

Front in the catalonian. The struggle of the "false" Leninists and their social-democratic allies against the P.O.U.M. has compelled the latter to draw closer to the anarcho-syndicalist movement than can commonly be expected of Leninists. This friendliness is, of course, truly Leninist and in practice extremely childish, carried on with the idea of bringing the anarcho-syndicalist movement under the influence of the P.O.U.M. Thus Juan Andrade writes in the September number of Plebs: "In Catalonia, which has always been a stronghold of anarchism, it begins to lose influence to the Marxist parties and especially to the P.O.U.M. The revolution can be victorious only if the Marxist parties are able to assimilate the numerous anarchist workers. This is the key to the future for Spain." The fact that the P.O.U.M. still speaks of other "Marxist" organizations is a sufficient indication that it still today regards the S.P. and C.P. as revolutionary movements to which it feels more closely bound than to the anarcho-syndicalist workers. This is equivalent to saying that the P.O.U.M. also is rather to be set down in the camp of the bourgeois-democratic (or state-capitalist) elements than to be embraced among the workers struggling for socialism, however hazy may be their programs. It is true that the P.O.U.M. takes a position against the coalition policy of the popular-front parties; but it will not take a position against a spanish state capitalism after the russian model, just as it also still today understands by the dictatorship of the proletariat only that of the bolshevist party.

Over against these "marxist" organizations, which have nothing more in common with Marxism than the name, stands the anarcho-syndicalist movement, which, even though it has not the organizational strength of the popular-front parties, can nevertheless be rated as their worthy adversary, capable of bringing into question the aspirations of the pseudo-marxist state capitalists.

Spanish anarchism has a long history. The labor organizations which were formed in 1869 and influenced by Bakunin soon won great influence both in the industrially more developed parts of the peninsula, mainly in Catalonia, as well as in the most backward parts among the farm workers of Andalusia. The socialist organizations arising later were never in a position to break the influence of the earlier anarchist movement. Later on, the anarchist organizations absorbed the ideas of the french syndicalists, and with the growing industrialization of Spain, which gave added importance to the struggle for day-to-day demands, the anarcho-syndicalist movement in Spain grew

very rapidly. In 1911 the syndicalists organized the Confederacion Nacional de Trabajo (C.N.T.), which first loosely combined the various trade unions and then the more recently formed industrial unions, the sindicatos unicos.

In 1914 the C.N.T. had 25,000 members; only four years later, 500,000; in 1923, a million; and in 1931, approximately 1,500,000. Though the C.N.T. is under the influence of the anarchists, it nevertheless accepts all workers without regard to their ideological position. Thru the influence of the russian revolution, the anarchists lost temporarily, in 1919, the control over the C.N.T. which even decided to become a member of the Third International and to come out for the dictatorship of the proletariat in the russian sense. This led to embittered inner struggles, and finally the influence of the anarchists in the C.N.T. was again asserted. In the years of Primo de Riviera's dictatorship --which, of course, did not strike the socialists so that they were enabled to grow at the expense of the anarchists--there arose the anarchist illegal organizations which in 1931, under the name of the Federacion Anarquista Iberica (F.A.I.) with a membership of about 10,000, obtained control over the C.N.T. In the fruitless uprisings of the years 1931-33 the anarchists sought to win the power in Spain. These rebellions, which were poorly organized and not very clear as to their aims, led to splits. A part of the unions left the C.N.T. and organized the "Libertarian Syndicalist Federation" which has a membership of about 40,000. In 1934 Angel Pestana began the formation of the Syndicalist Party, whose program is in large part copied from that of the parliamentary socialist labor movement.

Thru the defeats of the anarchists in the attempts at uprising and thru the resulting splits in the movement, as also by reason of the persecutions at the hands of the reaction as well as of liberalism and the reformist labor organizations connected with this latter, the anarchists lost further influence and their membership dwindled. Today the C.N.T. has a membership of about 600,000. During the October uprising (1934), the catalonian anarchists sabotaged the revolutionary movement. In Asturias, however, they fought together with the revolutionary workers, and in splendid manner. The attitude of the catalonian anarchists in October 1934, however much to be condemned, is explained by the fact that the "leftist" government of Catalonia had forced the C.N.T. to go underground, that it brutally persecuted the anarchists, that even upon the outbreak of the uprising which was supported by the catalonian government, it still failed to give up the struggle against the anarcho-syndicalists. The hatred which

this "leftist" government and its following had aroused in the ranks of the anarchists furnished occasion for these latter to sabotage the uprising and so to share in the blame for the October defeat.

After the setting up of the popular-front government--which of course had the partial support of the anarchists who participated in the elections for the sake of freeing the 30,000 political prisoners--it was left for the C.N.T. alone to carry on the struggle of the workers for the improvement of their position in life, since the coalition policy of the C.P. and S.P. made it impossible for these organizations to compromise, by way of workers' demonstrations, the situation of the coalition partners. In May 1936 the C.N.T. addressed the U.G.T. with a proposal for the forming of "revolutionary alliances", but continued to refuse all cooperation with the political labor parties. It soon found itself, by reason of its continuance of the struggle against the exploiters, in bitter opposition to the Popular Front. The hatred of the popular-front parties for the anarchists was recently still expressed after nearly a month of struggle against Fascism, in an interview with Deputy Juan Hernandez, editor of the communist-party Mundo-Obrero, as follows: "As for the anarchists, who prefer the rear guard to the line of fire, you must not attach too much importance to them. Their intentions are not clear, but the spanish people thru its official organisms will fix them. We do not want to know anything about those libertarian communists. They will be attended to the day after victory. Right now it is impossible to do anything against elements fighting at our side."

