

whole populations according to the private requirements of private investors, populations can still be shifted by a mere command of the dictatorial governments. If people can no longer be exploited through the market mechanism, they can be ordered to work at whatever wage the governments see fit to pay. The market mechanism was after all only one mechanism for the successful exploitation of labor; the new fascist mechanism serves this purpose just as well, though it partly eliminates those exploiting elements which were too closely connected with the old system, in favor of new exploiting elements which adapt themselves better and quicker to the new one. It eliminates those people not only in territories where the "new economy" is practised, but also where the "old capitalism" still prevails. The trade between European nations and Europe's trade with the world is the more disturbed the more it becomes "managed". On the basis of "mixed economics", clearing agreements, and barter deals, international trade cannot be enlarged, but can only be prevented from disappearing altogether. It becomes more difficult for the "rich" nations to use their capital to their own advantage. It does not enrich the poor countries, and it eats into the capital of the rich. Totalitarian economics injected into free-trade leads to an economic world mixture much worse in its results than either system could be by itself. "If Marx saw capitalism's hair graying, and its teeth falling out," *Herbert Heaton* remarked recently, "perhaps today he would say that its hair has turned gray overnight from the shocks of the last ten years, and that its teeth have been knocked out in a concentration camp."

What is now needed to bring into the world economy some kind of order which would enable people to speak once more of progress in social development can neither be done by democratic nor by fascist capitalistic methods and goals. The existing disorder has reached a point where only radical solution can help. The whole value production and value exchange has to be done away with, in its monetary as well as its barter form. After all, the fascist production of "use values for use" and exchange by barter agreements, the attempt to clean labor of its commodity character by giving it a modernized slave form has not change one iota the fundamental capitalistic social and economic relations. The production of "use values" serves production for profit as always, the barter system exchanges less for more labor, work is still exploited as before — only more so. Value production and value exchange must and can disappear only with the ending of class relations. Only because of the existence of the latter can the former not be seriously challenged, must the terror increase. Only then, when the fulfillment of the needs of the whole, not the symbolized whole of the state but the whole of society, is considered the pre-requisite for the satisfaction of the needs of the individual — and this in the restricted sense of the social relationship in any particular country, as in the large sense of the territorial relationships in the world economy — will it be possible to speak of the beginning of a new era of social development. Nothing short of this radical solution will help, and because it seems that we are still far away from this solution, it is not possible to find one single optimistic note in the present concert of hell.

Without such a radical solution the war may change its forms; it will not be ended. The only development possible now is the development of warfare. After the defeat of France, the continuation of the war meant the incorporation of England into the new American Empire. Short of the quite improbable occurrence of an internal collapse of Germany, there seems to be no possibility of defeating Germany by military means for some time to come. The military aspects of the war between England, Germany and Italy can indicate, if anything, only the military defeat of England. However costly an invasion of England may be, it will be undertaken if it proves to be a necessity for Germany, or if unforeseeable occurrences make it opportune. If England restricts herself to mere defense measures, if her aerial and naval tactics do not harm Germany sufficiently, it is not unthinkable that Germany will try to wear England slowly down rather than end her present existence by blitzkrieg methods. Even at this late hour a peace of compromise is not altogether precluded, and such a peace would split at least part of the English interests away from America. To exclude this possibility America must help England to a far greater extent than it has done so far. The greater this help, the greater the need for Germany to attempt the invasion.

It is no longer true that "England expects that every American do his duty". Rather the opposite conforms to the facts. If Roosevelt's frontier was once the Rhine, his shock-troops are now certainly on the Thames. This far-sightedness is the more astonishing because of the prevailing general short-sightedness, which does not see that the Stars and Stripes fly high above the Union Jack. It was rather superfluous to change the colors on the destroyers and tanks that were sent over to Canada.

To increase Germany's difficulties, to keep her occupied in Europe, America must help England — but never decisively. Aside from the question as to whether America is as yet really able to grant decisive support to England, she only hastens the military necessity of invasion by so doing. More than on anything else invasion depends now on American actions, on her possibilities to supply England with war materials, on her desire to keep Germany's striking power bound to the English scene. If America's help is not sufficient to increase England's military potentialities during the coming months to a point where her actions become unbearable for Germany, the latter country might consider it more important to fight England somewhere else than on her own ground. Spain's present attitude that suggests participation in the war on the side of the axis, the Italian offensive in Egypt, the attempts to take the Suez canal and Gibraltar which will follow, the closing of the Mediterranean to English shipping, together with continuous bombing of England proper — these and other tactics might weigh more heavily in the speculation of the axis powers general-staffs than the invasion itself. But any day they might also consider it better to take England first, and thus break up the Empire. The initiative is still on the side of the axis.

