

ist critique of scholasticism, and Hume's skepticism in their approach to the problem. The question of society, however, did not enter the problem of mind and nature though, to be sure, research in the natural science was encouraged because of social needs and social problems. The limitations of science were seen as human limitations, as the mind's inability to understand the whole of the universe. For the Nominalists there were no universal laws; ultimate realities could not be known. Things themselves were unrelated; it was man who, in order to control events, established, with organizing principles, relations between them. For Hume, too, thought was merely a practical instrument for the convenient interpretations of human experience, having no objective nor metaphysical vality of any kind. Only particulars could be known; there was no empirical proof for general ideas, and all inferences from experience were effects of custom, not of reasoning. The idea of "necessity and causation arises from the uniformity observable in the operation of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer one from the appearance of the other,"³³⁾ wrote Hume. Our knowledge of the external world is won by inductions from particular instances. Thus all knowledge, bound to particulars as it is, is only one of probabilities, though there are all sorts of degrees of assurances "from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence." But there is also a "kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still gone on in the same train with the other work of nature. Custom is the principle, by which this correspondence has been affected."³⁴⁾

What Hume called "custom" is of course the labor process that transformed nature into society. The harmony between the "course of nature and the succession of our ideas" is established by the activity of social man in his adaptive struggle with nature. Hume's limitation is the limitation of bourgeois society, the science of which restricts itself to natural facts. "Experimental reasoning which we possess in common with beasts," wrote Hume, "and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves."³⁵⁾ This, however, was only half the story. It left unsatisfied all those who were curious to know all of it.

English empiricism, quite satisfactory to the developing capitalist society, was utterly unsuitable to those societies which were in need of change or in the process of transformation. Without capitalism there is no need for a specific capitalistic science. To acquire that science and that capitalistic

33) *Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 84.

34) *Ibid.*, p. 55.

35) *Ibid.*, p. 113.

development, the backward nations required a philosophy or political theory leading to social change. The social question was the burning one, not that of man and nature. Nevertheless, their opposition to empiricism was an opposition favoring empiricism, although in a round-about-manner; for those societies that were still in their transitional period aspired to nothing more than to reach the stage of English development. That stage had now to be reached not only in opposition to feudalism, but also in opposition to the nation that vigorously enjoyed the advantages of an early start. At a period when other nations were still trying to unify themselves in their specific territories, England had already formed her Empire. The influence of her philosophy on the Continent had about the same effect as the influx of her commodities. It hampered progress on the Continent at the same time supplying an incentive to follow her example. Yet these nations, ultimately directed towards capitalist order and industry after the English example, had first to think in social and revolutionary terms in order to attain that goal. Thus the attempt in France to use mechanical materialism for social purposes; thus also the German dissatisfaction with the narrow bounds of English empiricism.

The English attitude in regard to social and political questions was, of course, the product of prior developments as much as it was of the new capitalistic reality. But the prior developmental stages were now adjudged as just so many incomplete steps towards the final, the prevailing society. For Hobbes, who had experienced a series of social upheavals, man was a contradictory being of reason and passion. Man's anarchical nature would make for social anarchy if reason did not keep passion under control. To control passion was "natural," because otherwise man would destroy himself, and social life would not be possible. To enforce observance of the "natural law" of self-preservation, a strong state was necessary. Locke, however, had seen the possible dangers implied in the existence of an all-powerful state, and held the view that men by nature are quite able to live together peacefully and guarantee social harmony by respecting the "natural rights" of all men, i. e., the rights of life, liberty, and property. The state was necessary only to prevent practices directed against these natural rights, to prevent unnaturally-inclined minorities from interfering with the right of property. The liberty to maintain individual property and the state that protected private property, in brief, the society that Locke represented, he conceived as the natural society. With David Hume, however, the capitalist society had consolidated itself sufficiently to drop the claim of representing natural rights. The idea of natural rights made room for theories of government based on strictly utilitarian principles. These principles did not allow, nor did they call for, the development of a scientific theory of society.

