

The argument was pitted against Idealist logic, the so-called "epistemological logic" with Lotze as chief protagonist. On the positive side, Dewey sought to fashion a "logic of genetic evolution," based on the tenets of James' functional psychology. The main point of the new logic was that ideas and concepts, notions and hypotheses, judgments and truths were all basically functional and instrumental, since they had a specific job to do in a specific problematical situation. "The entire significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social history is that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, has to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation." We find here the main ingredients of Instrumentalist logic: 1) the doctrine of the situation, 2) the doctrine of evolution, 3) the doctrine of adjustment and 4) the doctrine of instrumentation. Behind them lies the Darwinian theory of Evolution — originally enunciated in 1859. Logic was to be lifted off its former idealist and empiricist foundations by way of the experiences of men in reconstructing situations and specific situations under the aegis of evolution and instrumentation.

Experience is interpreted in terms of biological significance and history is taken to be of a similar continuum, to wit, natural history. For this is as far as the Pragmatist philosopher suffers change, evolution and transformation to be meaningful for his logic and for his society. Where, then, does society enter? Where do social and economic relations come in? Are these to be permitted a natural evolution, also, even as man, the biological animal? Are the specific situations to be disparate, atomic, sporadic, independent, isolated, in so far as the individual only must face them in his predicament? And what about the use of this logic, instrumentally, in relation to panics, crises, social problems? The answer lies in the actual way in which Dewey goes about solving and reconstructing his self-styled "indeterminate situations." First, there are trouble, predicament, stress, situation, problem. All these arise in our daily human experience. On the face of it the individual has a task before him, namely, to resolve the situation into some kind of reconstruction in order to carry life forward, beyond the particular present stasis. It is a condition that calls for "thinking" as functional. The difficulties at hand have to be smoothed out, readjusted, reconstructed, resolved. The situation must be wrestled with, experimented with, worked through and worked out. Antecedents, immediate material, and content — all these constitute the locus of the thinking evoked. The problem now becomes "the restoration of a deliberately integrated experience from the inherent conflict into which it has fallen." In short, the individual faces conflict in his immediate experience. What is to be done?

The idealist would muster his preconceptions for the problem, the empiricist would favor the psychology of impression and associations. Neither of these hit the mark, according to Dewey. The Pragmatist asserts the predicament calls for "adaptation," as thinking becomes the tool for reconstructing the situation to "evolving" experience. The vicious circle is broken

by "action," for only thus is the predicament to be resolved in order to keep experience going beyond the temporary individual blocking. Hence the offices of thinking are functional, not formal; they are activist, not associative; they are instrumental and purposive for the end in view. This is the gospel of the means-and-ends affair, the Pragmatist's philosophy of thinking as instrumentalist logic.

What does all this amount to when we consider the entire process as indicated? What kind of predicament is it? That of the individual, the person. Who is to do the reconstructing? The person, the individual undergoing the predicament. And, finally, what kind of thinking does the instrumentalist logician have in view? The psychology of the individual making use of his biological instrument, namely, his individual thinking. Thus the individual goes on in his life and experience, constantly facing these numerous and disparate individual predicaments of his until his whole biological experience undergoes the natural evolution of a lifetime.

Nothing at all is said, here, as to the kind of society in which all this individual experience transpires. Nothing is indicated of the particular economic system in which these predicaments occur. Furthermore, it seems as if the Darwinian concepts of a natural history of evolution constitute the entire environment and foreground. This amounts to Dewey's basic omission of the kind of history that matters most for our human experience, including the individual, about whom he is most concerned. It is as if Dewey takes experience to be opaque environment, common to all men as biological animals, without due regard for the actual transformations that have specifically appeared in the economic and social history of the past and present — and is yet to come in the immediate future. It is no wonder that Dewey, failing to ground his thinking on this economic, social history, ignores the dynamic of the class-struggle throughout history, the pivotal dynamic of man's historical growth and evolution throughout the centuries of changing economy.

