world war, traditions of the Neanderthal man unexpectedly became very popular. In the land of thinkers and poets, the "great time" was accompanied by a sudden return to the instincts of the contemporaries of the mammoth, the cave-bear and the wooly rhinoceros.

To be sure, the Russia of the Czars was not as yet a real culture-state and the mistreatment of foreigners and other public activities were not expressions of the psyche of the people. It was, rather, the monopoly of the government, fostered and organized at the proper moment by state institutions and encouraged with the help of governmental Vodka.

There was, for example, the famous trial of the "Multan Votiaks" that took the place in the '90's. Seven Votiak peasants from the village of "Great Multan" in the Province of Viatka, half heathens and savages, had been accused of a ritual murder and thrown into jail. This so-called ritual murder trial was, of course, only a small and casual incident of the government policy, which tried to change the depressed mood of the hungry and enslaved masses by offering them a little diversion. But here again, the Russian intelligentsia, with Korolenko in the lead once more, took up the cause of the half-savage Votiaks. Korolenko eagerly threw himself into the fight, unravelling the maze of misunderstandings and deceit. He worked patiently and with an infallible instinct for finding the truth, which reminds one of Jaurès in the Dreyfus case. He mobilized the press and public opinion, obtained a resumption of the trial, and by personally taking over the defense finally won an acquittal.

In Eastern Europe, the subject most preferred for diverting the people's bad disposition has always been the Jews, and it is questionable whether they have yet played their role to the end. The circumstances under which the last public scandal — the famous Bejliss trial — took place was definitely still in style. This Jewish ritual murder case in 1913 was — so to speak — the last performance of a despotic government on its way out. One could call it the "Necklace Affair" of the Russian *ancien règime.* As a belated follow-up to the dark days of the 1907-1911 counter-revolution, and at the same time as a symbolic forrunner of the world war, this ritual murder case of Kishinev immediately became the center of public interest. The progressive intelligentsia in Russia identified itself with the cause of the Jewish butcher of Kishinev. The trial turned into a battlefield between the progressive and the reactionary camps of Russia. The shrewdest lawyers and best journalists gave their services to this cause. Needless to say, Korolenko, too, was one of the leaders of the fight. Thus shortly before the bloody curtain of world war was to be raised, Russian reaction suffered one more crushing moral defeat. Under the onslaught of the oppositional intelligentsia the murder indictment collapsed. There was revealed also at the same time the whole hypocricy of the Czarist regime, which, already dead and rotten internally, was only waiting for the *coup de grace* to be administered by the movement for freedom.

,During the '80's, after the assassination of Alexander II, a period of paralyzing hopelessness enveloped Russia. The liberal reforms of the '60's with regard to the judiciary and to rural self-administration were everywhere repealed. A death-like silence prevailed during the reign of Alexander III. Discouraged by both the failure to realize peaceful reforms and the apparent ineffectiveness of the revolutionary movement, the Russian people were completely overcome with depression and resignation.

In this atmosphere of apathy and despondency, the Russian intelligentsia began to develop such metaphysical-mystical tendencies as were represented by Soloviev's philosophy. Nietzsche's influence was clearly noticeable. In literature the pessimistic undertones of Garshin's novels and Nadson's poetry predominated. Fully in accord with the prevailing spirit was Dostoyevsky's mysticism, as expressed in "The Brothers Karamasov," and also in Tolstoy's ascetic doctrines. The idea of "non-resistance to evil", the repudiation of violence in the struggle against powerful reaction, which was now to be opposed by the "purified soul" of the individual, such theories of social passivity became a serious danger for the Russian intelligentsia of the Eighties. The more so, as it was presented by such captivating means as Tolstoy's literary genius and moral authority.

Mikhaylovsky, the spiritual leader of the organization of the "People's Will," directed an extremely angry polemic against Tolstöy. Korolenko, too, came to the fore. He, the tender poet who never could forget an incident of his childhood, be it a rustling forest, a walk in the evening through the quiet fields, or the memory of a landscape in its manifold lights and moods, Korolenko, who fundamentally despised all politics, now raised his voice with determination, preaching aggressive, saber-sharp hatred and belligerent opposition. He replied to Tolstoy's legends, parables and stories in the style of the gospel with the "Legend of Florus."

The Romans governed Judea with fire and sword, exploiting land and people. The people moaned and bent under the hated yoke. Stirred by the sight of his suffering people, Menachem the Wise, son of Yehuda, appealed to the heroic traditions of their forebears and preached rebellion against the Romans, a "Holy War." But then up spoke the sect of the gentle Sossaians (who like Tolstoy, repudiated all violence and saw a solution only in the purification of the soul, in isolation and self-denial.) "You are sowing great misery when you call men to battle," they said to Menachem. "If a city is besieged and shows resistance the enemy will spare the lives of the humble, but will put to death all those who are defiant. We teach the people to be submissive, so that they may be saved from destruction . . . One cannot dry water with water nor queneh fire with fire. Therefore, violence will not be overcome with violence, it is evil itself."

To which Menachem answered unswervingly: "Violence is neither good nor evil, it is violence. Good or evil is only its application. The violence of the arm is evil when it is lifted to rob or suppress the weak; but if

it is lifted for work or in defense of thy neighbor, then violence is welfare. It is true, one does not quench fire with fire nor dry water with water, but stone is shattered with stone and steel must be parried with steel, and violence with violence. Knoweth this: the power of the Romans is the fire but your humbleness is . . . wood. And the fire will not stop until it has eaten all the wood."