In France — at this time — capitalism had not been fully realized, and political rule was still in the hands of the feudal class. The existing

state of affairs seemed unnatural to those opposing it. To reach the natural rights proclaimed by Locke it was not enough, however, merely to accept the materialistic view of nature. The struggle against the Catholic Church, one of the strongholds of feudalism, made atheism necessary, as the Reformation had long ago spent its force. But the materialistic philosophy did not provide for an ideology able to revolutionize the whole of society. Feudalistic society had not brought forth social political theories. The political views of Hobbes and Machiavelli which climaxed the political theory of the Renaissance were no more than the separation of politics from theology accompanying the separation of science from religion. These theories dealt with the mechanism of taking and holding power. Yet, to employ the mechanism, one had to have forces at his disposal. To get these forces, the slogan "life, liberty, and property" as being the natural rights of man had to be sufficiently flexible to attract more than the capitalistic layers of society, which were a mere minority opposed to the feudalistic minority. More than mere abstract theories had to be set against the religious assertions that nothing could be changed because all that exists by the grace of God and is therefore unalterable.

The goal of the bourgeoisie was not society, but a society of property owners. The freedom of the individual, not his subordination to feudal authority, was desired. Yet, social action was required to realize the individualistic goal. A social ideology was needed that did not violate the capitalistic inclinations of individuals. The atomism of bourgeois society, in harmony with their atomistic view of nature, had been the result of the successful English revolution. This revolution itself, however, had nourished quite different ideologies. In theological disguise they had expressed not only the desire for property but also the desire for the abolition of property in the interest of social unity and a true community of men. The English slogan, "King and Commons", had been directed against the egotistical rule of the feudal lords. The equality of men had been conceived as the equal right to work on the land, to hunt in the woods, to fish in the rivers. In his *Law of Freedom in a Platform*, Winstanley wrote: "Commonwealth government may well be called the ancient of days, for it was before any other oppressing government kept in." In a *Declaration from the Oppressed People of England* (1649) it was said "that men should endeavor to shut out of the Creation that cursed thing called Particular Property, which is the cause of all wars, bloodshed, theft and enslaving laws, that hold the people under miserie." The hope for the restoration of an imagined lost community that accompanied the narrow aspirations of the advancing bourgeoisie was, of course, the reaction to the Enclosure Acts practiced since the middle of the 15th Century. In 1649 the Diggers of Cobham issued under the signature of Winstanley and Everard a *Large Declaration* which said, among other things, that the Diggers "intend not to meddle with any man's property nor to break down any enclosures, only to meddle with what was common and untilled, to make it fruitful for the use of man. And that the

time will be when all men shall willingly come in and to give up their lands and estates and submit to the community. And for those who should come and work, they should have meat, drink and clothes, which is all that is necessary to the life of man, and that for money there was no need of it, nor of clothes more than to cover nakedness."³⁶⁾

Society was divided in more groups than just the ruling feudal class and the developing capitalist class. There were peasants, laborers, paupers, whose aspirations were not directed towards capitalist property, because their very existence was still bound up with the land, with the simple task of making a living, and no more. The capitalist layers were those that already owned capital, already possessed a degree of power. Their political outlook was from the very outset of the bourgeois revolution opposed to that of the hungry and beaten mass of the people which, with their utopian yearnings, gave an emotional and human drive to the Revolution. But Cromwell saved the day for capitalism, which tended not towards the distribution but towards the concentration of property.

A somewhat similar situation prevailed in France before the revolution. A chain of peasant risings preceded the city rebellions. These upheavals lasted "until the village communes were granted the right of resuming the communal land which had been taken from them during the two preceding centuries."³⁷⁾ The growing city proletariat, still bound with many ties to the peasantry, could not be satisfied ideologically nor derive a revolutionary enthusiasm from the mathematical abstractions that pleased the educated bourgeoisie. Though others already looked at them as being just another sort of commodity, they themselves, at this time, still felt and thought like human beings. The ideas of Rousseau who, of all the philosophers of his time, was closest to the masses, who had lived with them and had shared their miseries and hopes, were the product of the mental state of the masses as much as they were an attempt to mobilize them for a decisive struggle against the conditions of their existence.