Whatever may happen or has happened, the war is already a war between America and the axis powers. The latter might be further strengthened by allying Japan to themselves. The taking of Indo-China by the Japanese army, the final blow against China now in preparation to free Japan's hands for the possible struggle with America, (a struggle which would relieve America's pressure upon Germany), all indicate that any outcome of the struggle between England and Germany will not bring about an end to the war. In case of a successful invasion of England, whatever may be salvaged — parts of the fleet, or the dominions beyond Hitler's reach — will become part of the United States. In case of a compromise solution, implying the formation of a fascist government in England, those forces able to escape the "new England" will continue to fight, but under the Stars and Stripes, just as part of the French Empire and the allied soldiers who escaped now fight under the English flag. In the form of military operations the war will then continue wherever the armies of the axis powers reach English interests; that is, in Africa, Asia, India. Between America, the axis powers, and possibly Japan, a naval, air, and trade war will be carried on.

Under such conditions the destiny of the Balkans will have to be decided between Russia and the axis powers. Russia will either have to continue her present relations with Germany, or fight against her — and hence against Japan, in case she should orientate herself towards the United States. Russia might be further appeased with parts of China, Persia, Turkey, and possibly even India. The Russian attitude towards the continued war will depend largely on the relations between Japan and America, on the progress the war will make in Asia. There are attempts on the part of America to come to an understanding with both Japan and Russia, as there are attempts made to include Russia in the expanding front of the axis powers. The probability of success is greater for the latter than for the former attempt. It is, however, not entirely excluded that at this time a war in the Pacific might still be prevented, if only by postponement, in case this should suit the most immediate interests of both Japan and America better. But as far as one can see right now, there seems to be a much greater possibility that, because America is much more concerned over the problems of the Pacific** than over her need to fight the coming German trade war, the war for the United States will be predominantly located in the Pacific.

Only with the isolation of Russia by reason of the German success in Europe is it possible for Japan to challenge American capitalism in Asia and in the Pacific. America's struggle against Japan is thus at the same time the continuation of her struggle against Germany. Germany's support of Japan is designed to weaken the striking power of the United States, and is thus a part of the as yet unfinished European conflict, as well as a

**The next issue of *LIVING MARXISM* will deal extensively with the relations in the Pacific.

part of the coming trade-offensive. Despite all autarchy, national or regional, world economy has not come to an end; only now it spells world war.

IX

Aside from the question of whether the Nazi regime can sooner or later subdue and incorporate the free-enterprise regimes still existing in Europe, what has happened so far can mean only that America must face a deepening of the existing crisis conditions or adopt totalitarian methods in her internal and external relations. The world-wide economic struggle cannot fail to reduce the existing living standards and the demand for commodities, unless war economy displaces the crisis economy. The intensified efforts in all countries to produce for export enhances this need still further. The "normal" markets for America disappear with the progress of the war.

A victorious Germany will still remain in need of export outlets, in need of capital, foreign exchange and war material. Her economy will face a situation of general scarcity in everything — depleted inventories, obsolete industries, run-down railroads, and the need for more arms. This need cannot be satisfied by confiscations in Europe, nor by mere re-arrangements in distribution. The increasing poverty in the "new" Europe will allow neither Germany nor Europe to rest on the laurels of military victories. Expansion must go on, if only to utilize what has been won. But the further this expansion goes, the more difficult and the less profitable it becomes.

With the defeat of England the question of the re-distribution of Europe's colonial possessions will be opened. What is going to happen to Canada, Newfoundland, Greenland, the Bahamas, Bermuda, the French, British and Dutch West Indies, Honduras, Guinea, the Falkland and South Sea Islands, etc.? America is determined that they shall fall neither to Germany nor to Japan. There can be no doubt that with the defeat of England all European bases and possessions in the Western hemisphere will be seized by America. The enmity between Europe, Japan, and America will be thereby enormously increased.

But the coming Nazi trade offensive demands more than preventing German-controlled Europe from maintaining the old European possessions. South America belongs to the Eastern hemisphere rather than to North America. Its products are needed in Europe more than in America; its possibilities for trade with Europe are greater than with America. Barter agreements will move commodities where money economy has failed. American trade methods and tariff policies have emptied Latin America as well as many European countries of gold and foreign exchange. The German barter system offers a solution, as the gold will not by itself find its way back into countries with unfavorable trade balances.

