

# BULLETIN

## OF THE IV CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

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### Third Session.

November 10, 1922.

Chairman: Comrade Kolaroff.

#### Contents:

Report of E. C. Comrade Zinoviev (Conclusion). Method of voting. Discussion on Comrade Zinoviev's report.  
Speakers: Kolaroff, Zinoviev, Bordiga, Radek, Wajsbauer, Ernst Meyer, Varga, Ruth Fischer, Neurath.

#### Third Session. Nov. 10th.

The third session of the Congress began on Friday, November 10th, at 11.30. M. Kolaroff in the chair. Zinoviev, speaking in German, presented the second part of his report, as follows:

I hope that the theses I have drafted concerning this question are already in your hands, or will reach you shortly. I will therefore content myself with a preliminary upon the theses.

The first questions we have to consider are the international economic situation, the international political situation, and the position within the labour movements.

As regards the international economic situation, I think it would be superfluous for the Fourth Congress to recapitulate what we decided at the Third Congress. In my own thesis I propose that the Fourth Congress shall simply confirm the thesis concerning the economic situation of the world presented to the Third Congress by Comrades Trotzky and Varga.

We cannot fail to recognise that the course of events during the last fifteen months has substantially confirmed these theses. There has, indeed, been a transient improvement in the United States, Britain, Japan, and France, and perhaps in other countries as well, but it is quite clear that there has been no permanent change for the better, and Comrade Varga

was perfectly right when, in his last pamphlet, he characterised the existing state of affairs as appropriate to the declining phase of capitalism. What we are now living through is something more than one of the periodical crises of capitalism: it is THE crisis of capitalism: it is the twilight, the collapse of capitalism.

The economic position of the world remains, therefore, the same, despite improvements here and there in various countries. Capitalism cannot find a way out of this situation. The only salvation for mankind, the only way of restoring the forces of production, is to be found in the socialist revolution. In this sense our diagnosis is unaltered, and we can unhesitatingly repeat what was affirmed at the Third Congress, that the objective situation remains revolutionary. Within its own framework capitalism can find no energies that will provide an escape from the definitive crisis of the entire capitalist world.

Next we come to the international political situation. Its character, likewise, is such as to entitle us to affirm that the oppositions are being intensified day by day, and that the international situation remains objectively revolutionary. During the last fifteen months the decay of the Entente has advanced with giant strides. What we have been witnessing has been tantamount to a liquidation of the Peace



of Versailles, and this decay of the Peace of Versailles is still proceeding. Bourgeois pacifism, whose most notable leader is Lloyd George, is utterly bankrupt. The Genoa Conference and the Hague Conference have affixed the seals to the bankruptcy of bourgeois pacifism. The electoral struggle now proceeding in Britain bears witness to an unprecedented poverty of ideas among the capitalist parties. The nature of the fight between the classic bourgeois parties in the land which was the pioneer in capitalist development shows that no trace of principle is left to either party. We note an absolute spiritual collapse. The struggle is one between coteries, one which merely serves to underline what was already plain enough, that bourgeois pacifism is bankrupt, and that the capitalist parties are no longer in a position to fight one another on broad grounds of principle.

The colonial and semi-colonial countries which constitute one of the most important factors of the process we denote by the name of the world revolution, have during this period raised their combat to a very high level. We see that in quite a number of oppressed countries, despite all the efforts of the imperialist governments, the liberationist movement makes continual progress. I think that among the communists no one to-day will contest the assertion that this struggle, although it is neither socialist nor communist, is nevertheless, objectively considered, a struggle against the capitalist regime. The great movements which we have been watching in India and in the colonial and semi-colonial countries are by no means communistic, but dispassionately considered, they rate as an important factor in the fight against capitalism.

Bourgeois democracy, whose decline we have been witnessing for several years, is now perishing more obviously month by month. What is the meaning of the events in Italy? Are they not an unprecedented attack on bourgeois democracy? Italy was one of the countries where bourgeois democracy was most halloed. The Fascist onslaught is an attack, not only upon the monarchical ideal, but also upon the ideal of bourgeois democracy. Not merely has the King of Italy lost prestige because a band of desperadoes

has thrust him aside politically, but the prestige of the whole regime of bourgeois democracy has been lowered. We keep clearly before our minds the happenings in Italy are not simply phenomena. Other countries will experience what Italy is experiencing, though perhaps in a modified form. If the Fascisti maintain power in Italy (and it seems probable that they will so during the immediate future), we can be little doubt that similar occurrences will take place in Germany, and perhaps throughout Central Europe. A new government in Germany would be somewhat different in form from the Fascist Government in Italy. In substance the two would be identical. Again, is now happening in Austria is not so much akin to the Italian situation. It is a blow directed against bourgeois democracy, which in Austria has hitherto been defended, not only by the capitalists and the Second International, but also by the Two and-a-Half International.

In Czecho-Slovakia we see the transformation of such a counter-revolutionary transformation. Of Hungary it is the same. At this very time when I am speaking to you there are renewed complications in the situation, such as might lead and especially in Yugo-Slavia indications that things are taking the same turn as in Italy.

We must look at the facts in the face. It is essential during a period that is so long, but will be so long, that unless the social revolution breaks out first, thus depriving the capitalist States of the possibility of organising a new war. The future, therefore, remains uncertain, but the collapse of the capitalist system is also in sight when we confine our attention to the complications in the political field. Simultaneously we note an unprecedented strengthening of the political position of Russia, the only revolutionary State which has been able to maintain itself for five years.

It will be necessary to discuss the new economic policy in detail when we come to consider the Russian question. I will, therefore, not anticipate, but will content myself with recapitulating what I said in my introductory remarks. We have come to the conclusion that the new policy was no chance matter. It was not something forced upon us by the

Various episodes may intervene. What we are witnessing in Italy is a counter-revolutionary movement. But when we take a broad view, we see that it is only an episodic intensification, a stage in the maturing of the proletarian revolution in Italy. The same thing may be said of the proletarian movement in quite a number of important countries. In general terms, then, the international political situation has grown more acute during the last fifteen months. The Third Congress was right in declaring that no equilibrium has been secured in capitalist Europe; and it was also right in pointing out that events of great importance, such as parliamentary conflicts, extensive strikes, etc., might readily lead to revolutionary struggles. The foregoing sketch of the position will have shown that the diagnosis of the Third Congress was sound. Recent events in the Balkan peninsula testify to the growing acuteness of the political situation. In connection with the Greco-Turkish War, the spectre of a new great war loomed ominously for a brief space. We seemed to be witnessing a rehearsal of the coming war. At this very time when I am speaking to you there are renewed complications in the situation, such as might lead to disaster. My own estimate of the situation is that war is not yet imminent, but the Balkan flurry was a foreshadowing of what cannot fail to come unless the social revolution breaks out first, thus depriving the capitalist States of the possibility of organising a new war.

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weakness of many of our Communist Parties. It was something greater than this. You are right in saying, with many of the best friends of Soviet Russia, that if Russia found it necessary to adopt a new economic policy, this was because the German, French, and British workers were too weak to overthrow the bourgeoisie in their respective lands. This is true enough, but it is not the whole truth. We have come to the conclusion that the necessity for the new policy is not something peculiar to our own land, in which the peasants form so large a majority of the population. We now believe that all, or nearly all, countries, even those with great proletarian masses, will have to pass through some such political phase. The new economic policy is something more than a result of our weakness, or of the weakness of the world proletariat; it is based upon an accurate recognition of the balance of power between the workers on the one hand and the peasants and petty bourgeois on the other.

Of course the peasantry in such a country as Russia differs from the German peasantry. Nevertheless, alike in Germany and in the other countries where capitalist development is far advanced and where there is a very numerous industrial proletariat, at the decisive moment the working class will have to adopt a whole system of measures to neutralise the trend of the most influential part of the peasantry. The workers, in fact, will have to use just such methods as we have used in Russia. We shall return to their consideration in connection with the Russian problem.

In a survey of the political world situation, we must not fail to take into account the Soviet Republic as a factor of primary importance. At a moment when the Entente is collapsing, when the colonial and semi-colonial nations are engaging in intensified struggles when, the war spectre hovers over the Balkan peninsula, and when the equilibrium of the capitalist world is trembling—at this very time the position of Soviet Russia is being rendered increasingly stable by the adoption of new economic methods. Thereby Soviet Russia has become a titanic factor in world policy. The star of the first proletarian Republic rises ever higher.



The general upshot is a revolutionary situation.

The capitalist offensive is an international phenomenon, and is one of the factors leading for revolution. The working class has not yet been able to arrest that offensive. There are, however, numerous indications, in France and elsewhere, that in the near future a change in this respect may be anticipated. The workers are closing ranks for defence, and will repel the capitalist offensive.

I now turn to the situation within the labor movement. In this domain the most notable phenomenon is the amalgamation of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals, an amalgamation that will be effected very soon. In Germany the matter has already been settled, and yesterday came the news of a similar settlement in Sweden. Branting has accepted the Left Social Democrats into his party. The same thing will take place elsewhere. In point of organisation, the union is not yet complete; but politically it is an accomplished fact, and it is a fact of great historical importance. The Second International is the enemy of the working class. No detailed proof need be offered in support of the assertion that the Two-and-a-Half International is being absorbed into the Second International; the process is not the other way about. Suffice it to quote the words of Martoff, one of the spiritual leaders of the Two-and-a-Half International, and in many respects the intellectual superior of his associates. He writes as follows in an article in his newspaper "Der sozialistische Bote" dealing with the problem of the Second International:

"Let us harbour no illusions. Under present conditions, the mechanical amalgamation of the two Internationals signifies the return to the Second International of the parties that detached themselves from that body in the hope of founding a very different International. The return is a defeat of these parties."