The rationalism of self-interest appealed as little to Rousseau as it did to the non-capitalist yet revolutionary elements of France. The right to private property, equality before the law, democratic representation did not, in his opinion, guarantee real freedom, real equality, and real happiness. However, the future belonged to the "abstract freedoms," to that class that used them for its own capitalistic interests. To look beyond the capitalist society, which itself was only in its infancy, was quite impossible. The mind thus searched in the conditions of the past for clues that would lead to the realization of the desired social organization. The solution of the human-social problem Rousseau saw in the return to an original, primitive, natural

36) Quoted by H. Holorensaw: *The Levellers and the English Revolution*. London 1939, p. 20 a. p. 31

37) P. A. Kropotkin, *The French Revolution*. New York 1927, p. 111.

social state that had no class divisions and no property relations and in which a real communal spirit could exist.³⁸⁾

It was of no importance that the call for a return to a more rudimentary way of life was not realizable. Rousseau himself did not really believe in such a possibility, but he was convinced of the moral value of the idea and of its great emotional power. It was an awkward attempt to think beyond the limited program of the bourgeois revolution, an attempt to bring the social element into a revolutionary movement that ideologically had no more to offer than the findings of the natural scientists. The bourgeois thinkers simply assumed that what was good for the individual property owner was automatically good for everybody. Being empiricists in the sphere of natural science, they were metaphysicians in the sphere of society. Their social views were mere speculations, untested and unconfirmed. Rousseau, too, was not able to develop a science of society equal to that of the science of nature. He had merely a distorted "dream" of what should only much later become a reality.

Apparently Rousseau simultaneously nourished two contradictory ideas. On the one hand he favored the return to a primitive communal spirit and organization; on the other he proposed the *Contrat Social*, a theory of society that demanded the subordination of the individual to the "will of the people," the "general will," which was only another name for the state, and was, in fact, conceived in an attempt to reform the General Council of Geneva. Latter this idea was taken up in an elaborated form by the German philosopher, Fichte. The mystical state or the "will of the people" could in reality be no more than the ordinary bourgeois state as advocated by Locke. However, it was precisely the vague and idealistic concept of the state that best served the ideological needs of the bourgeois revolution. It was his inconsistency and the contradictory character of his ideas that made Rousseau the prophet of the revolution. He could be admired by all revolutionary groups, the bourgeoisie proper, the democratic lower middle class of property owners as represented by Thomas Paine and Robespierre, and by the mass of the disinherited who were destined to become the industrial proletariat.

In Germany, the situation was somewhat similar to that in France. There were also, however, important differences. The Reformation as represented by Martin Luther had been a movement of the middle class for secular against ecclesiastical authority, for the development of a social order

38) "In his praise of the state of nature," writes Gunnar Landtman (*The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes*, p. 4), "Rousseau was not so very wrong, although he mainly constructed his views out of his own mind. Not entirely so, however, for in *Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inegalite parmi les Hommes*, for instance, he to some slight extent follows the same method as modern sociologists in trying to corroborate his ideas regarding primitive stages by references to existing savage tribes. For this purpose he even makes use of a few books describing native tribes which are still quoted in modern sociological works"

beneficial to the petty bourgeoisie. The power of the Catholic Church had largely been broken. But the peasant risings and the Thirty Years War had sapped the strength of the peasants, impoverished the middle class, and slowed up commerce and industry. The Peace of Westphalia hindered territorial unification and the political and economic centralization needed for capitalist development. Only with the rise of the Prussian state was the basis for a capitalist development laid. Of course, the expansionist policy of the centralized military-bureaucratic Prussia of Friedrich Wilhelm I and his heirs was undertaken, first of all in the interest of the ruling house and its supporting feudal caste. Yet the Prussian state was the necessary prerequisite for the capitalist Germany to come. Unable to compete economically with the stronger European powers, the Prussian state relied on military-political means to secure its existence and its further development. Within this Prussian setting it was quite difficult to think in the terms of the English bourgeoisie or in those of the French revolutionists.

