of the Agency since 8 January 1921 when he had taken the present post, and wrote at the end as follows: "Mexico is, as I have been experiencing past six months, a very inconvenient place, especially looked from a practical standpoint, ... Because the commercial relations between North and South Americas are well established, the New York as a centre./ But South American proletariat is not so willing to listen to the American talk, owing to *a certain prejudice* that exists to-day between two continents. And then American (USA) comrades are accustomed to look down on the Latin American workers. Personally I think that the choice of the seat of the Agency is wise one in the long run" (**P-Doc. 1-11** [my *italics*]).

A similar indication was shown in a reply letter dated 14 July 1922 of Edgar Woog (alias Alfred Stirner) to Katayama in Moscow, informing the Agency's end from Mexico: "To the C.P. people in U.S.A. we have written several times with regard to closer collaboration, publishing in common of manifestoes etc. but never got any answer. *The people there look on Mexico as an absolute quantity negligeable* [*negligible*]; surely Mexico plays no first role in world-politics, but the comrades of the USA should, with a view on the international work, care more for the countries of Central and South America" [(31)]. Prejudices such as the sense of superiority of the CPA, were they to have gained more ground, would have aggravated the difficulties in setting up a network.

On 23 July 1921 Katayama and Fraina sent a letter to the American and Canadian Red Labor Bureaus, saying that they called out an immediate joint campaign against the Pan-American Federation of Labor, which was to hold a Congress sometime in autumn. The result was: "Above letter has been not answered by the Canadian. And the U.S. Red Bu. was abolished[,] so informed by the CEC of CPA, as if the work started by the Red Bureau were also entirely abolished!" [(32)] The CPC as well as Scott took little interest in the significance of the *Pan-American* movement.

The importance of Central and South America was underlined by Katayama in the report dated 10 January 1922 (**P-Doc. 9-1**): "I think that the Communist movement of two Americas should be aimed at the first overthrow of American imperialism and its capitalism of America. Without a [*sic*] strong Communist Parties in Mexico and South American countries the American Communist movement even led by the powerful Communist Party of America will not be able to strike hard blow at the American capitalism because its capitalism and imperialism have been laying their foundation widely along those countries. Mexico is the key to Central and South America and she is the connecting link of two Americas. The Communist International needs a strong Communist Party of Mexico and make it the connecting link of American Communist International with which united front will strike at the American capitalist imperialism a death blow."

These various problems provide ample reason to anticipate the difficulties present in the Comintern's direction of transnational activities such as the Pan-American Agency. This would

(31) РГАСПИ, 521/1/74/2-3 (my *italics*). Stirner, a Swiss immigrant, came back to Mexico after his attendance at the Third Congress of the Comintern.

(32) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/139-140.

also provide a frame of reference for examining how the Japanese Communist Party had contact with the Foreign Bureaus of the Comintern.

7 Some Problems with Funds for Activities of the Pan-American Agency

This chapter aims to tackle some problems with funds for activities of the Agency which arose over total sum of recipient subsidies and its distribution and expenditure in Canada, South America, Mexico and the USA, respectively. I have already handled that issue comprehensively in the supplementary chapter of *The Way to the Third International*. This present work is an abridged version in English (cf. Preface).

1) Total Sum of Recipient Subsidies and Its Distributions

From the ECCI Thompson (Fraina) received $60,000 and £600 in total. The breakdown is as follows: "from [M. Kobetsky,] E.C. Moscow (October, 1920) $2,000; from Barrodin [Borodin who escorted Fraina to Berlin] £600 & $3,000 also a draft $5,000; from James [Reich of the WES] (Berlin [where Fraina revisited on account of financial difficulties], April 1921) $50,000" [(1)].

Out of them Fraina distributed a total of **$26,250** and £220 to Scott and $360 to Ramírez, respectively. The breakdown of Scott's recipient amount is as follows: (1) $250 and £220 during his stay in Berlin toward autumn 1920; (2) the above-mentioned draft $5,000; (3) "To Mendels at Berlin for Scott $1,000"; (4) Out of $50,000 which Fraina received from Reich, "To Hamburger (Scott) $10,000" and "To Mendels (Scott) $10,000" (The total of bank charges for remitting to two intermediaries is $450); Out of $20,000 which Scott received, $3,000 was remitted again to Katayama.

At the beginning of July 1921 Fraina brought **$27,200** with him to Mexico City except **$6,800** of his expenses (including $250 to Scott, $360 to Ramírez, above-mentioned bank charges $450, "All exp. paid to Scott [N.Y. Feb. 10-24]" $214.57, etc.).

There were other subsidies from the ECCI. The above-mentioned funds from Fraina was not in time for the Agency's beginning to work in New York in January 1921. To tell the truth, its work began with $30,000. In order to track down a source of the funds, I take up the financial accounts for January-March 1921. It is the incomplete list of two sheets without signature and date, which is missing in the breakdown of expenses in January and February (hereafter cited as the March report) (**P-Doc. 2-2**). Only in it "30000.00" is given with no explanation as the figure from which expenses are subtracted. The following sentence in Katayama's letter to the members of the Small Bureau of the ECCI dated 10 January 1922 is a supporting evidence: "The Agency spent already [about the beginning of March 1921] over fifteen thousand *out of thirty* appropriated for the Red International and Communist International works" [**P-Doc. 9-1** (my *italics*)]. In counting in $30,000, up to this point, total sum of recipient subsidies is **$90,000**, leaving pounds aside.

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(1) **P-Doc. 10-7**; Report of the Federal Bureau Investigation's Interrogation of Lewis Corey, 1949-1950, Lewis Corey Papers, Box 2, #5, typed p. 74, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York. Indeed, this testimony of Corey (Fraina) in his later years have mentions of funds for activities here and there. But the amounts in his testimony which are based only on his memory are correct in some cases but not in others, so I do not take up them here.