Owing to the tardiness of the capitalist development in Spain, the predominance of small enterprises, the provincialism, and also to the prominence of the question of nationalities and the great cleft between the more developed parts of the peninsula and the rest of the country, the federal-autonomistic character of the spanish anarcho-syndicalist movement has been promoted and preserved. The centralism of the Social Democracy of both tendencies means at the same time, in Spain, centralistic control by way of Madrid, and was accordingly never able to find much response among the national minorities of Spain to whom Madrid is in poor repute. This is especially so in the stronghold of anarchism, in Catalonia. Isolated local manifestations were not only the product of a self-restricting philosophy, but the only form of action which for a long while has been practically possible. The thing that in more highly developed countries would be a weakness of the movement was here in part a source of strength. The state of disorganization of the ruling class did

not require the central control and direction of the workers' manifestations in such measure as is necessary in the capitalistically developed countries. The localizing of the workers manifestations was rather an inevitable product of the circumstance that only industrial oases existed in the feudal desert. At any rate, it was the spanish relations themselves, not the anarchist philosophy, which forms the secret of the development and preservation of the federal-syndicalist fighting methods and organizations. In the course of the further industrializing of Spain, this syndicalist movement likewise will be obliged, regardless of its previous attitude, to take up with more coordinated and centralized forms of organization, if it is not to go under. Or, possibly, the centralistic control and coordination of all political and economic activity will be imposed overnight by a successful revolution; and in these circumstances the federalistic traditions would be of enormous value, since they would form the necessary counter-weight against the dangers of centralism. Not least important, the C.N.T. has hitherto been able to preserve its special character by reason of the social-reformist and anti-revolutionary attitude of the pseudo-marxist parties. In contrast to these organizations, the discipline in the C.N.T. is not a compulsory but a voluntary one, even though the conditions preclude from time to time the strict adherence to this principle. Anchored in this organization is the conception, however often it may have been violated, that the revolution can be made only from below, thru the spontaneous action and the self-initiative of the workers. Parliamentarism and labor-leader economy is looked upon as labor fakery, and state capitalism is set on the same plane with any other kind of exploitation society. In the course of the present civil war, anarcho-syndicalism has been the most forward-driving revolutionary element, endeavoring to convert the revolutionary phrase into reality.

The organizational and ideological fragmentation of the spanish proletariat, although a result of the previous development, beclouds the immediate future of Spain. It has weakened the striking power of the workers, and points rather -- even from a purely national standpoint, without regard to the complications involved in the international field -- to the hopelessness than to the success of a real revolution by which the workers would be liberated.

IV

The proletarian revolution is necessarily international. It will have to begin in one country, but will be obliged to expire again unless it is propagated over a num-

ber of countries and develops forces capable of successfully withstanding a decisive struggle with international capital. Even a revolution which goes no farther than state capitalism can maintain itself nationally against the private-economy countries only in specially favorable circumstances. So long as the russian revolution, for example, failed to reveal clearly in which direction it was marching, the capitalist intervention tried to give it the bum's rush. It was not until the establishment of a strong government and the unequivocal course to state capitalism that the international bourgeoisie became reconciled to the new russian conditions. That is to say that in addition to the war weariness in the capitalist countries and the rivalries between the imperialist powers, the compromise between world capital and russian state capitalism was based on the consideration that the state capitalism signifies no direct revolutionary danger to the other countries, since bargains could be made even with such a Russia .

As regards present-day Spain, however, the situation is different. The broad masses of the capitalist countries play, for the present, no role in its decisions; they are sufficiently prepared for a new world slaughter, and their oppositional possibilities are stifled. With or without Spain, the imperialist powers are arming for a new war; and even though individual nations may be interested in the further postponement of the war, still this new world-slaughter can break out at any time. Open capitalist intervention in Spain would at once conflict with the imperialist rivalries, insofar as they relate to the spanish territory, to Morocco and to the mediterranean interests. Unless it were carried through jointly by all the nations, it would issue directly in the new world war. The fronts of the imperialist groups of powers are, however, not yet clearly established. Particularly in Asia, with regard to China and a possible change in the asiatic policy of England, alterations of the situation are still possible which make a postponement of the world war an asset for Russia and France. The franco-russian war block, as well as England, is not interested in the immediate outbreak of the war; they are waiting for more favorable circumstances and have need of still further arming and coordinating. The prevention of open intervention and the postponement of the otherwise seemingly imminent war was served by the non-intervention proposal of France with reference to the spanish civil war, a proposal which was also accepted by the imperialist rivals. The real meaning of the neutrality pact consists in breaking the back of the spanish revolution without, for the present, becoming involved in a new war.