Germany was still further removed from the conditions existing in England than from those in France. Her thinkers of the Enlightenment found it more enlightening to learn from the French than from the English. And although French thought could not really be distinguished from English science and philosophy, the French version of that science and philosophy appealed more to the philosophical needs of the German bourgeoisie. Not immediately in need of that naturalistic mechanical materialism which was so important to capitalism and to the French revolution, German philosophy was more interested in the idealistic and theological problems connected with the new philosophy. Leibniz tried to find a bridge between the older teleological conceptions of nature and mind and the Cartesian dualism, in order to establish a new harmony between reason and faith. He agreed with Hume that general principles could not be proved empirically, but he maintained that pure reason is more important and more comprehensive than mere sense perceptions, the latter being only a limited form of reason. Kant went one step further. He thought that Leibniz merely read intellect into the senses as against the English empiricists, who turned reason into sense perception. Instead of identifying the one with the other, he tried to combine rationalism and empiricism. He was at once ready to accept as limits of scientific investigation the Newtonian methods of mathematical physics, and to hold with Hume that science cannot deal with ultimate reality. He pointed out, however, that the empiricists were not able to show that sense experience also furnishes the means and ways by which the empirical material is organized. Reason was the organizer. Our knowledge, though unable, Kant insisted, to comprehend ultimate reality, was more than mere knowledge of particulars perceived through the senses. To reach general laws from sense experience presupposes independently established rational principles.

For Kant the objective world is produced by the subject, not by the individual, but by mankind. Things are knowable insofar as they enter into

the forms of human thought and intuition, but things change their character in the very process of becoming comprehended. The truth we know is the truth for man. Understanding, Kant said, "does not derive its laws from nature, but rather imposes them upon nature." The matter with which thought deals is furnished by the outside world. The form of knowledge, however, is furnished by the subject. Kant's reasoning, to repeat, did not refute any of the important principles of Hume; he tried to overcome their limitations. If Hume thought that causality is the product of mere association and habit, Kant maintained that it is the work of man, the result of his reasoning. It is thought and not mere sense that bring coherence into the phenomenal world. He objected to Hume's skepticism because he thought it prevented man's self-determination through his rational will. "If reason in man is made to serve the same ends which instinct serves in animals," he said, "it can do nothing to lift its possessors above the merely animal state." From such a position, he felt, no answer can be given to the question as to what one should do and what one may hope for. He insisted that although there can be no final truth, there was still to be gained the truth relative to man.

Dissatisfaction with the narrow naturalistic materialism at the base of English philosophy, great concern for social problems and the inability to find a connection between science, philosophy and society forced Kant into his idealistic position as it had forced Rousseau into Romanticism. Kant greatly admired not only English science but also the French Revolution and particularly Rousseau. He favored the capitalist mode of production and the ideological forces connected therewith. The economic principles hidden behind Hume's philosophy also furnished the background for Kant's reasoning. But reason had not yet installed the new capitalist reality in Germany; it could not abdicate before it was incorporated into the social organization. Reason could thus not be a passive acceptance of the conditioned world of experience, but had to serve as an active instrument for molding the world to the new needs of man. To satisfy the active needs of man for shaping the world to his new values, one had, if necessary, to proceed against all experience. As regards nature, Kant said, "experience gives us rules ready to hand; here experience is the fountain of truth." In regard to moral law, however, "experience is the mother of illusions, and it is extremely undesirable to derive the norm of what I ought to do from that which actually is done or to let this fetter my action in any way."