Martoff makes no secret of his opinion. It is true that at the close he finds some consolation for the members of the Two-and-a-Half International, saying: "Within the Second International we shall defend Marxism". But, none the less, he admits that the Two-and-a-Half International is returning into the bosom of the Second Inter-

national, and that the former has suffered a defeat.

There will, then, be a union of the reformist Internationals. This union greatly quicken the process of splitting the working class into two camps. On our side must also say: "Let us harbour no illusions!" The union of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals means two things. First of all, it means the preparation of the White Terror against the communists. The coup is connected with the world political situation, and so is the coup that is bringing governments à la Stalin to the front. The union of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals is preliminary to an unprecedented splitting up of the working class with a view to its weakening. I need not waste time insisting that this union really foretells a period of White Terror directed against the communists. Not by chance Mussolini, a renegade from the Second International, a sometime social democrat, is now at the head of the counter-revolutionary movement in Italy; not by chance are such as Ebert and Noske at the head of the government in Germany, or Pilsudsky at the head of the government in Poland. Nor is it a chance that the Second International shall be playing a decisive role in such countries as Britain and Germany. In Scotland as Germany, the situation is locally altered when the trade unions form a solid front with the mass of workers. No illusions then! The union of the Internationals foreshadows the inauguration of the White Terror against the Communist Parties.

In the second place, this union will involve the splitting of the Working Class. We communists are now advocating the unity of the trade unions. There is a reason for this course. The reformists plainly enough that the ground is being taken from beneath their feet. History speaking, this is inevitable. It is inevitable that the trade unions, should they take a normal course, will fall under the control of the communist reformists have a keen scent. They sense what is coming. They see that the influence of the communists over the working class, the general influence of the revolutionary movement, is growing.

instinctively, they try to avert it. They behave as if they had been directly commissioned by the bourgeoisie to shatter the trade unions. They are trying to destroy them before they are themselves driven out. I do not wish to suggest that they are directly commissioned by the bourgeoisie to pursue such a policy. We all know that political life is less simple than this would imply. Of course, Stinnes does not issue direct written orders to the trade union leaders as his henchmen. In the general political sense of the term, however, the socialist leaders are commissioned by the bourgeoisie to shatter the trade unions before leaving them. If they go out, they want to slam the doors so violently that all the trade union windows may be broken. This is their real aim.

No one can tell whether these developments will take months or years, but they are a historical necessity, and the leaders of the Second International realise that. That is why the same phenomenon is manifest everywhere—a deliberate preparation for a split at the moment when they feel that large masses of the trade unionists are about to come over to our side. They wish to weaken the working class, to pulverise the trade unions, so that when we come into power in the future we shall find nothing but fragments. That is what they are commissioned by the bourgeoisie to do, and it will be an act of unexampled treachery. In comparison therewith, even the treason of 1914 was perhaps a minor matter. A deliberate act of treachery is now being prepared. They want to disintegrate the working class, so that when the time comes for the workers to form a united front against the bourgeoisie, the workers will find themselves weak, disorganised, and utterly disintegrated. Such is the policy that finds expression in the union of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals.

This split in the labor movement is something more than a petty episode, something more than a trifle; it is a tremendous problem. Despite all its errors and defeats, despite the treachery of its leaders, the working class has fought for and achieved a huge organisation in the form of the trade unions, whose members are numbered by millions. At the given

moment, this organisation must play a decisive part in the struggle. To-day, when the momentous hour approaches, the Second International joins with the Amsterdamers in an act of the utmost treachery against the working class. Their aim is to shatter to fragments this great organisation, this last refuge of the working class, in order that when we get rid of the social democrats, we may find that there is nothing left to take over, that we have no labor organisations that are of any account. That is the most important fact with which we have to reckon. The social democrats and the Amsterdamers are foredoomed to become the professional disintegrators of the working class, not merely to betray the workers, not merely to interfere with the policy of the working class, but directly to break up the workers' weapons, the labor organisations. This will be the policy of the reunited Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals during the immediate future, and it is a fact with which we have to reckon.

It follows, comrades, that our tactics of the united front must be regarded as something more than a strategical move against our enemies. Nay more, it is our duty to do so. The policy of the united front, however, is dictated by the historical situation as a whole, by the general position of capitalist alike in the economic and in the political sphere, and by the state of affairs within the working class. If I am right in my view of the policy of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals, if I am right in believing that the tactics of the deliberate splitting of the trade unions and of the working class will be adopted in the near future, then our tactics of the united front are an inevitable and logical consequence. There are many reasons why we must deliberately work against this plan of the Second International. We must do so by our tactics of the united front.

At the Third Congress we accepted the task of winning over the majority of the workers. Has this task been fulfilled? No, not yet. We must state the fact boldly. In many countries, the influence of our Party has considerably increased. Nevertheless, we could not say at the Third Congress that the majority of the workers were on our side, nor can we say



at the Fourth Congress that they are on our side. There is much still to be done. In such circumstances, the tactics of the united front are the most important means of winning over the majority of the workers. We must be perfectly clear on the matter. The tactics of the united front denote something more than an episode in our struggle; they denote a period, perhaps an entire epoch. As circumstances change, we may perhaps find it necessary to modify these tactics. In the main, however, inasmuch as the Second International is our chief enemy and is the main prop of the bourgeoisie, we shall have to hold fast to these tactics.

From the economic outlook, capitalism is ripe for the transformation to socialism. The world political situation is one that may be characterised as revolutionary. The Second International is the main prop of the bourgeoisie. Without the help of the Second International and the Amsterdam International, the bourgeoisie cannot hold its ground. It follows that our relationship with the Second International is something more than a question of party tactics: it is part of the problem of the world revolution, of the tactics of our class as a whole. Inasmuch as the united Second International will for years to come work directly in favour of a split, we shall be enabled to win over the masses of the workers by purposely counteracting by our tactics of the united front, the efforts towards disintegrating the workers. Let me repeat, we are not dealing with an episode, but with an epoch.

The tactics of the united front have already proved advantageous to us in many ways. I do not mean that they have enabled us to win over the majority of the workers. Were that so, the game would already be in our hands. Still, we have gained a great deal. We have gained this, that the working class is coming to realise that the Communist Parties are not the disintegrators, and that it is the opponents of the communists that are working for disintegration. Until recently, the workers held another view, and perhaps they had some reason for doing so. At one time, in our efforts to defend the interests of the workers as a whole, we had to split the old Social Democratic Party. We should have betrayed the working class had we

failed to take this course. It was essential to secure a rallying point for a general liberating movement of the working class, and this could only be done by the creation of a Communist Party. In this period we had to accept the tactics of scissionists, for only by splitting the old social democratic parties could we forge the instrument for the liberation of the working class.

Now, however, we have entered a new historical phase. We have finished the task of the previous phase. There exist Communist Parties, which indeed contain vestiges of social democracy, which do indeed suffer from diseases incidental to childhood, which are troubled with growing pains, and which must be freed from these disorders. Our main problem now concerns the winning over of the majority of the workers, in order to save and win the trade unions, the chief weapon of the disposal of the world proletariat. That is why we have adopted the tactics of the United Front. I do not anticipate any serious disputes about the matter at this Congress. In France, the last of the Mohicans, those who had still fought against the tactics of the United Front, have laid down their arms, and it is an important fact that not only the French communists but also most of the syndicalists have now accepted the tactics of the United Front. Yesterday we had a brief talk with our friends in the United General Confederation of Labour. When we asked: "Are you still opposed to the United Front?" they answered laconically: "We have formed a United Front." Whoever follows the situation in France is well aware that in that country the centralists and the United General Confederation of Labor have deliberately adopted a United Front, for they do not help themselves. The needs of the daily struggle of the proletariat forced the adoption of the tactics of the United Front, both in the industrial and in the political field upon all who to defend the interests of the working class. The winning over of the masses of the United Front in France has been a great triumph, and it shows we are closing our ranks and that we shall be able to pursue tactics carefully thought out in advance.

What do we mean and what do we mean by the United Front? We certainly do not mean an electoral alliance. We have instituted an enquiry concerning the carrying out of the tactics of the United Front, and the enquiry has been very successful. Three hundred to four hundred answers have been sent in, some by comrades who work among the masses. The details are now being elaborated, and will probably be issued in book form. The enquiry has shown that much confusion still prevails among the comrades as to the precise meaning of the United Front. I have already explained that it does not mean an electoral alliance. Nor does it mean an organisatory union with the social democrats. The answers we have received from the executive committees of the Italian and of the French Parties show that many of the comrades have made the latter mistake. But an organisatory union with the social democrats would be the greatest crime we could commit. Everyone of us would rather have a hand cut off than enter into a union with these traitors to the working class, with those who are preeminently our enemies, with those who are the last prop of the bourgeoisie. The United Front implies nothing of that sort. The United Front means the leading of the working masses in the daily class war. It means that we are ready to march against capitalism side by side with all workers, be they anarchists, syndicalists, Christian Socialists, social democrats, or whatever you please to join forces with them in the daily struggle against the reduction of wages and against the loss of the 8 hour day. We accept the fact that we shall often have to sit at table with the treacherous leaders. The foregoing is what the united front means, and nothing else. I think that the problem is solved as far as the Comintern is concerned, and I think it has been solved even for the French Party, the one where the greatest confusion has hitherto prevailed upon this matter.