By way of barter, clearing agreements, blocked currencies, and export subsidies Nazi Germany has been able to double her share in the foreign trade of raw-material-producing countries at the expense of England and

America. As American exports to raw-material-producing countries were of much lesser consequence than her export to industrial nations, the further reduction of the former seems to be of small significance. However, the picture looks somewhat different if one considers the inescapable need of Europe to import raw materials, and her inability to continue to be America's best customer. If there were the chance of a general capitalist expansion all over the world the decline of American exports to South America would be no cause for worry as it would be compensated for by increasing exports to industrial Europe. As it is, however, the possible losses in South American trade will accentuate the decline of American exports all over the world. It is then not so much a question of European competition in South America proper that is behind the present "rediscovery" of the South by the industrial North, but the inescapable need to combat, by combatting European trade in South America, Europe's competitive position all over the globe. Control of the raw materials of South America Canada and the Pacific regions gives America a decisive advantage in the world competitive struggle. By withholding raw materials and foodstuffs from German and Japanese industries, the ability of those countries to take markets away from America by way of new trade methods is considerably reduced. The complete control of the Western hemisphere by America is so powerful a weapon that the German dream of a world reorganization on her own terms becomes quite ridiculous.

The raw material hunger of Germany, Italy, and Japan cannot be satisfied with old trade methods, because those countries lack the necessary gold and foreign exchange to purchase them in the quantities needed by their industries. Nor for similar reasons can the hunger for industrial goods in less-developed countries be satisfied. Trade between Latin America and Europe as well as America declined rapidly with the deepening of the world crisis. However, the total exports of Latin America amounted to over 1.75 and 1.86 billion dollars in 1938 and 1939 respectively. Germany, France and Italy absorbed 15.8 per cent in 1938, and 11 per cent in 1939, 15.9 and 12.8 per cent of all Latin American exports went to Great Britain. In foodstuffs, four nations — England, Germany, Belgium, and Italy — alone took 79 per cent of Argentina's total exports in 1938, while the United States took only 9 per cent. Half of the income that the South American nations derived from exports came from Europe. A serious disruption of trade between Europe and South America makes the existence of both territories quite difficult.

The fact that South America produces what Europe needs, and Europe what South America needs, made barter exchange both possible and necessary. The more this kind of trade flourished, the smaller became the possibility for competition among countries still based on the gold exchange methods. With the decline of economic influence, political influence declines and therewith the value of investments in South America. The increasing independence of South America from its friendly neighbor points in the direction of grand-scale repetitions of the Mexican expropriation acts. Such

a situation, together with the improvement of Europe's competitive position by virtue of better relations between Europe and South America, would force American industry into retreat, strengthen the totalitarian forces now in the ascendency, and bring about alterations in private capitalism. Fighting the German trade offensive in South America, American private capitalism continues the struggle for its very existence, the first round of which has just been lost in Europe. The harder it fights fascism, however, the more totalitarian it will become.

The whole Western hemisphere under the control of the United States means the possession of war-material resources unequalled in the world — food stuffs, nickel, aluminum, zinc, copper, etc. Partial control of rubber and military co-ordination of the hemisphere puts America in a position where she can dictate the commercial terms in her world relation; that is, where she can demand her share of the world-created profits. Neither her gold nor her industrial advantages, but a militarily-secured monopoly over an important part of the world can now guarantee profit appropriations beyond those spheres under control. The Germans, Italians, and Japanese will no longer be trading with a number of independent countries, but with America, which can take her share from any of the possible transactions. In other words, American imperialism is out to continue to share in the exploitation of all the other workers in the world besides her own, just as the "new" Europe will be out to prevent this muscling in on the part of America, and to create a condition where the bulk of the world-profits move in the direction of Europe.

American trade weapons such as embargoes, monetary control, control of shipping and insurance, of tourist traffic exchange-and-tariff manipulations, and her gold monopoly — all these weapons are no longer sufficient to secure world-wide exploitation for American capitalism. Nor will the measures taken to co-ordinate South America with American interests, such as have already been realized with regard to Canada, suffice in fighting Europe's trade offensive. An economic cartel of this hemisphere must control its entire production, not single commodities. To be really effective it cannot solve existing problems by bribing South American nations to abstain from trade with Europe and Japan. Loans granted to South America as compensation for losses incurred by the new imperialistic policy of the United States will be accepted, but the commitments connected with them will not be fulfilled. Some of the Latin American countries will blackmail America to grant ever-increasing loans which can never be repaid; others will refuse altogether to cooperate, since America could not possibly, in the case of the Argentine for instance, make up for losses incurred by a cessation of Argentine relations with Europe.