The "Legend" closes with Menachem's prayer: "O Adonai, Adonai! Let us never as long as we live fail the holy command: to fight against injustice . . . Let us never speak these words: save yourself and leave the weak to their destiny . . . I too believe, O Adonai, that your kingdom will be on earth. Violence and suppression will disappear and the people will gather to celebrate the feast of brotherhood. And never again shall man's blood be shed by man's hand."

Like a refreshing breeze, this defiant creed stormed through the deep fog of indolence and mysticism. Korolenko was ready for the new historic "violence" in Russia which soon was to lift its beneficient arm, the arm to work and to fight for liberty.

IV

Maxim Gorki's "My Childhood" is in many respects an interesting counterpart to Korolenko's "History of a Contemporary." Artistically, they are poles apart. Korolenko, like his adored Turgenev, has an utterly lyrical nature, is a tender soul, a man of many moods. Gorki, in the Dostoyevsky tradition, has a profoundly dramatic view of life; he is a man of concentrated energy and action. Although Korolenko is strongly aware of all the dreadfulness of social life, he has Turgenev's capacity to present even the cruellest incidents in the mood of an ameliorating perspective, enveloped in the vapors of poetic vision and all the charm of natural scenery. For Gorki as well as for Dostoyevsky, even sober every-day events are full of gruesome ghosts and torturing visions, presented in thoughts of merciless pungency, relentless, without perspective, and almost devoid of all natural scenery.

If according to Ulrici drama is the poetry of action, the dramatic element is positively evident in Dostoyevsky's novels. They are bursting with action, experience and tension to such an extent that their complex and irritating compilations seem at times to crush the epic element of the novel, to break through its bounderies at any moment. After reading with breathless anxiety one or two of his voluminous books it seems incredible that one has lived through the events of only two or three days. It is equally characteristic of Dostoyevsky's dramatic aptitude to present both the main problem of the plot and the great conflicts which lead to the climax at the beginning of the novel. The preliminaries of the story, its slow development, the reader does not experience directly. It is left to him to deduce them from the action in retrospect. Gorki, too, even in portraying complete inertia, the bankruptcy of human energy, as he did in "The Lower Depths," chooses

the drama as his medium and actually succeeds in putting life into the pale countenance of his types.

Korolenko and Gorki not only represent two literary personalities, but also two generations of Russian literature and freedom-loving ideology. Korolenko's interest still centers around the peasant; Gorki, enthusiastic pupil of German scientific socialism, is interested in city proletarians and in their shadows, the *Lumpenproletariat*. Whereas nature is the normal setting for Korolenko's stories, for Gorki it is the workshop, the garret and the flophouse.

The key to both artists' personalities is the fundamental difference in their backgrounds. Korolenko grew up in comfortable, middle-class surroundings. His childhood provided him with the normal feeling that the world and all that is in it is solid and steady, which is so characteristic of all happy children. Gorki, partly rooted in the petty-bourgeoisie and partly in the *Lumpenproletariat,* grew up in a truly Dostoyevskyan atmosphere of horror, crime and sudden outbreaks of human passion. As a child, he already behaved like a little hunted wolf baring his sharp teeth to fate. His youth, full of deprivations, insults and oppressions, of uncertainty and abuse, was spent close to the scum of society and embraced all the typical features of the life of the modern proletariat. Only those who have read Gorki's autobiography are able to conceive fully his amazing rise from the depths of society to the sunny heights of modern education, ingenious artistry and an outlook on life based on science. The vicissitudes of his life are symbolic of the Russian proletariat as a class, which in the remakably short time of two decades has also worked its way up from the uncultured, uncouth and difficult life under the Czar through the harsh school of struggles to historical actions. This is surely quite inconceivable to all the culture-philistines who think that proper street illumination, trains that run on time, clean collars, and the industrious clatter of the parliamentary mills stand for political freedom.

The great charm of Korolenko's poetic writing also constitutes its limitations. He lives wholly in the present, in the happenings of the moment, in sensual impressions. His stories are like a bouquet of freshly gathered field flowers. But time is hard on their gay colors, their delicate fragrance. The Russia Korolenko describes no longer exists, it is the Russia of yesterday. The tender and poetic mood which envelopes his land and his people is gone. A decade and a half ago it made room for the tragic and thunder-laden atmosphere of the Gorki's and their like, the screeching storm-birds of the revolution. It was replaced in Korolenko himself by a new belligerency. In him as in Tolstoy the social fighter triumphed in the end, the great fellow-citizen succeeded the poet and dreamer. When in the Eighties Tolstoy began to preach his moral gospel in a new literary form as folk-lore, Turgenev wrote letters imploring the wise man of Yasnaya Polyana in the name of the fatherland to turn back to the realm of pure art. The friends of Korolenko, too, grieved when he abandoned his fragrant poetry and threw

himself eagerly into journalism. But the spirit of Russian literature, the feeling of social responsibility, proved to be stronger in this richly endowed poet than his love for nature, his longing for an unhampered life of wandering and his poetic desires. Carried along by the rising revolutionary flood at the turn of the century, the poet in him was slowly silenced while he unsheathed his sword as a fighter for liberty, as the spiritual center of the opposition movement of the Russian intellectuals. The "History of a Contemporary", published in his review, "The Russian Treasury", is the last product of his genius, only half poetry, but wholly the truth, like everything else in Korolenko's life.