At the meeting of the Small Bureau of the ECCI on 12 October 1920 the draft on tasks of the Agency was proposed by Fraina and Jansons and adopted. The following was planned in it: "Ameri. Agency is allowed **100,000** for 3 months, to which $35,000 out of this sum is transferred just immediately." That "$35,000 transferred just immediately" would be supposed to be the start-up funds of the Agency, i.e., $30,000 after expenses.

On that point the following important description is offered in a letter of Thomas [Reich] to "Liebe Genosse" [Zinoviev or Kobetsky?] dated 5 April 1921: "Gen. Fraina is vor einigen Tagen hier [Berlin] eingetroffen. Zweck seiner Reise wird mit dem Abholen des Geld motiviert. Laut seinerzeit gefasstem Beschluss des Kleinen Büros soll er noch 70,000 Dollar (30,000 hat er erhalten) bekommen. Sofort greifbar have ich 50,000 Doll. Es wird möglich sein die volle Summe 70[,000] zu überweisen. Rest werde ich wahrscheinlich in allernächsten Tagen mobil machen" [(2)].

The amount of funds which Fraina received is not "30,000" but $10,000 as mentioned above, and that not through the intermediary of Reich. Therefore Reich soon accommodated Fraina with $50,000. The point is whether the "Rest" was provided really or not. Zinoviev's letter to Fraina later on 15 August 1923 (mentioned below) reads as follows: "from Thomas [not $70,000 but] $50,000" was received by Fraina [(3)]. As is often the case with subsidies from the ECCI, it may safely be said that there was a disparity between the approved amount ($100,000) and the amount supplied (**about $90,000**).

Next, I examine where the funds for activities were distributed. On 18 March 1921 Katayama left New York for Mexico, taking $5,000 with him. "I [Katayama] took 5,000 leaving with Scott over ten thousand; later Scott got $5,000 note brought by Fraina cashed, and Fraina sent Scott $20,000 in two sums. Thus the Agency spent somewhere about $45,000 for America and Canada, together with expenses for Allen['s travel to South America]."

Speaking of "over ten thousand" left with Scott, "it was found [at the meeting of the Agency on 9 March 1921] that there was about 16,000 left in treasury" (**P-Doc. 2-3**). That is to say that the source of "over ten thousand" would be "about 16,000." The point is how much "about 16,000" decreased at the time of Katayama's departure. According to "My Personal Accounts for Jan., Feb. and March 1921" by Katayama (hereafter cited as Personal Accounts) (**P-Doc. 10-1**), he received $5,000 on 17 March, that is, the day before his departure. So it would be natural for us to consider that the "Rest" for Scott was **about $11,000**.

As for "about $45,000 for America and Canada, together with expenses for Allen," there is one more related document. It is the letter of "Y[avki].C[arter]." [i.e. Katayama and Fraina] to Bray dated 28 September 1921, which reads as follows: "You [Bray = Scott] have in six months disposed of about forty-two thousand without making a single report — except for the March report you have so much spoken about but which we never received, ..." (**P-Doc. 5-5**). Speaking of Scott's receipts, they are $23,250 (provided by Fraina but with exception of $3,000 remitted again to Katayama in Mexico City) and about $11,000 (left in New York by Katayama). That is, we can confirm up to **about $35,000**. Therefore either "about $45,000" or "forty-two thousand" would be rather exaggerated.

From the above, I can provide the following summary in round figures. Out of the start-up funds ($30,000), **about $14,000** was spent by Katayama and Scott in New York during the period from January through 9 March 1921. Out of the balance (about $16,000), Katayama took $5,000 (to be precise, $4,771) with him to Mexico City and the remainder (about $11,000) was left with Scott. Then, out of $26,250 which Fraina provided to Scott, $3,000 was remitted to Katayama.

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(2) РГАСПИ, 499/1/5a/30.

(3) The editor/author made a written error in the first edition of *Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern*, p. 188 as follows: "from Fraina [not $70,000 but] $50,000." That error was corrected in its revised and enlarged edition.

About $35,000, which was added by the remainder ($23,250) and the above-mentioned about $11,000 together, was left with Scott as funds for activities in the USA and Canada, including Allen's travel to South America. The funds for activities in Mexico were **about $35,000** which were composed of $4,771 brought by Katayama, $3,000 remitted by Scott to Katayama, $27,200 brought by Fraina and exchange gains ($22.50) (**P-Doc. 10-4**). The above is **about $84,000** in total. When that amount is added by **$6,800** of Fraina's expenses before his arrival in Mexico, it corresponds roughly to the total sum of recipient subsidies ($90,000).

2) Expenditures of Funds for Activities in Canada

I examine how **about $35,000** was expended by Scott. As for the case of Canada, Y.C.'s letter to Bray (**P-Doc. 5-5**) reads as follows: "..... you loaned American company [the reunited CPA (or the former UCPA)] two thousand, and that you have been giving Canadian company [CPC] one thousand." In actual fact, Scott gave the CPC much more than $1,000 (The loan of $2,000 to the CPA [or the UCPA] will be discussed later).

I have already examined the case of Canada [(4)], so I furnish only the principal research results here.

Scott's authority was always accepted by the Canadian comrades. Whenever the CPC had awaited instructions since the eve of its founding, Scott gave them in detail to it (cf. **P-Doc. 7-5**). Even in August 1922, six months after the founding of the the WPC, the Executive of the CPC sent the following letter to the Presidium of the ECCI: "We appeal to you to authorize Comrade Sc[ott]. to remain here for at least six months as your Field Organizer. Comrades Sc. is thoroughly familiar with the needs of our movement, and his experience coupled with his driving force make[s] him a valuable organizer whose presence here for another six months would benefit us greatly, as already he has considerable influence within our ranks" [(5)].