It follows that Dewey's instrumentalist logic is brusquely lifted to a psychology of functioning, an individual psychology of functioning, as if these existed apart from their foundation in particular social economics, that is, the progressive class-struggles from ancient slavery to capitalism and beyond. Hence his logic is imbedded in biology and psychology — functional, to be sure — and not in the economics and material histories which generate them. Hence his apotheosis throughout of the individual or person taking part in individual and personal predicaments.

Yet Dewey — or any other thinker — cannot deny that we are living today under a specific and particular system of economy and polity, namely, the capitalistic system. Rather than ignore this cardinal fact of historical reality in any philosophy of thinking or in any logic, we should stress it as basic and fundamental. Consequently, it is not the individual or person, nor is it the individual's personal predicament that is foremost in importance. It is the nature of the basic economy that constitutes every individual's

predicament and situation. Furthermore, it is the dynamics of the capitalist economy that produces the conditions of and the clue to the problems we face, including the very thinking demanded of us. Failure, therefore, to regard this as fundamental brings with it the concomitant failure to grasp the meaning of the nature of the class-struggle.

Actually, Dewey does not provide us with a technique or logical method for thinking our way through our problems. We are given, rather, the psychology of a particular social class behind the instrumentalist, or class-logic, of Dewey and his fellow-pragmatists. The antagonism to idealist logic springs from the desire on the pragmatist's part to shed the residues of a past economy, a past kind of logic no longer efficacious in the current scene. And the antipathy to empirical logic derives from a similar inefficacy on its part to be equal to the present stage of capitalist economy, so that, beyond both Lotze and Mill, Dewey wishes us to move forward to the instrumentalist logic of the middle-classes under current capitalism.

V

We have already observed that the Theodore Roosevelt administration had its hands full with the inner contradictions of the economy. Of special import to us is the growth of Socialism in America. The question is not whether Socialism was feeble or strong in its analysis. It is rather that events gave rise to a movement dedicated to indicting the kind of economy under which we were living and having our "experiences." How did it happen that not one of the Pragmatists found themselves in the ranks of Socialism? These philosophers of change and evolution were dedicated to the reconstruction of our logic and psychology of thinking; they were interested in our children's welfare, in the schools; they took on themselves the evolutionary reconstruction of our predicaments of experience. And yet, they could not join the new social forces interested in changing the form of economy from capitalism to socialism.

The explanation lies in the fact that instrumentalist logic — like the philosophy of Pragmatism itself — is the ally of the class in power today, safeguarding the vested interests of the capitalist preserves. Change may be biological and evolutionary, but it is not to be social, class nor revolutionary; it does not attack the very foundations of the prevailing economy.

The eclectic nature of this logic — a logic of the discrete, the isolate, the sporadic and the disparate — is manifest once again in its application to education. It tries desperately to formulate a synthesis in its philosophy of education. But in vain, since there are no solid foundations upon which to rear its structure because, to repeat, pragmatism disregards economics and therefore fails to formulate a philosophy of history. Such progress as Dewey represents results from his break with idealism, as we may observe if we compare his ideals with those of Prof. H. H. Horne, whose philosophy of education held sway at the time.

The bourgeoisie of England preceded Dewey in laying up the foundations of its new education, aided by Mill's Utilitarianism with its inductive logic and methods of experimental inquiry. In 1860 came the work of Herbert Spencer in which education was based on science, practical application, and the principles of evolution, all of which were aimed at the democratization and liberalization of education. It remained for Dewey to add functional psychology (James), instrumentalist logic, and the doctrine of meaning.