(*Translated by Frieda Mattick*)

THE MODERN MACHIAVELLIANS

James Burnham's second attempt*) to purge himself of the misunderstood Marxism of his earlier years is slightly more successful than his first effort, *The Managerial Revolution*. In the latter book, he still tried to explain the problem of power in economic terms, although no longer from the social point of view of Marx but from that of the technocrats. Nevertheless, he insisted that not the politicians, but those who control the means of production directly, are the real rulers of society. In the present book he finds that in addition to the economic there are several other modes of analyzing events, that one can reach approximately the same conclusions about history from any number of quite different approaches. This, of course, does not reconcile his former opinion that power must be explained in technical-economic terms — that economics is the determinative of politics — with his present Machiavellian point of view, which deals with the struggle for power in purely political terms.

Burnham begins his exposition of power politics with Dante in order to demonstrate what the Machiavellians are not. In Dante's writing he discovers a divorce between its formal and its real meaning. Although the real meaning is there, it is rendered irresponsible since it is not subject to open and deliberate intellectual control. High-minded words of formal meaning are used to arouse passion, prejudice and sentimentality in favor of disguised real aims. This method cannot serve the truth, yet throughout history and down to the present it is consistently used to deceive people in the interests of the mighty.

The Machiavellians, on the other hand, proceed scientifically; they call a spade a spade. Like Dante, Machiavelli, too, pursued a practical goal. But he did not fool himself, nor others, as to the character of the

*) THE MACHIAVELLIANS. By James Burnham. John Day Company, New York, 1943. (270 pp., $2.50).

goal nor as to the means to be used to achieve it. He divorced politics from ethics in the sense that every science must be divorced from ethics or, rather he divorced politics from transcendental ethics in order to locate both ethics and politics in the real world of space and time and history. He used words not to express his emotions and attitudes, but in such a way that their meaning could be tested and understood in terms of the real world. And he found that politics is the struggle for power among men.

Though it must be said that Machiavelli was often scientific by instinct and impulse rather than design, the modern Machiavellians — Mosca, Michels, and Pareto — have an altogether clear understanding of scientific method. They are fully conscious of what they are doing and of the distinction between an art and a science. Mosca, like all Mechiavellians, Burnham says, rejects any monistic view of history because such theories do not accord with the facts. In his search for truth — which is the purpose of all Machiavellians — Mosca discovers as the primary and universal social fact the existence of two "political classes," a ruling class — always a minority — and the ruled. And he believes that not only has this always been and is now the case, but that it always will be.

Before dealing with Michels and Pareto, Burnham finds it necessary to say a few things about Sorel and the function of myth and violence. Sorel, a *syndicalist,* thought that if the socialists were to take over governmental power, this would lead not to socialism but merely to the substitution of a new èlite as ruler over the masses. This fits him into the Machiavellians. However, he thought that a real revolutionary program could be carried out with the help of an all-embracing myth, which would arouse the masses to uncompromising action.

A true Machiavellian, Burnham continues, separates scientific questions concerning the truth about society from moral disputes over what type of society is most desirable. Thus Robert Michels makes no attempt to offer a "new system" but merely tries to promote understanding. He deals with the nature of *organization* in relation to democracy. The Marxists believe that the elimination of economic inequalities will lead to the attainment of genuine democracy. But they fail to demonstrate the possibility of organizing a classless society. The Machiavellians, Burnham says, agree with the Marxists' negative critique of capitalism but, on the basis of evidence from historical experience, they hold the Marxist goal to be unattainable. Social life cannot dispense with organization. And by a study of organization, particularly labor organizations, Michels found that a tendency toward oligarchy is inherent in organization itself and is thus a necessary condition of life. The mechanical, technical, psychological, and cultural conditions of organization require leadership, and guarantee that the leaders rather than the mass shall exercise control. The autocratic tendencies are neither arbitrary nor accidental nor temporary, but inherent in the nature of organization. This *iron law of oligarchy* holds good for all social movements

and all forms of society. It makes impossible the democratic ideal of self-government.

Pareto is the last of the Machiavellians interpreted by Burnham. Pareto, he says, disavows any purpose other than to describe and correlate social facts. To understand Pareto's general analysis of society, one must be clear about the distinctions he makes between "logical" and "non-logical" conduct. A man's conduct is "logical" when his action is motivated by a goal or purpose deliberately sought after, when that goal is possible, and when the steps taken to reach the goal are in fact appropriate for reaching it. If, however, any one or more of the conditions for logical conduct are not present, the actions are then non-logical. Recalling the disparity between the "formal" goal and the "real" goal discussed in connection with Dante, one can say that where this disparity exists action is non-logical. In logical actions, the formal goal and the real goal are identical. There exists, however, a tendency to logicalize the non-logical.