The imperialist interests of England are closely bound

up with all the proceedings in Spain. Gibraltar is not sufficient to protect adequately the ocean route to India; this ocean route might be endangered from Ceuta and the Balearic Islands. It is for this reason that with the beginning of the tension between Italy and England there began also the english fortification of those islands. If Spain should incline to Italy, England would have received the second slap in the face at the hands of Italy since the beginning of the abyssinian conflict. The possibility that a spanish fascism would go along with Mussolini, a question with which Italy is obviously concerned, cannot be tolerated by England. That the discord between the english and italian interests is by no means laid aside becomes clear from the acceptance of Abyssinia into the League of Nations, as also from the english troop transports to Palestine. On the other hand, however, England has likewise no interest in a Spain subscribing to the franco-russian front, for the english interests in Asia still coincide with those of Japan, even though this union already begins to relax. Any support of Russia and France would be directed against Japan and Germany, and is not yet in conformity with the interests of England. The greater an empire, the greater the complications and difficulties, but the more cautious also the policy. And by the side of all the difficulties already mentioned, there also looms in the background the danger represented by America. And so the english interest in Spain is restricted to helping in bringing forth a policy there which is subordinated neither to Rome nor to Moscow. Hence the necessity of preventing open intervention on the part of the fascist powers, and at the same time strangling the revolution which might be put to use for franco-russian purposes. The french neutrality pact was agreeable to english policy, or at any rate left England with time and leisure for later decisions. To be sure, probably no one believed that german and italian fascism, even upon acceptance of the neutrality pact, would discontinue arming the spanish fascists, or that the italian and german imperialist interests in Spain and Morocco would be laid to sleep, but at any rate the neutrality pact was able to serve in postponing war in Europe. No doubt this postponement was accomplished at the expense of France and England; still, in politics also, the old saying holds true: Who laughs last, laughs best! The advantages won by Italy and Germany could also be looked upon as a sort of compensation for the slaughtering services rendered against the spanish revolution. Capitalist intervention had occurred without having occasioned war. The french neutrality pact, accepted by the democratic powers unreservedly, by the fascist ones with various reserves, was the licence delivered to Fascism for striking down the spanish revolution with-

out danger. This situation was regarded also by Russia, who accepted the neutrality pact, as the lesser evil with respect to a present war.

Even though the imperialist powers decided to accept the non-intervention proposal, still its carrying out is another matter. The situation is still capable of changing. A too far-going aggression on the part of Italy or Germany, speculating on the momentary unwillingness for war, an overstepping of the activities in Spain which have been tacitly assured them, can also cause those powers which are not yet willing to make war, to make a sudden reversal of their policy and thus, after all, still bring this war about.

If the spanish fascists should not succeed within a reasonable time in establishing "law and order", the open capitalist intervention may still come about. If the workers' revolution should become consolidated, and if it should strike down fascism as well as the Popular Front, there would still be the possibility that all the capitalist nations, or a special one at the order of all the others, would strike down the revolution while avoiding war between the imperialist rivals. It is also not absolutely precluded that the intervening powers would undertake a partition of Spain in accordance with the various imperialist spheres of interest, in which connection Catalonia as an "independent" power would possibly be placed under the protective rule of England and France, and the rest of the country would be left to the fascist states. It is even possible that a spanish fascism by which the country would be held together would subscribe, in spite of the german-italian support, to the interests of France and England. In short, the constellation of powers for the new war still admits of a great number of alterations by which Spain also is affected, and which may go so far as the apparently absurd combination of Germany and France, so that any speculation as to the immediate future in this respect seems out of order.

One thing, however, is clear: the international bourgeoisie shows by its actions to date with respect to Spain that it would not in any case leave the victory there to a workers' revolution. There is nothing strange about that. Anyone who imagines that international capital would tolerate a workers' revolution is ready for the madhouse. International capital has no illusions regarding the spanish situation. It knows that it is nonsense to speak of the "completion" of the bourgeois revolution, in which all the liberal-democratic powers thruout the world are said to be interested. What such a "completion" of the "bourgeois

revolution" means in the most favorable case the russian revolution has sufficiently served to make clear. The nonsense of the struggle for "bourgeois democracy" is manifest today, when one after the other of the bourgeois democracies goes fascist. The socialist-liberal-communist watchwords in Spain are hokum. It is not a question there of democracy; even this "democracy" is fighting only to decide the question as to which particular social group is to exercise the dictatorship over the workers and the control over the other social groups. The exploitation societies of today are compelled to the greatest centralization and concentration of all economic and political power, if they want to assert themselves in the imperialist hurly-burly or even so much as to maintain order at home within the framework of the present economic conditions of the world. Like any other "democracy", the spanish also would forthwith, or at least soon, be governing with fascist methods. Even where monopoly capital is weak, there is still no assurance for democracy; monopolization must, in that case, be artificially accelerated by the government in order that the exploitation society may be kept intact. It is only the workers who are still in a position to bring about a democratic state of affairs, though only within the framework of the communist economy. Neither Liberalism nor Fascism understands by the "completion of the bourgeois revolution" anything other than the concentration of all wealth and all power into the hands of fewer and fewer persons.

The bourgeoisie of the world has no illusions regarding the struggle in Spain. Thus the conservative London Times writes: "Should the revolt triumph, a fascist regime would be the result, against which rebellion would continue until drowned in blood. Should the sedition be suppressed, the Liberal Republic of 1931 must perish in the process. Two extremes are at each other's throats. One must succumb. There is no central force strong enough to separate them. . . . The die was cast. All thought of temporizing with the insurgents and the classes they represented was abandoned. . . . 'Committees of workers' have taken over the big railway companies. It seems only a question of time for this to happen to the trams, the banks and other key establishments. A decree promulgated by the Government to take control of all industries in the interests of the State looks like a forlorn attempt to forestall these occupations."

If the present socialist-communist popular-front government were still, after all, to succeed by means of the nationalization hokum in rescuing the bourgeois exploitation society, they will not be rescuing democracy, but

they themselves will have to take over, with the victory over Fascism, the fascist functions; they will then be obliged once more to fulfill the tasks of Noske-Socialism.

Even though a number of the powers may continue to prefer a "liberal" dictatorship to the fascist one, and accordingly hope that the tide may turn in favor of the Popular Front, still as soon as the dictatorship of the proletariat is actually exercised, to these countries also the fascist dictatorship will appear as a lesser evil. Nor on this point will the franco-russian interests constitute an exception. A communist Spain would mean the carrying of the civil war to France. The spanish communist revolution must press over the spanish boundaries or else it cannot live. Even though, as things now stand, it is almost out of the question that the french workers will take an active part in the present civil war on the side of the spanish workers, still attempts of this sort, occasioned by the fairly long existence of a proletarian dictatorship in Spain, may lead to domestic disorders in France which would enormously weaken the latter's military potentialities and very largely depreciate her value as an ally of Russia. A spanish fascism, on the contrary, can strengthen the national-military power of France by way of the demagogic utilization of the danger by which she would then be menaced from the west as well as the east.