We shall also fight for the partial demands of the working class. I was shown yesterday an article written a little while ago by Comrade Gorter. I have not finished reading the article, but I will quote a passage from it. The passage runs as

follows. "We must oppose every strike. You will perhaps ask, why oppose every strike. I reply, because we must reserve all our energies for propaganda in favour of the revolution." Further on he writes: "We are so few, the ranks of the K.A.P.D. are so thin, that we dare not dissipate our forces in strikes, but must keep them intact so as to concentrate upon the revolution."

This manner of thinking is so confused that one stands speechless before the childishness of such a political thinker. He has no time to fight alongside the workers in their daily struggle against the bourgeoisie. He wants to help the whole revolution. He who feels for the working class, he who is not satisfied with a subjective attitude towards the masses, but who, on the contrary, understands something about the lives of the workers and who has laboured in their ranks, will reject such childishness. For the very reason that we wish to fight on behalf of the proletarian revolution, we must participate in every strike, must go in advance of the working class, and must fight on behalf of every partial demand. We are revolutionists. But this does not mean that we ignore the fact that the position of the working class must be improved, were it only to enable the workers to buy a drop of milk for their children. We are opposed to reformism but we are not opposed to anything that may improve the lot of the working class. We know quite well that in the extant conditions of capitalism the possibilities for such improvement are extremely restricted; we know that nothing but the revolution will secure a real uplift of the workers; but we also know that we shall never be able to organise the workers unless we fight on behalf of their partial demands. It is from this outlook that we defend the united front as a tactic which is not simply ephemeral, which is not simply episodic, but which in the existing circumstances of capitalism may last quite a while.

The watchword of the Labor Government has not yet been fully clarified. The tactics of the united front are almost universally applicable. It would be hard to find a country where the working class has attained notable proportions but where the tactics of the united front have not



yet been inaugurated. They are equally applicable in America, in Bulgaria, in Italy, and in Germany. By no means can the same thing be said of the watchword of the Labor Government. This latter is far less universally applicable, and its significance is comparatively restricted. It can only be adopted in those countries where the relationships of power render its adoption opportune, where the problem of power, the problem of government both on the parliamentary and on the extra-parliamentary field, has come to the front. Of course even to-day in the United States good propaganda work can be done with the slogan of the Labor Government. We can explain to the workers. If you want to free yourselves, you must take power into your own hands. But we cannot say, in view of the present relationships of power in the United States, that the watchword of the Labor Government is applicable to an existing fight between two parties, as it has been in Czechoslovakia, as it will be perhaps in Germany, and as it was and may be again in Italy.

The watchword of the Labor Government, then is not a general watchword like the tactics of the united front. The watchword "Labor Government" is a particular concrete application of the tactics of the united front under certain specific conditions. It is quite easy to make mistakes in this matter. I think we have to beware of the danger that results from an attempt to regard the stage of Labor Government as a universally necessary one. In so far as it is safe to prophesy in such matters, I myself incline to the view that a Labor Government will only come into existence occasionally, in one country or another, where peculiar circumstances prevail. I think its occurrence will be exceptional. Besides, it is quite a mistake to suppose that the formation of a Labor Government will inaugurate a quasi-peaceful period, and that thereby we shall be saved from the burden of the struggle. A Labor Government can only be based upon the winning of parliamentary positions, and these are worth nothing when won. A Labor Government will be no more than a petty episode in the struggle, and will not suspend the civil war. Please do not interpret me as meaning that the watchword of the Labor Government is one to be rejected

in existing circumstances. The working class must be made clearly to understand that a Labor Government can only be a transitional stage. We must say in terms that the Labor Government will not do away with the need for fighting, will not obviate the necessity for war. But as long as we recognise dangers of this watchword, we need hesitate to employ it.

The United Front has its dangers and the executive referred to them in its December thesis. The dangers are especially great when the United Front takes the form of the Labor Government. In countries with old parliamentary traditions, in France, for instance, it is hard to see that when we Communists speak of the Labor Government we are referring to something altogether different from the dictatorship of the proletariat. But to us it seems that a Labor Government is only one application of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Even if a Labor Government should come, we cannot avoid the civil war. In certain circumstances the civil war will even be intensified by the existence of a Labor Government.

I cannot refrain from saying a few words concerning the industrial council movement. I have devoted to this matter a special section of my thesis. I contend that a Party which has no communist organisation in industrial centres, which has no communist nuclei, is to be taken seriously, cannot be regarded as a serious communist mass party. I contend that a Labor movement which has not yet learned how to support and organise a mass movement within the domain of the industrial councils, is yet a serious revolutionary mass movement. The statement is applicable to almost all the great labor movements of our day. It is a sign of the times in Germany, where important and decisive struggles are probably imminent, where the whole vanguard of the movement is by the industrial councils. Turning to other lands, we must advise our comrades to devote themselves first of all to founding communist nuclei within the industrial councils' movement. Not until then shall we have a real mass movement. Many of our Parties have failed

to carry out this advice. At the Third Congress we adopted an admirable resolution drafted by Comrade Kunsinen, to the effect that every Communist Party should devote itself to the formation of nuclei—whatever the general line of its activities might be. But it is futile to adopt excellent resolutions if nothing be done to carry them into effect. We must see to it that the nuclei are really founded. Then our movement will forge ahead.

I must also add a few words concerning international discipline. In the thesis concerning the tactics of the United Front, proposed by the Renoult group at the Paris Congress of the French Party, there was a section concerning international discipline. Golden words are here inscribed. The group gave a brilliant theoretical demonstration that nothing could be done without discipline, and that the International would perish unless good discipline were maintained. Golden words, I say. But this same group gave a practical demonstration how wide a gap there can sometimes be between words and deeds. The best proof of international discipline is provided in the realm of action. Our tactics of the United Front are now extremely complex. There exists an International which is closely associated with the bourgeoisie, and which consistently works in opposition to us. If we are successfully to resist its machinations we must be strongly organised, and must have a genuine and rigidly disciplined International. It will be the task of the Fourth Congress to maintain this discipline and to carry it into effect.

Decisive struggles will be upon us in the near future. Many excellent comrades murmur when they hear me say this. They declare that the world revolution has been arrested for a time. The advance will not be resumed until the material position of the Russian workers has so greatly improved that they are better off than the average European and American worker. Then the example of the economic advantages of the Russian workers will arouse a revolutionary impetus, and there will be a renewed surge of revolution.

In my opinion, comrades, this is nothing better than a subtle form of oppor-

tunism, though such views are advanced by many who are revolutionarily minded and good soldiers of the International. I will confine myself to a word or two upon the subject. It is an undoubted fact that the position of the Russian workers is on the upgrade to-day, not the downgrade. The upward trend in Russia is slow, but it is unmistakable. No doubt a day will come when the economic position of the Russian worker will be better than that of the European worker which is on the downgrade. The upward trend in Russia is slow, but it is unmistakable. No doubt a day will come when the economic position of the Russian worker will be better than that of the European worker. But it is pure opportunism to say that it is impossible to lead a revolutionary struggle on the part of the workers of capitalist countries so long as Russian conditions remain difficult.

The real revolution will not be made by the workers in various countries because of an example drawn from other lands; it will not be made in any country because the workers there envy those in some other country who have more meat. The revolution will occur because the workers will find themselves in difficulties from which there is no exit without the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Consequently we must not allow those tones to become dominant in our agitation which imply that there is an arrest in the revolutionary movement. The Russian workers had far more numerous obstacles to overcome than those which impeded the revolutionary progress of the workers in other lands. The revolutionary workers all over the world will have the support of the Russian workers. The Russian workers were the first to rise in revolt, and they were opposed by the entire capitalist world. It is unlikely that the working class of any other country will have such great difficulties to encounter. To the working class throughout the world we must present the picture of the Russian proletariat in its true colours, speaking of the blockade, of hunger, and of pestilence, and of the greatness which triumphed over all obstacles. We can now be satisfied that the Russian working class, despite all its sufferings, is past the worst, and that from hour to hour, day to day, and month to month, im-



movements are coming. Such must be our conception of the Russian revolution: this conception must be the basis of all our tactics. (Applause).

The Chairman next called upon Bordiga to speak upon a point of order. Bordiga said:

Comrades, I make the following proposals in the name of the Italian delegation:

First, that we shall discuss and vote upon Zinoviev's report concerning the activities and tactics of the Executive Committee of the Communist International down to the time of the Fourth Congress.

Secondly, that we shall discuss and vote upon the question of the tactics of the International after the Fourth Congress.

I need not speak at great length on behalf of these proposals. They seem to me perfectly logical. The two questions are of an entirely different character, all the more seeing that two texts, a draft resolution of the Fourth Congress on the report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International; and secondly, the first draft thesis on the tactics of the Communist International edited by Comrade Zinoviev.