In addition, the CPC also depended on funds from the Agency from the beginning. "This has averaged $1,000 a month for June, July and August" (**P-Doc. 7-6**). According to "Financial Report of Central Executive Committee of the C.P. of C. for 9 months from May 25th, 1921 to Feb. 20th, 1922," total receipts are $5,512.97, out of which $3,168 (57.5%) is from the Agency [(6)].

By the way, the remainder of receipts, $2344.97 (42.5%) was covered by the Party itself. After every financial aid from the Agency was stopped at the end of August 1921, Canadian communists were obliged to make their own Party self-supporting. Considering that during the first three months their regular receipts from dues, literature, etc. come to only about 15% of Party's expenses, Party's endeavor toward self-supporting (including gratuitous acts) in and after September 1921 should be highly evaluated.

There were other Agency expenses. "Estimate of expenses for the founding CPC convention being $3000, of which $2000.00 was supposed to be covered by the Agency" (**P-Doc. 7-3**). And expenses for the Agency's dispatching Atwood to Canada were $1,330 [(7)]. The total of Agency's

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(4) A. Yamanouchi, "The Forming of the Communist Party of Canada and the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern," *The Shien* or *the Journal of History* (Faculty of Humanities, Kyushu University), No. 152, III.2015, 51-106 [in Japanese].

(5) РГАСПИ, 495/98/4/109-112.

(6) G.S. Kealey, "The RCMP, the Special Branch, and the Early Days of the Communist Party of Canada: A Documentary Article," *Labour/Le Travail*, Vol. 30, Fall 1992, 183-187.

(7) **P-Doc. 10-9**. After his entry into Canada on 6 March 1921, Atwood worked hard to unify local communist organizations and finally managed to hold the founding convention of the CPC, being

expenditure on the case of Canada is supposed to be **about $6,500**. Expenses for Scott's activities in Canada, however, are unspecified and excluded here.

3) Expenditures of Funds for Travel to South America

The Agency dispatched Allen and his wife to South America, especially Argentina. The Agency decided on 5 March 1921 that "Allen be advanced $1500 for his trip, and start at once" (**P-Doc. 2-2**). The total of expenses amounted to about $3,500 which was over $2,800 (including additional remittance) provided by the Agency. "Balance due (money borrowed on promise to return immediately)" was $634 (**P-Doc. 10-8**). It is quite likely that Scott paid it, because Allen received strong backing from Scott. Therefore the total expenditure for South America is considered to be **about $3,500**.

In the breakdown of those expenses the followings are listed: articles for travel (coat, shoes, underclothes, collars, etc.), salary [which is equal with that of regular members]), 2 tickets, "Hotel and expenses," etc. Nothing like expenses for activities is listed. Indeed there were some problems such as adequate communication was not established and the existence itself of the Agency which had dispatched Allen was not recognized in those places [(8)]. But Fraina's testimony that "the man accomplished absolutely nothing except to spend the money for expenses" seems to be reliable [(9)].

I reconfirm that in Allen's "Financial Statement" (**P-Doc. 10-8**) and his report, "The Situation in South-America" (**P-Doc. 6-1**) Mr. & Mrs. Allen made a trip of 6 months and a half, but the period of their practical activities was only 2 months. On their way to and from Buenos Aires it took 2 months and 2.5 months (including one week when they were waiting for additional funds), respectively.

His report seems to be inactive even on his practical activities in Buenos Aires: "Realizing all this, I [Allen] felt that my trip, if conducive to any good whatever, could not be in interfering in work which I was not fitted for and handicapped by a lack of the language, customs, psychology, etc., but by getting information and laying connections between the North and South American movements." "Under these circumstances I had nothing to do but to gather information."

Based on the very information which he could get, Allen made out a report on the current situation of movement almost only in Argentina, at the end of which he presented the following recommendations "which I [Allen] hope will be acted upon favorably." "1. Recommend that the C.E.C. of the C.P. of Argentine be entrusted, that is given a mandate, to carry on the work of propaganda and agitation in all South America, and that funds be supplied for this purpose. ...../ 2. Recommend that a grant of five thousand dollars, at least, be made to the C.E.C. of the C.P. for their own domestic work. ...../ 3. A similar grant to the C.P. of Uruguay."

As compared with the way of spending money in Canada and Mexico (mentioned later), Allen was extraordinarily lavish in recommending to provide "a grant of five thousand dollars." The point is especially the following: although locally-employed cooperators worked such as collecting information and the like in Canada and Mexico, Allen spent no funds for activities in employing local staffs and even translators. Could he really collect reliable information?

Excluding about $10,000 of the expenditure on the cases of Canada and South America, total sum of Scott's expenditure limited to the USA amounts to **about $25,000**. Before examining that expenditure, let us take up the remaining case of Mexico.

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appointed chairman.

(8) Cf. Л.С. и В.Л. Хейфец, *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка*, 110-111.

(9) Report of FBI, typed p. 76.

4) Expenditures of Funds for Activities in Mexico

As mentioned above, total funds collected for Agency's activities in Mexico is $34,993.50 (**about $35,000**). As prices were lower in Mexico than in the USA, funds seem to be used sufficiently in its own way. Total funds expended or advanced on 1 October 1921 is $12,190.40 (**about $12,200**). The breakdown is as follows: "April, $1,811 / May, $1,017.70 / June, $1,916.50 / July, $1,648.50 / August, $1,842.30 / September, $2,954.40/ Advanced to four [Japanese] Coms. [Mosaburo Suzuki, Haruo Watanabe, Umekichi Nikaido and Seishi Nonaka] to the Far East P[ropaganda]. Bureau, $1,000" (**P-Doc. 10-4**).