This situation is already anticipated in the endeavors of the Communist Party of France to make of the french Popular Front the National Front; it also finds expression in the hypocritical demand for the violation of the neutrality pact, a demand which is evidence at the same time that the Communist International is convinced that Fascism in Spain has already won. Even though the Comintern has no objection to that, still this situation must be put to use for russian interests. Fascism in Spain, even if directed against France, and in spite of the eventual necessity of securing the french boundaries in the west as well as the east, is nevertheless a better guarantee for Russia and France than a communist Spain. Not only because the military forces of Spain are not very much of an asset to the adversaries of France and Russia, not only because England would thereby be driven more to the side of Russia and France, but quite as much so because the french unity would in this way be better secured, because the pact with Russia would seem less endangered. A spanish communism might, under certain circumstances, undermine the entire french Popular Front. It might carry the civil war to France, and, with a victory of the french fascists, mean a complete reorientation of french policy.

The financial and military aid received by spanish fascism at the hands of international capital is no secret. There is no doubt that the military successes of the fascists and the repulse of the workers is the direct result of the armament supplied by Germany and Italy. It is also clear that in view of the inner situation, the spanish fascists alone would not have been able to break the power of the government and of the workers and force them to take the defensive and probably to suffer defeat. While the openly fascist part of the capitalist nations made no secret of its sympathies for the spanish fascists, that part which has the design of leading the workers into the new world slaughter under the slogan "For Democracy and Against Fascism" is compelled, in order to hold the workers in leash, to weep bitter crocodile tears for Spain. The "communists" are even compelled to make a show of opposition to the neutrality pact in order to obviate the danger that the workers may see thru their treacherous game. This opposition is not calculated to violate the neutrality, but to secure its further existence. The unrest among the french workers was already too great; the Communist Party was compelled to make a gesture in favor of the spanish revolution. The collections of money and foodstuffs, the protests of scholars and literary men were not sufficient; a new wave of strikes in France seemed also to be about to take note of the spanish situation. In order to prevent deeds, it was necessary to make phrases; this critical situation was to be overcome with the aid of demagoguery. To be sure, it sank to the level of the peasant-catching stupidity of Moscow court proceedings, and there might be amusement if there were not at the same time so much that is sickening in observing the paid and unpaid communist Jesuits engaged in their endeavors to slobber themselves out of the fix into which the neutrality pact had gotten them.

At the time the non-intervention proposal was made by the Blum Government, the C.P. found not a word of criticism, but sought to make clear to the workers that the Blum policy was, after all, in harmony with the workers' interests. To take one of a great number of examples, the New York Daily Worker wrote, on August 20: "There is more than the question of the Blum government's assistance to a friendly government beset by Fascism. There is the question of a world war.... True, neither Mussolini nor Hitler needs any pretext for their bloodthirsty deeds. Yet, the Blum government has to gauge its tactics to a threefold perspective: First, there are the inner relations with the Radical Socialists. The french Fascists are manoeuvring with the extreme Right of the Radical Socialists to create a government crisis. In France there is the threat of

civil war at home...Second, British imperialism would be swung over to fascist Germany and Italy in the event of direct, open military aid to the Spanish government. Third, decisive aid might mean imminent world war. . . . The Communist Party of France has roundly criticized Blum. But it does not take the stand that (because of its non-intervention policy) an open, splitting attack should be made to wreck the Blum government." And this "criticism", which aimed at nothing, was preceded by a vote of confidence in the French Chamber for the Blum government and its neutrality policy, a vote in which the communist party block joined. It was not until later that the party adopted a somewhat different tone, or at least expressed itself in a different sort of phraseology. Thus on August 28th, the same Daily Worker wrote: "Such 'neutrality' means giving aid to the victory of fascism in Spain. It means help for the victory of Hitler and Mussolini. . . ." And the London Daily Worker of August 15th wrote: "The policy of neutrality is treason to democracy and peace, to the interests of the peoples of Spain, France and Britain, especially. . . It only helps the fascist murderers against the Spanish people." And still earlier, notwithstanding the later defense of Blum in the New York Daily Worker, we read in the Imprecor of August 8th: "A neutral policy of all democratic States . . . would be the policy most agreeable to the interests of Hitler and Mussolini."

Nevertheless--the Soviet Union, the Fatherland of All Workers, the bulwark of peace, the stronghold against Fascism, accepted the neutrality pact and thereby, in the words of its own organs, joined up with those States which are helping Hitler and Mussolini, betraying the interests of the people and endangering the peace. And not only that; they betray, also, the national interests of France, as witness the French C.P. in the Rundschau of August 6th: "The victory of this splendid Spanish people means the security of France in the Pyrenees and in North Africa; the assured effectualness of the defense in the east and also the security of England. France could not tolerate a triumph of the Spanish insurrectionists with aid from abroad. Against the betrayal! For France! For freedom and for peace! Frenchmen, let us unite! "

The Communist Party of France and the Russian wielders of power have not, as might appear from these quotations, gone crazy. They are merely playing a double game. They see two eventualities and want to be set for both. On the one hand, they support the neutrality pact in order to postpone the war; on the other, they want to assure themselves of the masses in case the war, nevertheless, breaks out. The special repulsiveness

of this Janus face is explained by the needs of Russian foreign policy.