I think that we shall all agree to proceed at once to the discussion of the past activities of the Executive Committee in relation to the general policy of the International; and that then we shall devote ourselves (perhaps appointing a special commission, for I think this idea will commend itself to the Congress) to examine the draft thesis on the tactics of the Communist International. I mean, to define the tactics which the Communist International ought to pursue in the future.

(Bordiga spoke in French, and Radek then translated his remarks into German, adding the following comments).

Bordiga's proposal amounts to this, that the discussion is to be broken up into two parts. We are first to consider the work of the Executive Committee down to the date of the Fourth Congress, and are then to discuss the future work of the Comintern. I have the following objections to this proposal.

The Agenda of the Congress constitutes an integral whole, comprising a settlement with the past and an outlook to-

wards the future work. No sharp distinction is drawn between these two in Zinoviev's report. The question arises whether we can discuss the past without mooting the perspectives of the future. There does not lie between the Fourth Congress and our coming work the prospect of any new happening which might nullify or modify our tactics. Consequently a judgment concerning past tactics is the same time an anticipation of future tactics. If at this Congress we declare that we are dissatisfied with the tactics of the united front and with the methods of work in the various countries, the methods that have been supported by the Executive Committee, a decision taken to the future will thereby have been taken, and the further work of the Congress will consist merely of matters in detail. As far as general political principles are concerned, we shall have nothing more to decide. We shall merely have to work out our strategy in detail and to apply it in individual countries. For this reason I am of the opinion that our discussion of the report should be of the following general form: Have the tactics been right, and are they to be continued?

The Chairman: No other speakers present in their names, and I shall therefore put Bordiga's proposal to the vote.

Various comrades: After the translation (Translations were then given).

The Chairman: I now put to the vote the Italian delegation's proposal, to the effect that the discussion be divided into two parts, as Comrade Zinoviev's report was divided.

(The motion was lost).

The Chairman: The matter is now open for general discussion. I have first called upon the Czechoslovakian delegation. Vajtauer.

Vajtauer spoke as follows.

I propose for the moment to say a few words only about Comrade Zinoviev's speech of yesterday concerning Czechoslovakian affairs. Yesterday Zinoviev passed judgment on the Czechoslovakian question. We were very much surprised that as chairman of the International had not taken the trouble to gather information from both sides. He knows the way to Comrade Smeral, who touches these observations betray. But will

our workers think when they read Zinoviev's speech, and when they note the points in it which directly conflict with the truth? Zinoviev says that in Czechoslovakia the united front has been established in exemplary fashion. Exemplary, indeed, Comrades! At a time when the industrial situation has within a few days become so serious that the workers have been looking around for someone to say a word of encouragement and to lead them, the Communist International has nothing at all to say to the workers. Only when the other parties have expressed their views and have passed resolutions does the Communist Party come forward with demands. These demands are those formulated by Comrade Lenin in June 1917. At that time, however, the situation in Czechoslovakia was utterly different. In these circumstances, this was a blow in the face. The united front has been so constituted that our comrades were invited by our own leaders to attend the national socialist meetings. But there, counter-revolutionary speeches were made, and counter-revolutionary resolutions passed. The communist speakers did not say a word against the counter-revolutionary resolutions, and the communist workers had to vote on these resolutions under the tutelage of the national socialists. This has sown dismay and has wrought confusion in our ranks. The initiative has passed entirely to the national socialists. Only two committees have been formed in two petty districts—two little united front committees. This was exemplary!

Yet more exemplary was the growth of the influence of the United Front. At the moment there was a governmental crisis, and various governmental combinations were tried. In an interview with a foreign newspaper correspondent Masaryk said: "Perhaps we might be able to work well enough with the Communist Party, but not until it has expelled its left wing. When that has been done, we shall be able to enter into serious negotiations with the Communist Party." This was followed by leading articles and paragraphs of like tenor in all the bourgeois and social-patriotic journals. That is why Smeral took up his parable against the left wing. By provocative measures he was able to get rid of this

left wing. Two days before the expulsion of the left, Wenkow, the agrarian, wrote about the expulsion as if it had already taken place, although it did not actually happen until two days later. The expulsion of the United Front did not extend merely to the national socialists, but aimed at including people from the bourgeois ranks even as far as Masaryk. Had not the workers massed their forces in support of the expelled, being prompt to realise the danger, had they not shown their opposition to Labor Party considerations on a purely parliamentary basis such as have been advocated by Smeral, Votava, and others, we could indeed have had an exemplary United Front. It would have been a United Front ranging from the Communist Party through the Social Democrats and the Agrarians including Burg and Masaryk. Any one who recommends a united front of that character is a strange sort of friend to the Communist Party. The upshot has been that the Party has been completely rent in twain, and the two parts are both incompetent for the struggle.

(Interjection: Ouh)

Zinoviev also says that the political trend of the majority of those who have been expelled from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is unsound. He says that we must not support the left elements. So be it! But the workers will say that the Third International approves everything that our Party Executive does: approves the complete inactivity of the Party in all industrial struggles; it even approves that the communist metal workers in Kladno, on the initiative of their opportunist leaders, should act as strike-breakers without a word of dissent on the part of the Executive of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; it certainly approves that not long ago in Kladno the secretary of the Miners' Union could have betrayed the strikers at the Ostrau mines by accepting without a fight the 25% reduction of wages demanded by the owners, although this was precisely what the Ostrau workers had struck against. Moreover the Executive approves all the confusion in the trade-union movement, the climax of the confusion coming in the matter of the recent trade-union congress, which was a complete fiasco, thanks



to opportunists. The Czecho-Slovakian workers will say that it must be a mistake for them to take the responsibility of all these things.

We are told that the opposition trend is toward anarchism. (Hear! Hear!). For all the expelled local organisations and trade union, to organise a great industrial union, is anarchism? When they devote themselves to trade union work in order to protect the unions from the opportunists, and in order to carry out detail work, this is anarcho-syndicalism? To proclaim a general strike is K.A.P.D.-ism (Kommunist-Arbeiter-Partei-Deutschlands)? The wish to make of the Party a fighting force is anarchism once more? Smeral is right when he says that only the anarchists, and the communists, can wish to organise the unemployed and lead them in the struggle, for the unemployed are putschist (futile revolt) elements! To vitalise the United Front committees by an active fighting program and to hinder Smeral from making of the United Front a national front extending so as to include the clericalists, Masaryk, and the Government—this is anarchism! To oppose a humbugging Labor Government on a parliamentary basis with its United Front committees which are to be called into life by legislation, and established on a legal basis, is also anarchism! If all these things are what the Third International understands to be anarchism and K. A. P. D.-ism, our Czecho-Slovakian workers will say: In that case we are really anarchists, and wish to remain so, for thus alone can we be faithful to our proletarian trust.

Comrade Zinoviev has been good enough to tell us that our case is not on all fours with that of Paul Levi. He does not seem to have grasped the nature of the motives which led Smeral to expel from the Party those who, according to his own characterisation, were its best elements. We have this much to say to Comrade Zinoviev: Not merely was there no resemblance between our case and that of Levi; there was no breach of discipline at all. It is the sacred duty of the workers to draw attention to the dangers threatening the Party. It is a sacred duty to steer clear of political chicanery. That is what we did, and we

want to let Comrade Zinoviev know if those be breaches of discipline, shall commit them just as often as attack is made on the Party.

Kolarov. Will the comrade kindly state whether he spoke on his own half or on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak delegation. We must be quite clear as to the peculiar views expressed by comrade. A voice from the Czech opposition: "He spoke in the name of the whole opposition and the expelled comrades."

Ernest Meyer.—(Germany).

Comrades, the German delegation is accord with the policy of the Executive since the III World Congress and with the remarks of Comrade Zinoviev, in most essential points. We only propose that the resolution which is before should be voted upon after the question concerning the various countries have been disposed of.

Comrades, the situation described by Comrade Zinoviev has not changed in main since the time of the III World Congress. We must admit that this situation has not been properly appreciated in the countries. In some countries it has been analysed in an exaggerated manner and exaggerated deductions were drawn from it, while various other groups (partly also in Germany) refused to recognise the correctness of this analysis altogether. Apart from the mistakes, an opportunist nature, which were frequently made, some comrades' conclusions induced them to advocate a policy of isolation which was tantamount to turning the Communist International into a sect. I believe that the German Party has shown by its attitude and action since the last World Congress that it is endeavouring to carry out the decision arrived at in International comradesly deliberations.

The question of the united front, which is occupying our attention at present, and which, according to Comrade Zinoviev's statement, is not to be considered as mere episode, but as a period of Communist tactics, has been very much discussed in Germany. The only fault I had to find with Comrade Zinoviev's statement is his omission to acknowledge the discussions and the application of these tactics were greatly furthered by

the Berlin Conference. We are in a position to state that this conference has not duly clarified the situation within our Party, but that it also helped the Party and the Communist International in persuading the non-Communist workers that the communists were really striving to fight in common with them, and that they were misrepresented by their opponents.

It is self-evident that in the application of these tactics, misunderstandings appeared even among our friends. Comrade Zinoviev has already drawn our attention to several of them. Some comrades outside Germany look upon the United Front tactics in the light of an election agreement with the social-democratic and even bourgeois parties. They consider these tactics as a preliminary to an organic amalgamation, and it is no use denying that such misunderstandings have appeared here and there not only among the non-party workers, but even within our own Party.