The *Age of Reason* which in England was already an age of capitalist industry and in France an age of revolution was, at the same time, in Germany a mere belief in man's capacity to alter his own situation. It was the ideological adaptation to conditions existing elsewhere and thus a mental preparation for the changes due in Germany proper. It was the recognition that institutions are not fixed by nature or God, but that they can be formed according to the will and reason of man. By turning the ultimate meaning of the world into a moral meaning, Kant emancipated the moral will, or the

practical reason of man, from a world conceived in static terms. Whereas in England the bourgeoisie was already thinking in strictly utilitarian terms, that is, was conceiving the well-being of the *citizens* as the supreme end, Kant's Germany was still too far removed from the capitalist reality to share the utilitarian principles whole-heartedly. Her *citizens*, i. e. the bourgeoisie, not as yet *citizens* in the English sense, demanded first of all justice for themselves. For Kant the supreme end one had to strive for was justice, not well-being. Reason was transformed into a principle of morality, because at this stage of development reform not revolution was deemed possible and desirable. Behind Kant's dualism of scientific and moral knowledge was the dualism of the evolving capitalist society that needed a concrete science and an abstract morality, because it needed industry and profits as well as an ideology that changed specific capitalistic needs into general moral principles.

The same German situation that did not prevent the ideological acceptance of the principles of the French Revolution, but prevented their realization by direct revolutionary means and thus transformed into idealistic general principles of self-determination and free will what was only the materially and specifically motivated will of the French bourgeoisie — this situation determined also the idealism of Hegel, the successor of Kant.

(This article will be continued in the next issue with a discussion of Hegelianism and Marxism, the history of the dialectical theory since Marx, and the present status of Marxism with regard to modern science and philosophy.)

BOOK REVIEWS:

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NAZI ECONOMY. Harvard Studies in Monopoly and Competition. By Maxine Y. Sweezy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1941. (225 pp.; \$3.00)

THE SOCIAL POLICY OF NAZI GERMANY. By C. W. Guillebaud. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1941. (134 pp.; \$1.00)

Miss Sweezy's study, "the product of several years' research in German statistical documents, National Socialist writings, and foreign secondary sources," is one of the best so far published on Nazi-Germany. It is not possible to deal with all the details that give the work its importance; only its general ideas can be considered here. And these ideas, well fortified with empirical data, come the nearest to presenting the fascist reality.

The book starts with a short review of the pre-Hitler situation in Germany. The Nazis took over a crisis-ridden economy and were temporarily able to solve the most urgent social problems. The secret of Hitler's "successes," as well as "the clue to the significance of the changes wrought in the economic sphere," Miss Sweezy finds in "the total coordination of Germany's entire manpower and natural resources . . . for

warlike enterprise." With Veblen she regards this as the "logical outcome" of the system of business enterprise. Not only in Germany, but generally, "the period in which business could entirely dominate government and the period in which business was largely independent" is now gone. She does not fail to indicate that the German scene is part and parcel of the capitalist world situation as, for instance, when she points out that "state invasion in the economic sphere could go so far in 1933 because the program of the politically victorious Nazis met with demands arising from the long-conditioned depression and the almost colonial subservience of the German economy to foreign control."

The book describes the relationship between business and government in great detail. It makes clear "that private property and state regulation are not opposed to each other if the ruling power has interests identical with those of the owning part of the community, or if the ruling power is the owning group." She shows that thus far the Nazis "transformed the already highly organized entrepreneurial economy only in so far as was imperative to consolidate the political power of the party." Neither the structure of the Nazi economy, nor the measures employed, differ in any radical manner from long-known practices, nor from the previous structure of capitalism.

Miss Sweezy deals especially well with the Nazi attempt to solve the unemployment question by way of a levelling process, public works, and armaments. She also points out the limitations inherent in such practices and the drives to solve by imperialistic means what cannot be solved in ordinary ways. Her material is of the greatest interest as are her observations in regard to questions such as transportation, corporations, investments, and social politics. Especially important are the chapters on the German cartel system, developed during the last war, and its present role in the Nazi scheme of things. The price policy

of the Nazis she considers a "remarkable achievement unique to economic history since the industrial revolution." But most interesting of all are the sections that deal with the regimentation and conscription of labor, with newly developed institutions such as the Labor Front and its various activities, and with the German social policy in general.