Let us see what Dewey's philosophy of education tried to do, even if it did not achieve its aims. Instrumentalist logic, as applied to education, finds its expression in Dewey's "How We Think" (1910), and in his "Democracy and Education" (1916). Both are designed to combat the formalism of our schools in the interests of training our children for the tasks they are to perform under the expanding economy of monopoly capitalism. The emphasis is placed, therefore, upon the pragmatic nature of thinking, side by side with the "shared experience" of bourgeois democracy. Education being a state function, what is Dewey's philosophy of state? To call it just "democracy" is merely to refer to its political machinery. There is, behind this philosophy — as Dewey does not make clear — the particular social economy of the modern state, the class-economy of the bourgeois mode of production. Hence, Dewey is really training his children for a class-state, for a class-economy, for a democracy under capitalism.

The proof of this lies in the ideas of the two volumes under discussion. "How We Think" advocates practical application and use as the mainsprings of concepts instead of the traditional method of formalism. The guiding factor is the solution of a perplexity by way of pragmatic reconstruction to further experience. Thus, in this view, the trouble with our schools is that they provide our children with formalist, ready-made products of knowledge, neatly set out in ready-made categories of subject-matter. These products are drilled into the child, with similar disciplines of formalism, and hence children are not activated to thought, particularly scientific methods of thought. The way out, as Dewey suggests, is instrumentalist logic.

What we have, here, is really no system of logic at all, but rather Dewey's sponsorship of the psychology he wishes to introduce, namely, the functional psychology of James. As such, it is a valuable contribution, both because it reforms our educational methods, bringing them up-to-date in the modern, scientific world about us, and because its value for education lies in the emphasis upon "process" and "growth." All this unmistakably pushes the boundaries beyond feudal economy, feudal education and the formalism of the traditional methods of thinking attuned to Aristotelian syllogism.

However, there are other alternatives besides the old syllogistic logic, as for instance, the symbolic logic of our day and the dialectical logic of the Hegelian variety, which came into prominence at the time Dewey wrote by way of the English logicians, Bradley and Bosanquet. We are still

within the precincts of capitalist ideology. Dewey does not favor symbolic logic but in several chapters in "How We Think" he actually draws a few lessons from the Hegelian idealists in the English group. Consider Dewey's attitudes toward inference and judgment, in order to see how heavily he leans in the direction of neo-idealism in logic. After declaring that there is a close connection between inference and judgment, Dewey goes on to view the latter as an "interpretation of facts" which serves him as guide to the subsequent doctrine of Meaning. For the idealist logicians — Bradley, Bocaquet, Lotze even — judgment is the "constructive interpretation of our present perception . . . for the process of interpretative amplification... It contains an identification of some ideal element, enlargement, or interpretation, with that relatively given element which reveals itself." Thus, in both schools of modern logic, there is a common trend away from formalism, away from syllogistic methods, in terms of judgment and inference as processes of reconstructing and interpreting the facts of reality. And in so far as Dewey makes meaning the clue to his psychology of thinking in education, his differences with the idealist logicians of England crystallize around differences of philosophy, since Pragmatism is the American way out.

But what is the Pragmatic view of Meaning, as a psychology of thinking in education? It means to take the particular fact before us, only to lift it up into a larger whole, as suggested to the person confronted with the fact. It is significant, it is indicative, it is directive. For Dewey, the process of meaning lies in the practical uses and applications of the concept. This makes the meaning pragmatic. Hence, education must break with formalism in order to provide the proper educative forces in school and in the course of study. The child is thereby encouraged to acquire the requisite attitude which will lead toward the pragmatic nature of meaning or meanings. Meanings for Dewey are applicative, instrumental, functional, psychologically prior.

Now what has this to do with logic in education? The answer lies, once again, in the fact that the philosophy of pragmatism offers no logic, but rather makes the definitive contribution of a new psychology. Thus, the so-called Instrumentalist logic is a functional psychology, and at best a theory of logic, or logical theory, offered as a break with formal logic.