Moreover, the fear has been expressed that the negotiations with the reformist leaders, instead of bringing about cooperation among the workers, have only done harm to our cause. On the strength of our experiences during the Rathenau campaign, we can definitely state that in many districts and localities it was only owing to the negotiations and consultations with these leaders that harmonious cooperation and a common struggle were brought about. Some comrades assert that the united front must only rest on an economic basis, and should not be extended to the political field. This is also a wrong conception. Our own experience has taught us, that in the present situation such a division is entirely out of the question. Comrade Zinoviev was quite right in opposing those (also in the German Party) who are making such a distinction in the struggles which the communist have to carry on.

Apart from the misunderstanding which is likely to crop up, real mistakes have also been made by our Party. These mistakes were quite frankly acknowledged at our Party meeting and in Party resolutions. It is not necessary to discuss these matters again, as this has been done very exhaustively at meetings in the Central Committee and in the Press.

I should like only to draw attention to one thing: much as it is to be desired that mistakes should be discussed, in order to avoid them in the future, it must be borne in mind that criticism must not make us forget essentials. For instance, the statement of the Czech comrade concerning the mistakes made during the application of the United Front tactics, is tantamount to rejection of these tactics. If the comrades from the Czech opposition have nothing else to say, not only on the question of breaches of discipline, but also on tactical and practical questions, I am convinced that the comrades on whose behalf the statement was made by the last speaker, will have sat down for the last time at the same table with communists.

There must be elasticity in the application of the United Front tactics. It must be adapted to various phases, and it would be quite wrong to consider it always as negotiations between leaders or between various parties. These united front tactics must take various forms according to the situation and if some comrades consider the attitude of the German party during the Rathenau campaign and during the railway strike as opposed to the factory committee movement, they are labouring under a misunderstanding. The establishment and consolidation of the factory committee movement have resulted from the attitude taken up by the German party since the III World Congress. We should not have a factory committee movement such as the present if we had not consistently applied the united front tactics, thus getting into closer touch with the masses (Hear! Hear) and penetrating into the trade unions and industrial concerns, in a word, wherever the workers congregate.

The amalgamation of the U. S. P. and the S. P. D. is also a result of the improved tactics of the Party by getting rid of misunderstandings, which were the result of a previous and quite different situation and by making it more difficult for the hostile organisations of the S. P. D. and the U. S. P. This is a great step forward for us, in as much as it does away with the illusion that there is room for another intermediate organi-



ation between the reformist and communist parties within one country.

The most difficult question which we had to solve in connection with the United Front tactics — (and which we have probably not yet solved) — is the question of the Workers Government. We must differentiate between social democratic governments and Workers Governments. We have social democratic governments in Germany — in Saxony, Thuringia and formerly also in Gotha — governments which we had to support but which have nothing in common with what we understand by Workers Government. If we desire that the International should support the idea of the Workers Government and if we wish that this watchword should be adopted by the brother parties that are working approximately under similar conditions to ours, this does not mean that we expect them to aim at the establishment of social democratic governments and to participate in them, but merely that they should struggle for Workers Governments, thus making our struggle easier. The chief difference between a Workers and a social democratic government is — that the former without bearing the label of a socialist policy is really putting socialist-communist policy into practice. Thus, the workers' government will not be based on parliamentary action alone it will have to be based on the support of the wide masses, and its policy will be fundamentally different from that of the social democratic governments such as those existing in some of the countries of Germany.

This gives rise to the following question which was already outlined by Comrade Zinoviev: is the workers' government a necessary phase of the labour movement in the various countries? Our answer to this is: no, it is not an inevitable, but a historically probable phase of the labour movement. It is quite possible that such workers' governments will be established and will be able to hold out for a certain period. This is also an answer to the second question: can a workers' government be of long duration, or will it be only very transitory? In order to answer this question satisfactorily one must have a clear idea of what constitutes a workers' government, and whether there is

any difference between a workers' government and the dictatorship of the proletariat. To-day Comrade Zinoviev made the distinction between a workers' government and proletarian dictatorship. This was never made quite clear before when the question was discussed. We find the following statement by Comrade Zinoviev on page 123 of the report on the session of the Enlarged Executive:

"The workers' government is the same as the dictatorship of the proletariat, is a pseudonym for Soviet Government (the Hear!). It is more suitable for the ordinary working man, and we will therefore use it."

According to our conception this is wrong. The workers' government is not the dictatorship of the proletariat (just so, from the German Delegation) it is only a watchword which we bring forward in order to win over the workers and convince them that the proletarian class must form a United Front in its struggle against the bourgeoisie. Should this watchword be followed or adopted by the majority of the working class, and should the latter take up the struggle for it, aim in good earnest, it will soon become evident that the attempt to bring about this workers government (at least in many countries with a big proletarian population) will lead either directly to the dictatorship of the proletariat or to a prolonged phase of very acute class struggles, namely, to civil war in all its forms.

In that respect we consider the slogan of the workers government as necessary and useful to winning over the masses. It will lead to a sharper class conflict from which the Proletarian Dictatorship will finally arise.

In conclusion, I wish to say that the German Party however fruitful it may have been, has been hampered by lack of understanding of our problem shown by our brother parties. In our discussion of the workers government the United Front we have found our work of agitation hampered by the remarks of the Party Press and of the French Party. We may say here that there are no questions today which may be solved on a national basis. All problems are directly dependent for their solution upon international action and the propaganda of our brother parties. The consciousness of the International effect of any party's action

must be insisted upon. True International discipline does not consist only in the union of all members through a central bureau, or in the execution of the resolutions adopted at our International Congresses; international discipline and international solidarity demand that every party understand its own activity upon the other parties. Some time ago we attempted to reach an agreement with our French comrades especially on the question of the Versailles Treaty. The Conference of Cologne was called primarily for that purpose. Our attempts were crowned with success. Our French comrades have helped us in the solution of this question, but we must say that the crisis of the French Party has greatly hindered the execution of our agreements at Cologne. We urgently insist here for the solution of the French question not only in the interest of our French comrades, but in our own as well. It seems to us that the Third Congress did not take up this question seriously enough, and that the International had too long delayed its solution. But it would be a mistake if after recognising our errors, we did not limit our disciplinary measures, after a final solution of the principles, to a minimum.

The German Delegation in conclusion wishes to state that it believed in the right policy to hold the Party Conferences before the International Congress. For instance it does not make a good impression for the French Party to solve its questions at its Conference before the World Congress, while the German Party in which no crisis exists has not been able to take more advantage of the situation created by the union of the Socialist Party of Germany and the Independents. We acknowledge that in many cases it might be better to hold the National Party Conferences after the World Congress. However, this is not true as a general rule, and they should take place in each special case after consultation with the Executive.

Varga. (Hungary).

Comrades, I only wish to speak on a single point on Comrade Zinoviev's report, the last point in which he in kindly fashion accused one of our comrades of

opportunistic tendencies. This comrade who has been accused of opportunism — I will lift the veil of anonymity, is myself. The whole thing is based on a misunderstanding. I have never wished to say that the working class of Europe should restrain their activity until such time as the situation of the Russian proletariat will have improved, I have only pointed out how far the possibilities for final success, that is for the erection of new proletarian dictatorships are diminished by the unjust conviction of the European worker that the Russian worker is still living very badly at present, and also by the deterrent effect of the famine. You will say comrades that this is a private matter and should not be brought up at the Congress, but the fact that Comrade Zinoviev thought it necessary to give the matter special attention before this Congress shows that this is not a purely personal matter, and that Zinoviev attributes special importance to it. Otherwise, he would surely not have brought it up. This is why I believe it necessary to give more serious attention to the matter.

Comrade Zinoviev says that the working class of every country is driven to revolution because it can see no other way out of its present misery. What are the facts? The working class of all the capitalistic countries is suffering greatly in this period of the decay of capitalism. The workers are searching for a way out of this situation. There is a conscious revolutionary group, the Communist Party, which point the way. This group says that the way leads through the dictatorship of the proletariat to Socialism. We say: this way means suffering, struggle, hunger. We need not hide this fact. Perhaps you will allow me who am accused of opportunism to point out that, without any knowledge of the Russian conditions and purely on the experience of the Hungarian dictatorship and the theoretical analysis of economic exchanges which are unavoidable in the transition from capitalism to socialism I wrote in my pamphlet "The Economic Problem of the Proletarian Dictatorship," that that section of the proletariat which will be the shock-groups in the fight, the industrial proletariat, will see its standard of living fall most.