This leads to the concepts of residues and derivations used by Pareto. Man, Pareto says, is pre-eminently a verbal animal. Peculiar and deceptive problems arise in connection with his conduct which is verbal but at the same time non-logical. Examining this kind of conduct, Pareto discovers in it a small number of relatively constant factors which change little or not at all from age to age. These factors he calls "residues." Along with these there are other factors which change rapidly and which differ from age to age and from nation to nation. These variable factors he calls "derivations." "Residue" simply means the stable, common elements which we may discover in social actions, the nucleus, so to speak, which is left over when the variable elements are stripped away. Residues are discovered by comparing and analyzing huge numbers of social actions. They correspond to some fairly permanent human impulses, instincts, or sentiments. Pareto, Burnham informs us, is concerned not so much with the question of where residues come from as with the fact that social actions may be analyzed in terms of them, whatever their origin.

Residues may be divided into different classes as, for example, the instinct for combinations, group-persistencies, self-expression, sociality, integrity of the individual and his appurtenances, and the sex residue. These form the relatively unchanging nuclei of non-logical conduct which makes up the greater proportion of human action. Along with these residues go the derivations, that is, the verbal explanations, dogmas, doctrines and theories with which man clothes the non-logical bones of the residues. Concrete theories in social connections are made up of residues and derivations. The residues are manifestations of sentiments; the derivations comprise logical reasonings, unsound reasonings and manifestations of sentiments used for purposes of derivations. They are manifestations of the human being's hunger for thinking. If that hunger were satisfied by logico-experimental reasonings only, there would be no derivations. Instead we should get logico-experimental theories.

Pareto believes, however, that derivations have little effect in determining important social changes. Residues are the abiding, significant and influential factor. The influence on people's actions and on the course of events that derivations seem at times to have is always deceiving the surface observer. But the seeming influence of the derivations is in reality the influence of the residue which it expresses. It is for this reason that the "logical" refutation of theories used in politics never accomplishes anything so long as the residues remain intact.

Disputes over the best form of society and government are derivations which never reach objective stability but come and go with every shift in cultural fashion and sentiment. Such disputes, according to Pareto, may be interpreted in terms of the notion of "social utility." And here it is necessary to distinguish between the utility *"of* a community" and the utility *"for* a community". The first refers to the community's strength and power of resistance as against other communities; the second to a community's internal welfare. The first may be objectively studied. The second, however, is purely subjective or relative, since what is internally useful depends on what the members of the community want. Internal and external utility seldom coincide. Because a community is sub-divided into various groups, utility means different things to different people. Programs are put forward which, though favorable only to a particular group, claim to favor the whole of society. Because of the disparity between the internal and external utility, it is useful for society to make people *believe* that their own individual happiness is bound up with the acceptance of the community's standards. Though this is not true, the truth is not always advantageous to society, falsehood or nonsense not always harmful. Whether one or the other should be employed can be found out only by concrete investigation.

Summing up Pareto's ideas, Burnham mentions five forces that make society what it is and that bring about social changes. 1) The physical environment; 2) residues; 3) economic factors; 4) derivations, and 5) the circulation of the èlites. The last point interests Burnham the most. Human beings, he says, are not distributed evenly over the scale. At the top there are very few, there are considerably more in the middle, but the overwhelming majority is grouped near the bottom. The èlite is always a small minority. Within the èlite we may further distinguish a "governing èlite" from a "non-governing èlite." According to Pareto, Burnham continues, the character of a society is above all the character of its èlite. The èlite is never static. If, in the selection of members of the èlite, there existed a condition of perfectly free competition so that each individual could rise just as high in the social scale as his talents and ambition permitted, the elite could be presumed to include, at every moment and in the right order, just those persons best fitted for membership in it. Under such conditions society would remain dynamic and strong, automatically correcting its own weaknesses.

But such conditions are never found in reality. Special principles of selection, different in different societies, affect the composition of the èlite so that it no longer includes all those persons best fitted for social rule. Weaknesses set in and, since they are not compensated for by a gradual day-by-day circulation, are sharply corrected by social revolution. It follows that a relatively free circulation of èlites is a prerequisite for a healthy society. Otherwise society is threatened either with revolution or destruction from outside. Of course, it is not enough to keep the èlite more or less flexible. The *kind* of individuals admitted or excluded is also very important, for the character of the society is determined not only by the basic residues present in the entire population, but also by the *distribution* of residues among the various social classes; and this distribution may change quite rapidly. Pareto's theory of the circulation of the èlites is, in brief, a theory of social change, of social development and degeneration.

At the end of his study of the Machiavellians, who speak mostly for themselves, (about half of the book consists of quotations), Burnham summarizes his findings into a few main principles in terms of which he then analyzes 1) the nature of the present historical period, 2) the meaning of democracy, and 3) whether or not politics can be scientific.