In allocating the logic of Pragmatism — in education — we are not unmindful of its historical contribution within the ideology of the bourgeoisie; nor are we drawing any moral in favor of either neo-idealistic logic, nor yet present-day symbolic logic. What we refer to is its failure to integrate thinking into a system of logic, and hence its reformatory and inadequate character as a psychology, not as a logic. Furthermore, the psychology itself is taken to be the thinking implement, or tool, as if it were totally apart and detached from its proper social, economic, bourgeois foundation in society. That the psychology is aimed toward the proper training of children in thinking is only half the story; for the psychology itself has no use nor purpose except to meet the patent needs of the kind of social

set-up behind the new kind of education. In other words, the psychology is nothing but the distinctive social psychology of the ruling class. And since economy and state indissolubly go together, it follows that education — its psychology and its "logic" — is of the same capitalist fabric and texture.

From 1903, the date of Dewey's initial offerings in logical theory to 1910, and then to 1916 — the respective dates of the two books under consideration — America's factories, machines, industry and commerce certainly demanded a new kind of schooling for its purposes. The idealists had succeeded, up to a point, in furnishing our schools with a philosophy of education, but America was no longer the country it was in the '70's and the '80's. It was now launched on the course of imperialist enterprise, and hence there was a demand, *a fortiori*, for the kind of psychology and "logic" suitable to our social needs. And this was supplied by the philosophers of Pragmatism — James, Dewey, Baldwin — who were specialists in the new science of psychology drawn to the doctrines of evolution.

VI

The development of the socialist movement during the period referred to is indicative of the critical nature of both the economy and the state. Panic, crises and strikes were too repetitive to be considered "sporadic." The Marxian analysis — originally that of De Leon within the S.L.P. — laid bare the fundamental indictment of the American form of capitalism. Movements assumed first a political wing and then a more direct action, as for instance, the I.W.W. When the Socialist Party rose to prominence, its literature and message of socialism attracted the attention of Americans for the first time since Edward Bellamy.

We have seen, already, how Pragmatism eschewed any affiliation whatsoever with socialism. So long as the latter signified the advent of working class control, its materialism in philosophy was definitely objectionable to Pragmatism. But as socialism revealed its middle-class tendencies more and more prominently, it was not strange that the Socialist Party seized upon Pragmatism as being *the* philosophy. This attempt to mate two irreconcilables—Marxism and Pragmatism—an attempt which young Americans today associate with Sidney Hook — thus finds its beginning in the Socialist Party. An instance in point is W. English Walling's "The Larger Aspect of Socialism" (1913) wherein Pragmatism furnishes this socialist with his ideas on education, philosophy, psychology, all in Deweyan vein. Furthermore, Walling cites chapter and verse to show that both Marx and Engels were "pragmatists", even before the advent of America's pragmatists. Pragmatism in America thus became a kind of Revisionism, paralleling the educators of the Second International.

Dewey's "Democracy and Education" will not concern us too much, at this point. We shall merely indicate the general nature of its message. The volume particularly aims at stressing education on new bases: 1) science, 2) evolutionism, 3) experimentalism, and 4) democracy. In the body

of the book, however, there is no historical analysis of democracy, nor of the connections of politics and the state to economy. We learn of kinds of education — in ancient Greece, and in the more recent German monarchy; but these systems are not defined in terms of their basic class struggles, nor in their connection with ancient slavery and the feudal, landed economy; nor yet with the emergence of modern capitalism. As to the next step beyond our present American democracy, Dewey has nothing at all to say. The reason is that Pragmatism really has no future in face of changes already apparent. But taking democracy as it is, what kind of analysis does Dewey offer? Ignoring the nature of commodity-production, what remains for the philosopher to say about democracy? Only that it is "shared experience," that it provides for "individual opportunity," that it provides the child with the chance to "develop its own faculties," and that "the child must be educated for the society of his generation," and so on . . . Reduced to their concrete, social connotations, what do these expressions mean if not the safeguarding of the present social scheme against any possible radical change toward socialism? Hence education towards democracy is nothing but a system of guidance for teachers to encourage our children to think and think scientifically, the better to take their positions — if they are allowed to — as upholders of the capitalism of their elders. It is a bourgeois individualism for the retention of bourgeois economy.