The author points out that "National Socialists recognized that destruction of labor unions might strengthen radicalism among the workers and that it would be necessary to run these energies into channels useful to the dictatorship." The new institutions and the social legislation serve the Nazis first of all. If questions of income, consumption and social welfare are considered, it becomes clear that the German "trust" is run for the Nazis and the owning classes. Although the living standard of the workers has not been reduced below the depression level; they have not profited by the increased economic activity and its greater productivity. The most striking change in the structure of the national income is the increased share going to property and the decreased share represented by earned income. Consumption has been limited in favor of capital investments. The new industrialists of Germany as Miss Sweezy sums them up "are Nazi party members, and their competitors — other business interests at home and abroad — are at an extreme disadvantage." The Nazi owning-class "still exercises one function — the receiving and accumulation of profits."

Mr. Guillebaud's book deals with the German social policy at greater length. He, too, demonstrates an ability to look objectively at the Nazi scene. His treatment, however, of the Nazi social policy becomes at times more positive than is really warranted. The reason for this may be found in the discrepancy between theory and practice. All that Mr. Guillebaud brings forth exists no doubt on paper, but what it really means in actual terms he fails to

demonstrate. Nevertheless he is right in pointing out that it is wrong to assume that the German masses "have entered a stage of peonage, the like of which has not been seen in the countries of Western Europe for centuries." People who hold such assumptions, he says, not only fool themselves, but "lay themselves open to the counter-charge that the same statement could be applied to the British worker in July 1940."

Although Mr. Guillebaud is inclined to look too positively at the Nazi practices in the social sphere, and particularly in regard to the capital-labor relations, he admits that the "progress" undoubtedly made in Germany came to a sudden end with the outbreak of the war. Yet, the

war cannot be divorced from either the general policy, or from the specific social policy of the Nazis. The war itself shows that all "progress" in capitalistic social policy is bound to turn against the workers and even against their very lives. The book is to be recommended nevertheless because it helps one to understand why Hitler could count, and still can count, on a large mass support. The "liberty" that individuals and organizations lost had ceased to mean very much within the general crisis conditions. Even that miserable form of "security" which, for a time, the Nazis were able to provide, weighted more heavily than the liberalistic ideology for which there was no longer any basis.

P. M.

FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN WORLD SOCIETY. By Linden A. Mander., Stanford University Press (910 pp. \$4.25)

Professor Mander's book deals with the need for a world organization of society. It is evident, Mander writes, "that nations as isolated units of government are unable any longer to perform their tasks as sovereign independent entities except at ruinous costs." Nor are the existing systems of government adequate for the purposes of the present world. International government has become a necessity.

Mander describes at length the previous attempts at international organization which had been restricted to such apparently non-political phases of social life as health, crime prevention, communication, legal rights, and collaboration on intellectual and religious issues. In the course of his exposition it becomes evident, however, that these everyday problems of human welfare are entirely dependent upon political and economic world relations.

In the economic sphere Mander's attention centers on monetary issues, loan, investment, tariff, and banking policies. He tends to believe that "financial stability cannot be attained as long as excessive tariff bar-

riers and other economic rigidities remain," and he expects that the international authority he envisions will assume control over more than just the financial aspects of the economic life. The added controls would make the international authority vastly different from that of the League of Nations. How much control the new authority should assume, Mander does not state, but without committing himself he quotes Condliffe, who has expressed the fear that the envisioned world state might "look very much like a totalitarian world-state." However, Mander would like to utilize the existing international organizations such as the diverse trade and commercial associations and the International Labor Office for the purposes of the coming world order.

Although Mander sees clearly that "national and international economics are different aspects of the same reality," he does not see that the difficulties facing an international economy are caused not so much by a lack of organization and an unwillingness to bring it about as by the peculiar character and structure of the existing class society. All he

can answer those "who believe that apart from the problem of war no satisfactory relation can be worked out between capital and labor, between government and industry, and between the individual and the community," and those who hold with the Marxists that society "cannot be regulated under a capitalist system," is to point optimistically to the now passe "Scandinavian Middle-Way," which was merely a by-product of the general European preparations for the present war. However, Mander recognizes the need for a solution of the problems presented by the social relations to achieve an efficient international organization.