II

Before following Burnham in this endeavor it may be well to point out that his present respect for the Machiavellians most probably stems from his previous respect for Marxism. His interpretation of Machiavelli is, by and large, the long-accepted one of Marxism or, for that matter, of all reasonable people. Like science and industry, politics had to emancipate itself from transcendental ethics, that, is, from the power of the Church in feudalism. It should also be noted that all the modern Machiavellians Burnham deals with have been profoundly influenced by Marx. Most of their principles, as, for instance, that one must distinguish between the words and the meanings of programs, that one must recognize that most social actions are "non-logical", that there are rulers and ruled, that politics is the struggle for power, that the èlite determines the "character" of society and that its rule is based upon force and fraud, that ideologies support the ruling classes, that èlites circulate, that revolutions are inevitable, and so on — all these ideas are also found in Marxism, though sometimes in another connection and with more or less meaning than is to be found in Burnham's study. If Burnham nevertheless prefers the Machiavellian version to the Marxian, it is for the sole reason that he believes the former to represent an objective science of politics and society which describes and correlates observable social facts, whereas the Marxists do not believe that politics can be an objective science, neutral to any practical political goal. ***However, one must also differentiate between the Machiavellians' avowed aim and what they are really doing.***

Aside from the question of whether or not politics can be an objective science, Burnham's Machiavellians did not succeed in making politics scientific. Their theories are part and parcel of the ideologies of their time. This may be noticed least in Sorel and Michels. But it is very clear in Mosca and Pareto and would be apparent in Burnham's interpretations if he had been less taken in by the prevailing fascist ideology. It is, for example, a little more than fair to say, as Burnham does, that Pareto was less concerned with the question of where residues come from than with the fact that social actions may be analyzed in terms of them, whatever their origin. Pareto explained every sociological and psychological fact by assuming a specific instinct or sense for it in human nature. His vagueness and ambiguity in this respect must not be taken for disregard as to the origin of things, but rather as an indication of Pareto's own limitations.

It is, furthermore, not possible to understand Pareto by merely dealing with his sociology, for the latter is closely bound up with his economic theory. Pareto was an ardent proponent of a liberal system of economics — the only system which he considered logical and scientific. But as there never was, save as an ideology, and never could be a capitalist system of economics such as he constructed in his mind, he could not help losing belief in its realization. But neither could he make himself admit its impossibility and thus he concluded that there was nothing wrong with his scientific theory, but that the unreasonable attitude which opposed liberalism was too strong to be successfully combated. Out of his disappointment came his theory of non-logical actions and their unchangeability. His thinking of the past, however, was not entirely wasted: it was utilized in his theory of the circulation of èlites. His sociology may be explained as a by-product of *laissez faire* ideology at a time when, due to the development of capitalism, the facts of the real world began increasingly to contradict its ideology, developed earlier.

Despite his apparent detachment from particular political interests, Pareto's "scientific attitude" is a mere illusion. His treatment of observable facts" is on the same level that modern economics treats the facts of production and distribution. For apologetic and "practical" reasons, bourgeois economy rejected the labor theory of value and tried to develop a workable subjective value theory which only resulted, in the end, in its giving up all attempts to explain prices. The given market prices — the observable facts — became the economists' sole concern. The value theory served merely decorative purposes. In Pareto's sociology, too, the axioms with which he works are only decorated with, but not based upon, the residues he established. Despite his apparent attempt to search for the causes of social conduct, what is really important in his theory are unexplained actions, witnessed and described by him.

The categories of bourgeois economics are thought to hold good for all mankind, under all circumstances. In like manner Pareto's residues are

also unchangeables. Of course, actual changes cannot be denied but, just as in the case of economics where all such changes leave undisturbed the idea of human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means, so in Pareto's sociology, too, all changes, for whatever reasons, remain determined by the residues.

If it were not for the predictions made by the Machiavellians, most of what they said could be accepted; indeed there was little that they brought forth that had not already been recognized, in one way or another, by Marxism. Neither is there any objection to the application of scientific methods to social problems — in Burnham's words to the accurate and systematic description of public facts — nor to the attempts to correlate sets of these facts in laws, and, through these correlations, to attempt to predict, with some degree of probability, future events. Of course the wish and the possibility are two different things. In many of its fields social science cannot be experimental. No social system is as empirical as are the natural sciences, not to mention the great and numerous difficulties that stand in the way of "objectivity" which the class character of society imposes. According to Burnham, predictions about future events must be based on evidence of the past. One could agree here, too. But what is the evidence of the past?

For Machiavelli the past simply meant that political life is never static but is continually changing. Deliberate actions of men have very little to do with this situation, which is laid at the doorstep of "fortune." Fortune remains unexplained; so also is the reason for political life. The latter is merely acknowledged. Machiavelli is satisfied with "political man", says Burnham, just as Adam Smith was with "economic man"; neither was interested in "human nature as a whole." Contrary to what Burnham says, however, human nature for Adam Smith consisted precisely in "the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another," and "political man" is the whole man for Machiavelli. For both it was not the evidence of the past which caused them to be concerned only with "political man" and "economic man" but their interest in the developing capitalist society and in its prerequisite, the nation-state. In reality both "political man" and "economic man" were only the results of the development of the social forces of production which underlie all social change.

Because the real evidence of the past was considered neither by Machiavelli nor by Adam Smith, they had to introduce either "fortune" or the "invisible hand" which supposedly accompanies the social development, based, as it was, on the peculiar character of human nature, described as "political" or as "economic" man. It was Marx who showed how unreal this kind of "realism" really was, first, by showing that economics determine politics and, secondly, by showing that economics are determined not by human nature but by social relations which arise in connection with the development of the social forces of production.