VII

Accepting the Darwinian principles as fundamental James Mark Baldwin, very early in his career as thinker perceived the possibilities of a "genetic" psychology. Growth and development, transformation and process, evolution and change were to be the key-ideas of his approach to the mind. His interest in psychological processes led Baldwin eventually into the camp of the Instrumentalists or Pragmatists, with whom he was in closest sympathy. At the time when that philosophy had not reached its culminating stage as an influential force in America, Baldwin manifested a few minor differences between the ideas of the others about him and those of his own, personal innovation. Today, however, we can regard his thought as belonging within the group under discussion.

When the logical problem became important, Baldwin saw a chance to offer his own "genetic" views toward the reconstruction of this science on similar Darwinian principles. These were incorporated — beginning in 1906 — in a series of volumes on the subject, collectively known as "Thought and Things." The reader interested in the logic of Instrumentalism in America will find these volumes a rich mine of reference for the salient features of this type of approach to logic.

What does Baldwin attempt to do with his logic? When all is said and done, he has provided us not with a system of logic but with a psychology. We have observed a similar phenomenon in the case of Dewey. The question resolves around the "genetic" origin and function of the psycho-

logical processes as they transpire in the mind of the individual. We must insist upon this point of the individual, since that is exactly what Baldwin means by the term "genetic": he is interested in the modes of behavior that the mind goes through as it exercises these processes within the individual mind. There is nothing social, sociological nor even societal about the concept as he uses it. Consequently, it is an individual psychology resembling that of Dewey's individualism. That Baldwin was aware of the social aspects of our environment is made clear in other works of his, and here, too, there is a bipartite division: on the one hand, the growth of the individual's mental capacities; on the other, the social evolution of humanity. We mention this because it is dangerous to read into these conceptions any kind of organic connection between the individual and society, since that would be to distort the implications. For Baldwin, the person exists, the individual's mind has a growth and development, psychologically; but society is quite a different matter. In fact, in so far as Baldwin touches social matters, he always puts the person, the individual first. For example, he refers to "the individual in society," but he does not make society a sum of individuals, for society has its own history, whatever that may mean to Baldwin.

"Genetic" psychology moves along in three continuous stages as the individual's mind moves along its own growth and development with the aid of these processes. These stages are: 1) pre-logical, 2) logical, and 3) hyperlogical. According to Baldwin, what happens in the "logical" stage? There are processes of inference and judgment, processes of reasoning and thinking. The instrumentalist view reveals itself here, since these are all geared to purpose, function, interest, use, motivation and meaning. It is valuable, therefore, to follow the argument about the above-mentioned processes in the individual's mind. Judgment, for instance, partakes of the nature of individualized meanings. Inference connotes the implications of meanings. Hence, Baldwin's ideas on meaning constitute his main drive in the reconstruction of logic on the pragmatic, or instrumentalist basis. In other words, our task is to see just what our logician means by meaning. The answer is furnished readily, as we meet instance upon instance of the manner in which Baldwin assumes that the processes of the individual's mind work up these meanings, namely, purpose, interest, use, all of which are individual and personal in nature.

What we have here is nothing but the reflex of the organic structure of the economy behind this psychology. We reiterate this fact, since it turns out to be common to all psychologists of the Pragmatic school. It is the doctrine that fits so neatly into the social patterns demanded by the current economy, as the work of the world is done under the present order of things. My meaning is mine, your meaning is yours, his meaning is his, and all depend upon the individual in question. For, as Baldwin puts it, the individual from infancy is trained to cope with the world about him, in so far as the meanings of life are acquired in this directly personal and individual fashion. But Baldwin does not question at any time the nature of the society within which the individual takes his place.