In great detail Mander describes the various attempts to achieve national security. His work becomes here a very useful handbook for the student of international affairs. It deals with almost everything one needs to know about the actual and the proposed systems of collective security; the principles and problems connected therewith; the different agreements reached and broken; the ambiguities of neutrality, the meaning of the balance-of-power policy; questions of federation, armaments and disarmament, and so forth. It gives the history of regional organizations for political, economic, and military purposes such as the Little Entente, the Balkan Conference, the Scandinavian Co-operation, the Monroe doctrine, and all the other aspects of bloc politics up to the recently discussed proposals for a European Federation. All these questions are dealt with in connection with the specific problems of the great powers, their relations one with another and with the world at large.

Especially interesting are Mander's chapters on the future of nationalism, minority problems, colonial and mandate policies in connection with the war and the various post-

war plans. It seems evident to Mander that no problem can really be solved short of a fundamental reconstruction of the world system that leaves a single authority in control; or the creation of a world system that arbitrates its frictions and is ready to offer its problems to the judgement of the international authority. Nations will have to recognize the new situation, Mander believes, for "modern war has revealed that the sovereign state is an inefficient instrument for achieving national security." To resurrect the smaller nations overrun in the course of the war he holds to be futile. Also the great powers "will bankrupt and ruin themselves if they continue to try to solve the problems of war by their independent sovereign efforts." Even continental security, Mander concludes, "must be part and parcel of the larger world security; it cannot be attained by continental exclusiveness."

Mander's own ideas about the post-war world ask for more than a British-American power monopoly. He hopes that the other allied nations will participate in it in some measure, so that the period of world rule may only be a transition to world understanding. He does not advocate Germany's destruction, but wants to disarm and control her to give her that Reason which, presumably, and in the not too far future, may also induce the victorious nations to abdicate from their power position and to give up their privileges in favor of peace, justice, and a better life for all. He recognized that his suggestions to this end are no more than a mere hope, but his particular bias does not allow him to wish for more than that the men fighting for the cause of the Allies may be able both to "maintain the fight and yet keep a clear vision of the greater values at stake."

M.

THE NATURE OF MODERN WARFARE. By Cyril Falls. Methuen & Co., London 1941

The author discovers that modern total war is a reversion to the most primitive conception of warfare and differs from tribal war "only" in that it is practiced between nations in a highly developed material civilization. Yet he does not extend the adjective "retrogressive" to the "nation-wide effort" which total war demands nor to the "profound interference with social life" which is represented, among other things, by the "rigid limitation of the output of corsets and silk stockings." He finds his greatest comfort in the old Clausewitzian wisdom that "war is never likely to be as absolute in practice as in theory." He thinks that even at the time of his writing (January to March, 1941) "the logic of total war has been carried to the point of absurdity because it has become too perfect." Thus we can hope that "when peace comes again the people will realize that war has now become . . . a veritable negation of organized life, that is, death."

With that pious hope the author concludes the first chapter which deals with the totalitarian aspects of war. He does not show that he is aware of the revolutionary impact of the present total war on all previous concepts. He comes nearest to it when he complains of the decline of "the noble profession of arms"

by which the professional soldier has come to be regarded by his new masters as a mere tool, "of no more practical utility than the propagandist or the thug who does his dirty work." He shows in his second chapter that he has learned since the days before Dunkirk to appreciate somewhat better the decisive importance of those technical changes that have recently revolutionized the practice of modern warfare — changes that go by the general name of "mechanization." Yet even this modest level of awareness of new developments is not maintained in subsequent chapters.

The book as a whole should be studied less for its contribution to the theory of the present war than for its particularly British flavor. What the author says on page 17 in regard to the use of parachute troops might be said of all the striking innovations of modern totalitarian warfare. Even if they had been used by the English, "our methods would have had little in common with those which have recently been seen, because our minds do not move within the orbit of total war." This is, to apply a favorite phrase of the author, the real "predicament" to which the totalitarian war has brought the ruling classes of the British Empire today.

l. h.