To fight Europe and Japan successfully the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States has to become still more neighborly; that is, as one reporter remarked, "The United States will be forced to put a little iron in the hand of the glove it extends to Latin America." And the Catholic

"Register" writes that "our business forces are going to drive our arms south into Latin America when Hitler's barter system starts to kill our trade. Self-defense is making us build up a huge armed forces; but never in history has any nation gone militaristic without also turning imperialistic." The excuse is at hand. Alsop and Kintner in their "American White Paper" say that "the situation is already acute. The immediate danger points are the largest and most important nations — the Argentine and Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and probably Columbia —. The State, War, and Navy Departments unite in believing that if there is an early German victory, it will be followed by German-inspired putsches in at least two and probably more of these countries... This will call for naval and military expeditions sent by the United States... And unless the Germans have obtained the Allied Fleets, the expeditions ought to accomplish their objective." Yes, they ought to, but this means the further militarization of America, and that means the growth of fascism by way of fighting fascism; it means the prolongation and the spreading of the war. For American imperialism, no less than German imperialism, means the further postponement of the only possibility to end continuous warfare — by ending the capitalist system of exploitation. American imperialism in South America, though designed for no other purpose than to make the world safe for American profits, will only diminish those profits still further. It will impoverish both North and South America and so will impoverish the world as a whole. The destruction of South American agriculture in the face of a starving world, the "plowing-under" on a now hemispheric scale of the surpluses created by the divorce of Europe from South America, the use of all industrial raw materials for almost exclusively destructive purposes — all this has to be "paid" for by the labor of American workers north and south of the Isthmus.

X

Though speculations as to the further course of world history are extremely interesting, they are by no means of great importance in so far as they concern the lot of the laboring masses. The question as to who will fight whom, who will be the winner and who the loser can mean little to people who have long since lost all they can lose and who can win nothing regardless of which side may be victorious. For so long as capitalist production relations are not done away with, in winning and defeated countries alike exploitation will be driven to the maximum; freedom and welfare will decline to the lowest point possible.

Also it no longer makes any difference to what policy one may subscribe, for the reality of today determines the actions of all individuals; and this reality no longer allows for any other policy than that fitted to the war-requirements of the various nations. How silly it is to say today that only a socialist America, or a socialist England, will be able to defeat fascism, to oppose Hitler successfully. Neither in England nor in America could a mere change of government, no, not even direct workers' control,

prevent the success of Fascism. To speak of a defense of America through an American socialism is beyond all serious consideration. Movements which could develop in the United States would have no socialist aspirations; they would be fascistic and imperialistic. To them belongs the immediate future.

For England, not a socialist government, but only a greater military power than Hitler's can defeat the latter. Because British socialism could not, merely by being socialistic, create such power socialism will not come to power; it will be defeated. To expect that German soldiers may revolt because of a change in class rule in England means to under-rate the power of the Nazi ideology. A change of class rule in England would mean the immediate defeat of England; it would be welcomed by the Nazis, and be killed in the act of her embrace. The presence of the Nazi force will transform a socialist into a state-capitalist fascist revolution, which will have to ally itself to the fascist imperialistic system dominated by Germany.

Only wishful thinking could assume that the next few years will present the opportunity for the rise of socialistic movements in the warring countries, or that the defeat of one or the other could be prevented by socialistic methods, or could be utilized for socialistic purposes. The anti-fascism practised by the existing labor organizations is in reality no more than the support of private property capitalism against the growing state-capitalist forces. This anti-fascism ends with the defeat of private capitalism. The anti-fascism capable of defeating fascism must be directed also against state-capitalism, it must have a real international basis and must involve the greater part of the world masses.

We are still far away from such a situation. It can, moreover, be created only by the continuation of general warfare, by the further disruption of all essential and vital economic world relations and by an increase in the existing chaos. Those most interested in peace and socialism will have to shout the loudest "Long live the war!"***

***The continuation of this article in the next issue will deal with the revolutionary tendencies inherent in the present world situation, and with the opportunities still left to us to work in the direction of socialism.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE. By F. Borkenau, Viking, New York, 1939 (\$2.00)

This little volume is packed with valuable information about the facts and forces behind the German expansion that led to the second world war. The book was written after Munich and before the actual outbreak of hostilities, apparently shortly after Hitler's invasion of Prague in early spring, 1939. For a few years the author had been a right wing member of the German Com-

munist Party, from which he was expelled about 1930. He has since published some interesting books on the civil war in Spain and a critical study of the Communist International. His new book makes even more evident his complete dismissal of any hope for a future victory of the revolutionary cause of the working class, which he had formerly temporarily adopted and tried to pro-

mote by an unquestioning acceptance of Stalin's leadership.