After Thompson (with his wife, Esther) took $27,200 with him into Mexico, the subsidies from the ECCI were cut off. How much did he have funds on hand, when he was leaving Mexico for South America on 24 December 1921? It will be supposed with three financial statements, which have each different details, as a clue: (1) "General Financial Statements. From April 1 to September 30, 1921," signed by Thompson (**P-Doc. 10-4**), (2) "Abrechnung über die seitens des Pan-Amerikanishen Buros [*sic*] an die K.P. Mexico gegebenen Summen" (**P-Doc. 10-6**) and (3) "Pan-Amerikanishes Buro [*sic*] 1921 [Abrechnungen]" (**P-Doc. 10-5**).

According to **P-Doc. 10-4**, the balance at hand on 1 Oct. 1921 is $22,803.10 (**about 22,800**), out of which Katayama took **$3,000** with him at his departure for Moscow.

P-Doc. 10-6 is the financial statement of the limited funds ($27,200) which Fraina brought with him to Mexico. The balance at hand on 1 Oct. 1921 is $19,300, in other words, $7,900 is expended. As a matter of fact, Fraina did not provide total sum of funds to Katayama at once. Fraina himself administered funds and, through 11 August into 28 September 1921, provided $4,200 at the first time and $255 or 252.50 bit by bit at the following 6 times (**P-Doc. 10-3**). The provided amount is $5,722.50 in total, so $5,722.50 and $1,200 (overhead expenses, including his own salary, listed in **P-Doc. 10-5**) will not add up to $7,900. That is to say that **$977.50** is unaccounted for.

According to **P-Doc. 10-6**, Fraina who was "entrusted by Katayama with the final responsibility in winding up the Agency affairs" remained as acting chairman in Mexico City and provided to the Communist Party of Mexico several funds totaling **$2,206.63** through 12 October into 31 December 1921. Furthermore, on 22 December before Fraina's departure, he also provided to Stirner $1,115, which was spent for publishing central organs and booklets, sending delegations and running its secretariat.

There were other expenses after 1 October 1921: "To Pan[-American] Bureau [which would mean "to Fraina himself"] $6,659." Although Fraina's work was inactive for October-December 1921, that expenses which would contain his salary $585 [$45 a week×13 weeks] seems to be too great, compared with total sum ($3,321.63) provided by him to the Communist Party of Mexico. In sum, Fraina's expenses unaccounted for, that is, both above-mentioned $977.50 and this $6,659 were very open to question and criticism.

Here I work out rough figures of the Agency's income and expenses in Mexico. The income was **$35,000**. On 1 October 1921 $12,200 had already been expended and the balance was **$22,800**. Out of the amount Katayama took **$3,000** with him at his departure for Moscow and Fraina provided **$3,300** to the Communist Party of Mexico, so the balance was **$16,500**. Out of the amount **$6,700** was expended "to the Agency" [to Fraina] and the final balance was $9,800. I suppose that Fraina took **$9,800** with him and left Mexico on 24 December 1921.

5) Expenditures of Funds for Activities in the USA

Finally I examine the expenditure in the USA. As mentioned above, out of about $35,000 which was left with Scott at Katayama's departure, about $6,500 and about $3,500 were expended for Canada and South America, respectively. The balance (**about $25,000**) was supposed to be the funds for activities limited to the USA (including expenses for Scott's activities in Canada). Was the total amount (about $25,000) expended efficiently in the USA?

Before I handle the question, I would like to argue the following question: Although the ECCI brought out a suspicion on Fraina's embezzling funds for activities after his disappearance at the beginning of 1922, why did not a similar suspicion turn on Scott?

Indeed there is a cause for suspicion because it was supposed that Scott did not make out any financial statement. In spite of that, there is no trace that he was suspected. He asserted he had made out a financial statement only once, but "I [Scott] was in such a fix that I were compelled to destroy mine March financial statement. Please send me copy immediately to above mentioned address" (**P-Doc. 5-2**). To that request Katayama replied only as follows: "If you sent the march report it must be lost" [(10)]. There is one more letter dated 10 January 1921 saying that "Last I [Katayama] heard is that he [Scott] sent his financial reports to you [the members of the Small Bureau of the ECCI] and me which *I do not get it yet*" (**P-Doc. 9-1 [**my *italics*]). Indeed, the RGASPI holds two sets of the March report in the Pan-American Agency file of the Secretariat of the ECCI (**P-Doc. 2-2**). The following address was written on the back of the last sheet (л. 44 об.) of one of them: "Nathan Mendelsohn / 1729 Park Ave[nue] / Montreal / Canada"; "Inside envelop addressed / Josef Skala [L.C. Fraina] / Immediate delivery please." It would mean that the March report reached Fraina. It may be that it did not reach only Katayama or Scott did not send it to Katayama but to Fraina. Didn't Fraina actually show it to Katayama after his arrival in Mexico City? We cannot still get at the truth.

When the ECCI suspected Fraina, Scott's behavior displayed at that time raises a suspicion in my mind. First, changing the way of quoting, I introduce G.E. Zinoviev's letter to Fraina dated 18 April 1923 which is translated from Russian into English [(11)].

> To follow up on and regarding [communication] to you of 15 August 1922, no. 1720, we inform you that upon our receipt of a report from Comrade Scott, your accounts with us are as follows.
> Received by you in Berlin for American Agency in 1921 from Borodin $10,000 and from Thomas $50,000, total $60,000.
> Out of that amount you gave Scott $20,204.70 and 6,513.40 in Canadian dollars, which is about $5,795.30.
> In all you gave Scott the equivalent of $26,000 which leaves you with the equivalent of $34,000.
> Regarding this amount we have received a report from you for the period [from] 1 October through 31 December 1921 for $19,803, of which amount on 1 January 1922 you still had $12,228.50. We do not have a report for the period from 5 June 1921 (the day you arrived in America [*sic*] from Berlin) through 1 October of the same year for the amount of $14,196.50.

(10) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/140.

(11) H. Klehr / J.E. Haynes / F.I. Firsov, *The Secret World of American Communism* (New Haven / London, 1995), 197-198.