CHALLENGE TO KARL MARX. By John Kenneth Turner. Reynal & Hitchcock. New York. (445pp.; \$3.50)

Despite his conviction that the "so-called 'crisis of capitalism' did not come about in the way and from the causes named by Marx," Mr. Turner thinks Marx's influence is still important enough to make an "accurate estimate" of his ideas more useful than ever. His estimate is summed up in the statement that Marx's "supreme conclusion"—the end of capitalism and the victory of the proletariat—proved to be false. Marx's most widely recognized mistake, he says, is the idea of the polarization of society into workers and capital-

ists in the wake of the concentration and centralization of capital accompanying its accumulation process. Marx wrongly thought that this process would cause the rates of profit to decline and thus lead to a sharpening of the social conflict, the development of class consciousness and, finally, to a revolution and a new society. This whole development Marx tried to explain with his labor theory of value which, in turn, was based on and supported by the evolution theories (Hegel and Darwin) current at Marx's time. The Marxian

dialectic, the idea of the inevitability of progress, is at the bottom of the whole Marxian thought. Marx's value and surplus value theory say the same things in economic terms. As this philosophy is a mere myth, all propositions stemming from it remain unrealistic.

From this position it should have been enough for Turner to refute Marx's philosophy. It is therefore difficult to see why he follows in such great detail all the wrong ideas flowing from Marx's mythical source, and why he attempts to oppose them with the acts of history. Turner admits, however, that "the item on which Marx was least wrong was the accumulation of capital," only it did not simplify the class issue in the way Marx thought it would. But it is possible to quote from official and unofficial sources more convincing facts in favor of Marx's predictions than Turner is able to muster against them. The "persistency of the middle classes", of which Turner speaks, is, after all, only the defence of an ideological idiosyncrasy the more indulged in, the more its believers become proletarianized. "The infrequencies of crisis", which Turner holds against Marx, is just another expression for the relatively diminishing expansion of capital, that is, for more permanent crisis conditions. And if Turner hopes that, in spite of what Marx has said, the concentration of capital may soon be arrested because it leads to inefficiency in large-scale enterprises, this hope is based on no more than the mistaken assumption that concentration and centralization of capital and bigness of enterprise are the same.

Turner speaks of a "Marxian law of wages which permits of no general rise in living standards," and he believes that this non-existing Marxian wage law is "essential to the whole Marxian scheme of social progression leading to the destruction of capital." He thinks that Marx conceived price and value as identical quantities, and repeats the argument of the so-called "great contradiction" between the first and third volumes of *Capital* where Marx, in explaining the average rate of profit, supposedly aban-

doned "his proposition that the prices of individual commodities are fixed by labor time." But Marx could not identify price and value, as may be seen by the mere consideration that the law of value asserts itself for Marx by way of crisis and collapse. For Turner it is not a fact but just a "Marxian law" that there is a "progressive increase in constant capital in proportion to variable." Thus he does not accept the law of the falling rate of profit since Marx, he says, "cannot be correct both in his law of the falling rate of profit and his law of accumulation in a constantly growing progression." Either process would exclude the other. But he forgets that Marx did not believe in a constantly growing progression of capital expansion but in crises, stagnation, and collapse, and that the law of the falling rate of profit must be conceived in connection with the limited possibilities of and the unlimited need for exploitation that accompany capitalist development.

For Marx, Turner states, the market and competition were only modifying factors for capital development. For him they are the determining factors. He thinks, nevertheless, that Marx employs the "buying-back" argument of the overproduction theorists who restrict themselves to problems of distribution. If Marx shares their views, he must share also Turner's position that the market and competition are the determining economic factors. Yet this is not the case as Turner insists. There is, however, little need for pointing out additional inconsistencies in Turner's reasoning, because the whole economic argumentation seems to him to be of small importance. He believes that the social problem is a political and thus a psychological one. His positive suggestions restrict themselves to a "great educational crusade against an adulterated democracy on behalf of the genuine article." He feels that we "have solved all our pressing problems except that of our social relations," and that this latter may also be solved through a greater application of reason in the advancement of existing democracy.

Luenika