In comparison with pre-capitalistic ideology, the new ideology of Machiavelli and Adam Smith was, of course, quite realistic. There simply is no such thing as "realism." Like everything else, realism, too, must be considered historically. To accept Machiavellian realism at the present time is a step backward from an already established social realism corresponding to the present level of general development, to a level that belongs to the early stages of present-day society. In this connection it is amusing to notice that the same people who no longer believe in *laissez faire* ideology now find refuge in the still more primitive form of that same ideology, namely, in Machiavellianism. Such a great retreat cannot, of course, be regarded as an attempt to consider the evidence of the past. It is plainly an attempt to learn from the evidence at the disposal of the politicians of the Renaissance.

To be sure, when Marx showed that economics determine politics, he was dealing with a particular stage of capitalist development — its *laissez faire* stage — during which business and not naked force found emphasis. This stage had been preceded by political struggles in which business seemed to play a secondary role. But as Robert A. Brady recently expressed it, "the natural frame of reference of ownership is, and has been from the beginning, as clearly political as economic, as obviously 'Machiavellian' as 'Ricardian'." What bourgeois economy understood as "economical" in distinction to "political" was that the exchange mechanism itself established a social order which, save for external purposes, made political interferences quite unnecessary. And in fact, after the political basis for an national economy had been established by way of wars and revolutions and far-reaching state-interferences there came a time for the foremost capitalist nations, when politics was almost entirely subordinated to the needs of business, when the state was in fact the servant of capital. It was in this sense that Marx could speak of the determination of politics by economics.

However, by considering the attempts to establish, defend, or expand the national basis of capitalistic economics one can also speak of the subordination of economics to politics. If one is interested only in a definite phase of capitalist development under particular conditions one may speak of the predominance of "politics" or the predominance of "economics" in determining national policy. But if one speaks of capitalism in general, such a distinction can no longer be made, save for the methodological reason of showing more clearly different aspects of the same thing.

Internally, too, a distinction may be made between economics and politics, depending upon whether or not the social frictions, caused by the class character of society, demand the employment of direct force. At times economic control suffices, at other times it must be supplemented by open terror. Yet, for a considerable length of time, the direct use of force against the workers was the exception, not the rule. The control of the means of production was enough to guarantee the undisturbed exploitation of labor

by capital. The capitalist ideology was strong enough to keep the police-budget low.

By saying that economy determines politics, Marx showed what was behind Machiavellianism. But he also showed what was behind both Machiavellianism and the capitalist economy by pointing out that history was the history of class struggles determined by the development of the social forces of production, which include both technics and social relations. "The sum total of the relations of production," Marx wrote, "constitute the economic structure of society — the real foundation on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite social consciousness." Definite systems of economics such as feudalism and capitalism, which determine the politics of their time, are in turn determined — just as these politics are inseparably connected with the economic structure in which they operate — by the forces of social production in which the history of mankind characterizes itself.

This is the reason for Burnham's charge that Marxism is a monistic theory, relating everything to the last cause of materialistic economics. However, Marx's concept of history is both monistic and pluralistic, depending upon what is to be investigated. When Burnham's Machiavellians, Mosca for example, reject Marxism because of its monistic aspect, his own pluralistic theory of history is pluralistic only because he stops at a definite point of investigation. Because like all capitalist theoreticians, he refuses to recognize the merely historical character of capitalist relations, he is not able to go beyond the superficial investigation of surface phenomena. Like Pareto's Mosca's ideas, are based upon some constant psychological laws. But the validity of these psychological laws cannot be demonstrated. What remains of his theory are the so-called "social forces" which stand for all human activities with significant and political influence, such as those connected with war, religion, land, labor, money, education, science, technological skill, and so forth. These "social forces" account for Mosca's theory of general social behavior, which is then boiled down to an investigation of politics. The whole endeavor finally yields nothing but this — that the stratification of society into rulers and ruled is universal and permanent.

We have seen that Pareto, too, speaks of five forces that make society what it is and that account for its changes. First, there is the physical environment. No theory of history disregards environment, that is, geographic and climatic factors, either utilized or combated by man. Without certain raw materials, furthermore, certain technical and social relations could not have been possible. But the existence of these production possiblities alone does not explain their utilization. The physical environment is a necessary condition for social history, but does not explain it. The second factor is residues, derived from a long-rejected instinct psychology. These we have already discussed. The third are economic factors. As an independent force

they make no sense in his theory. Pareto, as we know, considered economic theory as logical and scientific. It belongs thus to the derivations, which play no real part in history, determined as it is by residues. There remains the fifth factor: the circulation of èlites, that is, the capitalist theory of economic competition expressed in political terms. As such this factor, too, belongs to the derivations. Thus the pluralistic approach boils down to a monistic psychological theory of history.

Marxism has no objection to dealing separately with the "social forces" enumerated by Mosca and to considering their influence upon society and upon the course of history. In contrast to Pareto, Marxism holds that "derivations", that is, scientific theories and ideologies, are in one sense real forces in history. Because in class societies all factors are, so to speak, partly real and partly ideological, for all practical purposes Marxism cannot restrict itself to the underlying cause of all the separate movements and ideas that bring about changes in the social structure and social relations. It deals with the "logical" as well as with the "non-logical." But instead of merely separating them, Marxism inquires into the reason for their being and discovers that history has been not only the struggle between men and nature but also, within this setting, the struggle between men and men. The latter struggle is based on positions with respect to the means of production, for one can exploit and rule only by exploiting the labor of others and by ruling over the laborers.