In view of the above we request that you:
1. provide us with a report for the period June-September 1921.
2. send us the remainder, which you had in hand as of 1 January 1922 in the amount of $12,228.50, since after 1 January the agency no longer existed, and for that reason there could not have been any more expenses charged to the agency.

At once I have to raise a doubt, because "a report from Comrade Scott" was only a basis for the calculation. It is very odd that Scott made out a report on the financial statement including that of Mexico. He had no right to do so. Did he report the financial statement of the USA as well? In Zinoviev's letter, there is no mention of any statement concerning the USA, so there is a very fair possibility that Scott did not report any related statement. Although Katayama and Fraina made out some detailed financial statements, which did reach the ECCI, Zinoviev referred to neither them nor Katayama's important letter dated 10 January 1922 to the Small Bureau of the ECCI (**P-Doc. 9-1**). If Zinoviev had read Financial Accounts by Katayama (**P-Doc. 10-2**; **10-3**), that request would have been needless (Total amount of expenditure for the period from April through September 1921 is $12,190.40 and that for June-September is $9,361.70). If Zinoviev had wanted to get an effective report, a report for *July*-September 1921 should have been requested, because of Fraina's arrival in Mexico City at the beginning of July 1921. Zinoviev did not consider that total amount of funds for activities (about $35,000) in Mexico consisted of not only $27,200 left over by Fraina but also $4,771 taken by Katayama with him, $3,000 sent by Scott and exchange gains ($22.50). In addition, $6,800, which Fraina had spent before his arrival, was not taken from "$34,000" in Zinoviev's calculation.

Next I introduce one more letter dated 18 December 1923 to Fraina, written in English by O.A. Piatnitsky who was both treasurer, and chief of the International Liaison Department (OMS), of the ECCI [(12)].

Yours of Sept. 14 [1923] through the CEC of the WP [(13)] has reached our hands. We note in your letter the intention expressed of getting into contact direct with the Comintern. Up to the present, however, we have received no communication from you and therefore must confine ourselves to the letter above-mentioned.
We wish to put several questions to you which we ask you to answer without any evasion:
1. When, where and how was the $7,000 stolen from you?
2. What did you expend the $3,000 on?
3. You admit having $12,228.50 as of January 1, 1922. What has become of the balance of $2,228.50?
4. What have been your activities since your departure from Mexico on Dec. 24, 1921?
5. ...../ 6. .....
7. Why have you sent no report to the Comintern in these two years?
Upon receipt of an <u>immediate</u> comprehensive reply from you through the CEC of the Workers Party, we shall make a decision and duly inform you.

Although I have presumed that Fraina took about $9,800 with him at the end of 1921, according to this letter, Fraina had **$12,228.50** as of 1 January 1922. It is difficult to say that the amount was backed up by the ECCI only with the figures offered in these two letters. Things got still more complicated by the fact that Fraina revealed the stolen money for the first time. Beginning to tell the stolen case, Fraina might have tried to make a balance look like smaller one.

(12) Klehr/Haynes/Firsov, 198.
(13) The CPA was renamed the Workers Party of America in December 1921.

He did not even answer the question. He could not excuse himself in any way whatsoever.

Here I touch on an article on Fraina, recently published by one of the leading experts on intelligence & espionage history, R.B. Spence [(14)].

He begins to write as follows: "As this article will detail, the charge that Louis Fraina was an American Government agent was undoubtedly false. But that did not rule out him being someone else's." With Nosovitsky, who was not only an agent of the Department of Justice but also an agent of Scotland Yard, as a guide, Fraina went over to Europe and stayed in London for more than one month, before attending the "Conference of the 3d International." Then Nosovitsky "claims to have spent $2800 of Scotland Yard's money in a calculated effort to undermine Fraina's 'communistic morale' via a steady regime of fancy restaurants and luxurious hotel suites. He even boasted of convincing the reluctant Red to buy a custom-made tuxedo!"

In final analysis, however, Spence cannot provide conclusive evidence that Fraina was a secret agent of the English government. This article rather persuades me that Fraina's luxurious experience, whose concrete examples were shown by Spence, would have surely given one of the causes of his breaking away from the communist movement.

This temporary experience seems to have exerted deep influence on him in less than a year when Fraina came back to Berlin from Moscow in order to start work for the Agency. Taking up his above-mentioned expenses ($6,800), I would like to see that with **P-Doc. 10-7** clue to go on.

First of all, Fraina's two long stays are highly noticeable. One is a stay of 90 days in Berlin on his way to New York from the middle of October 1920 through the middle of January 1920 (expenses of £125). The other is a stay of 66 days in Berlin from 1 April through 5 June 1921 (expenses of $237.50) after his staying in New York only for two weeks and leaving there for Berlin in order to get ample funds. In this case Katayama asserted as follows: "Comrade Fraina did not 'Loafing all the time in Germany,' as Comrade Scott wrote you. He is not a business man; other comrades are not. To handle that amount money took him a considerable time and he wrote some articles to the Comintern and made a proposal to the Agency on the establishment of a daily paper, printing house, books and pamphlets. The proposal the Agency voted to start but Comrade Scott did not carry them out" (**P-Doc. 9-1**). In spite of Katayama's assertion, Esther, who had served as translator and typist of Fraina staying in Moscow for attending at the Second Congress of the Comintern and gotten married with him, came to Berlin and they enjoyed their newly-married life. During his second stay in Berlin he also lived with her who had not gone to New York with him. That must have exerted a considerable influence on his long stay. Fraina also stayed at the expensive hotels in particular in Montreal on 6-9 February 1921 before arriving in New York and 25 February-14 March (18 days) after leaving there. The former expenses of hotel was $70 only for four days and the latter ones of hotel and meal were $119 and $68, respectively. For all that he got a salary of 45 a week, he continued to include the money for his meal in necessary expenses on and after that time.