The Social Democrats and trade-union leaders, who are under no obligation to Russia, had an easier time of it. That is, they merely declared themselves in sympathy with the (fatal for Spain) non-intervention policy of their bourgeoisies. Though of course in view of their trade-mark "labor movement", these worthy fellows saw themselves obligated to send bandaging materials and medical supplies for the dead Spanish revolutionists.

And thus world capitalism, inclusive of the Russian edition, endeavored to put an end to the Spanish revolution, in part thru intervention, and in part thru non-intervention. In this endeavor, these various capitalisms have had the full support of the old labor movement. Thus the entire world is directing itself against a few hundred thousand Spanish revolutionists, and these latter are thereby directing themselves against the entire world. An unequal struggle. . . . But the Spanish revolutionists have no choice; however unpromising their position, they have to continue flinging their dynamite against the world.

V

Upon the outbreak of the fascist uprising, the popular-front government forthwith lost its head. Prime Minister Quiroga, at the suggestion of Azana, resigned. Martinez Barrio was commissioned to form a new government. He made the proposal of entering into a compromise with the rebellious army, but it was turned down by Prieto and Caballero. The leaders of the labor movement realized that any compromise would mean nothing more than going over to fascism without a struggle, and thereby also to their end. They further knew that such a decision would have had no effect on the bloody settlement of the fascists with the workers. On July 19th, three governments were formed, one after the other, and the last combination decided in favor of arming the workers and creating the militia. This decision was, however, only the ratification of already accomplished facts. A large proportion of the workers had armed themselves without waiting for the government's decision. They besieged the barracks of the insurrectionist troops and by their self-initiative secured for the government the cities of Malaga, Barcelona, Madrid, Toledo, Bilbao and San Sebastian. Without this action on the part of the workers, the popular-front government would have been swept away forthwith, since in addition to the army a part of the police and of the Guardia Civil joined the fascists,

and even the loyal part was not very reliable.

With the consolidation of the anti-fascist forces, the popular-front government endeavored to take control of the streets out of the hands of the workers' militia in order not to endanger the security of capitalist society. Mass pressure, however, forced it to make new concessions to the workers, and the successful advances of the fascist troops, which went so far as the occupation of Irun and San Sebastian, led to a new shake-up in the government, which now brought in the socialists and communists. Premiership and war were now under Caballero, navy and aviation under Prieto, education under Hernandez. The rest of the posts were divided among other socialists and left republicans.

After almost two months of embittered civil war, this "radical" government still summed up its tasks and designs, as reported by the communist Mundo Obrero of September 5th, as follows: "The present government has the enthusiastic support of forces of the country ranging from the nationalistic Catholics to the comrades of the C.N.T. It is the government of the people's will. Around it are concentrated all the forces of democracy and of anti-fascism. It will attain victory because it will create a great popular army, unify the command and make rapid and appropriate use of all the armed elements of the people. It will bring into being comprehensive agrarian reform and will be of assistance to small ownership in industry and commerce, and to all production which serves the purposes of the nation. It will institute for the working people social insurance, maximum hours and minimum wages, relief of unemployment, illness and old age, and at the same time extend to the utmost limit the protection afforded to the labor of women and children. It is a government which will respect all religious convictions and the freedom of religion within the framework of the democratic republic in regard to all those who respect the popular will and the laws of the Republic. It will recognize the rights of the nations existing in Spain-Catalonia, the Basque Provinces and Galicia--and establish extensive democratic liberties for Morocco and the other colonies."

But the will of this government, by the side of a better agrarian reform and a social-insurance law a la Roosevelt and Leon Blum, "to be of assistance to small ownership in industry and commerce and to all production which serves the purposes of the nation," that is, the will of the government to protect capitalist property and to rescue bourgeois society, no longer meant very much, for this government had practically ceased to govern; the power was already in the hands of the armed workers. The government's "social" program, which had in

mind going "to the utmost limit", as to the exact location of which the government itself was to be the judge, has the appearance of a bad joke in view of the hundred thousand among the workers who died under machine-gun fire. Whether the government's will can still mean anything depends, as the New York Times of August 18th wrote, on whether "this army of ragged irregulars can be persuaded to surrender their arms." In view of this situation, and in spite of all the kind words of the government, such wavering petty-bourgeois elements as had not already taken the step went over into the camp of fascism. At the same time, the popular-front government played a double game. Even though it did not dare to proceed generally and openly against the armed formations of workers under their own leadership and which were slipping from its control--though in localities where the socialists and the Guardia Civil had the upper hand, attempts were made at disarming the anarcho-syndicalist workers--still the government's aversion to this militia greatly endangered the anti-fascist struggle. In fact, the government's apprehension of a real workers' rule went all the way to direct sabotage of the anti-fascist struggle. Catalonia, which is completely in the hands of the workers, proposed to proceed against the fascist-controlled Saragossa; it failed, however, to obtain the consent or support of the Madrid Government, since Saragossa has constantly been a center of anarchism, and the liberation of the revolutionary forces held captive there would have still further weakened the position of the Popular Front against the workers' revolution. The otherwise "strictly neutral" France was, in this connection, even ready, in accordance with the request of the Madrid Government, to transport the anarchist troops of Barcelona across France to Irun in the hope that the power of the catalonian workers' revolution would thereby be weakened.