By recognizing that the double character of all activity and thought stems from social production-relations, it is possible to see through the different fetishism that different societies adhere to at different times. One can at once admire Machiavelli's attempt to rid politics of transcendental ethics or, for that matter, despite all the inconsistent and incoherent verbiage accompanying Mosca's and Pareto's ideas, agree with their re-discovery that society is divided into rulers and ruled. Marxism, however, is not interested merely in the recognition and classification of social facts. It wants to change the existing society. Being critical of all that exists gives it the incentive to search as thoroughly as possible for the reasons for previous social changes in order to be able to base its hypotheses on the evidence of the past and present. It was this revolutionary seriousness which led to Marx's predictions, the correctness of which is now almost generally acknowledged — at least as far as economic development is concerned. The connection between class structure, economics, politics, and ideology which is brought to light in historical materialism and in the theory of the fetishism of commodities has, indirectly, also found recognition, though in a perverted capitalistic form, in the present vogue of Machiavellianism, semantics, psychology, positivism, and in the growing cynicism generally.

It was the class-approach, that is, the search for the weaknesses of present-day society, which made Marxism differ from bourgeois economics, sociology and philosophy. Whoever does not want to change society, will look for its strong points. Both approaches undoubtedly tend somewhat

towards a distorted, one-sided picture of society and its possibilities. But history itself corrects it again. Each side, of course, always desires to see clearly both the weakness and the strength of the adversary but, aside from the power of ideology, the dearth of empirical data in the social field makes this quite difficult. What can be gained are approximations of the true status of society at any particular time. And here the evidence points to the superiority of the Marxian approach.

Society is in continuous flux; to some degree all its changes affect its underlying socio-economic basis. At certain times the changes bring the underlying relations into sharper relief; at other times they cloud them still further. The restlessness of society itself prevents Marxism from crystallizing into a dogma. Where it became a dogma it ceased to be Marxism and turned into an ideology to cover up an un-Marxian practice. As an ideology it has been attacked and as such it need not be defended. But as a realistic theory for the struggle against present-day society it has found no substitute. There is no other scientific theory concerned with goals that presuppose the destruction of present-day society. There is thus no theory so critical as Marxism. And it is precisely the lack of criticism which prevents the non-Marxian scientist from going beyond the superficially given facts and which makes him, wherever he tries to do so, indulge in mysticism garbed in scientific phraseology.

Marxism as a dogma must be rejected. A Marxist will therefore appreciate the work of Sorel and Michels in so far as they shed light upon reality darkened by dogmatism. The development of labor organizations, investigated by Sorel and Michels, roughly paralleled the development of liberal capitalism. The rapid increase of exploitation allowed for both sufficient profiits for capital accumulation and the betterment of proletarian living conditions in the advanced capitalist nations. The labor movement ceased to be a revolutionary force. It became a part of capitalism, one capitalist institution among others. Both the political and the economic organizations of labor changed into ordinary enterprises, supporting and participating in the exploitation of labor. Marxism served as the ideology which hid this fact, just as it serves in Russia today to cover up the exploitation of labor by the privileged under state-capitalism.

Sorel and Michels witnessed this development. Sorel thought that it had something to do with political parliamentarianism, which he considered an impossible way to reach socialism. It would merely change the personnel of the state apparatus but would not affect the lot of the workers. He also thought that the "scientific" approach of the socialists, being a part of the bourgeois ideology of science, was the wrong approach for the solution of social problems. This science was able to describe things, but unable to alter them. It could never lead to actions powerful enough to change social conditions. A social movement, in his opinion, needs ideas which guarantee

success in advance of its struggle — a myth, so to speak, which, though not a strictly scientific theory, is nevertheless not arbitrary but able to direct energies towards the solution of social problems. The particular myth he advocated was the myth of the general-strike, for this myth, he thought, was capable of incorporating in itself all the ideas that were needed, and actually bound up, with class necessities and the desires of the proletariat. It was in the strike that the class struggle found its sharpest and truest expression, in which the interests and feelings of the workers came mostly to the fore. In the strike, furthermore, they were directly engaged, not merely represented as in the so-called political actions of that time. A real general strike could work as the lever which would dislodge capitalism. It could not, however, be brought about in a purely rationalistic manner. It must be initiated and carried on with a deep conviction on the part of the masses that it would succeed and solve their problems in order to arouse the maximum of proletarian solidarity, activity and strength.

Sorel was right in his criticism of the state-socialism of the Second International. But the same criticism could be made, and was made, from a Marxian point of view. One did not need to be a "Machiavellian" to recognize that the political success of the socialists would not lead to socialism but merely to a change of politicians in the state apparatus. This was quite obvious from the behavior of the socialists within capitalism. But Sorel's road was not a road to socialism either. The "economic" organizations, syndicalist or otherwise, succumbed to the growing power of capital just as much as the political wing of the labor movement did. The "general strike" could not be made into an all-embracing myth, able to become a social force strong enough to destroy capitalism, for myth-making, too, is a capitalist monopoly. Controlling the means of production and destruction, capitalism controls also the making of myths and ideologies. To propagate a myth or to utilize science in order to get the masses into motion for the abolishment of present-day society are equally unrealistic.