The natural question arises as to how meanings of an individual's own mind, how the processes mentioned happen to function in the society about us as we are confronted with our fellow-men. How are meanings communicated? How are they brought into a common area of functioning for the welfare of society? What are the "genetic" problems of logic? Since Baldwin always thinks in terms of individual genesis, he seeks a way out in similar fashion: the individual imitates his betters, his elders, his masters, and the like. We may readily grant the power of suggestion as a social force, but at the same time we must realize that it is too hazardous for society to rely on this type of induction, for meanings, especially. A more reliable and more integral social force must be sought, and this elsewhere. The split that Baldwin made in behalf of the individual renders him incapable of solving this problem.

On the other hand, his suggestion that speech, or language, acts as the agency is a point well made, as there is no doubt that language is one of the cardinal binding forces in any society; in fact we may go even further and say that language is logic, a point that Baldwin does not even sense because of his individual and individualist psychology of "genesis." For if this were the case, then logic as language would be plunged into the possibility of involving the whole structure of social relations behind language and speech.

Meaning, here as with Dewey, follows the new psychology with the result that it breaks with idealism, and hence advances the reconstruction toward a new view of logic. Meaning as purposive, as functional, as experimental, as pragmatic — all this removes the problem of logic from the dusty and barren precincts of Idea and Ideal, of Eternal and Immutable, of Heavenly and Divine. This is progress in the history of thinking, for the psychology of the Pragmatists was a powerful weapon against the dogma and authority of the period in philosophy prior to the twentieth century. Or, to put it another way, Pragmatism was a decided reform in thinking away from formalism and structure, away from the perfectionist and the absolutist. It was not, however, rooted in the basic fundamentals of thinking in terms of the social realities of the world about us.

The logic and the psychology of the Instrumentalists are of a piece: they are allies and bed-fellows; they are joint weapons in a common exploitation. Tethered to the economy that generated them, they bear the brand of the class in power, the objectives it has before it. Thus, a psychology of function engenders a logic of function, and both are chiefly concerned with the individual in his purposes and motivations in life, in his desires and aims in life. How, then, we are to fare when the very prop is pulled at from under? Genetic logic is a grand scheme for understanding the human mind as the individual goes through the mental processes of growth and development. But if we were to ask Baldwin what kind of individual he has in view, whether his logic and psychology obtain for any kind of society, what kind of answer would be forthcoming? The individual under the economy of ancient Athens must have had genetic processes of

mind; and if we are to take an illustration nearer home, is it possible that Baldwin's thesis would hold equally well under the fascism of Germany? Either Baldwin means his psychology and logic to apply to all individuals, even as biology does, or he must see that changes in individuals—their lives, their minds, their logical processes — have something in their functionings that bespeak the various kinds of society, the various kinds of economy under which they live.

That is the main issue. How does the individual conduct himself in the different epochs in society — past and present? On this view we should be impelled to see "genesis" in its historical features, and thus be driven to the inclusion of class-struggles and class forces. To regard the individual as an omnibus for all times is either to ignore society or to permit no social backgrounds for the very "genesis" of the individual. The upshot of this failure to base his inquiry into logic and psychology on their socio-genetic foundations, plunges Baldwin into his final debacle. This is evident at the close of his work wherein he announces himself as a "pancalist," his own particular variety of Instrumentalist logic. He goes on to explain that Pancalism is the sum of it all, the definite and only proper view of reality, an apotheosis of *Beauty* in life. Such an out-and-out lesson in leisure-class collapse we have yet to see anywhere in the modern scene. After harping endlessly on purpose, growth, evolution, activity, function — the leading concepts of this philosophy of reconstruction — we find ourselves at the rainbow-end in view of the mystical vision of *Beauty*. Now all's right with the world, *Beauty* is on earth. That the life of contemplation is the be-all and end-all is the net conclusion of this logic of the genetic.