In contrast to the popular-front government, the workers of the C.N.T. have comprehended that the struggle concerns other matters than the transfer of the Blum policy onto spanish conditions. After the outbreak of the uprising, an anarchist conference which was held to take a position on the revolutionary situation, summed the matter up somewhat as follows: "...The common enemy, incarnated in the seditious militarism, must be crushed first of all. The anarchists must therefore continue to form part of the anti-fascist Committees, while at the same time striving to influence them in order that the struggle may not lose its virile and radical character, and so as to prevent them from entering into political combinations for which the people would subsequently have to pay the expenses. In view of the bankruptcy of bourgeois

economy and democracy, the social problem requires new solutions. The workers' organizations, particularly the C.N.T. and the anarchist movement, must materialize a complete work of economic reconstruction, from the collectivization to the socialization of the land, of the mines and of industry. In brief, the Plenum declares that the revolutionary work is not a mere matter of the violent collision with the reactionary forces of the bourgeoisie, but must be extended to the whole of modern life."

And in another proclamation to the workers of the world, published in the information bulletin of the C.N.T. and F.A.I. of August 15, 1936, these organizations once more emphasize that "contrary to the contentions of the political party sections of the Spanish workers' movement, . . . it must be stated that the struggle depends, above all, on the heroism, the fighting spirit and the numerical strength of the anarchist workers of Spain. . . . We have desired to maintain the unity of the anti-fascist front above all, and we have confined ourselves to exerting our influence thruout the life of Catalonia by creating economic and shop councils for regulating the whole economic life of society, and which are the bases of the social organization of the future."

With the arming of the workers in Catalonia, the influence of the popular-front government in that region had declined to zero. The workers organized themselves in centuries, elected their own soldiers' councils, their own "officers". The government occasionally called upon the workers to surrender their arms, "since of course the factory workers have no need of being armed"; yet the C.N.T. and F.A.I. gave out the word to keep the arms under all circumstances, as being the only reliable security--they even went so far as to call upon the workers to shoot anyone forthwith who sought to disarm them.

The Spanish revolution receives from Barcelona its true character. If the miners of the Asturias succeed in getting out of the claws of the fascists, the revolution will roll on to Madrid and create in Spain a wholly different situation. Then the Spanish struggle will dispense with the last bourgeois phrases and come to light as a struggle between Capital and Labor.

Even though Prieto, as late as the middle of September, magnanimously proclaimed that "in these bloody weeks the masses have won the right to demand a new State organized for them", the masses will probably after all fail to understand the enticement of nothing more than a new government as the only result of their huge sac-

rifices. Even in Madrid, though hindered in large measure at the hands of the parliamentary labor parties, the revolution has made progress. Goods and real estate belonging to fascist elements and refugee capitalists were expropriated. To prevent the "wild" expropriations from spreading, the government was forced to convert private property into state property. Hotels and club houses were transformed into hospitals, workers' homes and schools. Property belonging to orders was confiscated; concessions made in relation to wages, working conditions and hours. Later a sort of workers' control was introduced into the enterprises. The government is obliged to make more and more concessions in order not to be swept away, but its previous procrastination shows with all clarity that it has to be overthrown if the workers' revolution is to proceed.

As late as September 18th, the Madrid Government rejects the proposals of the anarcho-syndicalists for the consolidation of the revolutionary front. The anarchist proposal to grant to the workers' committees the right to participate in the establishment and carrying out of all economico-political and military measures is rejected at the hands of the socialist-communist government which "under no circumstances tolerates such a duality of power." Rejected also are the proposals for the immediate socialization of the banks, railways and industry, and to proceed with the complete confiscation of church property. The demand that all public authority be conveyed to the workers' militia is turned down, and likewise the demand for bringing all workers into the militia for the decisive struggle against fascism. The workers are not to govern; the government continues to hope that it will become master of the situation without conferring too much power upon the workers, the enemies of tomorrow. The politicians in power are apprehensive of a gigantic workers' army, continue to busy themselves with patching together the remains of the old army to which they had managed to hold on, and to supplement it with the militia, preventing the combination from becoming anything more than the army of the government. The workers, however, have too long had the opportunity to feel on their own bodies the functions of the various government soldieries. They have no confidence in the government's soldiers. They refuse to be taken into the strictly military formations. Their motto is: Militiamen, yes; combatants, yes; soldiers, never!

On August 19th, Catalonia declared its complete independence of Madrid. This separation from the central government, altho in the line of the Leninist policy as to nationalities, and altho a revolutionary element in the one-sided sense that it weakened the position

of the popular-front government, is nevertheless of a petty-bourgeois and capitalistic nature. The propaganda with which it was accompanied, for a "union of independent spanish socialist republics", does not do away with the anti-revolutionary character of the demand for national independence. National problems behind which are concealed special interests of a material nature belong to exploitation society. The proletariat can make no concessions to nationalism without doing immense damage to its class interests.

Catalonia is the wealthiest of the spanish provinces and was accordingly always obliged to turn over in taxes to the Madrid government more than it received from Madrid in the way of concessions. It was obliged, that is, to make a contribution for the poorer provinces; a state of affairs from which it sought release. Later on, nationalism became the instrument of catalan industry for the purpose of extorting tariff concessions. The middle class is nationalistic because it wants to monopolize for itself the administrative and public offices. The parliamentary labor movement was unable to attack the nationalist ideology for fear of losing its influence among the workers, who likewise are under the sway of this ideology. The anarcho-syndicalist movement sought to make use of the separatist currents for revolutionary purposes. The splitting up of Spain has ever appeared to the anarchists merely as the shattering of the power of the central government; and since such separatism is not in direct contradiction to their federalistic philosophy, they saw in the furthering of it no hindrance to the materialization of their socialist ideas. Such a position on the subject is obviously nonsense and shows the unrealistic character of the anarcho-syndicalist movement as well as its naivete with respect to the laws of economic development. For the partition of Spain into small independent republics would render politically and economically impossible any attempt at socialization. A socialist Catalonia is impossible in a capitalist Spain. Socialism thruout the country, on the other hand, eliminates any basis for national independence, which would then form a needless economic impediment. An independent Catalonia under the present conditions means furthermore placing it under the protective rule of a strong imperialist power, whereby socialism there is obviously precluded. The cunning "Marxists" want to make use of the "national matter" for international purposes; which likewise is a practical impossibility, for the support of "national matters" is necessarily at the same time the prevention of the class struggle within the nation and thereby the strengthening of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements. National elements are counter-

revolutionary: that is a lesson which the spanish workers also will have to learn from experience, unless they turn their struggle against the bourgeoisie into a struggle also against the national nonsense.