From the above, I must say that all the expenses of $6,800 was not appropriate. Although Fraina criticized Mr. and Mrs. Allen's wasting money, that criticism would come back on Fraina to some extent.

To return, with full knowledge that the suspicion against Fraina must be brought to light, I would like to ask a question: Why did the ECCI lend its ears to Scott's side of the story from beginning to end and lay aside the question of suspicion about Scott's dubious accounting? [(15)]

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(14) R.B. Spence, "Catching Louis Fraina: Loyal Communist, US Government Information or British Agent?," *American Communist History*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2012, 81-99.

(15) The following would be an answer to that question: There was a striking contrast in the way in which the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the WES were treated by the ECCI. That is, the WES was treated in a still more sympathetic way and its embezzling the funds for Sub-Bureau's activities

Finally I examine Scott's expenditure which would give some grounds for my raising the question.

Katayama and Scott started the work of the Agency without unification of accounting. Total expenses of January and February 1921 was $14,257.73, out of which $13,525.94 was recorded in the March report and $731.79 in Personal accounts respectively. Scott took charge of the American Bureau which the Agency had established separately to take up a task for trade unions. Harper who was appointed treasurer of its Bureau told Scott and Katayama "that he [Harper] will hold up the funds (he kept almost all the funds in his hands) and shall not surrender a penny without signing a receipt by three members ― Scott, Fraina and Yavki (myself). ..... To Harper's claim and action Scott acquiesced./ ..... With Fraina's written proposals and my approval I persuaded Scott to see as we two thought right and after some difficulties we got hold of the funds held by Harper" (**P-Doc. 9-1**). So the March report is supposed to be made out by Scott and Harper.

Out of the expenses of the March report (**P-Doc. 2-2**) the greatest one was $5,000 for sending 6 delegates to the First Congress of the Profintern and salaries to their wives. There were also other sending expenses: $3,500 for Yavki to Mexico, $1,500 for Allen to Argentina and $500 for Atwood to Canada.

Second to sending expenses, the highest ones were the financial aid to comrades in prison: $500 to [Harry M.] Winitsky, $150 to Big B[ill]. [Haywood], $100 to Ella R. Bl[oor] and $200 to [Thomas J.] Mooney Defense [Committee], in total $950.

Scott's wages followed: there were [a weekly wage of] $45 on the first sheet and 5 weeks of $200, Extra exp. of $50 and "Forwarded to go home" of $500 on the second sheet. Even though Katayama's weekly wages were the same amount, why did Scott get the special outlay of $550?

In his letter to Zinoviev dated 15 October 1921 (**P-Doc. 8-1**), Scott reported positive results of his activities up to that time as follows: "The work in the trade-unions given by Com. [M.P.] Tomsky was too much for the agency, for this field is terribly complicated and conflicting. ...../ Despite all these unfavourable conditions I [Scott] succeeded in carrying out the following work of organization. ..... I succeeded in organizing an agitational centre among the trade-unions showing out our views. I published three of [A.] Lozovsky's pamphlets in 100,000 copies, and about a million copies of our appeal on the attitude towards the trade-unions; organized the publication of a trade-union weekly (The Voice of Labour [*sic*]); sent a union delegation to Moscow to the Red Labour Union Congress./ In sphere of politics I succeeded [1] in uniting the two C.P-s of America; [2] in taking the initiative and effecting a split in the Socialist Party of M. Hillquit; [3] in organizing an illegal C.P. in Canada; [4] in starting the publication of a legal weekly paper [*The Workers' World*] in Canada; [5] in preparing the ground for the legal release of five imprisoned communists in the U.S."

According to the report, the expenses for the work in trade unions were supposed to be great, but we cannot confirm the amount of expenses for want of financial accounts. Judging from the following expressions: "I [Katayama] got the first number of the Voice of Labor 10 copies but since I don't get any" [(16)] and "The Voice of Labor does not satisfy me [Scott]" [(17)], it seems to be rather difficult to say that "I succeeded in organizing an agitational centre among the trade-unions." As for [3] and [4], as mentioned above, Scott's contribution was recognized

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was passed over, because the ECCI regarded the WES as loyal follower of its policy at that time (cf. Chapter 4-3). So the plausible reason why Scott was treated in a more sympathetic way than Fraina would be the same.

(16) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/62.

(17) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/140.

significantly. The amount of expenses, however, was not so great. As for [1] and [2] which were more important, was really his contribution significant? Especially [1] would have been very difficult without closer cooperation of two American communist parties. Considering the CPA's stance which was on the opposite side of Scott's pro-CLPA/UCPA one, it should be still treated with utmost caution to ascertain his contribution.

As far as I read through almost all documents on the Pan-American Agency held in the RGASPI, I found that loans to American communist parties were a marked characteristic of Scott's expenses, which was not clearly indicated in the March report. Scott's letter to Yavki dated 16 September 1921 reads as follows: "In view of the fact, that the Main Office did not granted any assistance for the time being,— the Comp.-here [CPA unified in May 1921 of UCPA and CPA], the Comp.-North [CPC] and I [Scott], we are all broke. I am broke because I have loaned to the Comp.-here $2,000 long time ago. Besides that, the Comp.-here through me have made loan from Messrs. Mendel- & Bross.[*sic*] $6,000." It would be hard, however, to consider that "Messrs. Mendel- & Bross." have no relation to Scott's intermediary, Mendels. There is also a phrase, "through me [Scott]." Therefore it is possible that Scott practically loaned the "Comp.-here" $8,000 in total. "Furthermore, the Comp.-[here] have made several loans from Various concerns in total $25,000. All I [Scott] got back so far as is $500. The balance — $1,500 the Comp.-[here] is not in position to repay at the present moment. Therefore please send me $1,000 immediately" (**P-Doc. 5-4a**).