Yes, comrades, the great mass of the working class who are not yet consciously revolutionary ask: How long will that period of suffering and of hunger last? To this question the Mensheviks answer: "It will last as long as the dictatorship exists." Comrades, due to various circumstances, some of which were unavoidably connected with the dictatorship, others of which resulted directly from the isolation of the Russian dictatorship, and finally due to accidental circumstances, such as the drought of 1920 and 1921, the famine broke out in Russia, and the Russian proletariat was forced to appeal to the help of the proletariat of the capitalist countries. This campaign has had its good sides. But those comrades who live outside Russia must admit that this famine campaign has awakened a great fear of the revolution and the dictatorship in the masses of the workers. It is quite certain when the Mensheviks repeat a thousand times: „You say that a revolution will save us, well, here is the example of Russia where the dictatorship has existed for five years, and the workers must appeal to our help. Make your revolutions, German, Italian and French Workers, and for ten years you will have to demand, to beg help from the proletariat of those countries which have remained capitalist";—it will have an effect on the proletarian masses. I say, comrades, that we must dispel this idea from the minds of the workers imprinted by the Mensheviks and by the famine relief that the condition of the Russian worker is very bad. We must combat it because it is not true. I have observed hundreds of thousands of workers on parade, in their homes, in the streets, and I must say that they are better nourished than the workers in Berlin. They are perhaps worse dressed, but they look much more healthy. Comrades, if you have observed the feeling of the masses, 90% of whom are not affiliated to any party, I would ask you: Did you ever see on the streets of Europe a proletariat who looked happier and more satisfied? I will not say that all Russian workers are so satisfied; I have been away from Russia for a long time. But this remains a fact that the worker of Moscow is well fed and happy.

It is another fact that the situation of the Russian worker has improved steadily

during the last nine months while the worker of Europe has grown worse. In the case of Germany, the fall of the standard of living has been catastrophic. This is what we must say to the unaffiliated masses of Germany in hundreds of articles. We say that in three or six months' time the Russian worker will be living better than the German. To-day he is already living better than the Austrian. We must destroy the idea that dictatorship is synonymous with hunger. I believe this is important because the future of the world revolution depends upon it.

Comrades, yesterday, I used a phrase in the German Delegation which, perhaps was not quite true; I said that the bourgeoisie will not let itself be taken by surprise as it did partly in Russia and totally in Hungary. I mean to say that the Russian bourgeoisie did not resist with all its might because it believed that the Bolshevik régime, the proletarian dictatorship, would be overthrown in a short time. The bourgeoisie of Hungary had absolutely no conception of what dictatorship of the proletariat meant and was overthrown without any resistance. This will never happen again. The bourgeoisie has seen that the power of the Russian dictatorship has maintained itself for five years; it has understood that no counter-revolution is possible in Russia in any near future and therefore the ruling power in every country has made its preparations, armed its troops. The bourgeoisie observes carefully every movement of the Communist Parties. In my opinion no surprise action is possible to-day. What does this signify? It means that we must prepare our armies, that we cannot think of storming the stronghold of the bourgeoisie with a relatively small group of determined comrades, with the revolutionary membership of a strong, disciplined Communist Party. We must draw the masses to us. This is why I say that we cannot draw certain vacillating proletarian masses to us so long as we have not destroyed this legend of the starvation of the Russian working class. I do not know whether this is opportunism. I do not think so. It is a clear observation of what the non-Communist proletariat of Western Europe thinks.

Comrades, this question is closely bound up with that of the United Front as well as with that of the programme of proletarian action, which, in my opinion, is nothing but an extension of the idea of the United Front to the rural population. Just as in the case of the United Front we have to intervene into the daily struggles of the proletariat, so must we, in the agrarian question, take part in the daily struggle of that class which is something that I hold it absolutely necessary for the success of the revolution in the countries outside of Russia that we draw the masses into our party, or at least that we get them to adopt a neutral attitude, and not fight against us on the side of the bourgeoisie.

What I have said is not opportunism. It is only the recognition of the true facts of the situation in the West European countries. So long as we meet with the reaction from the non-Communist masses that dictatorship means hunger and again hunger, we will not be able to carry out our masses with us. It is therefore one of the important tasks of the coming year to put an end to this legend of the starvation of the Russian worker.

Ruth Fischer.  
(Germany).

Comrades: The report by Comrade Zinoviev furnishes abundant material for discussion, but I only wish to touch upon two German questions which may be deemed to be of interest to the World Conference. The first question is what was the effect of the III Congress upon the German Party? Here it must be frankly stated that there are by no means a few German comrades who view the settlement of questions affecting the German Party in far less rosy colours than it is regarded in Com. Zinoviev's report. The III Congress did not make its position clear with regard to the Levi group, the way the March action was handled could create the impression that Levi had been expelled entirely on grounds of discipline. A great number of the German comrades think that this position on the German question has been the cause of much confusion, as well as of the unhappy grouping at the Conference of Jena and the eventual

rise of the Friesland group. This has resulted in the waste of precious months. I raise this question here not for the purpose of opening old wounds, but in order to declare that the question of the Levi group was not merely one of discipline. This mistake ought to be a lesson to us in the solving of many other questions. Every question of discipline is a political question. Now let me touch upon the second question, the application of it. Here again one must clearly state what is to be understood by the tactics of the United Front, because it is subject to various interpretations. The tactics of the United Front has had a chequered career also in Germany. This development started with the Oper Letter and has culminated in the Factory Committee Movement. It ought to be clearly understood that our work has to be based on the amelioration of conditions for the workers. But, comrades, the basis of those partial demands which Radek has characterised as "a crust of bread" would be an ill-fitting definition. It ought further to be said that it is not enough to agitate for these demands, but also the proper basis should be found, by establishing organised foundations within the masses themselves, which alone could render it possible to take up the fight for these demands.

Comrades: the much debated question of dealing with the leaders is after all a question of expediency and tactics. The mistake begins when one puts the centre of gravity on the dealings with the leaders. What is really at the back of this attitude in regard to the dealings with the leaders? It is a very dangerous illusion, an illusion which in its consequences leads to a revision of communism and of the revolution, and this in the following manner. The severe defeats, the terrible blows, the bloody experiences which we have gone through have brought about a state of mind among the German working class which makes them believe that the sole responsibility for the retreat before the advancing counter-revolution rests upon the various splits and the weakness of the organisation. It is quite a common illusion in Germany to attach the highest importance to the strength of organisation as the only means capable of defeating the counter-revolution. It was



by means of the illusion that the German Social Democratic Party captured the Independent Socialist Party; it was by means of this conception of the United Front that all district conferences of the Independent Socialist Party workers were urged to merge themselves into the German Social Democratic Party. It was often proclaimed to be the realisation of the United Proletarian Front.

Between our conception and that of the Mensheviks there is a shade of opinion which seems to have a vaguely conceived conviction that the only way to fight effectively against the counter-revolution is to have the concurrence of the great Social Democratic parties and the general Alliance of German Trade Unions. Thus it is no longer a question of dealing with the leaders, or working jointly with them, but a notion that the Communist Party is altogether weak in the fight without coalition with the Social Democrats. This is a dangerous notion (Interruption). I will soon come to that (meriment). Of course the German delegates are excluded. This idea of the indispensability of coalition with the Democrats and the trade union leadership has again been refuted by the arguments in Comrade Zinoviev's speech, where he demonstrated that the Second International and its affiliated parties are our worst enemies. It has also been repudiated by actual facts showing that these Parties everywhere have joined in the bitterest offensive against us.

But you may ask—Who is there entertaining any such notion? To this I would answer without mincing words. It is in the heads of some German communist workers that had been bruised in struggle with capitalism and the bourgeoisie. If one likes to deceive and delude oneself, let him do so. But the practical experience of the work in the factories and trade unions has shown that we as a mass party are not free from the illusions held by the masses in whose midst we are living. These illusions react upon the party, leaving their definite imprints.

I would like to emphasise in this connection that the idea of the possibility of coalition with the Social Democrats has been repudiated by the entire course of the recent revolutionary events. For it tends towards amalgamation with the

Social Democratic Parties, which question has been discussed by our Norwegian comrades with such refreshing frankness. It is a wrong conception of the United Front, and behind it lurk deeply concealed tendencies for a revision of the resolution, for a trimming of the revolution in "Western" style, for the creation of democratic transition stages between present and the future.

The attempt to delude oneself of the difficulty of the civil war is tantamount to the attempt of overthrowing capitalism without any serious difficulties and in parallel alliance with the Social Democrats.

Comrade Zinoviev has already emphasised the fact that the situation is a difficult one. It is difficult in Germany and we could reasonably expect the victory in Europe the day after tomorrow. We have a very shrewd and dangerous adversary to contend with—one should overrate the weakness of the German Social Democracy. For this reason the German Party as well as the Communist International must beware of the danger of revisionism and take the most cautious measures in its daily practice. At the risk of being called "Menshevik hunters" through a misrepresentation of the purposes of our criticism we declare quite clearly that the danger is not yet great in the German Party. It can be easily obviated. But during the crisis of the Levi Group we were considered as gloomy pessimists, and our events confirmed our views.

Comrades, in conclusion I wish to view the tactics of the United Front from the point of view of practical application. First of all I wish to say that the way Strike has been a movement of scope, which perhaps has not been properly appreciated abroad. This Strike has made perfectly proper application of the tactics of the German Party. We told the masses then: "The day is in danger, the right of work is in danger." We threw ourselves into the mass movement, but we advanced a programme contradictory to our own interests.

It was a different matter during the Rathenau campaign. It must be stated that in the Rathenau Campaign was the negative side of the

United Front that had come to the surface. The masses were excited, they were calling for us, but we were conducting secret negotiations which lasted many weeks and were of a diplomatic nature. Between ourselves and the general Federation of German Trade Unions and the German Social Democratic Party, who were playing a cunning game, we deliberately prolonged negotiations in order to keep us tied. In those negotiations we exercised moderation instead of making aggressive demands. We did not dare to expose ourselves either in the press or at meetings. We were forced to moderation, and there is no greater mistake than to play the role of diplomats instead of speaking out in a frank revolutionary manner at the time when the masses whom we are out to win are excited. This mistake of the Rathenau Campaign could not be obliterated by the German Party even if it made the attempt to do so. This mistake produced a deep impression upon the comrades in our German Party, who are very mistrustful, far more mistrustful than is believed here, as a result of the experiences of the Levi crisis.