He shows by this book that he saw clearly enough the historical significance of the fascist challenge to "our whole western civilization". He early understood some of the "undeniable facts" that are only today, after overwhelmingly conclusive experience, being grasped by most people. He stated before the war began that an eventual success of the fascist attempt at conquering the world through revolution would be due not to force of arms alone but much more to "the weakness of the moral, religious and political impulses of the opposing side". Yet in his forecast of the possible outcome of the impending war, he allows for no other alternatives than a collapse of the anti-fascist resistance or an unexpected reevaluation of what he describes rather evasively as a set of "values which had become somewhat time-worn". Even if, after a sweeping victory over half the world or more, the fascist regime eventually breaks down, this will result, according to Borkenau, not from a genuine workers' rebellion but only from a lack of stability assumed inherent in the fascist regime itself. It will then be followed by "some other regime not yet discernible". Thus, this book both describes the lamentable weakness of the anti-fascist forces today and itself serves, by its own thorough-going skepticism, to illustrate further that same despondent mood which pervades the whole of the so-called "democratic" resistance of the fascist counter-revolution.

There is another objection, this time from a strictly theoretical viewpoint, to Borkenau's otherwise admirable argument. Due in part to the fact that his book was written before the war began, its brilliant analysis of the methods applied by Nazi Germany in a tremendously efficient drive for expansion suffers from an under-evaluation of the essential unity of the different forms assumed by those methods at the various successive stages of their practical application. Here again, the author starts from a clear insight into the characteristic difference between the fascist forms of imperialis-

tic expansion and those applied in the past by Spain, Portugal, Holland, Britain, France, and the United States. The new German Empire of Hitler has never fought for colonies in exactly the same manner that Britain and France did, nor, for that matter, as pre-fascist Germany attempted to do under the Kaiser. Its policy of expansion resembles rather that of Japan and of Russia (both Czarist and Stalinist). Fascist Germany takes her own borders as the starting point of expansion. She aims first of all at conquering her nearest neighbors, and even during subsequent phases of her imperialistic expansion seems to strive for territorial conquest not so much as an end in itself as for the purpose of acquiring indirect control over much more widely extended areas.

So far so good. There have been, there are today, and there will be in the near future many illustrations of this basic feature of new German imperialism — an imperialism aiming not at territorial conquest *per se* but at comparatively small conquest that will yield a larger expansion of Nazi power by indirect control. Yet we must refrain from undue generalization about this particular type of German expansionist policy. From Borkenau's viewpoint, Hitler's occupation of the Sudetenland, the enforcement of a German dominated conservative government in Prague, and the creation of two small vassal states (Slovakia and Ruthenia) had been a correct imperialist policy — true to the new model of fascist expansion. But when, at a later date, Germany decided to strike at Prague and for all practical purposes to swallow the whole of the former Czecho-Slovakian territory, she was forced, according to Borkenau, to break with her tried and successful policy of "indirect rule" and was thrown back to the much more hazardous methods of pre-fascist imperialism. It would not be unfair to carry this line of reasoning further and draw the conclusion that not only was Germany later "compelled", against her own original intention, to invade Poland, to enter into an all-European war and into whatever might result from it in the future, but that the poor creature was also actually "compelled" to conquer the whole world, although she would

have been quite content with a much milder form of economic and political domination. This, by the way, is exactly what Herr Hitler himself would say.

A closer investigation of the facts presented by Borkenau, and of the developments that took place after the publication of his book, seems to show that it is much more appropriate and certainly more in agreement with actual historical events to regard those two forms of the German expansionist policy not as an enforced break with an original plan, but rather as two different yet entirely complementary phases of an essentially identical policy. Fascist Germany, in spite of its racist ideology, aims at a comprehensive expansion by direct as well as by indirect conquest. Though she has been forced in the past, and may again be forced on the wider scale of her future expansionist enterprises, to content herself at first with an indirect expansion of her rule rather than with a direct territorial conquest, she will try to proceed from the early, unsatisfactory form to direct domination as soon as time and circumstances permit.