Behind the ideas of socialists and syndicalists there was finally no more than the capitalist liberal ideology itself, that is, the illusion that capitalism would largely remain a competitive, decentralized, planless, uncoordinated system, by virtue of which it was possible to build something new in the shell of the old. Did not capitalism, too, develop within the framework of feudalism? The hope of being able to utilize liberalism for the class purposes of the proletariat was even stronger in the syndicalists than in the socialists. The syndicalists combated "Marxism" not only because it aspired to control the state, but also because it had no real objections to the centralizing forces of capitalism and intended to make the state the controller of all the means of production. This centralism, the syndicalists thought, would foster exploitative social relations. They favored the decentralization of power and production. A kind of non-capitalistic *laissez faire* system was to insure self-government of the various unions or syndicates. It must also be noted here that syndicalism flourished best in those nations where the

centralization process of capital was only in its infancy, where numerous small enterprises dominated, whereas in the highly-developed capitalistic nations socialist unions professed to share the centralizing ideas of the socialist parties.

The "Machiavellian" in Sorel, of which Burnham speaks, did not prevent his falling victim to the ideology of liberal capitalism. The more Machiavellian he tried to be the more he succumbed to it. The Marxists at least recognized that the capitalist centralization process had its basis not only in capitalist competition but also in the increasing socialization of production by the spreading of the division of labor under capitalistic conditions, by the development of large-scale industry and the world-wide expansion of the capitalist mode of production, which created not only a different relationship between men and men but also a different relationship between man and nature. If capitalist competition can be changed, it must be changed in a manner which does not contradict the necessities of the increasing socialization of production. With the coming of capitalism, furthermore, centralization or de-centralization in the direction and use of the means of production ceased to be a debatable question, for capitalism always means the control over more means of production by always relatively fewer men. A new society can only be a society in which neither centralism nor de-centralism plays any important part, in which the producers organize their production rationally in accordance with the real needs of society without being too much concerned with questions of organization — where organization is merely a part of the production and distribution process like any other machine, factory, or material entering production, and not simultaneously a question of power and privilege.

In any class society, organization has two functions: to secure the life of society and to secure the position of the ruling class. The history that the Machiavellians deal with is the history of class societies. There is no doubt that the evidence of the past suggests an *iron law of oligarchy* based on the social need for organization which Robert Michels speaks of. Social life cannot dispense with organization, it is true, but from this it does not follow that social life cannot dispense with classes. It may not be able to dispense with classes under certain conditions. But conditions can be changed. Specifically, under conditions of a social production which is unable to satisfy the needs of the people, it is difficult to envision modern society as a classless society. In a society in which the necessities of life exist in potential abundance, classes may co-exist. Yet it is not impossible to envision such a society as classless.

It is certainly not scientific to conclude from the evidence of experience that no new experiences are possible. From the experience of organzations in class societies, one cannot draw the conclusion that organizations cannot be "democratic," whatever the conditions. Organization by itself has no meaning; it has meaning only in connection with social activity and will mean different things for different activities in different societies. Michels' concept of organization is a timeless concept, more crude but of the same order as, for instance, Hans Kelsen's timeless concept of law or, for that matter, the timeless economic categories of bourgeois economy. These timeless concepts, however, have their sole justification in methodology. They may or may not help in understanding the historically-conditioned and class-determined real law, real organization, real economy and so forth. But no direct conclusions with regard to past and present realities and the possibilities of the future can be drawn from these general concepts. The attempts to abstract political and economic systems from time and space in order to find elements common to all times and all people are made, of course, to enable bourgeois social scientists to proceed in their field with the "objectivity" that the natural scientists employ in their fields. Yet even if such common elements have been found, they must still be taken up *anew* in their specific historical setting. There they take on a *new* character in need of special investigation, for they never exist by themselves.

Michels advances some mechanical and technical reasons for the impossibility of "democracy" in organization. All of them, however, refer to democratic political organizations under liberal capitalism. His experiences in this field he offers as evidence for his position that all organizations, at all times, even the "economic democracy" of socialism, are by necessity always oligarchic. We have already pointed out that the labor organizations, investigated by Michels, had been thoroughly capitalized, so that their structure did not differ from the structure of so-called bourgeois democracy. Pareto's theory of the circulation of èlites is a re-statement of the theory of capitalist competition in political terms, whereas in Michels' theory the experiences with bourgeois political democracy form the sole content of his seemingly timeless concept of organization.

According to Michels the need for organization and the mechanics of organization make a classless and democratic society impossible. In other words, social life itself prevents a real sociality. But one cannot deal with organization *per se*. There was, for example, a pre-capitalist division of labor which differed from the division of labor under capitalism which will differ from the division of labor under socialism. To repeat, for methodological reasons one may deal with the division of labor *per se*. Yet, in order to make statements referring to the world of facts, one must return from this abstract investigation to the division of labor under specific conditions, at a particular time. Therefore, when Burnham says that a Machiavellian will be "scientific", that is, will be satisfied with "the systematic description of public facts and the attempt to correlate sets of these facts in laws; and, through these correlations, attempt to predict, with some degree of probability, future events," the facts he can deal with are not the timeless concepts with which the Machiavellians operate — such as Machiavelli's "political man", Mosca's "constant psychological law", Sorel's ever-necessary "function of myth", Michels' "iron law of oligarchy", and Pareto's "residues" — but the prevailing facts of the society in which the predictions are made.