Now, comrades, I would like to say a few words in conclusion on the question of the factory committee movement which shows the positive side of these mistakes. I would like to declare with the same frankness that the virtues of the factory committee movement are not to be ascribed to our credit, but rather to the Social Democrats' guilt, because the latter threw us out and thus made it impossible to continue any of the tactics of the Rathenau Campaign. I venture to say, comrades, that when the movement in Germany will have become more pronounced, the Social Democrats will try the same game that they played in the Rathenau Campaign, because they have discovered that it is a good expedient to cripple the force of the Communists at dangerous moments.

The factory committee movement should not be overestimated. I think that its real significance cannot be fully appreciated as yet. To my mind it possesses three principal merits which we should clearly distinguish: Firstly,—It has exposed the real nature of all the Social Democratic and Independent cla-

mour for unity and for the sanctity of the big Social-Democratic Party. Instead of recruiting membership for the great Social-Democratic Party they had to contend against our party; they had to contend against our party; they had to carry on controversies against our slogans and write articles against us. In a word, they had to be on the defensive and were not able to celebrate their Party Congresses with the pompous effect they wished.

Secondly, it has placed again on the order of the day the question of the initiative of the Industrial Organisations and of the factory committees, after a lapse of two years. Any one who has an idea of the sad state of the industrial councils in Germany ought to appreciate this success.

Thirdly, and this is the most important, the question of the workers control over production is being debated again although still weakly and somewhat clumsily. It is now being debated in the factories not only by communists who are also greatly in need of such discussion having forgotten much during these two years, but also by Social Democratic workers, compelling the "Vorwärts"... to carry on controversy against it.

The Communist International and the German Party ought to give this movement their continued attention, regarding it as the forerunner of the militant United Front, thus ensuring the success of this proper form of applying the tactics of the United Front. In this movement we have too often addressed the aristocratic unions expecting thereby to win the trade unions to our side, and we proposed to the Universal Federation of German Trade Unions to form a bloc for the practical solution of labour questions, but we soon discovered that that august body wished neither to have a congress convened nor to engage in any struggle.

The Factory Committee movement should demonstrate to all the fraternal parties that the tactics of the United Front, when properly understood, contain no danger whatever, and that the only thing needed is a clear definition of our aims. At the same time the Communist International and the Fourth Congress should make it quite clear that the question of the tactics of the United Front,



in a certain sense, opens up also the question of revisionism which we find in the different parties under various guises. The matter which is stated in my mandate from the Berlin organisation: "We wish the Fourth Congress to see to it that the Communist International be freed of all opportunists."

(Tremendous cheering from the German side).

Neurath (Czecho-Slovakia).

Comrades, first of all I wish to say that a statement will be presented on behalf of the delegation as a whole on the report of Comrade Zinoviev. And so I will only give you a few facts in reply to Comrade Vajthauer's statement.

Comrades, some delegates might gather from the statement made by comrade Vajthauer that there is a left opposition in the Czecho-Slovak Party, which he represents. Comrades, this is not so. The left opposition of the Czecho-Slovak Party carried on a struggle against the opportunism represented by Comrade Smeral previous to the Unity Congress. After this Congress, Comrade Smeral adopted the decisions of the Third World Congress which made collaboration between the opposition and Comrade Smeral possible. The so-called new opposition, which has been in existence since about December 1921, for eight months failed to formulate any fundamental principles different from those underlying our tactics. It is only a few weeks ago that the opposition formulated something like a program, and I will put before you some of its provisions. But first of all I must draw your attention to the fact that immediately after the Unity Congress, we had to go through a number of very serious struggles in Czecho-Slovakia, and that the Executive of the Party led these struggles in such a way as to bring the greatest influence to bear upon large sections of the working masses. I wish to remind you, for instance, of the struggle of the civil servants, of the clerks, the metal workers, the miners and the glass workers. During all these struggles, the majority, known as the Smeralists, formulated principles to which the communist trade union officials were bound. These principles have been recognised and have been applied with success. They were not

attacked, not opposed by the members of the opposition which never put forward any principles of their own. After came successfully out of these struggles and after formulating (especially during the miners' struggle) the watchwords which impressed the working masses was brought to our notice that some of the communist trade union leaders done very foolish things. It is only natural that communist trade union leaders should occasionally do foolish things. However, when these, our representatives, expressed themselves during the negotiations with the employer in connection with the miners' strike, a way with which we did not agree, reprimanded them severely, pointed to them their mistakes and explained to them how to remedy them. At the time the opposition did not take notice of this matter. It ignored these mistakes which we recognised at once.

This happened during our big struggles. We carried on a United Front with the opposition by means of a series of meetings. The opposition seemed to agree with us, for it never proposed anything different, but remained silent. When the secretary of the Party, Comrade Zapotocky, was appointed, he declared that the opposition, while not declaring any principles, was fighting against us. He was showing its disagreements with us. The opposition explained their attitude by asserting that Smeral was an opportunist (for which they could not produce any proof), that he was aiming at becoming a Cabinet Minister and that behind the back of the Party, was carrying on negotiations with the counter-revolutionaries, which they also failed to prevent. Moreover, the opposition asserted that those who tried to work with Smeral abandoned their principles and became Smeralists. Such were the positive contents of the program brought forward by the opposition.

At the Easter Conference we made clear to the opposition that this program could not be carried on any longer. We told the opposition to let us know what it wanted, and to formulate their program and their principles. We asked them that, if they had no principles, they did not know in what way they differed from us, they should say so once

for all. At this conference we formulated the principles of the United Front. We brought forward the theses on our Party work and arrived at as important decisions as any communist conference can arrive at.

All the time the opposition remained silent, and gave not the least sign that it disagreed with us. It left us entirely in the dark as to its attitude towards the United Front, and the other tasks of our Party. We were therefore of the opinion that, owing to the fact that the opposition remained silent at the conference when it had every opportunity to ventilate its opinion, it had been brought over to our way of thinking. The same game went on after the conference. I am sorry to have to deal with such matters, for they are not very edifying. Well, the old game went on—no principles, no program, no ideas to speak of, except the silly argument that comrade Smeral wants to make use of old Sture in order to become a cabinet minister. Thereupon, Comrade Jilek went to Moscow. He was sent everywhere as a representative of the Czecho-Slovak Party. In Moscow the most experienced comrades studied the material put before them by Comrade Jilek. The latter was asked by them to state his program. He spoke here, and so did Smeral. The result of this was that the Executive recognised that there was no fundamental political differences in the Czecho-Slovak Party, but only some organisational shortcomings which had to be remedied. We took this into consideration and admitted the existence of such shortcomings. We did not say that we could not remedy these shortcomings, because our time at all the Sessions of the Managing Committee was occupied with the absurd attacks of the opposition. When, in Moscow, Comrade Jilek agreed with this resolution, he admitted that there were no political differences in Czecho-Slovakia. Thereupon he returned to Czecho-Slovakia, and only then began to organise the opposition, to give it a more definite form and to make the differences more acute than before.

Well, comrades, what was to be done? Comrade Radek published an article and the Executive made known its decision. Both declared that there were many

organisational shortcomings in Czecho-Slovakia. We discussed this matter, and said that the shortcomings would be remedied, that there were no political differences, and that, henceforth, the Party could begin to work for the accomplishment of the great tasks confronting it. However, nothing came of it. Unfortunately, we could devote only very little time to the great tasks of the Czecho-Slovak Party and we could not turn our attention to the great problems of the movement, because we had still the same petty matters to deal with. We had still to spend seven hours at a stretch during the meetings of the Executive Committee in order to explain to Comrade Sture that Smeral had no intention of becoming a Cabinet Minister.

Then we had a meeting at which representatives of the International took part. At this meeting it was established that the opposition had brought forward nothing which would lead anyone to believe that there were theoretical differences. Comrades, I don't want to take up too much of your time, and will be as brief as possible. Just before the above mentioned meeting an article appeared in the "Communist", signed by a member of the opposition. This article consisting of 220 lines, contained 180 lines from Comrade Trotzky's book "The New Phase". The opposition derived its principles from these lines (Comrade Bukharin, "Inverted commas?") No, comrades, not in inverted commas.

What happened then? The opposition continued the struggle. Therefore, there was nothing else to do but to call another conference, the National Conference. The comrades were all tired out; we could endure it no longer. We had determined, on the journey between Reichenberg and Prague, on certain important resolutions with regard to the miners and metal workers' struggles, but in the session we found that we could not deal with them. Comrade Zapotocky and all the other comrades declared that things could no longer continue in this manner that would it be impossible to call one national conference after the other; and that if this opposition were not liquidated we could no longer treat with its representatives. Then came the National Conference, at which the representatives of the Communist



... and the relations of the Communist party hereto. In the chapter on the aims of the party the following appears:

The worker is doubly exploited, firstly by the employer and secondly by the middleman. The high cost of living, caused by the provision merchants, is a far greater burden upon him than his capitalist exploitation.