* * *

In closing, let us see what we have found in the American annals of the philosophy of Pragmatism, with its weapon of thinking, Instrumentalist logic. As we go over the ideology of the pragmatic representatives of American capitalism — Peirce, James, Dewey, Baldwin — it becomes clear that there is a vital connection between bourgeois economy and bourgeois logic. The system of commodity-production, with its dynamic of exploitation and its basic class-struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, has developed its own experimental, functional and genetic logic. This replaces the logic of idealism—residues of feudalism and initial capitalism abroad, that is, formal logic, primarily — on behalf of activity, pragma, use, purpose, function, in order to safeguard the economy of competitive individualism. Hence its logical outlook is always in terms of either the individual mind, the personal mind, the self, the individual experience, the isolated situation, the disparate predicament. Following in the wake, historically, of the logics of induction and positivism, it pushes forward on behalf of the class in power the better to channel thinking for the preservation of what is at stake. Any threat of fundamental change is anathema to this type of reformistic reconstruction, since it would lead to the dialectical logic of materialism and to a classless psychology.

C. P. West

GERMANY'S MASTER PLAN. The Story of Industrial Offensive. By Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh. Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc., New York, 1943. (339 pp., \$2.75).

This superficial book about the "disease of cartelization" serves the propaganda needs of the United States in her war against Germany, and aims to justify the policies of the Anti-trust Division of the Department of Justice. It speaks of a German master plan concocted by the "ruthless Teutonic vanity that finds release in war." This plan, it turns out, however, consists of no more than the various activities of the numerous German cartels which differ in no way from the activities of other cartels in other nations. Although the authors realize that in America, too, cartels and trusts foster totalitarianism, they find that only the German cartels were sufficiently developed to be dangerous to the peace of the world. Apparently all other cartels were merely the dupes of the Germans, for while cartelization in the democracies meant re-

stricted production and unpreparedness, in Germany it meant greater production and preparation for war. Even before the war these clever Germans acquired "more colonies" than Germany had before Versailles. Their conquests were "made by contract, which allowed German firms to 'divide and rule' world markets." The war must be fought to alter this situation. To guarantee peace the "principles of democracy", which oppose private planning and industrial oligarchy, must be victorious. Fortunately, despite all her planning in economics, science, and technology designed to weaken other nations and build up her own strength, Hitler's Germany started the war too soon, the democracies rallied their forces rapidly enough, and thus Germany will be defeated because of a miscalculation in time.

IN DEFENSE OF MARXISM. Against the Petty-Bourgeois Opposition. By Leon Trotsky. Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1943. (211 pp., \$1.50).

This book contains a selection of articles, bulletins and letters pertaining to discussions within the **Socialist Workers Party** before its last split. It all circles around Trotsky's attitude toward Russia and the war and around his orthodoxy in regard to dialectical materialism, and also touches on smaller things, such as whether or not Trotsky should have been ready to testify before the Dies Committee. All this is quite instructive if one is interested in knowing what goes on in a Leninist organization in which different factions fight for control. Behind the "big issues" discussed are small things concerning the influence of personalities within the organization. In his controversy with Trotsky, for instance, Burnham points out that nobody, not even the **Old Man** himself, objected to this disbelief in dialectics so long as he shared his, Trotsky's, political views. The controversy on the dial-

ectic itself yields nothing new. Trotsky insists that it is absolutely necessary in order to think correctly, but Burnham prefers "science" to Trotsky's "religion."

On the other main issue — the defense or non-defense of Russia — Trotsky's position is the more consistent one. If one believes that nationalization of property is a progressive step, it has to be defended against the onslaught of other nations less "progressive" in this respect. The defeatist position of the opposition is illogical so long as it agrees with Trotsky as to what constitutes the economic base of socialism. If Russia's basis is socialistic, it must be defended whether or not one likes the personalities who occupy the lucrative positions. However, for those who see no choice between a Stalinist and a Trotskyist bureaucracy, the whole debate is senseless.

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