LIFE AND WORK OF ROSA LUXEMBURG. By Paul Froelich. London 1940. 7/6. German Edition "Rosa Luxemburg—Gedanke und Tat". Paris 1939. 2.50.

Paul Froelich's *Rosa Luxemburg* is not only an historically accurate and theoretically stimulating account of her life and work, but also a worthwhile contribution to the study of revolutionary tactics and the history of revolution in our time. It is a useful book, rich in learning — one of the few works in the inconspicuously vacuous Marxian literature of the present-day which is reminding of the epic days of Marxism. No revolutionary who strives for understanding and clarity in the present economic, political and social crisis of capitalism can fail to benefit from this work.

The only criticism one can offer is that the book lays too much stress on the past and too little on the present and future. But it is doubtful whether this can be considered a shortcoming in an historic-bio-

The present day fascist counter-revolution does not amount to a "true world revolution" as Borkenau and many other bourgeois writers today feel compelled to say. Yet it resembles a genuine revolution in the one respect that it endeavors to disintegrate all existing political forms on a world wide scale. It does so, however, for the ultimate purpose not of world wide emancipation and cooperation, but of world wide oppression and exploitation. It is just this small difference that makes the challenge of Fascism today "acceptable" to an increasing number of people all over the world by whom communism and a genuine workers' revolution were regarded only as a danger and an offense. Mr. Borkenau would do well to work out this difference between the "expansionist" tendencies of revolutions true and false as soon as he is freed from his present predicament. According to a recent report in the *New York Times*, he is at the moment restricted to a study "from within" of the conditions prevailing in a democratic English concentration camp.

K. K.

graphical work. It would have been exceedingly difficult to intersperse it with the newer historical developments without distorting the perspective of Rosa Luxemburg's contributions. When Froelich, however, does deal with incidents and literature of the post-war period he does so inadequately, choosing his material badly, and failing to evaluate it in the spirit of Luxemburg. For instance, it is insufficient to present onesidedly Luxemburg's "Accumulation Theory", her most important contribution to the science of Marxism, in the light of Sternberg's "Correction" and Bucharin's "Criticism".

We would like to stress three points especially: 1.) It seems that Froelich has deliberately and consciously softened and weakened the specific difference and divergences

between the Luxemburgian and Leninist conceptions. This is especially obvious when he deals with the co-called "Questions of Organization", (Spontaneity Theory, Role of the Party, Centralism, Uprisings, etc.) It is of course true, that though there were differences between Luxemburg and Lenin on these points, there were many points of agreement. It is also true that these disagreements were exaggerated in a senseless manner by even better men than those Froehlich enumerates (Yaroslavsky, Arkadiey, Maslov). But neither fact would justify the author in presenting these differences, which sprang from different historical backgrounds as well as from different political tendencies, not exactly as if they were non-existent, but as if they were finally dissolved in an harmonious and peaceful manner.

2.) In dealing with certain problems of great importance, the book fails to give them the emphasis they deserve. In its exposition of the historical and theoretical significance of Luxemburg's work "Reform or Revolution" this inadequacy is apparent not only in the chapter specifically devoted to the pamphlet, but also in succeeding chapters. This work of Luxemburg's is praised very highly, but its real substance is not sufficiently made clear to the reader; the vast difference between Luxemburg's conceptions and those of other social-democratic tendencies, and the polemics of decisive historical significance are also not elucidated enough.

In this respect Froehlich's greatest shortcoming is in his interpretation of the "Accumulation Theory". It is remarkable how at one place he swallows Bucharin's superficial criticism hook, line and sinker, and at another he celebrates Luxemburg as the true genius who solved the problems unsolved by Marx. A little later he voices the need for modification of the Luxemburg solutions, but at the same time presents Bucharin's "one solution" as an "indirect proof of the decisive theses of Luxemburg"; and finally, to circumvent the whole controversy, he admits the "theoretical" possibility of a new capitalist advance.

3.) The great political question of the time, the fundamental problem of proletarian revolution and dictatorship, are not dealt with in full proportion to their importance; whereas the purely personal takes up far too much space and is handled too often in a sentimental and un-Luxemburgian manner. This is true not only of those chapters specifically devoted to Luxemburg's personality, but, throughout the book, there are scattered such subjective passages unconvincingly overpersonalized. It seems to us that the necessary confutation of the "Bloody Rosa" caricature delineated by her enemies and false friends could have been accomplished more realistically and convincingly.

All these objections however, do not change the fact that here a great historical theme is being presented for the first time with competence and with a historical fidelity to the present struggles.

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