The official, though at present powerless catalonian government of Companys and Casanovas is taking a quite passive attitude with respect to the workers by whom the power is exercised. This passivity is its rescue and preservation for later counter-revolutionary attacks. It is waiting for the first favorable opportunity to recover the lost power. After the suppression of the fascist uprising in Barcelona, the real power was taken over by the workers' militia, in which the anarchists are the determining factor. Of course, this militia can govern only so long as it is able to prevent the development of new centers of power. The acts of the Companys government have shown with all clarity that it regards the present state of affairs as only temporary, and in this hope it is confirmed by the attitude of the friendly powers. France and Russia continue to deal not with the workers, but with the discarded government. The struggle against fascism postpones the decisive struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat and allows both sides only half-way measures which not only hold up the progress of the revolution, but also the forming of the counter-revolutionary forces; and both these factors are at the same time prejudicial to the anti-fascist struggle. In order to remain "representative" in the altered situation, the government has taken pains to include representatives of labor. But the socialists and stalinists taken into the government were forced out by the anarcho-syndicalists. The governmental decrees, which in part were in conformity with the demands of the situation as well as those of the workers, were necessary in order to keep this reserve government from vanishing out of the picture. Its continued existence shows that, altho the workers represent the actual power, still they do not dare as yet to put it to full use.

It is true that the workers obtained for themselves the 40-hour week and a 15 percent wage increase, as well as the recognition of and extensive powers for the workers' councils in the enterprises; but still all this was for the present posited on the "cooperation of workers, enterprisers, trade unions and the government." Then the development passed on to "worker control" in the smaller enterprises and to the nationalization of the large ones. Four weeks after the suppression of the fascist uprising, the workers of Barcelona had taken over the railways, the municipal transport services (buses, trams, subway), the petroleum companies, the automobile industries, the steamship companies, the hospitals, the public services, (elec-

tricity, gas, water, etc.), the large stores, the building and contracting companies, the munition plants, the theaters and cinemas. Each enterprise is conducted by a workers' council which is responsible for production. As a transitional measure, these workers' councils are subordinated to a General Committee for the direction and control of all economic activity, which is made up of delegates of the various trade unions. A leveling up of wages is ordered. The salaries paid to directors in the concerns placed under control are to be reduced, and in the socialized enterprises the old boards of directors are to be completely suppressed. In preparation is the introduction of the 36-hour week, as well as publication of the financial situation of the concerns, together with a complete list of stock. Likewise, the setting up of a work program, particularly for the enterprises serving the military defense. To avoid international complications, foreign capital ownership has been left unmolested.

By the side of the production committee, another was formed to provide for subsistence. The rural syndicates of the C.N.T. and the collectives of the expropriated domains place foodstuffs at the disposal of the population. The C.N.T. syndicate for the workers in the foodstuffs branch has become the supply center of Barcelona. The distribution of the foodstuffs was in part effected by means of so-called bonds or tickets, whereby the bourgeoisie was automatically excluded. The circulation of money has, however, been maintained. In the further program of the revolution stands the design of going over to planned control of the economy in order to harmonize production and consumption. Also a state monopoly of foreign trade, nationalization of the banks and the complete collectivization of agriculture. So that we have here in the economic regard a condition and plans similar to those at the beginning of the Russian revolution, and the slow transformation of private economy into state economy, interpenetrated with factors of so-called war communism. The measures adopted to date point rather in the direction of a state-capitalist than of a communist economy; even though this state-capitalist economy, in case it should come about, need not be a hundred-percent copy of the Russian. Even though the turn to real communism, to the abolition of wage labor and to direct control of all economic activity through the workers is still not absolutely precluded, yet from the present transitional stage and the "partial socialization" we are rather justified in looking forward to an economy after the Russian model, in case both possibilities are not eliminated through a return to a fascist or democratic capitalism in which private property would be maintained under state coordination.

As yet the workers have nothing certain but the armed power. Since a communist society is possible only through the continuance of the revolution, these workers will sooner or later have to resign their power to a special group, just as this power even today stands under the influence of the organizational interests of the C.N.T. and F.A.I. With the surrender of the power, the state capitalist perspective is probable, whereupon the bureaucracy necessary to it will be furnished either by the anarcho-syndicalist or the socialist-stalinist elements or by a combination of the two. If the Spanish fascists win, they will then, unless this is prevented by the imperialist powers, slaughter the Catalan revolutionary movement with the aid of the Catalan bourgeoisie, to which greater concessions will be made on the part of Madrid. If the Madrid Government wins, it will then,--possibly after a period of pseudo-socialism sufficing to make "democracy" also strong in opposition to the workers--in conjunction with the Catalan bourgeoisie and the sympathetic part of the labor movement, likewise strike down the anarcho-syndicalist workers and set aside the social accomplishments won to date. It will perhaps be forced to take up the struggle against the workers forthwith.