Part of the loans was made by Scott before Katayama's departure for Mexico City. According to Katayama's "Note," Scott and Harper advanced $500 to the CEC of the UCPA for "defense." Katayama criticized them for that advance as follows: "It is outrageous to have advanced the U. C. P. money. What becomes of our impartiality? It is beyond the imagination of Scott and Harper to realize the use the C. P. will make of this advance when the news leaks out-- as it will leak out? Limit our work but finance the U. C. P.-- that is no policy for the Agency" (**P-Doc. 2-2**).

It was not only the problem with impartiality, but also the financially aiding to comrades in prison itself ([5]) was questionable, that is, "sidetracking from the work of the Agency" (**P-Doc. 5-4**). Because Katayama had the following criticism against them: "Here again Scott and Harper show no real understanding of the Agency business. The main office considers all the Negro affairs as fundamental" (**P-Doc. 2-2**). Therefore I cannot take Scott's evaluation of [5] at face value.

Even if the amount of loans made by Scott was not $8,000 but $2,000, considering that about 25,000 limited to the USA was at his disposal, it is hardly understandable that he requested a remittance of $1,000 on the excuse that he found himself in a difficult position due to an unrepaid loan of $1,500. Because he expended a great deal of funds in various fields of activity and he was supposed to regard loans themselves as entirely justifiable. In addition, before requesting a remittance, Scott should have prepared the breakdown of total expenses paid by himself.

There was the following question, too. Scott cabled Katayama on April 18, 1921: "Received fifteen barrels of magnesium from Lillebit (Fraina) company. How much you require." Katayama replied: "Ship me five barrels through company so and so." On 6 May 1921 Scott sent Katayama a cable: "Hamburger sent three barrels acknowledge receipt" (**P-Doc. 9-1**). As Katayama received $3,000 in June, one barrel meant $1,000. As Fraina remitted $10,000 to Mendels and $10,000 to Hamburger, respectively, did Scott receive not 15 barrels but 20 barrels? What did Scott do with 5 barrels ($5,000)? As Katayama received not 5 barrels but 3 barrels, did Scott misappropriate 7 barrels ($7,000), including 2 barrels ($2,000)?

In conclusion, I take up the unsolved case. On 24 September 1921 Katayama wrote to Zinoviev as follows: "You appropriated us fifteen thousands while the Red International also fifteen [thousands] which Comrade Scott brought with him" (**P-Doc. 1-11**). If that description were true, the predecessor of the Profintern would be a supplying source of half of the initial funds for activities of $30,000. But that supposition would be unreasonable, judging from the

above-mentioned decision of the Small Bureau of the ECCI dated 12 October 1920. Rather $15,000 might be initially estimated to pay the expenses for the work in trade unions. There is also no evidence that Scott brought considerable funds with him from Berlin to New York. According to Bray's letter to Kelley (Katayama) dated 22 July 1921 (**P-Doc. 5-2**), however, there is an instance that funds were carried secretly from Moscow into the USA: "I [Bray] have had long conference with G[eorge]. Hardy, who is now also memeber of the Pan-American Council of the Red Labor Union International appointed by the Main Office. ...../ G.H. have got five thousand dollars from Main Office for to create and to develop our business point of view within I.W.W." (underlined parts are deciphered). Scott's letter to Zinoviev might supply a clue for solving the question: "[5] in preparing the ground for the legal release of five imprisoned communists in the U.S., which, however, was held up due to the fact that you had not replied to any of my three telegrams *about the 25,000 dollars promised by you*" (**P-Doc. 8-1** [my *italics*]). In short, Scott might have had another route to get funds, whose matter I cannot approach under the present conditions.

Did Scott expend the funds for activities efficiently? The breakdown of total expenses which Scott paid is not still made clear under the existing circumstances. But then we would not be able to accept at face value the results of his activities especially in the USA for which he praised himself. We would have to gather extensively the related materials on the side of American communist parties as well, even if it would offer further difficulties to us.

List of Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern

1 S. Katayama (and L.C. Fraina) in Mexico City to the ECCI/Comrades in Moscow

P-Doc. 1-1 10.03.1921 [Yavki = Sen Katayama] (New York) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/70-73; 495/18/65/74-76]

P-Doc. 1-2 22.04.1921 [Katayama] (Mexico City) to M. Kobezky [of the Small Bureau of the ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/14-16; 521/1/17/2-4]

P-Doc. 1-3 22.04.1921 Sen Katayama (Mexico City) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/11; 495/18/65/134]

P-Doc. 1-4 25.04.1921 Sen Katayama (Mexico City) to Comrades, the Third International (Moscow)
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/20-21; 495/18/65/150-151]

P-Doc. 1-5 26.05.1921 Yavki (Mexico City) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/25; 521/1/17/15]

P-Doc. 1-6 26.05.1921 & 05.06.1921 [Katayama] (Mexico City) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/29-34; 495/18/65/190-195; cf. 521/1/17/15]

P-Doc. 1-7 11.06.1921 [Katayama] (Mexico City) to Comrade [in Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/14]

P-Doc. 1-8 01.08.1921 [Katayama] (Mexico, D.F.) to N. Bukharin
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/61]

P-Doc. 1-9 24.08.1921 [Katayama] (Mexico, D.F.) to E.C. of Communist International
[РГАСПИ, 521/1/17/96-101]

P-Doc. 1-10 05.09.1921 Report of American Agency. Kata[yama]/Fra[ina]/American Agency, C.I. to the Small Bureau of the Executive Committee
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/36-41; 495/18/66/98-103; 495/108/10/24-29]

P-Doc. 1-11 24.09.1921 [Katayama] (Mexico, D.F.) to G. Zinoviev
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/11/122-124]

P-Doc. 1-12 28.09.1921 Kata[yama]/Fra[ina] to the Small Bureau, Comintern
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/42-46; 495/18/66/327-331]