Among the small and large retailers are found, if not the greatest, at least the most active class enemies of the workers. The commercial class are the more energetic advocates of the capitalist system, and also the most strenuous fighters for it.

The two most important weapons of which the working class may and must avail itself are:

- 1—The boycott of capitalistic products.
- 2—The expansion and centralization of all productive and retail cooperatives.

With regard to the boycott, Comrade Vajtaur said the following.

With regard to the use of the boycott, the present situation is most advantageous. The bourgeoisie does not hesitate to make full use of the dependence upon it of the working class; neither should the working class hesitate to take advantage of the dependence of the bourgeoisie upon the toilers. The capitalists throw thousands of workers out upon the streets in order to use this unemployed reserve as a means of lowering wages. The workers, by means of the boycott, can ruin any firm which charges high prices for necessities or which opposes the working class unmercifully. The working class must not scorn this method, as, by neglecting this terrifying weapon, they merely accelerate the concentration of capital and themselves are left behind. There should be a list, firstly of all boycotted firms who charge unusually high prices for their products; and, secondly, of those firms that are known for their inimical attitude towards the working class. It is true that through this pressure upon prices many small businesses will be unjustly ruined, as it is impossible for them to secure their raw materials at cheap rates. This how-

ever, should not stop us in the application of this policy. The fear of utter ruin will force these small traders to join together with others in common productive enterprises and then to enter into the working class productive cooperatives, where, through cooperative buying of raw material at cheap prices, they will be able to meet the demands of the working class.

This embodies the entire program of the opposition which, until the National Conference, was designated by the Executive Committee as the Left.

Comrades, I believe, that we have heard enough of this stupid game. I have said sufficiently for you to understand why the opposition has to offer us upon this important problem of workers' control. It is this opposition which claims that the Executive have failed to do their duty and that our action should have been altogether contrary to what it was.

Firstly, we would like to have them tell us in what particular respect we have failed in our duty and, secondly, why does the Opposition understand by workers' control. Comrades, the first question has not yet been answered, but the opposition can tell us what they understand by the program of workers' control. I quote you the following sentence as an example:

"Firstly the workers' government must accomplish the following:—creation of a period of culmination in which the concentration of production and distribution takes the form of collective capitalism. (Later)."

Comrades, I have never understood this sentence and I do not believe that I shall never understand it.

"2. The transformation of militarism into a militia system."

"3. The securing of an understanding with Communist Russia."

The problem of the working class rule must be solved by the Czech and Slovakian Communist Party in the closest conjunction with the other sections of the Communist International in all capitalist countries in complete and strict accordance with the Communist International. As to the actual methods of attacking the working class rule are concerned

we refuse to discuss them and believe that such discussions are of a purely abstract nature.

That means that it is not abstract but that it is concrete (Laughter).

These are all actual facts. We only heard for the first time of a portion of this program at the National Conference. At the National Conference, the representatives of the Third International took the floor and explained to the representatives and supporters of the Opposition that they had not a leg to stand on and had absolutely no chance, politically, or otherwise, against the majority. Before the National Conference we should have been able to have exerted an unusually strong influence upon the masses with our propaganda of workers' control and the United Front. Those are the masses, which we could have influenced, and who are now following the Czech Nationalists. I say "Czech Nationalists" because, for example, Comrade Ruth Fischer (Berlin) made an exchange of the Czech Nationalist for the German nationalist. Great masses of the workers adhere to the Czech Nationalist Party, and we previously had won such an influence over these workers that the leaders of the party were forced to come to our headquarters in order to parley with us and to invite us to a conference with them, in order that we might together bring a common influence to bear upon the Government, as Comrade Vajtaur has already told you. But, does not Comrade Vajtaur know what we have answered the National Socialists? We said to the National Socialists, United Front? Yes, but with whom? with you? We don't need it with you. A United Front with you would be ludicrous. But a United Front with the workers who follow you—we are in favor of that. Do you stand for higher wages for the workers? Are you in favor of an offensive against the bourgeoisie? If so, we are with you. We are ready to struggle side by side with you. The only conditions that the fundamental points which we have prepared to govern this struggle, must be recognized. It was then that Comrade Vajtaur formulated the points which he delivered here today. Into this serious situation, which in no country could have been as favorable, there suddenly appears the opposition

and declares:—If the Executive will not abide by a whole series of our demands, if they will not place a whole newspaper at our disposal, then we shall distribute a leaflet to all organizations in which are exposed the crimes of the Executive. That was 48 hours before the National Conference. We were not able to prevent this. The leaflet was released.

In this leaflet were such serious charges against us that, if they were true, we could not be now where we stand. We should have no place within the Third International. They were the bitterest and worst accusations which one can possibly imagine. We went into the National Conference and said:—Now show us what is true in these charges. And the comrades had not a word to say except that they were distrustful of Comrades Smeral. In this conference the motion was made to expel the Opposition. The overwhelming majority of members of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party only took this extreme step after we had been compelled to waste our time for eight or ten months, with an opposition which had never expressed a single thing worth while or shown any desire to work together with us, and which had also never given any proof that they could manage better than we could. After we had bothered with them for ten months and had laid aside many important problems because we were compelled to do so by their importunities, in the interests of the party and its growth, we were forced at last to take a stand upon the grounds of discipline and to demand from the Opposition that they withdraw the statements made in their leaflet. This the Opposition refused to do and when the representatives of the Third International pleaded with them, the Opposition repeated its refusal.

And, finally, take note that the idea is untrue which some badly informed comrades seem to possess, that only an inconsiderable number of the members of the Czechoslovakian party stand upon the basis of this Opposition. We shall give proof of this during the sitting of the commission. I tell you that it is only one particular clique—and not a large one at that—which takes the Opposition's standpoint. That is the Brossnitz clique, which is one of twenty-four. The decision of the



...and destroyed the authority of the party executive. Despite this, the Party has not only accepted the decision, but has enthusiastically and have continued to do so. We have conformed to it, comrades, because we are convinced that the majority of this congress will decide to take such steps so that we in Czecho-Slovakia may be permitted to work and to learn. That this Congress, by a majority, should accept a program which is not fit for a proletarian organization, and is rather suited to a veteran society, is unbelievable.

We shall permit this kind of opposition no longer. It shall no longer be allowed that fundamental party power shall be spoken and that this Party which has certain tasks to fulfill shall let itself be hindered to so a frivolous a manner in the performance of its duties. (Lively applause.)

Kolarov.—Before passing on to the translation of Comrade Neurath's speech, there are several announcements to be made to the Congress.

The Belgian Delegation will be represented on the Negro Commission and has appointed Comrade Overman to act in this capacity. Any opposition? Carried.

The South American Delegation will be represented by Comrade P. Argentine in the French Commission, Comrade Pintos in the Spanish Commission, and by Comrade Stiner of Mexico in the North American Delegation. Is there any opposition? Carried.

The Presidium moves that Comrade Rakovksy be included into the French Commission. Any opposition? Carried.

The following commissions will meet to-night:

The French Commission at 6 p.m. in this Hall.

The Czecho-Slovak Commission at 7 p.m. in one of the Kremlin Halls.

The Negro Commission at half past nine in the Grand Paris Hotel.

The next Session of the Congress will be held at 11 a.m. sharp to-morrow.

The Session adjourned at 4 1/2 p.m.

# BULLETIN

## THE IV CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

MOSCOW.

13th November 1922

### Fourth Session.

Sunday 11th November (evening)

#### Contents.

Chairman: Kolarov

Discussion of Report of Comrade Zarembo (continued).  
Speakers: Baker, Baker, Dore, Berman, Kolarov.  
Session opened at 7 1/2 p.m.

Kolarov.—I declare the Session open and upon Comrade Becker to address the Congress.

Becker.—Germany: The Communist Party is highly praised in the report of Comrade Kolarov. However, comrades, we do not feel very happy over it. We are annoyed that being considered one of the best boys of the large family of the Communist International means that our next foolish action shall be judged all the more severely. Therefore for this reason we would like to emphasize shortcomings here.

Regarding the United Front tactics, comrades, we must take into account tendencies which impede us in this regard. With us these tendencies are not Italy and France, guided by a policy of avowed opposition to the United Front. As I have already said, we have only tendencies which will be of interest to those comrades which are about to put the United Front into practice. The real nature of these tendencies is that they are sure to come across in our work.

Tendencies which arise not only in Italy and France, but also in a number of other members, are performing their task as

opportunists to break the United Front and holding aloft the banner of the class struggle even in the United Front when the proletariat is halfhearted and inactive, giving way to pessimism. A section of these masses has become slack and indifferent. It would be ridiculous and a lost hope of anything coming out of it, even using the daily words of the proletariat as a starting point for agitation.

During the last few months a section of our members has partly lost sight of this need. Nevertheless, this need is still the basis of these tendencies and affects the workers of the Party in analysing the political situation. Comrades, two tendencies draw Europe's attention: can they do it in such a way as to encourage passivity and pessimism? Comrades, this applies to the United Front as well as to the right. Moreover, a number of other factors are affecting our leading comrades, and among some of them, mostly those of the bourgeoisie, from taking advantage of the various opportunities that present themselves to carry out the letter of the United Front, and where there is exaggeration, the points of opportunism. They even induce them to put obstacles in the way of these tactics. The opportu-

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