There is a large number of possibilities. The Spanish struggle alters the situation continuously. Surprises are not precluded. For the present, all that is possible in the way of anticipation is to take into consideration the various eventualities, for the thousand interlinking elements of the social conflicts are not clearly observable from this distance. The tasks of the proletariat, however, are clear. And clear also is the fact that the forces interested in the maintenance of capitalist exploitation society were in a position to hold up the full development of the struggle against fascism. Ostensibly it was desired, through limitation of the struggle against the fascist form of State and its policy, to enlarge the anti-fascist front and secure its unity in order to aid in the victory of democracy as the lesser evil for the workers. In reality, this limitation leads to defeat. In this way the government was not in a position to bring into action against fascism the full weight of the mass of peasants because in order not to frighten away the bourgeois elements, it did not dare to award the peasants the complete expropriation of landed property, and because it did not dare to take up the complete expropriation of capital ownership for fear of losing the sympathies of the democratic powers as well as those of the petty bourgeois and of its own democratic bourgeoisie. The minimum program of the anti-fascists led so far that in the course of the struggle the fascist demagoguery was

enabled to develop a program which was more radical than that of the popular-front government. The Chicago Tribune could permit itself the malicious pleasure of remarking that "the 'Reds' spoke like Fascists, and the Fascists like Bolsheviks."

What was intended to lend force to the anti-fascist struggle, weakened it. The workers can even now, when the fate of the spanish revolution still hangs in the balance, derive the lesson that the anti-fascist struggle is capable of winning only as a fight against capitalism; that it is only as such that it has meaning for the workers; that these latter are obliged, from the first day of the struggle against fascism onward, to attack also the capitalist property relations; that they can strengthen their own position only when, at the same time, they disrupt irrevocably the foundations of the capitalist order. It is false to believe that fascism was first to be struck down, after which the rest would come as a matter of course. The workers' struggle must be directed not exclusively against fascism, but against Capital in all its forms and manifestations. Even the such a policy may bring the whole capitalist world into action against the revolution at once, yet it is only such a policy which is capable of arousing in word and in deed the solidarity of the world's working population.

War against a communist Spain would not be an ordinary war; it would be a war which, in certain circumstances, in view of the position of the working class, could become the international class war against the international bourgeoisie. It needs to be stated plainly that it is silly to believe that the democratic imperialism could rush to the aid of the spanish revolutionists. What would be needed is that the french workers should rush to the aid of the spanish revolutionists, but this at the same time would mean the revolution in France. And if the revolution fails to roll on in this manner, if it dies out, still its defeat is only a stage in the proletariat's revolutionary onward march. The workers cannot shout, with the mendacious rabble of the old labor movement, for arming of the spanish popular-front government at the hands of the democratic countries. Such arming takes place only so long as bourgeois society is sure of its mastery and it would direct these arms also against the revolutionary proletariat. The revolutionary proletariat in Spain precludes arming of the popular-front government at the hands of other bourgeoisies. The proletariat can only arm itself. It was the task of the international proletariat,--particularly of the french workers who have already shown themselves capable of occupying the munitions factories for so little as an increase in wages--to seize arms and

get them to Spain. But that would be not only the simultaneous revolution in France; it would also be the beginning of the imperialist war, which, however, would then pose the revolutionary question at its very beginning instead of leaving it in abeyance until the bloody end. The working population which failed to rush to the aid of the spanish revolutionists, on its own initiative and against the will of its organizations, has betrayed the spanish revolution just as was done by the scurvy rabble of the two Internationals.

And these workers, who were unwilling to risk their lives for their spanish comrades, will perhaps after all be shoved tomorrow onto the battlefield. If the spanish question should after all serve as the occasion for the outbreak of the war between the fascist and the "democratic" capitalisms, then the workers will be persuaded, ostensibly in order to aid the spanish anti-fascists, to fight on the side of their bourgeoisie against the enemy fascist bourgeoisie. It must be said plainly, however, that even then the workers are not coming to the aid of the spanish comrades, but of the imperialistic interests of their bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie never takes up for working-class interests; it may combat on fascism in favor of another, but it is never anti-fascist. What the workers of the world have to do in order to help help themselves and thereby also the spanish comrades is only one thing: to take up the struggle against their own bourgeoisie, and with the overthrow thereof to doom spanish fascism as well.

At the time when this article is brought to a close, the further course of the spanish civil war is still unforeseeable. Regarded from the military point of view, the fascists seem to be gaining the upper hand, Toledo has fallen, the march upon Madrid continues. But this advance can still be held up: thru uprisings in the rear of the fascists, in spite of the terror which is being exercised, as well as thru a surprising shift in the situation on the fronts, thru a new exertion of effort by the workers. The anti-fascist front still has various possibilities. Altho it no longer controls more than a third of the country, nevertheless this portion contains important industrial centers which make it possible to continue the manufacture of arms and munitions. The problem of subsistence also is still for the present soluble. But the fascists too have adjusted everything, in the territory at their disposition, to the continuation of the war. They have, moreover, the military aid of Italy and Germany. But even with the fall of Madrid the struggle is still not necessarily decided, tho the panicky sentiment arising from a series of defeats may also bring the

civil war to a quick end. This end would not diminish the sacrifices of the proletariat; the white terror of conquering fascism will far surpass all the previous bestialities. In view of this situation, the fighting workers will no doubt go all the way down the line. But even their defeat is powerless to affect the situation, which is objectively ripe for revolution. This defeat is also at the same time the beginning of a new series of workers' struggles which will stand out far in advance of everything hitherto accomplished and which even today, before the beginning of the world war and the beginning of the new world-revolutionary wave, point to its colossal impetus. The victims of the spanish revolution are already the first victims of the approaching world revolution, nor could a present-day victory of spanish fascism suffice to conjure the fact away. The verve and the enthusiasm of the spanish revolutionists of today is a guarantee of the victory of the new workers' revolution tomorrow.

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