P-Doc. 1-13 10.10.1921 Kata[yama]/Fra[ina]/American Agency to the Small Bureau, Comintern
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/47-50; 495/18/66/156-159; 495/18/66/237-240]

P-Doc. 1-14 08.12.1921 L.C. Fraina to the Small Bureau [of ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/22/11-11a]

P-Doc. 1-15 02.01.1922 Louis C. Fraina to the Small Bureau [of ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/22/1-4; 495/18/66/241-244]

2 Pan-American Agency in New York

P-Doc. 2-1 01.03.1921 Meeting of Council
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/39; 495/18/65/40]

P-Doc. 2-2 05.03.1921 Decisions of the Agency
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/41-44; 495/18/65/62-65]

P-Doc. 2-3 09.03.1921 A Memorandum Prepared in Conjunction with Comrade Allen [Cohen]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/57-58; 495/18/65/54-56]

P-Doc. 2-4 04.04.1921 American Agency of the Communist International, by Charles E. Scott to the Communist Party and the United Communist Party
[*The Communist* (Official Organ of the United Communist Party), No. 16, April 1921; Reprinted from: Records of FBI, RG 65, 202600-1644-1]

3 Pan-American Agency in Mexico City

P-Doc. 3-1 01.04.-12.04.1921 Minutes of Conversations between Yavki and Tanner [Charles F. Phillips]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/108-109]

P-Doc. 3-2 [14.05.1921] Six Weeks' Work of the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/337-338]

P-Doc. 3-3 19.09.1921 [Katayama] to the Organization Committee of the Mexican Communist Party
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/119-120]

4 S. Katayama in Mexico City to S.J. Rutgers

P-Doc. 4-1 12.04.(-10.05.)1921 [Katayama] (Mexico City) to [S.J.] R[utgers]. [in care of Bartha Rutgers]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/5-10; 495/18/65/100-105]

P-Doc. 4-2 28.04.1921 Sen Katayama (Yavki) (Mexico City) to R[utgers].
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/22-23]

P-Doc. 4-3 05.07.1921 S[en]. K[atayama]. (Yavki) (Mexico, D.F.) to R[utgers].
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/26-28]

5 S. Katayama in Mexico City to/from Ch.E. Scott (K. Jansons) in New York

P-Doc. 5-1 19.04.1921 Charlie [Charles E. Scott] to Chairman of the American Agency of the CI
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/126-128]

P-Doc. 5-2 22.07.1921 A. Bray [Scott] (New-York) to Kelley [Katayama]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/49-51]

P-Doc. 5-3 21.08.1921 A. Bray to Y[avki] & Co[mpany]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/87]

P-Doc. 5-4 16.09.1921 [Katayama] to Bray
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/116]

P-Doc. 5-4a 16.09.1921 A. Bray to Y[avki] & Co[mpany]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/121]

P-Doc. 5-5 28.09.1921 Y.C. [Yavki & Carter]— A.A. to Bray
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/130]

P-Doc. 5-6 08.10.1921 [Yavki] to A. Bray
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/165-167]

6 The Pan-American Agency in South America

P-Doc. 6-1 12/15.10.1921 The Situation in South-America. Report of HENRY ALLEN, South-American Representative of the Pan-Americ. Agency of Comintern
[РГАСПИ, 495/79/2/5-11; 495/18/66/324-326); cf. *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка. Сборник документов* (Москва, 1998), 31-35]

7 The Pan-American Agency in Canada

P-Doc. 7-1 19.02.1921 Thompson[/]Scott to the C.E.C. of the C.P. and U.C.P.
[Records of FBI, RG 65, BS202600-1775-291]

P-Doc. 7-2 04.04.1921 Minutes of Meeting of the Provisional Executive, held in Toronto
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/89]

P-Doc. 7-3 18.04.1921 Minutes of meeting held by comrades Scott, Atwood and Marks
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/117-118; 495/98/1/1-2]

P-Doc. 7-4 18.04.1921 Report of Organizer Atwood
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/119-124; 495/98/1/4-9]

P-Doc. 7-4a 13.07.1921 Minutes of meeting July 13, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/98/4/19]

P-Doc. 7-5 15.07.1921 The Application of the Communist Party of Canada for Affiliation with the Communist International
[РГАСПИ, 495/98/4/59-62; 495/18/66/231-233; 495/18/66/36]

P-Doc. 7-6 26.09.1921 To the Executive Committee of the Communist International
[РГАСПИ, 495/98/4/70-77]

8 Ch.E. Scott (K. Jansons) to G.E. Zinoviev

P-Doc. 8-1 15.10.1921 Scott (New York) to Com. Zinoviev, President of the Comintern
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/171-181; 495/18/66/307-311; 495/18/66/245-246]

9 S. Katayama in Moscow to Small Bureau of the ECCI

P-Doc. 9-1 10.01.1922 Sen Katayama (Moscow) to the Members of Small Bureau [of the ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 5/3/145/2-5; 495/18/66/211-214]

10 Financial Accounts of the Pan-American Agency

P-Doc. 10-1 n.d. [before 05.08.1921] My Personal Accounts for Jan., Feb. and March, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/12; 495/18/65/81; 495/18/65/80; 495/18/65/79]

P-Doc. 10-2 n.d. [after the end of 06.1921] Financial Accounts, April, May and June, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/30-32]

P-Doc. 10-3 n.d. [after the end of 09.1921] Financial Statements for July, August and September, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/134-135]

P-Doc. 10-4 07.10.1921 General Financial Statements. From April 1 to September 30, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/160]

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[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/52]

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[РГАСПИ, 495/108/22/15]

P-Doc. 10-7 n.d. [after 11.08.1921] Accounts by T[hompson]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/71-73]

P-Doc. 10-8 n.d. [after 15.09.1921] Financial Statement of Henry Allen
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/322]

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[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/323]

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